Files
warmbly/internal/app/token/verify.go
T

92 lines
2.6 KiB
Go

package token
import (
"context"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/warmbly/warmbly/internal/errx"
"github.com/warmbly/warmbly/internal/models"
)
func (s *tokenService) GetSession(ctx context.Context, sessionID uuid.UUID) (*models.Session, *errx.Error) {
sess, err := s.getSession(ctx, sessionID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if sess != nil {
return sess, nil
}
sess, err = s.tokenRepository.GetSession(ctx, sessionID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Best effort: the session is already resolved, and failing to cache it
// only costs the next request a database read. Returning the error here
// meant a Redis write that was refused, on quota or anything else, failed
// every authenticated request with a 500.
_ = s.saveSession(ctx, sess, SessionTTL)
return sess, nil
}
func sameTokenIssueTime(a, b time.Time) bool {
// JWT issued-at precision can differ from DB timestamp precision.
// Compare at second precision to avoid false mismatches.
return a.UTC().Truncate(time.Second).Equal(b.UTC().Truncate(time.Second))
}
func (s *tokenService) ValidateAccessToken(ctx context.Context, accessToken string) (*models.Session, *errx.Error) {
t, err := s.VerifyTokenFor(PurposeAccess, accessToken)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if t.ExpiresAt.Before(time.Now()) {
return nil, errx.ErrToken
}
session, err := s.GetSession(ctx, t.SessionID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// A revoked session is dead immediately. Revocation busts the Redis cache,
// so the next read here re-loads the row with revoked_at set and the token
// stops working without waiting for the cache TTL or a refresh.
if session.RevokedAt != nil {
return nil, errx.ErrToken
}
if session.AccessNonce != t.Nonce || !sameTokenIssueTime(session.LastRefreshedAt, t.IssuedAt.Time) {
return nil, errx.ErrToken
}
return session, nil
}
// VerifyTokenFor is VerifyToken plus the check that the token was minted for
// this flow.
//
// A token with no purpose is treated as an access token: tokens issued before
// the claim existed are still inside their 12-hour window during a deploy, and
// refusing them would sign everybody out. Every other flow demands its purpose
// explicitly, so that leniency cannot be used to spend a reset or challenge
// token as a session.
func (s *tokenService) VerifyTokenFor(purpose, tokenStr string) (*TokenClaims, *errx.Error) {
claims, err := s.VerifyToken(tokenStr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
got := claims.Purpose
if got == "" {
got = PurposeAccess
}
if got != purpose {
return nil, errx.ErrToken
}
return claims, nil
}