Matthew Meszaros e668a2a36b feat: complete the ADA CASA v2.1.1 AL1 control set across authentication, sessions, access control, cryptography, input validation and configuration, adding a breached-password denylist and per-account login throttling, enforced multi-factor authentication on the admin panel, step-up confirmation before an action that mints a lasting credential, purpose-scoped session tokens, single-use TOTP steps, tenant verification on every cross-referenced identifier, security headers on every surface, encrypted webhook signing secrets, per-organization idempotency, PKCE and a minimal two-scope Gmail consent on the mailbox OAuth flow, bounded spreadsheet and archive decoding, a patched Go toolchain with govulncheck in CI, and the evidence pack under compliance/casa

2026-09-19 08:18:35 +02:00

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boot.go

feat: address the CodeRabbit review: render EMAIL_BRAND_NAME in every transactional template body and subject instead of a hardcoded product name, name FRONTEND_BASE_URL as the source when emailed links come from it, warn on an insecure effective dashboard URL even when APP_URL was inferred rather than configured, and correct the unsubscribe guide's claim that an unset API_PUBLIC_URL disables link minting

2026-09-09 06:52:37 -07:00

envsample

feat: complete the ADA CASA v2.1.1 AL1 control set across authentication, sessions, access control, cryptography, input validation and configuration, adding a breached-password denylist and per-account login throttling, enforced multi-factor authentication on the admin panel, step-up confirmation before an action that mints a lasting credential, purpose-scoped session tokens, single-use TOTP steps, tenant verification on every cross-referenced identifier, security headers on every surface, encrypted webhook signing secrets, per-organization idempotency, PKCE and a minimal two-scope Gmail consent on the mailbox OAuth flow, bounded spreadsheet and archive decoding, a patched Go toolchain with govulncheck in CI, and the evidence pack under compliance/casa

2026-09-19 08:18:35 +02:00

main.go

feat: complete the ADA CASA v2.1.1 AL1 control set across authentication, sessions, access control, cryptography, input validation and configuration, adding a breached-password denylist and per-account login throttling, enforced multi-factor authentication on the admin panel, step-up confirmation before an action that mints a lasting credential, purpose-scoped session tokens, single-use TOTP steps, tenant verification on every cross-referenced identifier, security headers on every surface, encrypted webhook signing secrets, per-organization idempotency, PKCE and a minimal two-scope Gmail consent on the mailbox OAuth flow, bounded spreadsheet and archive decoding, a patched Go toolchain with govulncheck in CI, and the evidence pack under compliance/casa

2026-09-19 08:18:35 +02:00

oauth_base_url_test.go

feat: build the Gmail and Outlook mailbox-connect redirect_uri from API_PUBLIC_URL instead of API_HOST, which is the listener's bind address and stays 0.0.0.0:8080 in a container, so every self-hosted OAuth connect sent Google and Microsoft a redirect_uri that is not even an absolute URI and was rejected with invalid_request before the account picker appeared, adding an oauthPublicBaseURL helper next to the existing oidcRedirectURL that reads the same already-documented variable and falls back to a browsable http://localhost:PORT derived from the bind address (mapping the 0.0.0.0, :: and bare-port wildcard forms to localhost, and passing through a value that is already a URL) so a stock local install emits exactly the http://localhost:8080/addresses/google/callback the guide tells operators to register, plus a test pinning the resolution order and the root-registered callback path, and a deployment-guide note naming API_PUBLIC_URL as the variable that has to match the registered URI (#116)

2026-08-16 07:45:54 +02:00

sso_redirect_test.go

feat: build the browser half of social sign-in, which was never wired: GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID was read at boot and made the login screen render a Google button, but the button opened a popup at /auth/google/login which no route served, and authService.GoogleAuth/AppleAuth had no caller anywhere in the codebase; internal/app/socialauth now runs Google and Apple through the flow generic OIDC already used (one-time state, PKCE, nonce, id_token verified against the provider JWKS, identity keyed on issuer and subject, JIT provisioning, the ban and 2FA gates), the redirect URI defaults to API_PUBLIC_URL/v1/auth/<provider>/callback and is logged at boot because registering the dashboard origin instead is the mistake that produces a valid OAuth client and a dead button, /auth/config advertises only providers the backend can actually complete, the SSO landing page no longer swallows a two_fa_required response, and OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME finally reaches the button it documents

2026-08-28 01:33:08 -07:00