warmbly

cache.go

feat: make self-hosted auth work without a mail relay by rewriting the platform SMTP transport with real AUTH and TLS (it did neither, so SMTP_USERNAME/SMTP_PASSWORD were dead and every documented relay was unreachable), adding MAIL_TRANSPORT=smtp|log|ses with a log transport that prints codes so a fresh install can sign in with no relay, demoting the emailed login code to AUTH_LOGIN_CODE=always|new_device|off (off on self-host, per NIST SP 800-63B and OWASP ASVS), claiming the first owner through a single-use setup link or WARMBLY_BOOTSTRAP_* instead of register-then-psql, deriving every emailed URL from APP_URL rather than a hardcoded app.warmbly.com that leaked live reset tokens to the vendor, fixing the confirm hooks that read path params against paramless routes and broke login, register and reset confirmation in the dashboard everywhere, adding generic OIDC with PKCE, one-time state, verified nonce and (issuer,subject) identity binding, enforcing 2FA on the social paths that skipped it, adding a per-IP limiter and trusted-proxy handling to the unthrottled auth group, refusing boot on the published default secrets, and dropping mailpit from the default stack (#99 )

2026-08-14 14:57:09 +02:00

config.go

feat: make self-hosted auth work without a mail relay by rewriting the platform SMTP transport with real AUTH and TLS (it did neither, so SMTP_USERNAME/SMTP_PASSWORD were dead and every documented relay was unreachable), adding MAIL_TRANSPORT=smtp|log|ses with a log transport that prints codes so a fresh install can sign in with no relay, demoting the emailed login code to AUTH_LOGIN_CODE=always|new_device|off (off on self-host, per NIST SP 800-63B and OWASP ASVS), claiming the first owner through a single-use setup link or WARMBLY_BOOTSTRAP_* instead of register-then-psql, deriving every emailed URL from APP_URL rather than a hardcoded app.warmbly.com that leaked live reset tokens to the vendor, fixing the confirm hooks that read path params against paramless routes and broke login, register and reset confirmation in the dashboard everywhere, adding generic OIDC with PKCE, one-time state, verified nonce and (issuer,subject) identity binding, enforcing 2FA on the social paths that skipped it, adding a per-IP limiter and trusted-proxy handling to the unthrottled auth group, refusing boot on the published default secrets, and dropping mailpit from the default stack (#99 )

2026-08-14 14:57:09 +02:00

email.go

feat: bound auth login network waits

2026-06-01 16:56:24 +02:00

external_idtoken.go

feat: make self-hosted onboarding survivable by fixing invite_only, which could not onboard anyone (the accept route is JWT-only, so redeeming the invitation that would create your account required already having one, making the self-host default silently identical to fully closed), threading the invitation token through registration so an invited person lands in the inviting organization instead of a stray workspace, gating SSO just-in-time provisioning behind DISABLE_REGISTRATION (it bypassed the gate entirely, so an instance set to true was still open to anyone the IdP would assert) with SSO_AUTO_PROVISION as the opt-out, correcting the OIDC redirect URL that pointed at /api/v1 against a route at /v1 and 404'd every SSO login, scoping the first-launch exemption so it no longer overrides an explicit lockdown, preserving the remaining TTL when restoring a losing setup token so a public endpoint cannot hold the claim window open forever, replacing a generic 403 with typed registration_invite_only, registration_closed, invitation_invalid, setup_token_invalid and setup_already_complete codes that name the next step, logging why no claim link was issued on an already-claimed instance instead of staying silent, adding a warmblyctl operator CLI (status with health checks and a non-zero exit, reissuable setup-link, user create/list/reset-password/grant-admin/revoke-admin/disable-2fa, hash-password) so a locked-out operator no longer needs hand-written psql, adding read-only instance configuration over 104 environment variables with structural secret redaction and fingerprints, 35 health checks, a database-backed settings tier for the three keys no environment variable owns, hiding the signup form when the config already says invite_only rather than failing the whole form with a toast, and documenting first run, accounts and access, configuration, instance health and troubleshooting alongside the root .env.example the README told operators to write but never shipped (#114 )

2026-08-16 05:58:11 +02:00

gen.go

New Repository: Add Backend Code

2026-01-17 14:11:14 +00:00

login_risk_test.go

feat: record the verdict that issued the login challenge instead of re-judging at confirm, and stop a mailbox in no warmup pool reading as healthy: the emailed code is confirmed by a second request that can carry a different address and sees history the first one did not, so re-assessing there could file a challenged sign-in as clean and drop it from the repeat count that reaches the workspace posture; the verdict now travels in the login session and every completion path takes it, while ListLifecycleCandidates returns a NULL health as unknown so leaving the pool is no longer evidence of recovery and a resting mailbox neither resumes nor accrues probation on it

2026-08-28 12:20:11 -07:00

login_risk.go

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into fix/issue-241

2026-08-28 23:06:07 -07:00

login.go

feat: record the verdict that issued the login challenge instead of re-judging at confirm, and stop a mailbox in no warmup pool reading as healthy: the emailed code is confirmed by a second request that can carry a different address and sees history the first one did not, so re-assessing there could file a challenged sign-in as clean and drop it from the repeat count that reaches the workspace posture; the verdict now travels in the login session and every completion path takes it, while ListLifecycleCandidates returns a NULL health as unknown so leaving the pool is no longer evidence of recovery and a resting mailbox neither resumes nor accrues probation on it

2026-08-28 12:20:11 -07:00

model.go

feat: make self-hosted onboarding survivable by fixing invite_only, which could not onboard anyone (the accept route is JWT-only, so redeeming the invitation that would create your account required already having one, making the self-host default silently identical to fully closed), threading the invitation token through registration so an invited person lands in the inviting organization instead of a stray workspace, gating SSO just-in-time provisioning behind DISABLE_REGISTRATION (it bypassed the gate entirely, so an instance set to true was still open to anyone the IdP would assert) with SSO_AUTO_PROVISION as the opt-out, correcting the OIDC redirect URL that pointed at /api/v1 against a route at /v1 and 404'd every SSO login, scoping the first-launch exemption so it no longer overrides an explicit lockdown, preserving the remaining TTL when restoring a losing setup token so a public endpoint cannot hold the claim window open forever, replacing a generic 403 with typed registration_invite_only, registration_closed, invitation_invalid, setup_token_invalid and setup_already_complete codes that name the next step, logging why no claim link was issued on an already-claimed instance instead of staying silent, adding a warmblyctl operator CLI (status with health checks and a non-zero exit, reissuable setup-link, user create/list/reset-password/grant-admin/revoke-admin/disable-2fa, hash-password) so a locked-out operator no longer needs hand-written psql, adding read-only instance configuration over 104 environment variables with structural secret redaction and fingerprints, 35 health checks, a database-backed settings tier for the three keys no environment variable owns, hiding the signup form when the config already says invite_only rather than failing the whole form with a toast, and documenting first run, accounts and access, configuration, instance health and troubleshooting alongside the root .env.example the README told operators to write but never shipped (#114 )

2026-08-16 05:58:11 +02:00

provision.go

feat: sign a new account in as part of registration: createAccount returns the user, both the verification-free and the code-confirm paths mint a session through finishLoginAs (2FA challenge included), /auth/register/confirm answers with that session instead of 204, and the dashboard drops into the workspace right after signing up instead of bouncing to the sign-in form

2026-08-29 08:41:34 -07:00

registration.go

feat: sign a new account in as part of registration: createAccount returns the user, both the verification-free and the code-confirm paths mint a session through finishLoginAs (2FA challenge included), /auth/register/confirm answers with that session instead of 204, and the dashboard drops into the workspace right after signing up instead of bouncing to the sign-in form

2026-08-29 08:41:34 -07:00

reset_password.go

feat: make self-hosted auth work without a mail relay by rewriting the platform SMTP transport with real AUTH and TLS (it did neither, so SMTP_USERNAME/SMTP_PASSWORD were dead and every documented relay was unreachable), adding MAIL_TRANSPORT=smtp|log|ses with a log transport that prints codes so a fresh install can sign in with no relay, demoting the emailed login code to AUTH_LOGIN_CODE=always|new_device|off (off on self-host, per NIST SP 800-63B and OWASP ASVS), claiming the first owner through a single-use setup link or WARMBLY_BOOTSTRAP_* instead of register-then-psql, deriving every emailed URL from APP_URL rather than a hardcoded app.warmbly.com that leaked live reset tokens to the vendor, fixing the confirm hooks that read path params against paramless routes and broke login, register and reset confirmation in the dashboard everywhere, adding generic OIDC with PKCE, one-time state, verified nonce and (issuer,subject) identity binding, enforcing 2FA on the social paths that skipped it, adding a per-IP limiter and trusted-proxy handling to the unthrottled auth group, refusing boot on the published default secrets, and dropping mailpit from the default stack (#99 )

2026-08-14 14:57:09 +02:00

service.go

feat: sign a new account in as part of registration: createAccount returns the user, both the verification-free and the code-confirm paths mint a session through finishLoginAs (2FA challenge included), /auth/register/confirm answers with that session instead of 204, and the dashboard drops into the workspace right after signing up instead of bouncing to the sign-in form

2026-08-29 08:41:34 -07:00

signup_origin_test.go

feat: sign a new account in as part of registration: createAccount returns the user, both the verification-free and the code-confirm paths mint a session through finishLoginAs (2FA challenge included), /auth/register/confirm answers with that session instead of 204, and the dashboard drops into the workspace right after signing up instead of bouncing to the sign-in form

2026-08-29 08:41:34 -07:00

sso_test.go

feat: bind a browser sign-in to the browser that started it, so a handoff link cannot be forwarded: one-time state proves the callback answers a request this server made, not one THIS browser made, so anyone could run the flow against their own Google or OIDC account and send the resulting URL to someone else, whose browser would then hold the sender's session (RFC 9700 4.7.1); begin now mints a binding secret that never reaches the provider and never appears in a URL, the callback carries it into the handoff, and the exchange refuses a collection that cannot present it with sso_wrong_browser, while the comments this PR added are condensed to the constraint they exist to state

2026-08-28 01:44:39 -07:00

sso.go

feat: bind a browser sign-in to the browser that started it, so a handoff link cannot be forwarded: one-time state proves the callback answers a request this server made, not one THIS browser made, so anyone could run the flow against their own Google or OIDC account and send the resulting URL to someone else, whose browser would then hold the sender's session (RFC 9700 4.7.1); begin now mints a binding secret that never reaches the provider and never appears in a URL, the callback carries it into the handoff, and the exchange refuses a collection that cannot present it with sso_wrong_browser, while the comments this PR added are condensed to the constraint they exist to state

2026-08-28 01:44:39 -07:00