Matthew Meszaros bf47984cd5 feat: cap every OAuth grant and API key at the delegating member's role (consent narrows scopes and reports the withheld ones, tokens re-check the member's current role at every gate and MCP tool, keys stay within their creator's permissions, mailboxes and IP allowlist), keep OAuth tokens off API key and OAuth app management, require a fresh sign-in to approve an app, revoke a grant whose refresh token is presented twice, count only unexpired grants as installs, seal app webhook secrets under the instance key, name the workspace and flag unverified apps on the consent screen, and let credential managers list and revoke every member's app authorizations

2026-10-04 02:59:10 -07:00

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boot.go

feat: address the CodeRabbit review: render EMAIL_BRAND_NAME in every transactional template body and subject instead of a hardcoded product name, name FRONTEND_BASE_URL as the source when emailed links come from it, warn on an insecure effective dashboard URL even when APP_URL was inferred rather than configured, and correct the unsubscribe guide's claim that an unset API_PUBLIC_URL disables link minting

2026-09-09 06:52:37 -07:00

envsample

feat: complete the ADA CASA v2.1.1 AL1 control set across authentication, sessions, access control, cryptography, input validation and configuration, adding a breached-password denylist and per-account login throttling, enforced multi-factor authentication on the admin panel, step-up confirmation before an action that mints a lasting credential, purpose-scoped session tokens, single-use TOTP steps, tenant verification on every cross-referenced identifier, security headers on every surface, encrypted webhook signing secrets, per-organization idempotency, PKCE and a minimal two-scope Gmail consent on the mailbox OAuth flow, bounded spreadsheet and archive decoding, a patched Go toolchain with govulncheck in CI, and the evidence pack under compliance/casa

2026-09-19 08:18:35 +02:00

main.go

feat: cap every OAuth grant and API key at the delegating member's role (consent narrows scopes and reports the withheld ones, tokens re-check the member's current role at every gate and MCP tool, keys stay within their creator's permissions, mailboxes and IP allowlist), keep OAuth tokens off API key and OAuth app management, require a fresh sign-in to approve an app, revoke a grant whose refresh token is presented twice, count only unexpired grants as installs, seal app webhook secrets under the instance key, name the workspace and flag unverified apps on the consent screen, and let credential managers list and revoke every member's app authorizations

2026-10-04 02:59:10 -07:00

oauth_base_url_test.go

feat: build the Gmail and Outlook mailbox-connect redirect_uri from API_PUBLIC_URL instead of API_HOST, which is the listener's bind address and stays 0.0.0.0:8080 in a container, so every self-hosted OAuth connect sent Google and Microsoft a redirect_uri that is not even an absolute URI and was rejected with invalid_request before the account picker appeared, adding an oauthPublicBaseURL helper next to the existing oidcRedirectURL that reads the same already-documented variable and falls back to a browsable http://localhost:PORT derived from the bind address (mapping the 0.0.0.0, :: and bare-port wildcard forms to localhost, and passing through a value that is already a URL) so a stock local install emits exactly the http://localhost:8080/addresses/google/callback the guide tells operators to register, plus a test pinning the resolution order and the root-registered callback path, and a deployment-guide note naming API_PUBLIC_URL as the variable that has to match the registered URI (#116)

2026-08-16 07:45:54 +02:00

sso_redirect_test.go

feat: build the browser half of social sign-in, which was never wired: GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID was read at boot and made the login screen render a Google button, but the button opened a popup at /auth/google/login which no route served, and authService.GoogleAuth/AppleAuth had no caller anywhere in the codebase; internal/app/socialauth now runs Google and Apple through the flow generic OIDC already used (one-time state, PKCE, nonce, id_token verified against the provider JWKS, identity keyed on issuer and subject, JIT provisioning, the ban and 2FA gates), the redirect URI defaults to API_PUBLIC_URL/v1/auth/<provider>/callback and is logged at boot because registering the dashboard origin instead is the mistake that produces a valid OAuth client and a dead button, /auth/config advertises only providers the backend can actually complete, the SSO landing page no longer swallows a two_fa_required response, and OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME finally reaches the button it documents

2026-08-28 01:33:08 -07:00