Matthew Meszaros cdf200191c feat: accept the API's origin in the mailbox OAuth callback listener so connecting Gmail or Outlook completes on a split-domain deployment, where the bridge page is served by the backend (deliberately, so the registered redirect_uri survives front-end changes) and therefore arrives with event.origin equal to API_URL while the dashboard only ever compared it against APP_URL, silently discarding every callback and leaving the connect modal on 'Waiting for authorization' forever even though the provider exchange had already succeeded, normalising both configured bases through URL.origin so a trailing slash no longer breaks the comparison either, and separately deriving the bridge's postMessage target origin from APP_URL when APP_ORIGIN is unset instead of falling back to a wildcard that posts the authorization code to whatever origin the opener happens to have, since compose never set APP_ORIGIN despite the configuration table claiming it was derived, with the app_origin_wildcard health check and both docs pages updated to match the narrower condition that now triggers it (#117)

2026-08-16 07:45:57 +02:00

..

handler

feat: accept the API's origin in the mailbox OAuth callback listener so connecting Gmail or Outlook completes on a split-domain deployment, where the bridge page is served by the backend (deliberately, so the registered redirect_uri survives front-end changes) and therefore arrives with event.origin equal to API_URL while the dashboard only ever compared it against APP_URL, silently discarding every callback and leaving the connect modal on 'Waiting for authorization' forever even though the provider exchange had already succeeded, normalising both configured bases through URL.origin so a trailing slash no longer breaks the comparison either, and separately deriving the bridge's postMessage target origin from APP_URL when APP_ORIGIN is unset instead of falling back to a wildcard that posts the authorization code to whatever origin the opener happens to have, since compose never set APP_ORIGIN despite the configuration table claiming it was derived, with the app_origin_wildcard health check and both docs pages updated to match the narrower condition that now triggers it (#117)

2026-08-16 07:45:57 +02:00

middleware

feat: make self-hosted auth work without a mail relay by rewriting the platform SMTP transport with real AUTH and TLS (it did neither, so SMTP_USERNAME/SMTP_PASSWORD were dead and every documented relay was unreachable), adding MAIL_TRANSPORT=smtp|log|ses with a log transport that prints codes so a fresh install can sign in with no relay, demoting the emailed login code to AUTH_LOGIN_CODE=always|new_device|off (off on self-host, per NIST SP 800-63B and OWASP ASVS), claiming the first owner through a single-use setup link or WARMBLY_BOOTSTRAP_* instead of register-then-psql, deriving every emailed URL from APP_URL rather than a hardcoded app.warmbly.com that leaked live reset tokens to the vendor, fixing the confirm hooks that read path params against paramless routes and broke login, register and reset confirmation in the dashboard everywhere, adding generic OIDC with PKCE, one-time state, verified nonce and (issuer,subject) identity binding, enforcing 2FA on the social paths that skipped it, adding a per-IP limiter and trusted-proxy handling to the unthrottled auth group, refusing boot on the published default secrets, and dropping mailpit from the default stack (#99)

2026-08-14 14:57:09 +02:00

cors.go

feat: move infrastructure state off dynamodb

2026-06-02 15:54:12 +02:00

routes.go

feat: make self-hosted onboarding survivable by fixing invite_only, which could not onboard anyone (the accept route is JWT-only, so redeeming the invitation that would create your account required already having one, making the self-host default silently identical to fully closed), threading the invitation token through registration so an invited person lands in the inviting organization instead of a stray workspace, gating SSO just-in-time provisioning behind DISABLE_REGISTRATION (it bypassed the gate entirely, so an instance set to true was still open to anyone the IdP would assert) with SSO_AUTO_PROVISION as the opt-out, correcting the OIDC redirect URL that pointed at /api/v1 against a route at /v1 and 404'd every SSO login, scoping the first-launch exemption so it no longer overrides an explicit lockdown, preserving the remaining TTL when restoring a losing setup token so a public endpoint cannot hold the claim window open forever, replacing a generic 403 with typed registration_invite_only, registration_closed, invitation_invalid, setup_token_invalid and setup_already_complete codes that name the next step, logging why no claim link was issued on an already-claimed instance instead of staying silent, adding a warmblyctl operator CLI (status with health checks and a non-zero exit, reissuable setup-link, user create/list/reset-password/grant-admin/revoke-admin/disable-2fa, hash-password) so a locked-out operator no longer needs hand-written psql, adding read-only instance configuration over 104 environment variables with structural secret redaction and fingerprints, 35 health checks, a database-backed settings tier for the three keys no environment variable owns, hiding the signup form when the config already says invite_only rather than failing the whole form with a toast, and documenting first run, accounts and access, configuration, instance health and troubleshooting alongside the root .env.example the README told operators to write but never shipped (#114)

2026-08-16 05:58:11 +02:00