Matthew Meszaros 9f7d45a1fb feat: charge every password, emailed-code and TOTP attempt atomically before comparing it (Redis INCR+expire script) with a per-account TOTP budget across challenges, put the signed-in password change on the reauth budget, set the per-account login limit to 50 per hour, give tester passwords an expiry (users.password_expires_at, migration 000257) and clear them plus every session on revoke, mint warmblyctl reset links with the password-reset purpose, expire fleet join tokens (7 days default, 30 max, reusable inside the window), derive captcha from the resolved Turnstile secret, refuse weak bootstrap argon2id hashes, make registration codes single-use, rate-limit the v1 invitation lookup, and draw RIDs and user codes without modulo bias

2026-10-04 02:52:22 -07:00

..

passwords

feat: complete the ADA CASA v2.1.1 AL1 control set across authentication, sessions, access control, cryptography, input validation and configuration, adding a breached-password denylist and per-account login throttling, enforced multi-factor authentication on the admin panel, step-up confirmation before an action that mints a lasting credential, purpose-scoped session tokens, single-use TOTP steps, tenant verification on every cross-referenced identifier, security headers on every surface, encrypted webhook signing secrets, per-organization idempotency, PKCE and a minimal two-scope Gmail consent on the mailbox OAuth flow, bounded spreadsheet and archive decoding, a patched Go toolchain with govulncheck in CI, and the evidence pack under compliance/casa

2026-09-19 08:18:35 +02:00

asymmetric_private.go

New Repository: Add Backend Code

2026-01-17 14:11:14 +00:00

asymmetric_public.go

New Repository: Add Backend Code

2026-01-17 14:11:14 +00:00

asymmetric_test.go

New Repository: Add Backend Code

2026-01-17 14:11:14 +00:00

asymmetric.go

New Repository: Add Backend Code

2026-01-17 14:11:14 +00:00

gen_test.go

New Repository: Add Backend Code

2026-01-17 14:11:14 +00:00

gen.go

feat: charge every password, emailed-code and TOTP attempt atomically before comparing it (Redis INCR+expire script) with a per-account TOTP budget across challenges, put the signed-in password change on the reauth budget, set the per-account login limit to 50 per hour, give tester passwords an expiry (users.password_expires_at, migration 000257) and clear them plus every session on revoke, mint warmblyctl reset links with the password-reset purpose, expire fleet join tokens (7 days default, 30 max, reusable inside the window), derive captcha from the resolved Turnstile secret, refuse weak bootstrap argon2id hashes, make registration codes single-use, rate-limit the v1 invitation lookup, and draw RIDs and user codes without modulo bias

2026-10-04 02:52:22 -07:00

hash_test.go

New Repository: Add Backend Code

2026-01-17 14:11:14 +00:00

hash.go

New Repository: Add Backend Code

2026-01-17 14:11:14 +00:00

password_error.go

feat: complete the ADA CASA v2.1.1 AL1 control set across authentication, sessions, access control, cryptography, input validation and configuration, adding a breached-password denylist and per-account login throttling, enforced multi-factor authentication on the admin panel, step-up confirmation before an action that mints a lasting credential, purpose-scoped session tokens, single-use TOTP steps, tenant verification on every cross-referenced identifier, security headers on every surface, encrypted webhook signing secrets, per-organization idempotency, PKCE and a minimal two-scope Gmail consent on the mailbox OAuth flow, bounded spreadsheet and archive decoding, a patched Go toolchain with govulncheck in CI, and the evidence pack under compliance/casa

2026-09-19 08:18:35 +02:00

validation_test.go

feat: complete the ADA CASA v2.1.1 AL1 control set across authentication, sessions, access control, cryptography, input validation and configuration, adding a breached-password denylist and per-account login throttling, enforced multi-factor authentication on the admin panel, step-up confirmation before an action that mints a lasting credential, purpose-scoped session tokens, single-use TOTP steps, tenant verification on every cross-referenced identifier, security headers on every surface, encrypted webhook signing secrets, per-organization idempotency, PKCE and a minimal two-scope Gmail consent on the mailbox OAuth flow, bounded spreadsheet and archive decoding, a patched Go toolchain with govulncheck in CI, and the evidence pack under compliance/casa

2026-09-19 08:18:35 +02:00

validation.go

feat: complete the ADA CASA v2.1.1 AL1 control set across authentication, sessions, access control, cryptography, input validation and configuration, adding a breached-password denylist and per-account login throttling, enforced multi-factor authentication on the admin panel, step-up confirmation before an action that mints a lasting credential, purpose-scoped session tokens, single-use TOTP steps, tenant verification on every cross-referenced identifier, security headers on every surface, encrypted webhook signing secrets, per-organization idempotency, PKCE and a minimal two-scope Gmail consent on the mailbox OAuth flow, bounded spreadsheet and archive decoding, a patched Go toolchain with govulncheck in CI, and the evidence pack under compliance/casa

2026-09-19 08:18:35 +02:00