warmbly

admin.go

feat: complete the ADA CASA v2.1.1 AL1 control set across authentication, sessions, access control, cryptography, input validation and configuration, adding a breached-password denylist and per-account login throttling, enforced multi-factor authentication on the admin panel, step-up confirmation before an action that mints a lasting credential, purpose-scoped session tokens, single-use TOTP steps, tenant verification on every cross-referenced identifier, security headers on every surface, encrypted webhook signing secrets, per-organization idempotency, PKCE and a minimal two-scope Gmail consent on the mailbox OAuth flow, bounded spreadsheet and archive decoding, a patched Go toolchain with govulncheck in CI, and the evidence pack under compliance/casa

2026-09-19 08:18:35 +02:00

apikey_test.go

feat: scope automation and sequence unsubscribes to the caller's organization, require manage_settings to create, edit, enable or delete automations, run each integration action only on its own provider's connection (400 action_provider_mismatch), refuse org-permission gates when no organization service is wired, read /integrations/bookings like contacts, scope lead claims, research runs and CRM list cursors to the organization, and bind contact note edits to the contact in the path

2026-10-04 02:47:10 -07:00

apikey_usage.go

feat: make PostHog the default error tracker across every runtime while keeping Sentry fully supported alongside or instead of it, by turning internal/observability/errs into a two-sink fan-out with a local-log fallback, adding $exception capture to the Go services, the Rust tracking service, the Elixir realtime service and the dashboard, admin and form apps, reporting gin panics with their route, request id, workspace and user, attaching that identity plus a route and failed-request trail to browser exceptions, and wiring POSTHOG_ERROR_TRACKING, the node join env, compose, source-map upload and the docs to match

2026-09-10 19:11:32 +02:00

apikey.go

feat: hold every API key to its creator's current workspace role on each gated route and AI tool, and stop a key, including on the realtime socket, once its creator leaves the workspace (api_key_holder_left)

2026-10-04 05:15:30 -07:00

auth.go

feat: end a removed member's sessions and OAuth app grants through a removal hook detached from the request, refuse OAuth tokens whose holder is no longer a member, clear and detach a session selection that outlived its membership, gate subscription checkout, portal and cancel on manage_billing in the API and the dashboard, re-read org channel permissions live on member, role and ownership changes and withhold gated events while they cannot be read, drop the unrouted GitHub releases webhook handler, and correct v1 and release trigger paths in the docs

2026-09-26 22:07:54 -07:00

dashboard_origin_test.go

feat: bind password recovery, invitations, mailbox and integration OAuth, referral and billing returns to trusted initiating dashboards

2026-10-05 12:51:37 +00:00

dashboard_origin.go

feat: bind password recovery, invitations, mailbox and integration OAuth, referral and billing returns to trusted initiating dashboards

2026-10-05 12:51:37 +00:00

fresh_auth.go

feat: hold the invite_member, update_member_role and rotate_webhook_secret AI tools to the same recent confirmation their REST routes require, answering reauth_required on /ai/tools and refusing them where no confirmed session exists

2026-10-04 05:14:30 -07:00

handler.go

feat: address the Greptile review on the pool link: require https for the cloud URL (loopback exempt for local development) since the instance token and mailbox passwords travel on it, remove the cloud copy when the local enrollment row cannot be written so a mailbox never warms in both places, delete the local enrollment row before the cloud one and restore it if the cloud call fails so a mailbox is never left with no warmup anywhere, and trim the new multi-line comments to the one-line style

2026-08-29 07:17:10 -07:00

idempotency_test.go

feat: bound auth login network waits

2026-06-01 16:56:24 +02:00

idempotency.go

feat: complete the ADA CASA v2.1.1 AL1 control set across authentication, sessions, access control, cryptography, input validation and configuration, adding a breached-password denylist and per-account login throttling, enforced multi-factor authentication on the admin panel, step-up confirmation before an action that mints a lasting credential, purpose-scoped session tokens, single-use TOTP steps, tenant verification on every cross-referenced identifier, security headers on every surface, encrypted webhook signing secrets, per-organization idempotency, PKCE and a minimal two-scope Gmail consent on the mailbox OAuth flow, bounded spreadsheet and archive decoding, a patched Go toolchain with govulncheck in CI, and the evidence pack under compliance/casa

2026-09-19 08:18:35 +02:00

internal_auth_test.go

feat: bound auth login network waits

2026-06-01 16:56:24 +02:00

internal_auth.go

feat: answer a node heartbeat sent with INTERNAL_API_TOKEN where NODE_BROKER_TOKEN is required with the node's desired version only, recording nothing, through NodeHeartbeatAuthMiddleware and fleetnode UpdateOnly, so a node on an older release always updates itself onto the broker token without NODE_ACCEPT_INTERNAL_TOKEN, and say so in the configuration and split-deployment docs

2026-10-05 06:54:31 +02:00

key_holder_test.go

feat: bind each Remie approval to its tool call and run it once, show every argument and the resolved send on dashboard and Slack approval cards, keep always-allow to settings managers with a revocable list and never for tools that start sending or change access, withhold secrets and unpermitted tool results from the assistant and shared conversations, gate /mcp, /ai/tools and the web and playbook tools on AI_AGENT or use_ai, and scope get_mailbox by organization

2026-10-04 03:45:02 -07:00

mcp.go

feat: cap every OAuth grant and API key at the delegating member's role (consent narrows scopes and reports the withheld ones, tokens re-check the member's current role at every gate and MCP tool, keys stay within their creator's permissions, mailboxes and IP allowlist), keep OAuth tokens off API key and OAuth app management, require a fresh sign-in to approve an app, revoke a grant whose refresh token is presented twice, count only unexpired grants as installs, seal app webhook secrets under the instance key, name the workspace and flag unverified apps on the consent screen, and let credential managers list and revoke every member's app authorizations

2026-10-04 02:59:10 -07:00

node_heartbeat_auth_test.go

feat: answer a node heartbeat sent with INTERNAL_API_TOKEN where NODE_BROKER_TOKEN is required with the node's desired version only, recording nothing, through NodeHeartbeatAuthMiddleware and fleetnode UpdateOnly, so a node on an older release always updates itself onto the broker token without NODE_ACCEPT_INTERNAL_TOKEN, and say so in the configuration and split-deployment docs

2026-10-05 06:54:31 +02:00

oauth_member_test.go

feat: cap every OAuth grant and API key at the delegating member's role (consent narrows scopes and reports the withheld ones, tokens re-check the member's current role at every gate and MCP tool, keys stay within their creator's permissions, mailboxes and IP allowlist), keep OAuth tokens off API key and OAuth app management, require a fresh sign-in to approve an app, revoke a grant whose refresh token is presented twice, count only unexpired grants as installs, seal app webhook secrets under the instance key, name the workspace and flag unverified apps on the consent screen, and let credential managers list and revoke every member's app authorizations

2026-10-04 02:59:10 -07:00

oidc_test.go

feat: require a verified Cloud Tasks token with a pinned audience on task webhooks, manage_settings on integration OAuth and a fresh membership check at every mailbox and integration OAuth finish, user verification for passkey sign-in, ended sessions before a password reset or ban reports success, and a revoked session when a rotated refresh token is replayed; remove the internal DEK delete route, log credential path parameters by name, hold remote images in received mail until the reader loads them, add Calendly and Cal.com signing keys with inbound URL rotation, keep automation signing secrets out of connection responses, and apply the password rules to the bootstrap password

2026-09-30 06:46:24 -07:00

oidc.go

feat: require a verified Cloud Tasks token with a pinned audience on task webhooks, manage_settings on integration OAuth and a fresh membership check at every mailbox and integration OAuth finish, user verification for passkey sign-in, ended sessions before a password reset or ban reports success, and a revoked session when a rotated refresh token is replayed; remove the internal DEK delete route, log credential path parameters by name, hold remote images in received mail until the reader loads them, add Calendly and Cal.com signing keys with inbound URL rotation, keep automation signing secrets out of connection responses, and apply the password rules to the bootstrap password

2026-09-30 06:46:24 -07:00

organization.go

feat: scope automation and sequence unsubscribes to the caller's organization, require manage_settings to create, edit, enable or delete automations, run each integration action only on its own provider's connection (400 action_provider_mismatch), refuse org-permission gates when no organization service is wired, read /integrations/bookings like contacts, scope lead claims, research runs and CRM list cursors to the organization, and bind contact note edits to the contact in the path

2026-10-04 02:47:10 -07:00

poollink.go

feat: complete the ADA CASA v2.1.1 AL1 control set across authentication, sessions, access control, cryptography, input validation and configuration, adding a breached-password denylist and per-account login throttling, enforced multi-factor authentication on the admin panel, step-up confirmation before an action that mints a lasting credential, purpose-scoped session tokens, single-use TOTP steps, tenant verification on every cross-referenced identifier, security headers on every surface, encrypted webhook signing secrets, per-organization idempotency, PKCE and a minimal two-scope Gmail consent on the mailbox OAuth flow, bounded spreadsheet and archive decoding, a patched Go toolchain with govulncheck in CI, and the evidence pack under compliance/casa

2026-09-19 08:18:35 +02:00

ratelimit_ip.go

feat: accept only Salesforce domains as an org's API host and call it through the SSRF-guarded client, register the Warmbly Cloud link only on self-hosted instances behind the instance admin with a second factor and dial it through safehttp with fixed error text, keep automation signing secrets in the sealed connection config, answer integration service failures with fixed messages, add security headers to the forms, tracking and docs origins and TLS 1.2+ to the nginx template, compare the captcha bypass in constant time, require TLS 1.2 for IMAP probes, and drop the unused RSA helpers

2026-10-04 02:58:43 -07:00

ratelimit.go

feat: put every runtime behind one optional error-reporting story: a single internal/observability/errs wrapper that is now the only package importing sentry-go, InitSentry for cmd/forms, release and environment tags on every service from the existing build stamp, optional Sentry in the admin panel and the public forms app, the sentry crate in the Rust tracking service, release tagging in realtime, CI source-map upload that only runs when a Sentry token is configured, and docs covering the DSN for each service

2026-09-07 03:51:06 -07:00

reporting_test.go

feat: make PostHog the default error tracker across every runtime while keeping Sentry fully supported alongside or instead of it, by turning internal/observability/errs into a two-sink fan-out with a local-log fallback, adding $exception capture to the Go services, the Rust tracking service, the Elixir realtime service and the dashboard, admin and form apps, reporting gin panics with their route, request id, workspace and user, attaching that identity plus a route and failed-request trail to browser exceptions, and wiring POSTHOG_ERROR_TRACKING, the node join env, compose, source-map upload and the docs to match

2026-09-10 19:11:32 +02:00

reporting.go

feat: make PostHog the default error tracker across every runtime while keeping Sentry fully supported alongside or instead of it, by turning internal/observability/errs into a two-sink fan-out with a local-log fallback, adding $exception capture to the Go services, the Rust tracking service, the Elixir realtime service and the dashboard, admin and form apps, reporting gin panics with their route, request id, workspace and user, attaching that identity plus a route and failed-request trail to browser exceptions, and wiring POSTHOG_ERROR_TRACKING, the node join env, compose, source-map upload and the docs to match

2026-09-10 19:11:32 +02:00

request_id_test.go

feat: bound auth login network waits

2026-06-01 16:56:24 +02:00

request_id.go

feat: add api request ids

2026-05-30 04:26:12 +00:00

request_log_test.go

feat: answer every server-side failure in admin, internal, webhook, warmup routing, Stripe webhook, agent tool and MCP handlers with the fixed internal error and log the detail against the request id, keep correctable webhook and routing refusals as typed errors with their own messages, drop the request URL from MillionVerifier transport errors so the API key never reaches a log or response, and redact :code path parameters in the access log

2026-10-04 02:57:17 -07:00

request_log.go

feat: answer every server-side failure in admin, internal, webhook, warmup routing, Stripe webhook, agent tool and MCP handlers with the fixed internal error and log the detail against the request id, keep correctable webhook and routing refusals as typed errors with their own messages, drop the request URL from MillionVerifier transport errors so the API key never reaches a log or response, and redact :code path parameters in the access log

2026-10-04 02:57:17 -07:00

security_headers_test.go

feat: complete the ADA CASA v2.1.1 AL1 control set across authentication, sessions, access control, cryptography, input validation and configuration, adding a breached-password denylist and per-account login throttling, enforced multi-factor authentication on the admin panel, step-up confirmation before an action that mints a lasting credential, purpose-scoped session tokens, single-use TOTP steps, tenant verification on every cross-referenced identifier, security headers on every surface, encrypted webhook signing secrets, per-organization idempotency, PKCE and a minimal two-scope Gmail consent on the mailbox OAuth flow, bounded spreadsheet and archive decoding, a patched Go toolchain with govulncheck in CI, and the evidence pack under compliance/casa

2026-09-19 08:18:35 +02:00

security_headers.go

feat: send HSTS from the forms service only on FORMS_DOMAIN and strip it in the installer's Caddy block for customer-owned domains, so no customer apex is pinned to HTTPS

2026-10-04 05:19:22 -07:00

session_org_test.go

feat: end a removed member's sessions and OAuth app grants through a removal hook detached from the request, refuse OAuth tokens whose holder is no longer a member, clear and detach a session selection that outlived its membership, gate subscription checkout, portal and cancel on manage_billing in the API and the dashboard, re-read org channel permissions live on member, role and ownership changes and withhold gated events while they cannot be read, drop the unrouted GitHub releases webhook handler, and correct v1 and release trigger paths in the docs

2026-09-26 22:07:54 -07:00

version.go

feat: serve the entire customer API (auth + resources) only under /v1 with no unversioned alias, and repoint the web and admin clients to the versioned base accordingly

2026-06-13 07:18:23 +02:00