mirror of
https://github.com/warmbly/warmbly.git
synced 2026-09-12 08:04:41 +00:00
139 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
139 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
package handler
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import (
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/warmbly/warmbly/internal/infrastructure/encryptedkeys"
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)
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// Internal endpoints used by workers to fetch/store encrypted DEKs without
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// connecting to Postgres directly. Auth via middleware.InternalAuthMiddleware
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// (static bearer token in INTERNAL_API_TOKEN env var, both sides).
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//
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// Wire format mirrors what encryptedkeys.HTTPStore expects:
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//
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// GET /api/v1/internal/dek/:orgID -> 200 {"encrypted_data_key":"..."} | 404
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// PUT /api/v1/internal/dek/:orgID body: {"encrypted_data_key":"..."}
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// -> 201 | 409 ErrAlreadyExists
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// DELETE /api/v1/internal/dek/:orgID -> 204
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// POST /api/v1/internal/dek/decrypt body: {"encrypted_data_key":"..."}
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// -> 200 {"data_key":"<base64>"}
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type dekPayload struct {
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EncryptedDataKey string `json:"encrypted_data_key"`
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}
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type dekDecryptResponse struct {
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DataKey string `json:"data_key"`
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}
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func parseOrgID(c *gin.Context) (uuid.UUID, bool) {
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id, err := uuid.Parse(c.Param("orgID"))
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if err != nil {
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c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "invalid orgID"})
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return uuid.Nil, false
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}
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return id, true
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}
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func (h *Handler) InternalGetDEK(c *gin.Context) {
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id, ok := parseOrgID(c)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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v, err := h.EncryptedKeys.Get(c.Request.Context(), id)
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if err != nil {
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c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
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return
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}
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if v == "" {
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c.Status(http.StatusNotFound)
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return
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}
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, dekPayload{EncryptedDataKey: v})
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}
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func (h *Handler) InternalPutDEK(c *gin.Context) {
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id, ok := parseOrgID(c)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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body, err := io.ReadAll(c.Request.Body)
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if err != nil {
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c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "read body"})
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return
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}
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var p dekPayload
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if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &p); err != nil {
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c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "decode body"})
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return
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}
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if p.EncryptedDataKey == "" {
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c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "encrypted_data_key required"})
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return
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}
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err = h.EncryptedKeys.Put(c.Request.Context(), id, p.EncryptedDataKey)
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switch {
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case err == nil:
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c.Status(http.StatusCreated)
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case errors.Is(err, encryptedkeys.ErrAlreadyExists):
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c.Status(http.StatusConflict)
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default:
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c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
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}
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}
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func (h *Handler) InternalDeleteDEK(c *gin.Context) {
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id, ok := parseOrgID(c)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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if err := h.EncryptedKeys.Delete(c.Request.Context(), id); err != nil {
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c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
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return
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}
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c.Status(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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// InternalDecryptDEK opens a sealed data key for a node, so the node needs no
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// credential for the KMS behind it.
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//
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// Without this a worker running against AWS KMS needs its own IAM credential
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// good for kms:Decrypt, which means a long-lived access key on every machine
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// in the fleet. This endpoint replaces that with the internal API token the
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// node already holds, which is scoped to this instance and revocable from it.
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//
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// It takes ciphertext and returns plaintext, with no organization id anywhere
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// in the exchange: a caller can only open a key it was already given, so this
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// grants nothing beyond what holding the sealed key and the token already did.
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func (h *Handler) InternalDecryptDEK(c *gin.Context) {
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if h.KMS == nil {
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c.JSON(http.StatusNotImplemented, gin.H{"error": "no kms provider configured"})
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return
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}
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var p dekPayload
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if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&p); err != nil {
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c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "decode body"})
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return
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}
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if p.EncryptedDataKey == "" {
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c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "encrypted_data_key required"})
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return
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}
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key, err := h.KMS.GetDecryptedKey(c.Request.Context(), p.EncryptedDataKey)
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if err != nil {
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// The reason is not echoed: this answers an unauthenticated-by-org
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// caller, and KMS errors distinguish "not a key of ours" from "malformed",
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// which is exactly what a prober wants to learn.
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c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "could not decrypt data key"})
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return
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}
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, dekDecryptResponse{DataKey: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(key)})
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}
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