Matthew Meszaros 40506c4f05 fix: seed the two warmup pools on every instance under fixed ids and make one pool per type structural, since the baseline squash dropped the insert and a fresh self-hosted instance never warmed; move memberships onto the canonical pools, scope the standing mirror trigger to the columns it mirrors so a pool move keeps a retention window, commit the runtime and every seeder to the ids through MoveToPool, assert the pools at boot and in a warmup_pools_missing health check, and drop the guide's claim of cross-tier borrowing the health gate rejects (#493)

2026-09-13 21:37:17 -07:00

..

checks_access.go

feat: build the browser half of social sign-in, which was never wired: GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID was read at boot and made the login screen render a Google button, but the button opened a popup at /auth/google/login which no route served, and authService.GoogleAuth/AppleAuth had no caller anywhere in the codebase; internal/app/socialauth now runs Google and Apple through the flow generic OIDC already used (one-time state, PKCE, nonce, id_token verified against the provider JWKS, identity keyed on issuer and subject, JIT provisioning, the ban and 2FA gates), the redirect URI defaults to API_PUBLIC_URL/v1/auth/<provider>/callback and is logged at boot because registering the dashboard origin instead is the mistake that produces a valid OAuth client and a dead button, /auth/config advertises only providers the backend can actually complete, the SSO landing page no longer swallows a two_fa_required response, and OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME finally reaches the button it documents

2026-08-28 01:33:08 -07:00

checks_fleet_test.go

feat: address the review on the split-deployment branch by moving the two broker routes onto their own NODE_BROKER_TOKEN so the internet-facing tracking and forms services no longer hold a credential that can open any organization's data key, refusing to presign any key outside the prefixes a node reaches, fixing IAM policies that named an alias ARN KMS never resolves in a Resource element, bounding both brokered HTTP clients because the sync loop's context never expires, no longer reporting a 403 from the object store as a missing body, and redacting the DSN and URL credentials the dry-run listing printed in clear

2026-09-10 14:19:53 +02:00

checks_fleet.go

feat: address the review on the split-deployment branch by moving the two broker routes onto their own NODE_BROKER_TOKEN so the internet-facing tracking and forms services no longer hold a credential that can open any organization's data key, refusing to presign any key outside the prefixes a node reaches, fixing IAM policies that named an alias ARN KMS never resolves in a Resource element, bounding both brokered HTTP clients because the sync loop's context never expires, no longer reporting a 403 from the object store as a missing body, and redacting the DSN and URL credentials the dry-run listing printed in clear

2026-09-10 14:19:53 +02:00

checks_infra.go

fix: seed the two warmup pools on every instance under fixed ids and make one pool per type structural, since the baseline squash dropped the insert and a fresh self-hosted instance never warmed; move memberships onto the canonical pools, scope the standing mirror trigger to the columns it mirrors so a pool move keeps a retention window, commit the runtime and every seeder to the ids through MoveToPool, assert the pools at boot and in a warmup_pools_missing health check, and drop the guide's claim of cross-tier borrowing the health gate rejects (#493)

2026-09-13 21:37:17 -07:00

checks_mail.go

feat: tester accounts, creatable from the admin panel (#483)

2026-09-13 03:07:10 -07:00

checks_security.go

feat: make self-hosted onboarding survivable by fixing invite_only, which could not onboard anyone (the accept route is JWT-only, so redeeming the invitation that would create your account required already having one, making the self-host default silently identical to fully closed), threading the invitation token through registration so an invited person lands in the inviting organization instead of a stray workspace, gating SSO just-in-time provisioning behind DISABLE_REGISTRATION (it bypassed the gate entirely, so an instance set to true was still open to anyone the IdP would assert) with SSO_AUTO_PROVISION as the opt-out, correcting the OIDC redirect URL that pointed at /api/v1 against a route at /v1 and 404'd every SSO login, scoping the first-launch exemption so it no longer overrides an explicit lockdown, preserving the remaining TTL when restoring a losing setup token so a public endpoint cannot hold the claim window open forever, replacing a generic 403 with typed registration_invite_only, registration_closed, invitation_invalid, setup_token_invalid and setup_already_complete codes that name the next step, logging why no claim link was issued on an already-claimed instance instead of staying silent, adding a warmblyctl operator CLI (status with health checks and a non-zero exit, reissuable setup-link, user create/list/reset-password/grant-admin/revoke-admin/disable-2fa, hash-password) so a locked-out operator no longer needs hand-written psql, adding read-only instance configuration over 104 environment variables with structural secret redaction and fingerprints, 35 health checks, a database-backed settings tier for the three keys no environment variable owns, hiding the signup form when the config already says invite_only rather than failing the whole form with a toast, and documenting first run, accounts and access, configuration, instance health and troubleshooting alongside the root .env.example the README told operators to write but never shipped (#114)

2026-08-16 05:58:11 +02:00

checks_signin_test.go

feat: build the browser half of social sign-in, which was never wired: GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID was read at boot and made the login screen render a Google button, but the button opened a popup at /auth/google/login which no route served, and authService.GoogleAuth/AppleAuth had no caller anywhere in the codebase; internal/app/socialauth now runs Google and Apple through the flow generic OIDC already used (one-time state, PKCE, nonce, id_token verified against the provider JWKS, identity keyed on issuer and subject, JIT provisioning, the ban and 2FA gates), the redirect URI defaults to API_PUBLIC_URL/v1/auth/<provider>/callback and is logged at boot because registering the dashboard origin instead is the mistake that produces a valid OAuth client and a dead button, /auth/config advertises only providers the backend can actually complete, the SSO landing page no longer swallows a two_fa_required response, and OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME finally reaches the button it documents

2026-08-28 01:33:08 -07:00

checks_updates.go

feat: add a one-command self-host installer at warmbly.com/install.sh with an interactive data-control wizard, give docker-compose.yml image keys and per-store volume variables, add an image-mode updater, move engagement/form/audit retention into instance settings, and add warmblyctl backup/restore

2026-09-04 05:49:54 -07:00

checks_urls_tracking_test.go

feat: stop aws-bootstrap from treating a bucket that exists in another region as done, since head-bucket answers globally and a second region silently kept its blobs in the first, stop it printing the database master password to stdout where a terminal, a CI log or an agent transcript keeps it forever, and add an instance check that reports a tracking domain sharing a registered domain with the product's own URLs

2026-09-11 05:24:57 +02:00

checks_urls.go

feat: stop aws-bootstrap from treating a bucket that exists in another region as done, since head-bucket answers globally and a second region silently kept its blobs in the first, stop it printing the database master password to stdout where a terminal, a CI log or an agent transcript keeps it forever, and add an instance check that reports a tracking domain sharing a registered domain with the product's own URLs

2026-09-11 05:24:57 +02:00

helpers.go

feat: make self-hosted onboarding survivable by fixing invite_only, which could not onboard anyone (the accept route is JWT-only, so redeeming the invitation that would create your account required already having one, making the self-host default silently identical to fully closed), threading the invitation token through registration so an invited person lands in the inviting organization instead of a stray workspace, gating SSO just-in-time provisioning behind DISABLE_REGISTRATION (it bypassed the gate entirely, so an instance set to true was still open to anyone the IdP would assert) with SSO_AUTO_PROVISION as the opt-out, correcting the OIDC redirect URL that pointed at /api/v1 against a route at /v1 and 404'd every SSO login, scoping the first-launch exemption so it no longer overrides an explicit lockdown, preserving the remaining TTL when restoring a losing setup token so a public endpoint cannot hold the claim window open forever, replacing a generic 403 with typed registration_invite_only, registration_closed, invitation_invalid, setup_token_invalid and setup_already_complete codes that name the next step, logging why no claim link was issued on an already-claimed instance instead of staying silent, adding a warmblyctl operator CLI (status with health checks and a non-zero exit, reissuable setup-link, user create/list/reset-password/grant-admin/revoke-admin/disable-2fa, hash-password) so a locked-out operator no longer needs hand-written psql, adding read-only instance configuration over 104 environment variables with structural secret redaction and fingerprints, 35 health checks, a database-backed settings tier for the three keys no environment variable owns, hiding the signup form when the config already says invite_only rather than failing the whole form with a toast, and documenting first run, accounts and access, configuration, instance health and troubleshooting alongside the root .env.example the README told operators to write but never shipped (#114)

2026-08-16 05:58:11 +02:00

instancecheck.go

feat: make a split deployment work end to end by fixing the three defects that made an off-host node impossible to configure (nodeEnvKeys shipped S3_BUCKET and KMS_KEY_ID, which nothing reads, so an AWS-backed node silently used the default bucket and key alias; a joined consumer never received PRIMARY_DB and died at boot; and node.env was rewritten on every join with no file an operator could add to), then removing the need for cloud credentials on a node at all with brokered KMS and blob providers that renderNodeEnv hands out automatically, plus deploy/split-cloud, scripts/aws-bootstrap.sh, two fleet instance checks and the docs

2026-09-10 13:58:59 +02:00