warmbly

account_exists_test.go

feat: answer a signup for an existing address with 409 conflict and let a concurrent SSO first sign-in resolve against the account it raced, adopt the stored organization DEK when a parallel first use stored one first, classify IMAP SERVERBUG, LIMIT, bare read-command failures and provider ALERT/EXPIRED responses as server-unreachable, throttle or credentials errors and keep the ALERT text, wait up to two minutes for a free connection slot before the boot migration gives up, guard the dashboard's DOM mutations against browser page translation, treat an aborted passkey sign-in as a cancellation, and drop posthog-js request timeouts from error tracking

2026-09-27 08:26:55 +02:00

cache.go

feat: light, input-width Turnstile on the auth screens, one captcha per sign-in instead of a second one on the code step, and an opt-in 30-day remembered device that skips the emailed login code with a random server-hashed account-bound token, revoked on password reset or change and on signing out everywhere or other sessions

2026-10-05 04:32:15 +00:00

config.go

feat: light, input-width Turnstile on the auth screens, one captcha per sign-in instead of a second one on the code step, and an opt-in 30-day remembered device that skips the emailed login code with a random server-hashed account-bound token, revoked on password reset or change and on signing out everywhere or other sessions

2026-10-05 04:32:15 +00:00

email.go

feat: stop the password reset flow reporting success while sending nothing, by answering 200 only for an address with no account rather than for every cache and database fault, folding addresses to one case on every account lookup and write so a typed capital cannot miss the row or split an SSO account in two, refunding the two-per-four-hours budget when the failure was ours, retrying one transient send and quoting the link's real lifetime; and clear the rest of error tracking by grouping the engagement breakdown in a subquery so ORDER BY stops resolving opens against email_opens, dropping unibox_mailboxes and email_sync_state writes whose mailbox was deleted mid-sync instead of redelivering them forever, answering a corrupt argon2 hash with ErrCredentials rather than a 500, never filing a cancelled caller as a database incident, and reporting only the first websocket init failure of a streak

2026-09-18 11:42:49 +02:00

external_idtoken.go

feat: answer a signup for an existing address with 409 conflict and let a concurrent SSO first sign-in resolve against the account it raced, adopt the stored organization DEK when a parallel first use stored one first, classify IMAP SERVERBUG, LIMIT, bare read-command failures and provider ALERT/EXPIRED responses as server-unreachable, throttle or credentials errors and keep the ALERT text, wait up to two minutes for a free connection slot before the boot migration gives up, guard the dashboard's DOM mutations against browser page translation, treat an aborted passkey sign-in as a cancellation, and drop posthog-js request timeouts from error tracking

2026-09-27 08:26:55 +02:00

invited_signup_test.go

feat: complete invited signup in the dashboard and atomically provision accounts with workspace roles and resource grants

2026-10-10 04:11:45 +00:00

login_code_exempt_test.go

feat: ship the iOS app to TestFlight from GitHub Actions on merges touching ios/ (ios-release workflow with cloud-managed signing, shared Warmbly scheme, ExportOptions, iPhone-only 1.0.0, privacy manifest), add in-app account deletion and a read-only billing page, let admins exempt an existing account from the emailed login code for App Review, read Apple .p8 keys as PEM or base64 through one applekey parser for Sign in with Apple and APNs, and document the release flow and Apple web sign-in setup

2026-10-12 10:38:14 +02:00

login_risk_test.go

feat: record the verdict that issued the login challenge instead of re-judging at confirm, and stop a mailbox in no warmup pool reading as healthy: the emailed code is confirmed by a second request that can carry a different address and sees history the first one did not, so re-assessing there could file a challenged sign-in as clean and drop it from the repeat count that reaches the workspace posture; the verdict now travels in the login session and every completion path takes it, while ListLifecycleCandidates returns a NULL health as unknown so leaving the pool is no longer evidence of recovery and a resting mailbox neither resumes nor accrues probation on it

2026-08-28 12:20:11 -07:00

login_risk.go

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into fix/issue-241

2026-08-28 23:06:07 -07:00

login.go

feat: redesign the iOS app (inbox with inbox agent drafted replies edited in the full composer, Remie, home, analytics, CRM, contacts, settings hubs, mailbox connect flow covering every dashboard source) and replace Turnstile in the app with Apple App Attest (attested keys in app_attest_keys, challenge and key endpoints, verifyHuman gate on login, registration and password reset, auth config flag, docs and OpenAPI)

2026-10-11 19:00:50 +02:00

model.go

feat: redesign the iOS app (inbox with inbox agent drafted replies edited in the full composer, Remie, home, analytics, CRM, contacts, settings hubs, mailbox connect flow covering every dashboard source) and replace Turnstile in the app with Apple App Attest (attested keys in app_attest_keys, challenge and key endpoints, verifyHuman gate on login, registration and password reset, auth config flag, docs and OpenAPI)

2026-10-11 19:00:50 +02:00

provision.go

feat: complete invited signup in the dashboard and atomically provision accounts with workspace roles and resource grants

2026-10-10 04:11:45 +00:00

registration.go

feat: redesign the iOS app (inbox with inbox agent drafted replies edited in the full composer, Remie, home, analytics, CRM, contacts, settings hubs, mailbox connect flow covering every dashboard source) and replace Turnstile in the app with Apple App Attest (attested keys in app_attest_keys, challenge and key endpoints, verifyHuman gate on login, registration and password reset, auth config flag, docs and OpenAPI)

2026-10-11 19:00:50 +02:00

reset_password_test.go

feat: stamp users.password_changed_at on every password write and refuse a password reset link issued at or before it, so a link requested earlier dies when the password is changed from settings, by another reset link or by warmblyctl, with the rule documented on the reset endpoint and the security guide

2026-09-21 03:23:14 -07:00

reset_password.go

feat: redesign the iOS app (inbox with inbox agent drafted replies edited in the full composer, Remie, home, analytics, CRM, contacts, settings hubs, mailbox connect flow covering every dashboard source) and replace Turnstile in the app with Apple App Attest (attested keys in app_attest_keys, challenge and key endpoints, verifyHuman gate on login, registration and password reset, auth config flag, docs and OpenAPI)

2026-10-11 19:00:50 +02:00

service.go

feat: redesign the iOS app (inbox with inbox agent drafted replies edited in the full composer, Remie, home, analytics, CRM, contacts, settings hubs, mailbox connect flow covering every dashboard source) and replace Turnstile in the app with Apple App Attest (attested keys in app_attest_keys, challenge and key endpoints, verifyHuman gate on login, registration and password reset, auth config flag, docs and OpenAPI)

2026-10-11 19:00:50 +02:00

signup_origin_test.go

feat: add cookieless PostHog analytics for the hosted marketing site and dashboard with server-side signup and subscription events, a first-party acquisition record written once at signup on a new organization_acquisition table registered in the org-transfer spec, an acquisition column and channel filter in the admin org list, and never a single request from a self-host because every key is unset by default

2026-09-07 04:18:33 -07:00

sso_link_test.go

feat: route the sso_link completion through the one login path (completeLogin) so the ban check, the 2FA gate, login recording and device memory apply before a parked identity is attached, carry the session provider into every 2FA challenge so a Google or Apple sign-in on a 2FA account is recorded as such, make IdentityRepository.Link report a pair another account holds as ErrIdentityTaken instead of silently updating nothing, refuse a spent address budget before charging a link try, drop the dead expiry check and the duplicate link fields on the web Session model

2026-09-21 03:57:29 -07:00

sso_link.go

feat: charge every password, emailed-code and TOTP attempt atomically before comparing it (Redis INCR+expire script) with a per-account TOTP budget across challenges, put the signed-in password change on the reauth budget, set the per-account login limit to 50 per hour, give tester passwords an expiry (users.password_expires_at, migration 000257) and clear them plus every session on revoke, mint warmblyctl reset links with the password-reset purpose, expire fleet join tokens (7 days default, 30 max, reusable inside the window), derive captcha from the resolved Turnstile secret, refuse weak bootstrap argon2id hashes, make registration codes single-use, rate-limit the v1 invitation lookup, and draw RIDs and user codes without modulo bias

2026-10-04 02:52:22 -07:00

sso_test.go

feat: bind a browser sign-in to the browser that started it, so a handoff link cannot be forwarded: one-time state proves the callback answers a request this server made, not one THIS browser made, so anyone could run the flow against their own Google or OIDC account and send the resulting URL to someone else, whose browser would then hold the sender's session (RFC 9700 4.7.1); begin now mints a binding secret that never reaches the provider and never appears in a URL, the callback carries it into the handoff, and the exchange refuses a collection that cannot present it with sso_wrong_browser, while the comments this PR added are condensed to the constraint they exist to state

2026-08-28 01:44:39 -07:00

sso.go

feat: attach a Google, Apple or OIDC identity to an existing password account only after that account's password is presented: resolveFederatedUser parks the sign-in as link_required with a single-use sso_link pending token, POST /auth/sso/link checks the password against the provider-asserted address on the sign-in failure budget and links then issues the session through finishLoginAs, the dashboard collects it on a new login step, and the API reference, endpoints list, security guide and OpenAPI spec describe the third login result

2026-09-21 03:25:29 -07:00

trusted_device_test.go

fix(auth): fail revocation when remembered devices can't be forgotten; resend never sends the device token

2026-10-05 05:51:31 +00:00

trusted_device.go

fix(auth): fail revocation when remembered devices can't be forgotten; resend never sends the device token

2026-10-05 05:51:31 +00:00

verify_human_test.go

feat: redesign the iOS app (inbox with inbox agent drafted replies edited in the full composer, Remie, home, analytics, CRM, contacts, settings hubs, mailbox connect flow covering every dashboard source) and replace Turnstile in the app with Apple App Attest (attested keys in app_attest_keys, challenge and key endpoints, verifyHuman gate on login, registration and password reset, auth config flag, docs and OpenAPI)

2026-10-11 19:00:50 +02:00