Uploads in Files had their own card with a thick progress bar, larger
corners and a heavier shadow, so they looked unlike the toasts around
them.
Toasts can now show work in progress: the thin line at the bottom fills
with progress instead of counting down, and the toast stays until it is
updated or removed. Uploads use it, with the file and percentage below
the title and Cancel as the toast action.
On 1.0 a vCard export sent every blob photo through the avatar download
queue, a burst of 40 and then 6 a second, two at a time: about 160 s for
1000 photos. Avatars and print (which gives up after 5 s) waited behind
it, the Export button showed nothing, and a second click started the
whole export again.
- Export fetches the blob media of all cards with Blob/get
(`data:asBase64`), asking for the sizes first and packing the requests
to about 4 MiB. `urn:ietf:params:jmap:blob` goes into `using` only
when the session advertises it; without it, or when a request is
refused, the rest is downloaded one by one behind avatars and print,
which keep half of the download burst for themselves.
- The export buttons in the settings, the bulk bar, the context menu and
the detail menu show that an export is running and ignore clicks until
it is done.
- When the photo changes, the form rebuilds `media` on the card as the
server has it now. A logo or sound blobId from the list's older copy
made 1.0 refuse the whole update ("The following blobIds do not exist
or are not accessible").
- A new photo takes the key, place, `pref`, `label` and `contexts` of the
one it replaces, so it stays the photo shown on cards with several.
Removing the photo removes every photo the card had instead of only the
shown one, which brought up the next; logos and sounds stay.
- A card whose login has no client downloads nothing, instead of asking
the active login's server and remembering the refusal for two minutes.
- Photo downloads run at half the server's `maxConcurrentRequests`
instead of a fixed two.
- `invalidProperties` naming `media/...` also counts as a refused blobId
in media, not only `media` itself.
Stalwart 1.0 returns every photo, logo and sound in a contact card as a
blobId without a uri, including every photo Bulwark saved as a data:
URI. Bulwark read only `uri`, so avatars, the contact list and detail,
print, vCard export and the "has photo" filter showed nothing, and the
form sent `media` without the photo on every save, so editing a phone
number deleted the photo on the server.
- `ContactMedia` carries `blobId`, `label`, `pref` and `contexts`; `uri`
is optional, and `getContactPhotoRef`/`hasContactPhoto` read both.
- Blob photos are downloaded once each, at most two at a time and at a
paced rate, only while on screen, into an LRU of object URLs revoked
on eviction, account switch and logout. They share Stalwart's
per-account budget of 4 concurrent requests and 1000 a minute.
- Avatars look senders up in an index built once per contact list.
- The form leaves `media` out unless the photo changed, and otherwise
passes the other entries through as the server returned them.
- A new photo is uploaded into the user's own account and sent as a
blobId where the blob capability lists ContactCard (1.0). 0.16 refuses
blobIds in media and keeps getting a data: URI; a refusal at runtime
falls back the same way for the rest of the session.
- Print and vCard export download blob media first; duplicate and
cross-account move send the bytes instead of the source's blobIds.
- vCard export also writes photos whose data: URI names no media type
(`data:;base64,`, `data:base64,`), which it dropped before.
A meeting invitation puts the join URL in the description - Teams, Meet,
Zoom and the plain iTIP fallbacks all do - and the three read-only
description renders (invitation RSVP view, event detail view, detail
popover) printed it as bare text. The one actionable thing in the event
was not clickable: you had to select the URL by hand, across the line
wraps, and paste it into the address bar.
Render those three through the same pipeline the plain-text mail body
already uses (`plainTextToSafeHtml` + `sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml`),
wrapped in a small `LinkifiedText` component. The text stays plain text:
it is escaped, only `<a href="http(s)://...">` is emitted, and the result
is sanitized again before it reaches the DOM - an event description is
attacker-controlled, since anyone can send an iTIP invitation.
Two details along the way: `break-words` on the paragraphs, so a long
join URL wraps instead of widening the panel, and `whitespace-pre-line`
on the invitation view, which was the only one of the three dropping the
description's own line breaks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018QPPAw4SK4M9Z7euVPM2cL
Clicking an address in the app's own chrome - the recipient card, the
contact sidebar, the contact details - handed a mailto: URL to the OS
mail handler. In a webmail client that goes nowhere: the browser asks
which application should open the link, and the message is composed
somewhere else, if at all. Only users who registered Bulwark itself as
their system mailto handler got a usable result, and even then via a
detour through the OS into a new tab.
A new MailtoLink component sends the click to the built-in composer
instead. It stays a real anchor with an href, so "Copy email address",
middle click and assistive technology keep working; only the plain
left click is redirected, and only when a listener takes it - otherwise
the browser's own behaviour still applies. Modified clicks are left
alone.
The request reaches the mail page through a window event, the way
`bulwark:rate-limit-blocked` already does, rather than threading a
callback through three component levels and five call sites. It goes to
openMailtoDraft rather than the protocol path: an in-app click carries
its own context - the account being read - so the account picker that an
external mailto: needs would only get in the way here.
Message content is deliberately untouched. Plain text bodies render into
the main document rather than the sandboxed frame and their sanitizer
permits mailto:, so a document-wide interceptor would have swept up
untrusted links too; a component cannot be reached from message HTML at
all.
Linus Rath
lucletoffeandClaude Opus 5
dealerweb
Matthieu MALVACHE