Plugins that talk to Nextcloud, Paperless or an AI provider used to need
the password or key in their own settings, readable by the plugin and
stored in the browser. A plugin can now declare credentials in its
manifest and send requests "with credential X" through the server:
- `credentials` in the manifest: admin scope (secret and server from the
admin config) or user scope (the user connects an account; the server
address is fixed or chosen by the user)
- `/api/plugin-secrets`: the user's connected accounts, encrypted per
mail account under `PLUGIN_SECRETS_DIR`; listing never returns secrets
- `/api/plugin-proxy`: adds the secret and forwards only to the
credential's own origin, through the SSRF guard unless the admin set
the server up or listed it in `PLUGIN_PROXY_PRIVATE_ORIGINS`; no
redirects or WebDAV moves to other servers, streamed bodies capped at
512 MB up and 2 GB down, 300 requests a minute per plugin, 8 at once
per user, and one audit line per request without paths or bodies
- a capture mode that stores a secret from a sign-in response (Nextcloud
Login Flow v2) and removes it from what the plugin gets back
The admin page offered "User Plugin Uploads" and "Require Admin
Approval", but nothing in Settings used them: there was no upload, no
uninstall and no way to ask for approval, and the admin had no list of
requests. The approval code that existed pinned a hash of the code only
and showed the admin a manifest the browser sent, never the code.
Now:
- Settings > Plugins has an install button (when uploads are allowed),
a remove button for the user's own plugins, and lists in plain
language what each plugin may do, high-risk items first
- an install sends the ZIP to the server, which reads the manifest and
code itself and pins the request to a hash of both
- the admin Plugins tab lists requests with the code and approves or
denies them; a user may have 10 open requests
- a user plugin is checked again on every start, so a revoked approval
or turning user plugins off takes effect
- the consent dialog and the plugin settings are translated, use the
theme colours, and show the sites a plugin may send data to
The Settings upload, the admin upload, the marketplace install and the
marketplace preview each parsed the ZIP and manifest with their own copy
of the code, and the copies had drifted. A `permissions` string skipped
validation and was then matched by substring, a small ZIP could inflate
to hundreds of megabytes on the server, the Settings upload dropped
`locales` and took origin lists unchecked, and settings schemas were
never checked at all.
All of them now go through `lib/extension-package.ts`:
- every file is inflated through a byte cap, with a limit on entries
- one manifest check: types, permissions, entrypoint, version,
minAppVersion, settingsSchema, configSchema, locales and origin lists
- only checked fields are stored
Users with several accounts can save the list of accounts in their browser
(address, server, label, colour) on the webmail server and bring it back on
another device. The list is encrypted in the browser with a password the user
chooses (PBKDF2-SHA-256, 600,000 iterations, AES-256-GCM, owner bound as
additional data); the server stores only the envelope, one file per owner
under SETTINGS_DATA_DIR/account-archives. No mailbox passwords are included.
Off by default behind the admin feature gate accountArchiveEnabled, pinned
off in Lite. Every method of /api/account-archive needs a session cookie of
the owner, matched without regard to case, whose credential is checked
against the mail server on each call; listing included.
Restored accounts this browser lacks are listed as awaiting sign-in: they
survive a reload, and opening one leads to the sign-in form with the address
filled in. Accounts already present get their archived label and colour.
The agenda sidecar queried only the session's primary calendar account,
so events in a shared or group account (a family or team calendar) never
reached the Calendar Agenda plugin, although the calendar app shows them.
Read every account the calendar app reads: the primary account plus
accounts that advertise the calendar capability or are not personal,
mirroring the client's getCalendarCapableAccountIds(). Event and
calendar ids repeat across accounts, so the DTO id is scoped as
<accountId>:<id> and carries accountId; calendar colours are looked up
per account. A shared account whose calendars cannot be read is skipped
instead of failing the whole agenda; a failure of the primary account is
still reported.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Any failed method in the preview request answered 502, so when the
server named the delivered message and it was read fine, a failing
Inbox query still turned the notification into a generic "New mail".
The named message is now a complete preview on its own.
A response without the optional `total` was also treated as a failure;
it now counts the returned ids.
A JMAP method error comes back with HTTP 200. The preview route read a
failed Mailbox/query or Email/query as an empty Inbox and answered
"nothing unread", so the service worker dropped the push in silence.
It now answers 502, and the worker shows its generic notification.
When the server names the message that arrived and it cannot be read -
deleted since, or filed where this login cannot see it - the route no
longer substitutes the newest unread message in the Inbox, which was
some other mail announced as if it had just arrived. It names no
message; the unread total still comes back for the generic toast.
Some servers build a message's preview from its HTML body without skipping
the <style> element, so a marketing mail's preview - in the list and in its
push notification - can read "@media screen and (min-width:600px){.hide{
display:none!important;…" and never reach the text.
Drop whole leading rules from the preview before showing it; a preview that
ends inside the style sheet was nothing but CSS and becomes empty, so the
usual "no preview" text shows instead. A rule only counts as CSS when its
block holds declarations or further rules, so prose with a brace in it
("the meeting is at {time} tomorrow") is left alone.
Three files carried a literal NUL byte inside a string: the admin
check's cache key in `app/api/admin/auth/route.ts`, the global search
hit key in `lib/global-search/types.ts` and two TNEF fixtures in
`lib/__tests__/tnef.test.ts`. Git treats any file containing a NUL as
binary, so it showed no diffs for them, never normalised their line
endings, and reported every pull request that touched the admin route
as a conflict even when a text merge was clean.
The escape produces the same string at runtime. The admin route was
stored with CRLF while git saw it as binary; it is now stored with LF
like the rest of the tree, so its diff covers the whole file (the only
content change is on line 70).
`/api/auth/sso/complete` only accepted cookie slots 0-4 and quietly
used slot 0 for anything higher. Since the account limit rose to
`MAX_ACCOUNT_SLOTS` (50) on HTTP/2, adding a sixth account through
server-side SSO wrote its refresh token over the first account's cookie,
while the new account was registered on slot 5 with no cookie behind it.
The route and the OAuth callback's pending-slot check now use the same
bound as every other auth route.
Retry interrupted or invalid runtime configuration requests with bounded backoff and per-attempt timeouts. Validate the complete response before caching it, and prevent stale HTTP-cached configuration.
Cover request and body timeouts, shared hook consumers, retry bounds, the server response contract, and both Lite configuration paths.
The app refuses a JMAP server over plain http (loopback aside), yet the
desktop issued a code, reported "Signed in on your phone" once it was
redeemed, and the phone failed. Linking now stops before the step-up
with an explanation.
The token proxy trusted the endpoint sealed into a phone's refresh token
for good: after a server was removed or its provider moved, it kept
posting there with the plain fetch and whichever secret the server id
now maps to. Trust is now re-derived on every renewal; an endpoint the
webmail is no longer configured for gets neither the secret nor the
unguarded fetch.
The step-up for SSO accounts asks the provider for a new login with
`prompt=login`, but a provider that ignores it answers from its existing
session, so anyone at an unlocked desktop could link a phone. When the
ID token's `auth_time` is older than the step-up, the re-auth is now
refused.
The step-up's failure count was keyed on the cookie slot, which the
client chooses, so a session could spread guesses over 50 slots; and
even one key allowed 480 failures a day, well above Stalwart's ban of
100 a day per address, which would ban the webmail's own IP for every
user. Failures now count per server and login name, 5 per 15 minutes
and 20 a day.
The mobile handoff returned the provider's token endpoint and the
webmail's client id as they were. With a confidential client the phone
could not renew (it has no secret), and a provider on another host was
refused by the app outright. The handoff now returns the same bundle a
paired phone gets: such grants renew through `/api/auth/pair/token` with
a sealed refresh token.
"Link Mobile App" only appeared for OAuth sessions, its step-up could
only go through the identity provider (which failed without an OAuth
client and bounced password+TOTP users to the provider's login page),
and it handed the phone the desktop's own refresh token. Revoking that
token on sign-out, or a rotating provider, signed the phone out too; a
confidential client stopped the phone at its first token expiry; and an
identity provider on another host was refused by the app.
The step-up now mints the phone's own grant:
- Password and password+TOTP accounts confirm the current password (and
code) in the dialog. The server uses it once to get an OAuth grant
from Stalwart's structured login for the app's own client, retries
with the webmail's client when the server insists on a registered one,
and falls back to an app password ("Bulwark mobile (paired <date>)")
or, on servers that offer neither, the verified password. Failed
attempts are limited per account so the webmail's address cannot be
banned by guessing through it.
- SSO accounts keep the provider round trip, now with `offline_access`
where offered; its fresh tokens become the phone's grant instead of
being thrown away, and must belong to the account being paired.
- The account and server always come from the slot's verified session
context, never from the request.
Grants live 5 minutes server-side, codes 2 minutes, both single use; the
store is pinned on `globalThis`. Redeem answers `invalid_code`,
`expired_code` or `used_code`, and the desktop polls a separate status
id to replace the QR with "Signed in on your phone". A phone whose
client is confidential, or whose provider is on another host, renews
through `/api/auth/pair/token` with a sealed refresh token, so current
app builds work unchanged. Signing out discards a pending grant but no
longer affects a paired phone.
The dialog shows for every account (not in Lite), with a copyable
sign-in link, a TOTP field when needed, and the app's own "Scan a
sign-in code" wording.
The step-up for linking a device sends the user to the identity
provider with `prompt=login`. The login route accepted that pending
state too, so a code from the re-auth could be spent there and sign this
browser in as whichever account answered the prompt. It now refuses a
re-auth state; only the pairing route completes one.
The callback page also handles its code once. React's development
double effect ran it twice: the second pass no longer saw the re-auth
flag and raced the pairing route for the single-use code.
The password+TOTP login drove Stalwart's structured login (`/api/auth`,
then `/auth/token` with PKCE) inline. Linking the mobile app needs the
same exchange to mint a phone's own grant, so it now lives in
`lib/auth/stalwart-password-login.ts` and the route only maps its
result to the responses it always gave.
The mock JMAP server behind `/api/dev-jmap` accepts any password and
shipped in every image, held back only by `DEV_MOCK_JMAP=true` at
runtime. It now also needs the flag at build time (inlined through
`next.config.ts`), so a build made without it cannot switch the mock on,
and the Docker image drops the route before building.
Several endpoints answered anyone with what fingerprints a deployment:
`/api/health?detailed=true` (versions, memory), the update status
(exact version and the text of a pending security advisory, even with
`loginShowVersion` off), `/api/plugins` (installed plugins and the hosts
they may reach), the admin policy (push relays, sidebar app URLs,
plugin lists) and `/api/config` (every domain each server serves).
Visitors without a session now get:
- the plain liveness answer from `/api/health`;
- the update status only where the login page shows the version, and
never the advisory text;
- a 401 from `/api/plugins`, which the client only syncs after signing
in;
- the policy without plugin lists, push relays and sidebar apps, marked
`X-Bulwark-Policy-Scope: public`; the client fetches the full policy
once it signs in;
- server domain lists only when servers are picked by domain.
A mailbox session, a remembered session cookie or the admin session
counts as signed in. Deployments without a session secret cannot tell
sessions apart and keep the old answers.
A WOPI token carries the user's credentials to the editor server and
stayed valid for its whole six-hour lifetime, so an editor opened
before signing out could still read and save the document afterwards.
Each token now records the browser (a random id in an HttpOnly cookie,
hashed) and account slot that opened it. Signing out records a
revocation time for that browser and slot, or for every slot on a full
sign-out, and WOPI calls with a token minted before it are refused.
Signing out on another device leaves this browser's editors alone.
Revocations live in the state directory, so they survive a restart and
reach replicas sharing the state volume, and are dropped once the
tokens they cover have expired.
`/api/auth/verify` checked any username and password against the JMAP
server without a limit. Every probe reaches the server from the
webmail's own address, so the route was a password oracle and enough
wrong passwords could trip Stalwart's authentication ban against the
webmail itself, locking out every user.
Wrong passwords now use up a budget of five per client and thirty
across all clients per fifteen minutes; right ones are refunded. Over
budget the route answers `inconclusive` and the browser probes the JMAP
server itself, as it did before the pre-check existed.
Used impersonation token ids were only remembered in process memory, so
a captured handoff link could be redeemed a second time within its five
minute lifetime once the process restarted, or on another replica. Each
used id now also leaves a marker file in the state directory, created
exclusively, which every replica sharing the state volume sees; markers
are pruned once the token could no longer verify.
The absolute session limit comes from the eight-hour app password that
Stalwart itself expires.
Linus Rath
lucamzanon
sudandClaude Fable 5.1
Lucius7nya