A wipe by name took any username and server with no session behind it. It
now needs a sealed cookie the account got while it was signed in, since a
dropped account has no session cookie left. The old wipe test asserted that
a name alone was enough, which is the behaviour being removed.
Until now a lost laptop kept its offline mail for as long as anyone could
open it, and an account whose login the server had ended kept its copy too.
- `lib/devices`, `app/api/devices`: browsers with offline on and desktop
apps register, in a durable collection with no expiry. A check-in goes
by a per-device secret, so a revoked device still hears its wipe.
- `app/api/admin/devices` and the org devices page: wipe one device or all
of a user's, with audit entries for each request and each confirmation.
- `lib/offline/device-wipe.ts`: a start finishes any wipe cut short, then
waits up to a second for the instance before showing the local copy. A
wipe takes the store, keys, plugin databases and handoffs, signs out,
and reports back, again at the next contact if the report failed.
- `lib/jmap/client.ts`, `stores/auth-store.ts`: only `invalid_grant`, the
session limit, or a 401 lasting past a re-auth count as refused. A 500,
a proxy page or an outage never do.
- Settings: "Remove everything from this device", with a confirmation.
`lib/shared-store/__tests__/import-data.test.ts` changes its assertion
because it lists every collection the import copies, and `devices` is new.
- `/api/metrics` in Prometheus text format, off until `METRICS_TOKEN`
or `METRICS_TOKEN_FILE` is set (404 before, 401 without the bearer
token): requests per route group with status class and latency,
sign-in outcomes, calls to Stalwart, WOPI, translation, the plugin
proxy and OAuth, browser errors, errors today, process memory,
event-loop lag, uptime and build info. Labels come from fixed lists.
Each replica serves its own.
- `/api/health/live` answers while the process runs;
`/api/health/ready` checks the config, the shared store, writable
data dirs and Stalwart's session resource. `/api/health` and
`/api/ready` are unchanged.
- the Docker image gets a HEALTHCHECK on the live endpoint
- adds prom-client, and the OpenTelemetry packages the tracing step
loads on demand
The earlier fix answered 503 to every read and write of a settings file
or plugin vault that doesn't decrypt, so a rotated SESSION_SECRET left
the user with no way out: even disconnecting a plugin failed. Now such a
document reads as nothing stored, and the next write first moves it
aside, then saves as usual. The bytes are kept unchanged, so the data can
be restored with the old secret:
- local mode renames the file to `<file>.unreadable-<time>` next to it
- shared mode copies the document to `<id>.unreadable-<time>`, then
deletes the original only if it is still the same document
A settings file too short to hold anything reads as nothing stored and
is written over, as before 585e10041. The 503 is now only for a shared
store that can't be reached or a file that can't be read at all.
Credentials the admin set up for a plugin no longer read the user's
vault, so they keep working when it can't be read, and the credential
list still reports their status.
Plugins that talk to Nextcloud, Paperless or an AI provider used to need
the password or key in their own settings, readable by the plugin and
stored in the browser. A plugin can now declare credentials in its
manifest and send requests "with credential X" through the server:
- `credentials` in the manifest: admin scope (secret and server from the
admin config) or user scope (the user connects an account; the server
address is fixed or chosen by the user)
- `/api/plugin-secrets`: the user's connected accounts, encrypted per
mail account under `PLUGIN_SECRETS_DIR`; listing never returns secrets
- `/api/plugin-proxy`: adds the secret and forwards only to the
credential's own origin, through the SSRF guard unless the admin set
the server up or listed it in `PLUGIN_PROXY_PRIVATE_ORIGINS`; no
redirects or WebDAV moves to other servers, streamed bodies capped at
512 MB up and 2 GB down, 300 requests a minute per plugin, 8 at once
per user, and one audit line per request without paths or bodies
- a capture mode that stores a secret from a sign-in response (Nextcloud
Login Flow v2) and removes it from what the plugin gets back
Linus Rath