The theme sanitizer was a short denylist. It missed protocol-relative
`url(//host)`, schemes and keywords spelled with CSS escapes
(`url(\68ttps:...)`, `@\69mport`), `image-set("https://...")` and
`@font-face` sources, so a theme could load remote resources from the
app document. `validateThemeSelectors` was never called, so theme CSS
could also target `input[type=password]` or restyle real UI. The admin
routes and the zip validator only sanitized when the safety check
failed, and CSS returned by the `onThemeBeforeApply` plugin hook was
injected as-is.
- every `url()` except a `#fragment` and every `image-set()` is removed
with its arguments; a banned construct spelled with escapes drops the
whole stylesheet
- theme CSS keeps only `:root` and `.dark` rules (no nested rules),
plus `@font-face`, `@keyframes` and `@media`/`@supports` wrappers
- sanitizing is unconditional everywhere, including plugin-transformed
CSS; compiled token values may not contain escapes or `url()`
The Stalwart admin check only bailed while `allowCustomJmapEndpoint` was
on. A context cookie minted while it was on keeps naming the
user-chosen server, and the envelope has no expiry, so after the admin
turned the switch off that server could still answer the admin probe
and mint a Bulwark admin session. The check now also requires the
cookie's server to be an admin-configured one.
The Stalwart admin check probed `x:Account/query`. Stalwart's default
tenant-admin role carries `sysAccount*`, so an administrator of a single
tenant passed and, in the default `auto` mode, was signed into the
Bulwark dashboard, which configures the whole instance for every
tenant. The `auto|password|off` switch added for #870 left the default
at `auto`, so the advisory never held on a default install.
The probe is now `x:Tenant/query`, which needs `sysTenantQuery`: by
default only the server-wide superuser holds it.
GetFile answered on the webmail origin with the Content-Type stored in
the WOPI token, which for a mail attachment comes straight from the
launch request and for a Files node is a user-settable property. No
CSP, nosniff or disposition was added, since `/api/*` skips the proxy.
A user could mint a token for their own blob typed `text/html` and have
a victim open the GetFile URL, running script in the webmail origin.
GetFile now always sends `application/octet-stream` with
`Content-Disposition: attachment`, `nosniff` and a sandboxing CSP, and
refuses browser loads (any `Sec-Fetch-Dest` other than `empty`). The
editor fetches it server-to-server, so it is unaffected.
The origin gate in the proxy only covered `/api/auth/*`. The JMAP
passthrough, `/api/settings`, `/api/wopi/launch`,
`/api/plugin-approval-status`, `/api/fetch-ical`, `/api/translate`,
`/api/caldav/discover`, `/api/calendar-agenda` and `/api/webdav` all act
with the session cookie and had no origin check. A page on a same-site
sibling origin receives SameSite=Lax cookies, so it could run arbitrary
JMAP as the signed-in user, including sharing mailboxes to a third
account.
The proxy now gates every `/api/` route except the WOPI file endpoints
the office editor calls server-to-server, and each of these handlers
checks again. The proxy also decides on the decoded path, so an escaped
spelling such as `/api/%61uth/session` no longer skips the gate.
An impersonation handoff sealed `<target>%<master>` and the master
password into the session cookie, and `PUT /api/auth/session` hands that
cookie's contents to the browser on every restore. Anyone who received
a handoff could read a credential that signs in as every mailbox and
into Stalwart administration, with no expiry and no audit trail.
The impersonate route now uses the master credential server-side, once,
to create an app password on the target mailbox that expires after
8 hours. Only that app password reaches the cookies. Signing out
revokes it through a sealed grant cookie, and PUT refuses any session
that still holds the configured master password, so cookies minted
before this change are dropped instead of returned.
The browser paints a native <select>'s option list itself, so the
bg-muted / text-foreground classes on the control never reach it. Themes
whose --color-muted is translucent (Aurora Glass dark uses
rgba(255,255,255,0.05)) composited to a light popup with near-white
text, leaving every unselected option almost invisible.
Pin option background/colour to the popover tokens, which every built-in
theme defines as an opaque surface, and set color-scheme: dark on
selects under .dark so Safari (which ignores option colours) renders a
dark popup too. Fixes all ~40 native selects at once.
Adds a stylesheet test that locks the rules and asserts every built-in
theme's --color-popover stays opaque in each variant.
Linus Rath
Aaron Guise
Linus Rath
Almost-Senseless-Coder
Paulhenry Saux
Michael Richter