Review follow-up to #751.
The offload path could not actually run: onBeforeBlobUpload goes through
HookBus.transform, which capped every handler at the 5s default. A handler
that pushes the file to an external store blows past that, and on timeout
the error is swallowed, the original file id is kept, and the composer
attaches the big file anyway - silently - while three such timeouts in a
minute auto-disable the plugin. Buses can now carry their own per-handler
budget and this one gets 120s. The same ceiling existed inside the sandbox,
where http.post/http.fetch were bounded by the 30s default API timeout;
those two are transfers rather than round-trips and now get 120s as well.
PRIVILEGED_ONLY_METHODS listed 'upfiles.set', which matches no dispatched
method - the dispatcher calls it 'upfiles.save'. So the write was never
tier-gated despite the comment saying it was, and an untrusted plugin with
email:blob-write could replace the bytes of a file the user was about to
send. Fixed the name. Relaxing the read while that stayed open was the
wrong order.
Moving upfiles.get to email:blob-read is kept, but it is a wider grant than
the PR described: onBeforeBlobUpload hands the file id to every registered
handler, so the id is not a secret and any untrusted plugin holding
email:blob-read can read every file the user attaches. The consent copy now
says that; email:blob-write's copy was describing the read and now describes
the replace it actually gates.
Also in the composer offload path:
- sanitize the handler's html before it reaches the document and the sent
message, and insert it through the editor at the caret rather than
concatenating it after the signature and quoted block
- honour an abort that lands while the handler is offloading
- delete the right staged file when the handler re-saved it under a new id
via upfiles.save, which otherwise stranded a copy in IndexedDB forever
upfiles.get is a read, but sat behind the email:blob-write permission and
the privileged tier, which requires crypto:full plus a signed managed
bundle. That put a simple attachment-offload plugin in the same trust
bucket as crypto plugins that read stored message bytes.
The method only returns a file the user just attached in this session,
looked up by the unguessable UUID the composer itself passes to the
onBeforeBlobUpload hook. It cannot reach server-side message blobs; those
stay behind jmap.fetchBlob on the privileged tier. So gate it behind
email:blob-read (consent copy already covers attachment bytes) and drop
the tier requirement.
Note: the privileged set also lists 'upfiles.set', but the dispatched
method is named 'upfiles.save', so that entry never matched; left as-is
here, flagged in the PR.
api.http.post(path, body, options) now accepts a Blob/File body and sends
it as-is to the same-origin route instead of JSON.stringify-ing it into
'{}'. The plugin may only supply Content-Type and X-Plugin-* metadata
headers; anything else is refused, and the host attaches its credential
headers after the plugin's, so they can never be overridden. Non-Blob
bodies keep the stock JSON behaviour. The sandbox facade previously
dropped the third argument, so the options never reached the host.
Upstream 1.7.2 prefixes most hand-written URLs with basePath via apiFetch /
withBasePath, but four subpath-relevant spots were missed:
- host-bridge: the sandbox iframe src was a bare "/plugin-sandbox" -> 404
under NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_PATH, breaking all plugins. Wrap in withBasePath.
- host-api doHttpPost: the same-origin /api/* plugin proxy used raw fetch on
url.pathname -> 404 under a subpath. Route it through apiFetch.
- admin branding preview <img>: unprefixed src -> broken thumbnail.
- (sandbox) layout: drop the Geist font + globals.css imports. The sandbox
runs with an opaque origin, so those assets are CORS-blocked; the plugin
bundle and all host API calls travel over the postMessage bridge, so no
same-origin asset fetch happens there.
Linus Rath
Roman Varlakov
Paulhenry Saux
Linus Rath
Paulhenry Saux
dealerweb