Nothing showed where a published image or download came from, and the
standalone tarballs had no checksum at all. Anyone who could swap a
release asset could swap its `.sha256` with it.
- every published image (release, `-always`, beta/dev and Lite) gets a
signed build provenance attestation, pushed to GHCR next to it
- the Lite zips and standalone tarballs are attested as well
- standalone tarballs get a `.sha256`, like the Lite zips
- the tarball build no longer holds a write token: a separate release
job, which runs no checked-out code, checksums, attests and uploads
- the README says how to check with `gh attestation verify`
The Stalwart bundle's README told admins to use
`releases/latest/download/bulwark-lite-stalwart.zip` as `resourceUrl`.
Stalwart re-downloads that URL on its own schedule and checks no hash or
signature, so whatever the newest release held would run as script on
the Stalwart origin next to the web admin.
The README now installs from the tagged release, explains updating by
moving `resourceUrl` to the next tag, and describes the floating URL as
an opt-in with that risk spelled out. Release runs upload a `.sha256`
next to each Lite zip.
A manual run of the release image workflow tagged `latest` on whatever
ref it was dispatched from, and the demo deploy and every Watchtower
install follow `latest`. It now moves only for a published stable
release or a dispatch on a stable `v*` tag.
- `static-lite.yml` gave the whole workflow `contents: write`, including
the build job that runs pull-request code. The build is read-only
now; a separate release job with no checkout uploads the zips.
- `docker-publish.yml` passes the ref name through `env` instead of
interpolating it into the shell script.
Linus Rath