A refused login used to delete the account's data, and with it everyone's
S/MIME and OpenPGP keys, also with offline off. The usual cause is a password
changed on another device, which Stalwart 0.16 and 1.0 both answer with
`invalid_grant`, so that lost unsent mail for little protection.
- A refused login signs out at once and hides the data. A new password brings
it back, unsent mail included. Otherwise it goes after 30 days. The sign-in
page gives a count and a date. The 24-hour timer is gone.
- `organisation.devices.wipeOnRefusedLogin`, off by default, asks for deletion
at once, of that account's own data only.
- The session limit no longer counts as a refusal on any route. It hides the
data and says nothing.
- A wipe runs under a Web Lock, tells other windows when it starts and ends,
and queues its report before deleting anything. It reports only once the
deletion worked and no plugin database is left.
- More goes with a wipe: Pro tabs, search history, Files and WebDAV state,
templates, pop-out drafts, shown notifications, push state, and Web Push
with the last account.
- The unsent count is per account, and unknown rather than 0 when the store
can't say. A new row is checked against the account that asked, and a
sign-out drops its row.
Existing tests changed because the rule did: `auth-store-keep-local.test.ts`
expected a wipe on `invalid_grant` and at the session limit, and
`device-wipe.test.ts` expected shared keys to go on a refused login.
Until now a lost laptop kept its offline mail for as long as anyone could
open it, and an account whose login the server had ended kept its copy too.
- `lib/devices`, `app/api/devices`: browsers with offline on and desktop
apps register, in a durable collection with no expiry. A check-in goes
by a per-device secret, so a revoked device still hears its wipe.
- `app/api/admin/devices` and the org devices page: wipe one device or all
of a user's, with audit entries for each request and each confirmation.
- `lib/offline/device-wipe.ts`: a start finishes any wipe cut short, then
waits up to a second for the instance before showing the local copy. A
wipe takes the store, keys, plugin databases and handoffs, signs out,
and reports back, again at the next contact if the report failed.
- `lib/jmap/client.ts`, `stores/auth-store.ts`: only `invalid_grant`, the
session limit, or a 401 lasting past a re-auth count as refused. A 500,
a proxy page or an outage never do.
- Settings: "Remove everything from this device", with a confirmation.
`lib/shared-store/__tests__/import-data.test.ts` changes its assertion
because it lists every collection the import copies, and `devices` is new.
Plugins that talk to Nextcloud, Paperless or an AI provider used to need
the password or key in their own settings, readable by the plugin and
stored in the browser. A plugin can now declare credentials in its
manifest and send requests "with credential X" through the server:
- `credentials` in the manifest: admin scope (secret and server from the
admin config) or user scope (the user connects an account; the server
address is fixed or chosen by the user)
- `/api/plugin-secrets`: the user's connected accounts, encrypted per
mail account under `PLUGIN_SECRETS_DIR`; listing never returns secrets
- `/api/plugin-proxy`: adds the secret and forwards only to the
credential's own origin, through the SSRF guard unless the admin set
the server up or listed it in `PLUGIN_PROXY_PRIVATE_ORIGINS`; no
redirects or WebDAV moves to other servers, streamed bodies capped at
512 MB up and 2 GB down, 300 requests a minute per plugin, 8 at once
per user, and one audit line per request without paths or bodies
- a capture mode that stores a secret from a sign-in response (Nextcloud
Login Flow v2) and removes it from what the plugin gets back
Linus Rath