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33 lines
1.7 KiB
TypeScript
33 lines
1.7 KiB
TypeScript
import { isIP } from 'node:net';
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import { getClientIP } from '@/lib/admin/session';
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/**
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* Every credential the sign-in routes check reaches the mail server from this
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* host's address. Stalwart counts failed logins per address (fail2ban) and
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* bans the address once the allowance is spent, so wrong passwords typed by
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* or fired at the webmail would eventually lock the webmail itself out for
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* everyone. Handing Stalwart the real client address lets it attribute the
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* failure to that client instead, once the admin tells it to read the header:
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* on 0.16 `Http.useXForwarded` (it then prefers a `Forwarded` header and
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* otherwise takes the first `X-Forwarded-For` entry), on 1.0
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* `Http.clientIpSource` = `xForwardedFor` with `forwardedHops` = 1 (the last
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* entry; more when proxies between the webmail and Stalwart append their
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* own). Neither checks where the connection comes from, so only enable it
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* when every HTTP client of Stalwart goes through the webmail or a proxy
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* that sets the header. Left at its default, Stalwart ignores the header.
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*
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* Only a syntactically valid address is forwarded: the client-facing value
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* comes from the request's own `X-Forwarded-For` when no reverse proxy
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* rewrites it, and anything else would be a stranger's text in an upstream
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* header.
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*/
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export function forwardedClientHeaders(clientIp: string | undefined): Record<string, string> {
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if (!clientIp || clientIp === '0.0.0.0' || isIP(clientIp) === 0) return {};
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return { 'X-Forwarded-For': clientIp };
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}
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/** The client address of `request` as the sign-in routes forward and budget it. */
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export function loginClientAddress(request: Request): string {
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return getClientIP(request);
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}
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