Files
webmail/app/api/auth/token/route.ts
T

333 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript

import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
import { cookies } from 'next/headers';
import { logger } from '@/lib/logger';
import {
refreshTokenCookieName,
refreshTokenServerCookieName,
accessTokenCookieName,
encodeCachedAccessToken,
decodeCachedAccessToken,
} from '@/lib/oauth/tokens';
import {
exchangeCodeForTokens,
buildOAuthParams,
getMetadata,
getRequiredConfig,
getTokenEndpoint,
DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID,
} from '@/lib/oauth/token-exchange';
import type { OAuthMetadata } from '@/lib/oauth/discovery';
import { getCookieOptions } from '@/lib/oauth/cookie-config';
import { fitsSetCookieBudget } from '@/lib/oauth/set-cookie-budget';
import {
buildEndSessionUrl,
clearIdToken,
getPostLogoutRedirectUri,
idTokenCookieName,
isEndSessionEnabled,
storeIdToken,
} from '@/lib/oauth/end-session';
import { MAX_ACCOUNT_SLOTS } from '@/lib/account-utils';
import { rejectCrossOriginRequest } from '@/lib/security/same-origin';
function parseSlot(raw: string | null): number | null {
if (raw === null) return null;
const slot = parseInt(raw, 10);
if (isNaN(slot) || slot < 0 || slot >= MAX_ACCOUNT_SLOTS) return null;
return slot;
}
function getSlot(request: NextRequest): number {
return parseSlot(request.nextUrl.searchParams.get('slot')) ?? 0;
}
// Sign-out waits for this route, so an unresponsive revocation endpoint must
// not hold it up for long.
const REVOCATION_TIMEOUT_MS = 3000;
async function revokeRefreshToken(token: string, serverId: string | null, metadata: OAuthMetadata | null): Promise<void> {
if (!metadata?.revocation_endpoint) return;
const params = buildOAuthParams({
token,
token_type_hint: 'refresh_token',
}, serverId, { fallbackClientId: DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID });
try {
// Never follow a redirect with the refresh token and client secret in
// the body: the endpoint was validated, its redirect target was not.
const revocationResponse = await fetch(metadata.revocation_endpoint, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
body: params.toString(),
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(REVOCATION_TIMEOUT_MS),
redirect: 'error',
});
if (!revocationResponse.ok) {
logger.warn('Token revocation returned error', { status: revocationResponse.status });
}
} catch (err) {
logger.error('Token revocation network error', { error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Unknown error' });
}
}
/** The provider logout URL for a slot being signed out, or null when there is none to visit. */
function endSessionUrlFor(metadata: OAuthMetadata | null, serverId: string | null, idToken: string | undefined): string | null {
if (!metadata?.end_session_endpoint || !isEndSessionEnabled()) return null;
let clientId: string;
try {
({ clientId } = getRequiredConfig(serverId));
} catch {
return null;
}
return buildEndSessionUrl({
endpoint: metadata.end_session_endpoint,
clientId,
idToken,
postLogoutRedirectUri: getPostLogoutRedirectUri(),
});
}
type CookieStore = Awaited<ReturnType<typeof cookies>>;
/**
* Cache the access token for the slot so a page reload can resume with it.
*
* Scoped to the token's own lifetime - once it expires the cookie is worthless
* and should not linger. A token too large to store, or one that would push
* the response past a proxy's header buffer beside `otherCookieValues`, is
* simply not cached: a reload then refreshes instead (#1237).
* Returns the cookie value written, or null.
*/
function cacheAccessToken(
cookieStore: CookieStore,
slot: number,
accessToken: string,
expiresIn: number,
otherCookieValues: ReadonlyArray<string | null | undefined>,
): string | null {
const name = accessTokenCookieName(slot);
const value = encodeCachedAccessToken(accessToken, expiresIn);
if (!value || !fitsSetCookieBudget([...otherCookieValues, value])) {
// Drop any stale entry rather than leaving a mismatch.
if (cookieStore.get(name)) cookieStore.delete(name);
return null;
}
cookieStore.set(name, value, { ...getCookieOptions(), maxAge: expiresIn });
return value;
}
export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
// CSRF gate (GHSA-qvr9-m8cq-7wvg): cookies written here are SameSite=Lax,
// so a cross-site top-level POST would otherwise reach this handler.
const crossOrigin = rejectCrossOriginRequest(request);
if (crossOrigin) return crossOrigin;
try {
const { code, code_verifier, redirect_uri, slot: bodySlot, server_id: bodyServerId } = await request.json();
if (!code || !code_verifier || !redirect_uri) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Missing required parameters' }, { status: 400 });
}
const slot = typeof bodySlot === 'number' && bodySlot >= 0 && bodySlot < MAX_ACCOUNT_SLOTS ? bodySlot : getSlot(request);
const serverId = typeof bodyServerId === 'string' && bodyServerId ? bodyServerId : null;
const tokens = await exchangeCodeForTokens(code, code_verifier, redirect_uri, serverId);
const response = NextResponse.json({
access_token: tokens.access_token,
expires_in: tokens.expires_in,
});
const cookieStore = await cookies();
if (tokens.refresh_token) {
const cookieName = refreshTokenCookieName(slot);
cookieStore.set(cookieName, tokens.refresh_token, getCookieOptions());
}
const cachedAccessToken = cacheAccessToken(cookieStore, slot, tokens.access_token, tokens.expires_in || 3600, [tokens.refresh_token, serverId]);
storeIdToken(cookieStore, slot, tokens.id_token, request.nextUrl.basePath, [tokens.refresh_token, cachedAccessToken, serverId]);
// Persist which server entry minted this refresh token so the PUT/DELETE
// handlers can route the refresh/revocation calls to the right token
// endpoint without the client having to track it across page loads.
const serverCookieName = refreshTokenServerCookieName(slot);
if (serverId) {
cookieStore.set(serverCookieName, serverId, getCookieOptions());
} else if (cookieStore.get(serverCookieName)) {
cookieStore.delete(serverCookieName);
}
return response;
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Token exchange error', { error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error' });
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Internal server error' }, { status: 500 });
}
}
export async function PUT(request: NextRequest) {
// CSRF gate (GHSA-qvr9-m8cq-7wvg): cookies written here are SameSite=Lax,
// so a cross-site top-level POST would otherwise reach this handler.
const crossOrigin = rejectCrossOriginRequest(request);
if (crossOrigin) return crossOrigin;
try {
const slot = getSlot(request);
const cookieName = refreshTokenCookieName(slot);
const cookieStore = await cookies();
const refreshToken = cookieStore.get(cookieName)?.value;
const serverId = cookieStore.get(refreshTokenServerCookieName(slot))?.value || null;
if (!refreshToken) {
cookieStore.delete(accessTokenCookieName(slot));
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'No refresh token' }, { status: 401 });
}
// A session restore calls this to get its token back, not because the
// current one expired. Serving the cached token avoids spending a refresh
// the IdP may legitimately reject: Rauthy stamps refresh tokens with
// nbf = iat + access_token_lifetime - 60, so refreshing early fails with
// "Token is not valid yet" for most of the access token's life (#552).
//
// `force=true` means the caller was told the current token is no good (a
// 401 from JMAP, or a scheduled renewal), so the cache must be skipped.
const force = request.nextUrl.searchParams.get('force') === 'true';
if (!force) {
const cached = decodeCachedAccessToken(cookieStore.get(accessTokenCookieName(slot))?.value);
if (cached) {
return NextResponse.json({
access_token: cached.accessToken,
expires_in: cached.expiresIn,
});
}
}
// The refresh token may have been minted by the password+TOTP login route,
// which works without a configured OAuth client by falling back to the
// default client id - refreshing must fall back the same way (#873).
const tokenEndpoint = await getTokenEndpoint(serverId, { fallbackClientId: DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID });
const params = buildOAuthParams({
grant_type: 'refresh_token',
refresh_token: refreshToken,
}, serverId, { fallbackClientId: DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID });
const tokenResponse = await fetch(tokenEndpoint, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
body: params.toString(),
// See revokeRefreshToken: the body holds the refresh token.
redirect: 'error',
});
if (!tokenResponse.ok) {
const errorText = await tokenResponse.text();
logger.error('Token refresh failed', { status: tokenResponse.status, error: errorText });
// Drop the refresh token only when the server definitively rejected it
// (invalid/expired/revoked grant). A 5xx or 429 is an outage - keeping
// the cookie lets the session resume once the server is back.
const status = tokenResponse.status;
if (status === 400 || status === 401 || status === 403) {
cookieStore.delete(cookieName);
cookieStore.delete(refreshTokenServerCookieName(slot));
cookieStore.delete(accessTokenCookieName(slot));
clearIdToken(cookieStore, slot, request.nextUrl.basePath);
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Refresh failed' }, { status: 401 });
}
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Token endpoint unavailable' }, { status: 503 });
}
const tokens = await tokenResponse.json();
if (!tokens.access_token) {
logger.error('Refresh response missing access_token', { response: JSON.stringify(tokens).substring(0, 500) });
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid token response' }, { status: 502 });
}
if (tokens.refresh_token) {
cookieStore.set(cookieName, tokens.refresh_token, getCookieOptions());
}
const expiresIn = tokens.expires_in || 3600;
const cachedAccessToken = cacheAccessToken(cookieStore, slot, tokens.access_token, expiresIn, [tokens.refresh_token]);
// Providers may reissue the id token on refresh. Only a slot signed in
// through the provider keeps one; a password login's slot gains none here.
if (typeof tokens.id_token === 'string' && cookieStore.get(idTokenCookieName(slot))) {
storeIdToken(cookieStore, slot, tokens.id_token, request.nextUrl.basePath, [tokens.refresh_token, cachedAccessToken]);
}
return NextResponse.json({
access_token: tokens.access_token,
expires_in: expiresIn,
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Token refresh error', { error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error' });
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Internal server error' }, { status: 500 });
}
}
/**
* Revoke a slot's refresh token and clear its token cookies. With
* `endSession`, also returns the URL that ends the provider's session, or null
* when the provider has no usable end_session_endpoint.
*/
async function signOutSlot(
cookieStore: CookieStore,
slot: number,
basePath: string | undefined,
endSession: boolean,
): Promise<string | null> {
const cookieName = refreshTokenCookieName(slot);
const refreshToken = cookieStore.get(cookieName)?.value;
const serverId = cookieStore.get(refreshTokenServerCookieName(slot))?.value || null;
const idToken = cookieStore.get(idTokenCookieName(slot))?.value;
let endSessionUrl: string | null = null;
if (refreshToken || endSession) {
const metadata = await getMetadata(serverId, { fallbackClientId: DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID }).catch((err) => {
logger.warn('Failed to discover OAuth metadata during logout', {
error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Unknown error',
});
return null;
});
if (refreshToken) await revokeRefreshToken(refreshToken, serverId, metadata);
if (endSession) endSessionUrl = endSessionUrlFor(metadata, serverId, idToken);
}
// Cleared whether or not revocation worked: the browser must not be able
// to resume a session the user ended. Only cookies the browser sent are
// cleared - signing out of every slot would otherwise answer with a
// Set-Cookie header per slot and cookie, too large for some proxies.
for (const name of [cookieName, refreshTokenServerCookieName(slot), accessTokenCookieName(slot)]) {
if (cookieStore.get(name)) cookieStore.delete(name);
}
if (idToken !== undefined) clearIdToken(cookieStore, slot, basePath);
return endSessionUrl;
}
export async function DELETE(request: NextRequest) {
// CSRF gate (GHSA-qvr9-m8cq-7wvg): cookies written here are SameSite=Lax,
// so a cross-site top-level POST would otherwise reach this handler.
const crossOrigin = rejectCrossOriginRequest(request);
if (crossOrigin) return crossOrigin;
try {
const params = request.nextUrl.searchParams;
const basePath = request.nextUrl.basePath;
const cookieStore = await cookies();
if (params.get('all') === 'true') {
// One top-level navigation can end only one provider session, so the
// caller names the slot whose provider should be signed out, if any.
const endSessionSlot = parseSlot(params.get('end_session_slot'));
const slots = Array.from({ length: MAX_ACCOUNT_SLOTS }, (_, i) => i);
const urls = await Promise.all(
slots.map((i) => signOutSlot(cookieStore, i, basePath, i === endSessionSlot)),
);
const endSessionUrl = endSessionSlot === null ? null : urls[endSessionSlot];
return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, ...(endSessionUrl && { end_session_url: endSessionUrl }) });
}
const endSessionUrl = await signOutSlot(cookieStore, getSlot(request), basePath, params.get('end_session') === 'true');
return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, ...(endSessionUrl && { end_session_url: endSessionUrl }) });
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Token revocation error', { error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error' });
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Internal server error' }, { status: 500 });
}
}