mirror of
https://github.com/bulwarkmail/webmail.git
synced 2026-10-31 08:13:50 +00:00
Linus Rath
7401ea6658
Dark mode used to invert the whole message body with a CSS filter and re-invert images and coloured cells. Brand colours came out shifted (red turned pink), white cells set through bgcolor stayed white, and the result changed after loading remote content because the blocker strips the background attributes the selectors relied on. The rendered body is now read back through computed styles and its colours are rewritten in place: light backgrounds are darkened in their own hue, vivid and dark fills stay as sent, text and borders only change when they lack contrast, and anything painted on a background image is left alone. Transparent dark images get their original light background behind them when their pixels show they would vanish. The thread conversation view uses the same pass. Also fixed along the way: - blocking remote content dropped every leading `<style>` block, so mails lost their CSS until images were loaded - a mail's `prefers-color-scheme` rules followed the OS instead of the app theme
1055 lines
47 KiB
TypeScript
1055 lines
47 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
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import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
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import {
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sanitizeEmailHtml,
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sanitizeSignatureHtml,
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sanitizeSignatureHtmlForDisplay,
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parseHtmlSafely,
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hasRichFormatting,
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plainTextToSafeHtml,
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sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml,
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EMAIL_SANITIZE_CONFIG,
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EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG,
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isExternalResourceUrl,
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isHttpLinkHref,
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isOpenableLinkHref,
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applyNewTabToAnchor,
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sanitizeI18nHtml,
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sanitizePluginBodyHtml,
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decodeCssEscapes,
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styleHasExternalUrl,
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stripExternalCssUrls,
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stripExternalStyleSheetCss,
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blockExternalResourcesOnNode,
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restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode,
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sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe,
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sanitizeEmailBodyForIframe,
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TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL,
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} from '../email-sanitization';
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describe('email-sanitization', () => {
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describe('sanitizeEmailHtml', () => {
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it('should remove script tags', () => {
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const malicious = '<p>Hello</p><script>alert("XSS")</script>';
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const clean = sanitizeEmailHtml(malicious);
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expect(clean).not.toContain('<script>');
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expect(clean).toContain('Hello');
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});
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it('should remove event handlers', () => {
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const malicious = '<img src="x" onerror="alert(\'XSS\')">';
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const clean = sanitizeEmailHtml(malicious);
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expect(clean).not.toContain('onerror');
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});
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it('should remove iframe, object, embed tags', () => {
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const malicious = '<div>Content</div><iframe src="evil.com"></iframe><object></object>';
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const clean = sanitizeEmailHtml(malicious);
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expect(clean).not.toContain('<iframe');
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expect(clean).not.toContain('<object');
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expect(clean).toContain('Content');
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});
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it('should remove meta, link, base tags', () => {
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const malicious = '<p>Text</p><meta charset="utf-8"><link rel="stylesheet" href="evil.css">';
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const clean = sanitizeEmailHtml(malicious);
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expect(clean).not.toContain('<meta');
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expect(clean).not.toContain('<link');
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expect(clean).toContain('Text');
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});
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it('should preserve safe HTML structure', () => {
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const safe = '<p>Paragraph</p><div><span>Nested</span></div><table><tr><td>Cell</td></tr></table>';
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const clean = sanitizeEmailHtml(safe);
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expect(clean).toContain('<p>');
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expect(clean).toContain('<div>');
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expect(clean).toContain('<table>');
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expect(clean).toContain('Cell');
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});
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it('should preserve safe attributes', () => {
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const withAttrs = '<p style="color: red;" class="text">Styled</p>';
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const clean = sanitizeEmailHtml(withAttrs);
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expect(clean).toContain('style');
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expect(clean).toContain('class');
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});
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it('should handle empty input', () => {
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expect(sanitizeEmailHtml('')).toBe('');
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expect(sanitizeEmailHtml(' ')).toBeTruthy();
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});
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it('should handle malformed HTML', () => {
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const malformed = '<p>Unclosed<div>Tags';
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const clean = sanitizeEmailHtml(malformed);
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expect(clean).toContain('Unclosed');
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expect(clean).toContain('Tags');
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});
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});
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describe('sanitizeSignatureHtml', () => {
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it('should allow basic formatting tags', () => {
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const signature = '<p><strong>John Doe</strong><br><em>Software Engineer</em></p>';
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const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
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expect(clean).toContain('<strong>');
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expect(clean).toContain('<em>');
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expect(clean).toContain('John Doe');
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});
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it('should allow img with https src', () => {
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const signature = '<p>John</p><img src="https://cdn.example.com/logo.png" alt="Logo" width="120" height="40">';
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const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
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expect(clean).toContain('<img');
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expect(clean).toContain('src="https://cdn.example.com/logo.png"');
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expect(clean).toContain('alt="Logo"');
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expect(clean).toContain('width="120"');
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expect(clean).toContain('height="40"');
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});
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it('should allow img with data:image/png;base64 src', () => {
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const dataUri = '';
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const signature = `<img src="${dataUri}" alt="Logo">`;
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const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
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expect(clean).toContain('<img');
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expect(clean).toContain('data:image/png;base64,');
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});
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it('should allow img with ', '', '', ''];
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for (const src of cases) {
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const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(`<img src="${src}" alt="x">`);
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expect(clean).toContain('<img');
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expect(clean).toContain(src);
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}
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});
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it('should strip img with http: src (https only)', () => {
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const signature = '<img src="http://insecure.example.com/logo.png" alt="Logo">';
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const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
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expect(clean).not.toContain('http://insecure.example.com');
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expect(clean).not.toContain('<img');
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});
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it('should strip img with javascript: src', () => {
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const signature = '<img src="javascript:alert(1)" alt="x">';
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const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
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expect(clean).not.toContain('javascript:');
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expect(clean).not.toContain('<img');
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});
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it('should strip img with " alt="x">';
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const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
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expect(clean).not.toContain('data:image/svg');
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expect(clean).not.toContain('<img');
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});
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it('should strip img with non-image data: URI', () => {
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const signature = '<img src="data:text/html;base64,PHA+aGk8L3A+" alt="x">';
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const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
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expect(clean).not.toContain('data:text/html');
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expect(clean).not.toContain('<img');
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});
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it('should strip event handlers on img', () => {
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const signature = '<img src="https://cdn.example.com/logo.png" alt="x" onerror="alert(1)" onload="alert(2)">';
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const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
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expect(clean).not.toContain('onerror');
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expect(clean).not.toContain('onload');
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expect(clean).toContain('https://cdn.example.com/logo.png');
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});
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it('should remove video and audio tags', () => {
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const signature = '<p>John</p><video src="vid.mp4"></video><audio src="sound.mp3"></audio>';
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const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
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expect(clean).not.toContain('<video');
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expect(clean).not.toContain('<audio');
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});
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it('should preserve links with safe attributes', () => {
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const signature = '<p><a href="https://example.com" style="color: blue;">Website</a></p>';
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const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
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expect(clean).toContain('<a');
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expect(clean).toContain('href');
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expect(clean).toContain('example.com');
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});
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it('should remove script tags', () => {
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const malicious = '<p>Signature</p><script>alert("XSS")</script>';
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const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(malicious);
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expect(clean).not.toContain('<script>');
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expect(clean).toContain('Signature');
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});
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it('should handle empty signatures', () => {
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expect(sanitizeSignatureHtml('')).toBe('');
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expect(sanitizeSignatureHtml(' ')).toBe('');
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});
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it('should be stricter than email sanitization for script-bearing tags', () => {
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const html = '<p>Text</p><table><tr><td>Data</td></tr></table><video src="v.mp4"></video><iframe src="x"></iframe>';
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const emailClean = sanitizeEmailHtml(html);
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const signatureClean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(html);
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// Both preserve tables (signatures are universally table-based)
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expect(emailClean).toContain('<table>');
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expect(signatureClean).toContain('<table');
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expect(signatureClean).toContain('Data');
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// Signature still blocks media and frames
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expect(signatureClean).not.toContain('<video');
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expect(signatureClean).not.toContain('<iframe');
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expect(signatureClean).toContain('Text');
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});
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it('should preserve table layout attributes used by email signatures', () => {
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const signature = '<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"><tr><td valign="top" align="left" bgcolor="#fafafa" colspan="2">Name</td></tr></table>';
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const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
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expect(clean).toContain('cellpadding');
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expect(clean).toContain('cellspacing');
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expect(clean).toContain('valign');
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expect(clean).toContain('align');
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expect(clean).toContain('bgcolor');
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expect(clean).toContain('colspan');
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});
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});
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describe('parseHtmlSafely', () => {
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it('should return a valid Document', () => {
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const html = '<p>Test</p>';
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const doc = parseHtmlSafely(html);
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expect(doc).toBeInstanceOf(Document);
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});
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it('should not execute scripts', () => {
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let executed = false;
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const html = '<script>executed = true;</script>';
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parseHtmlSafely(html);
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expect(executed).toBe(false);
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});
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it('should handle malformed HTML gracefully', () => {
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const malformed = '<p>Unclosed<div>Tags';
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const doc = parseHtmlSafely(malformed);
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expect(doc).toBeInstanceOf(Document);
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expect(doc.body.textContent).toContain('Unclosed');
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});
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});
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describe('hasRichFormatting', () => {
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it('should detect tables', () => {
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const html = '<table><tr><td>Data</td></tr></table>';
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expect(hasRichFormatting(html)).toBe(true);
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});
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it('should detect images', () => {
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const html = '<img src="pic.jpg">';
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expect(hasRichFormatting(html)).toBe(true);
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});
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it('should detect inline styles', () => {
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const html = '<div style="color: red;">Styled</div>';
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expect(hasRichFormatting(html)).toBe(true);
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});
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it('should detect formatting tags', () => {
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expect(hasRichFormatting('<b>Bold</b>')).toBe(true);
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expect(hasRichFormatting('<strong>Strong</strong>')).toBe(true);
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expect(hasRichFormatting('<em>Emphasized</em>')).toBe(true);
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});
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it('should detect headings', () => {
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expect(hasRichFormatting('<h1>Title</h1>')).toBe(true);
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expect(hasRichFormatting('<h3>Subtitle</h3>')).toBe(true);
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});
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it('should detect lists', () => {
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expect(hasRichFormatting('<ul><li>Item</li></ul>')).toBe(true);
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expect(hasRichFormatting('<ol><li>Item</li></ol>')).toBe(true);
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});
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it('should return false for plain text', () => {
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const plain = '<p>Just plain text</p>';
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expect(hasRichFormatting(plain)).toBe(false);
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});
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it('should return false for simple paragraphs', () => {
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const simple = '<p>Line 1</p><p>Line 2</p>';
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expect(hasRichFormatting(simple)).toBe(false);
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});
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it('should handle empty HTML', () => {
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expect(hasRichFormatting('')).toBe(false);
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expect(hasRichFormatting(' ')).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe('inline CID image handling', () => {
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it('should preserve blob: URLs for CID-replaced images (not treated as external)', () => {
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// Simulate what the component does: replace cid: with blob: object URLs
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const html = '<p>See image:</p><img src="blob:http://localhost/abc-123">';
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const clean = sanitizeEmailHtml(html);
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expect(clean).toContain('blob:');
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});
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it('should preserve data: URLs for CID placeholder images', () => {
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const html = '<img src="">';
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const clean = sanitizeEmailHtml(html);
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expect(clean).toContain('data:image/gif');
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});
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it('should not leave raw JMAP download URLs after CID replacement pattern', () => {
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// This tests the regex pattern used for CID replacement
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const htmlWithCid = '<img src="cid:image001@example.com">';
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// Simulate the component's replacement: all cid: refs should become blob: or data: URLs
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const replaced = htmlWithCid.replace(
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/\bcid:([^"'\s)]+)/gi,
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() => 'blob:http://localhost/safe-object-url'
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);
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expect(replaced).not.toContain('cid:');
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expect(replaced).toContain('blob:');
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});
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it('should block external http(s) images but not blob/data URLs via DOMPurify hook', () => {
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const html = `
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<img src="blob:http://localhost/inline-ok">
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<img src="https://tracker.evil.com/pixel.png">
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<img src="">
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`;
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const config = { ...EMAIL_SANITIZE_CONFIG };
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DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) => {
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if (node.tagName === 'IMG') {
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const src = node.getAttribute('src');
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if (src && (src.startsWith('http://') || src.startsWith('https://') || src.startsWith('//'))) {
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node.setAttribute('data-blocked-src', src);
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node.removeAttribute('src');
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node.setAttribute('alt', '[Image blocked]');
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}
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}
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});
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const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(html, config);
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DOMPurify.removeAllHooks();
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// External https image should be blocked
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expect(clean).toContain('data-blocked-src');
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expect(clean).toContain('tracker.evil.com');
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// blob: and data: URLs should NOT be blocked (they don't start with http/https)
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expect(clean).toContain('blob:');
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expect(clean).toContain('data:image/gif');
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});
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});
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describe('isExternalResourceUrl', () => {
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it('detects http(s) and protocol-relative URLs', () => {
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('https://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('http://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('//tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
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});
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it('sees through leading whitespace/newlines (imgNewlineSrc bypass)', () => {
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('\n\nhttps://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl(' \t https://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
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// Tab/newline removed anywhere in the URL by the parser.
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('h\nttps://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('ht\ttps://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
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});
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it('treats inline/local schemes as not external', () => {
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('')).toBe(false);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('blob:http://localhost/abc')).toBe(false);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('cid:image001@example.com')).toBe(false);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('/relative/path.png')).toBe(false);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('')).toBe(false);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl(null)).toBe(false);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl(undefined)).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe('isHttpLinkHref (open-in-new-tab eligibility)', () => {
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it('treats http(s) and protocol-relative links as new-tab links', () => {
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expect(isHttpLinkHref('https://example.com/page')).toBe(true);
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expect(isHttpLinkHref('http://example.com/page')).toBe(true);
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expect(isHttpLinkHref('//example.com/page')).toBe(true);
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expect(isHttpLinkHref('HTTPS://EXAMPLE.COM')).toBe(true);
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});
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it('sees through obfuscated schemes (leading/embedded whitespace)', () => {
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expect(isHttpLinkHref('\n\nhttps://example.com')).toBe(true);
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expect(isHttpLinkHref(' \t https://example.com')).toBe(true);
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expect(isHttpLinkHref('h\nttps://example.com')).toBe(true);
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});
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it('excludes mailto and other non-web schemes (must NOT open a new tab)', () => {
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expect(isHttpLinkHref('mailto:someone@example.com')).toBe(false);
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expect(isHttpLinkHref('mailto:someone@example.com?subject=Hi')).toBe(false);
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expect(isHttpLinkHref('tel:+15551234567')).toBe(false);
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expect(isHttpLinkHref('sms:+15551234567')).toBe(false);
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expect(isHttpLinkHref('cid:image001@example.com')).toBe(false);
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expect(isHttpLinkHref('#section')).toBe(false);
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expect(isHttpLinkHref('/relative/path')).toBe(false);
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expect(isHttpLinkHref('')).toBe(false);
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expect(isHttpLinkHref(null)).toBe(false);
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expect(isHttpLinkHref(undefined)).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe('applyNewTabToAnchor', () => {
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const anchor = (html: string): HTMLAnchorElement =>
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parseHtmlSafely(html).querySelector('a')!;
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it('adds target/rel to http(s) links', () => {
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const a = anchor('<a href="https://example.com">x</a>');
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applyNewTabToAnchor(a);
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expect(a.getAttribute('target')).toBe('_blank');
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expect(a.getAttribute('rel')).toBe('noopener noreferrer');
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});
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it('strips target/rel from mailto links', () => {
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const a = anchor('<a href="mailto:a@b.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">x</a>');
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applyNewTabToAnchor(a);
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expect(a.getAttribute('target')).toBeNull();
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expect(a.getAttribute('rel')).toBeNull();
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});
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it('strips target from tel: and in-page #anchors', () => {
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const tel = anchor('<a href="tel:+1555" target="_blank">x</a>');
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applyNewTabToAnchor(tel);
|
|
expect(tel.getAttribute('target')).toBeNull();
|
|
const frag = anchor('<a href="#section" target="_blank">x</a>');
|
|
applyNewTabToAnchor(frag);
|
|
expect(frag.getAttribute('target')).toBeNull();
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('ignores non-anchor elements', () => {
|
|
const span = parseHtmlSafely('<span target="_blank">x</span>').querySelector('span')!;
|
|
applyNewTabToAnchor(span);
|
|
expect(span.getAttribute('target')).toBe('_blank');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('sanitizeI18nHtml', () => {
|
|
it('preserves an authored target="_blank" and hardens rel (regression: DOMPurify strips target)', () => {
|
|
const out = sanitizeI18nHtml(
|
|
'See the <a href="/docs/guides/account-security" class="underline" target="_blank">documentation</a>.',
|
|
);
|
|
expect(out).toContain('target="_blank"');
|
|
expect(out).toContain('rel="noopener noreferrer"');
|
|
expect(out).toContain('href="/docs/guides/account-security"');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('leaves links without a target untouched (no spurious new tab)', () => {
|
|
const out = sanitizeI18nHtml('Go <a href="/settings">here</a>.');
|
|
expect(out).toContain('href="/settings"');
|
|
expect(out).not.toContain('target=');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('decodeCssEscapes', () => {
|
|
it('decodes hex escapes (cssEscape bypass)', () => {
|
|
expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\68ttp://x')).toBe('http://x');
|
|
expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\000068ttps://x')).toBe('https://x');
|
|
// Hex escape consumes one trailing whitespace separator.
|
|
expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\68 ttp')).toBe('http');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('decodes single-character escapes', () => {
|
|
expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\h\\t\\t\\p')).toBe('http');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('styleHasExternalUrl / stripExternalCssUrls', () => {
|
|
it('detects and strips plain external url()', () => {
|
|
const style = 'background:url(https://tracker.example/p.png)';
|
|
expect(styleHasExternalUrl(style)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(stripExternalCssUrls(style)).toBe('background:url()');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('detects and strips CSS-escaped external url()', () => {
|
|
const style = 'background:url(\\68ttps://tracker.example/p.png)';
|
|
expect(styleHasExternalUrl(style)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(stripExternalCssUrls(style)).toBe('background:url()');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('detects url() with whitespace/quotes', () => {
|
|
expect(styleHasExternalUrl("background: url( '\n https://t/p.png' )")).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('leaves data: and relative url() untouched', () => {
|
|
const style = "background:url('')";
|
|
expect(styleHasExternalUrl(style)).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(stripExternalCssUrls(style)).toBe(style);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const BS = String.fromCharCode(92);
|
|
|
|
it('detects an escaped url keyword', () => {
|
|
const style = `background:${BS}75 rl(https://tracker.example/p.png)`;
|
|
expect(styleHasExternalUrl(style)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(stripExternalCssUrls(style)).not.toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('detects image-set() with plain strings', () => {
|
|
const style = "background-image:image-set('https://tracker.example/p.png' 1x)";
|
|
expect(styleHasExternalUrl(style)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(stripExternalCssUrls(style)).toBe('background-image:none');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('detects an unclosed url() at the end of the declarations', () => {
|
|
const style = 'width:9px;background:url(https://tracker.example/p.png';
|
|
expect(styleHasExternalUrl(style)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(stripExternalCssUrls(style)).not.toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('detects backslash-spelled hosts inside url()', () => {
|
|
// CSS reads an escaped backslash as one "\", which the URL parser
|
|
// then treats as "/": "/\host" is "//host".
|
|
expect(styleHasExternalUrl(`background:url(/${BS}${BS}tracker.example/p.png)`)).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('isExternalResourceUrl: backslashes and slashless schemes', () => {
|
|
const BS = String.fromCharCode(92);
|
|
it.each([
|
|
`https:/${BS}tracker.example/p.gif`,
|
|
`https:${BS}${BS}tracker.example/p.gif`,
|
|
`/${BS}tracker.example/p.gif`,
|
|
`${BS}${BS}tracker.example/p.gif`,
|
|
'https:tracker.example/p.gif',
|
|
])('treats %s as external', (url) => {
|
|
expect(isExternalResourceUrl(url)).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('still leaves a plain relative path alone', () => {
|
|
expect(isExternalResourceUrl('/relative/path.png')).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('stripExternalStyleSheetCss (<style> block defence-in-depth, #457)', () => {
|
|
it('strips external url() inside a style rule', () => {
|
|
expect(stripExternalStyleSheetCss("#x{background:url('http://tracker.example/y')}"))
|
|
.toBe('#x{background:url()}');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('strips the CSS-escaped url() keyword (\\75\\72\\6C()', () => {
|
|
expect(stripExternalStyleSheetCss("#x{background:\\75\\72\\6C('http://tracker.example/y')}"))
|
|
.toBe('#x{background:url()}');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('removes a remote @import (bare-string form)', () => {
|
|
expect(stripExternalStyleSheetCss('@import "http://tracker.example/s.css";\n#x{color:red}'))
|
|
.toBe('\n#x{color:red}');
|
|
expect(stripExternalStyleSheetCss("@import '//tracker.example/s.css';")).toBe('');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('neutralises a remote @import url() form', () => {
|
|
expect(stripExternalStyleSheetCss('@import url(http://tracker.example/s.css);'))
|
|
.toBe('@import url();');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('leaves a stylesheet with no external refs unchanged (escapes intact)', () => {
|
|
const css = '#x{content:"\\2014";background:url()}';
|
|
expect(stripExternalStyleSheetCss(css)).toBe(css);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('blockExternalResourcesOnNode strips a <style> block and reports blocked', () => {
|
|
const style = parseHtmlSafely(
|
|
'<body><style>#x{background:url(http://tracker.example/y)}</style></body>',
|
|
).body.firstElementChild!;
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(style)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(style.textContent).toBe('#x{background:url()}');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('blockExternalResourcesOnNode (anti-tracking vectors)', () => {
|
|
function el(html: string): Element {
|
|
return parseHtmlSafely(`<body>${html}</body>`).body.firstElementChild!;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
it('blocks an img whose src is hidden behind a leading newline', () => {
|
|
const img = el('<img src="">');
|
|
img.setAttribute('src', '\n\nhttps://tracker.example/pixel.png');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(img)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(img.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toBe('https://tracker.example/pixel.png');
|
|
expect(img.getAttribute('src')).toBe(TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('blocks img srcset', () => {
|
|
const img = el('<img srcset="https://tracker.example/1x.png 1x, https://tracker.example/2x.png 2x">');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(img)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(img.hasAttribute('srcset')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(img.getAttribute('data-blocked-srcset')).toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('blocks <picture><source srcset> (pictureSource)', () => {
|
|
const source = el('<source srcset="https://tracker.example/pic.webp" type="image/webp">');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(source)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(source.hasAttribute('srcset')).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('blocks <source src> for media', () => {
|
|
const source = el('<source src="https://tracker.example/v.mp4">');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(source)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(source.hasAttribute('src')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(source.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('blocks <video poster> (videoPoster)', () => {
|
|
const video = el('<video poster="https://tracker.example/poster.jpg"></video>');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(video)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(video.hasAttribute('poster')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(video.getAttribute('data-blocked-poster')).toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('blocks video src', () => {
|
|
const video = el('<video src="https://tracker.example/v.mp4"></video>');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(video)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(video.hasAttribute('src')).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('blocks the legacy background attribute', () => {
|
|
// <td> is foster-parented out of <body>, so build it directly.
|
|
const td = document.createElement('td');
|
|
td.setAttribute('background', 'https://tracker.example/bg.png');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(td)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(td.hasAttribute('background')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(td.getAttribute('data-blocked-background')).toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('strips external inline style url() including CSS escapes (cssEscape)', () => {
|
|
const div = el('<div style="background:url(\\68ttps://tracker.example/p.png)">x</div>');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(div)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(div.getAttribute('style')).not.toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
expect(div.getAttribute('data-blocked-style')).toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('does not block inline/local resources', () => {
|
|
const img = el('<img src="blob:http://localhost/inline">');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(img)).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(img.getAttribute('src')).toBe('blob:http://localhost/inline');
|
|
|
|
const dataImg = el('<img src="">');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(dataImg)).toBe(false);
|
|
|
|
const cidImg = el('<img src="cid:logo@example.com">');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(cidImg)).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('works as a DOMPurify afterSanitizeAttributes hook across all vectors', () => {
|
|
const html = `
|
|
<img src=" https://tracker.example/a.png">
|
|
<picture><source srcset="https://tracker.example/b.webp"><img src="https://tracker.example/c.png"></picture>
|
|
<div style="background:url(\\68ttps://tracker.example/d.png)">bg</div>
|
|
`;
|
|
DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) => {
|
|
blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node as Element);
|
|
});
|
|
const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(html, EMAIL_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
|
|
DOMPurify.removeAllHooks();
|
|
|
|
const doc = parseHtmlSafely(clean);
|
|
// No live src/srcset/style references the tracker anymore.
|
|
doc.querySelectorAll('img, source').forEach((node) => {
|
|
expect(node.getAttribute('src') ?? '').not.toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
expect(node.getAttribute('srcset') ?? '').not.toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
});
|
|
expect(doc.querySelector('div')?.getAttribute('style') ?? '').not.toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
// The originals are stashed for the banner/affordance.
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('data-blocked-src');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('data-blocked-srcset');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('data-blocked-style');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('Email Privacy Tester exact payloads (iframe render path)', () => {
|
|
function render(html: string): string {
|
|
DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) =>
|
|
blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node as Element)
|
|
);
|
|
const out = DOMPurify.sanitize(html, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
|
|
DOMPurify.removeAllHooks();
|
|
return out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
it('pictureSource: <picture><source srcset> does not keep a live external ref', () => {
|
|
const source = parseHtmlSafely(render('<picture><source srcset="http://TRACK/"><img src="#"></picture>')).querySelector('source')!;
|
|
expect(source.hasAttribute('srcset')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(source.getAttribute('data-blocked-srcset')).toContain('TRACK');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('imgNewlineSrc: newline after the first slash (protocol-relative) is blocked', () => {
|
|
const img = parseHtmlSafely(render('<img src="/\n/TRACK_HOST/PATH">')).querySelector('img')!;
|
|
expect(img.getAttribute('src')).toBe(TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL);
|
|
expect(img.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toContain('TRACK_HOST');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('videoPoster: poster and src are both stripped', () => {
|
|
const video = parseHtmlSafely(render('<video poster="http://TRACK/" autoplay="true" src="http://OTHER/"></video>')).querySelector('video')!;
|
|
expect(video.hasAttribute('poster')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(video.hasAttribute('src')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(video.getAttribute('data-blocked-poster')).toContain('TRACK');
|
|
expect(video.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toContain('OTHER');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('anchor href is preserved (links stay clickable; DNS prefetch is disabled via iframe meta)', () => {
|
|
const out = render('<a href="http://TRACK/">link</a>');
|
|
expect(out).toContain('href="http://TRACK/"');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('plainTextToSafeHtml', () => {
|
|
it('escapes HTML-special characters in surrounding text', () => {
|
|
const result = plainTextToSafeHtml('<script>alert(1)</script> & "q" \'q\'');
|
|
expect(result).not.toContain('<script>');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('<script>');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('&');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('"');
|
|
expect(result).toContain(''');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('linkifies http(s) URLs', () => {
|
|
const result = plainTextToSafeHtml('visit http://example.com/path now');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('<a href="http://example.com/path"');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('target="_blank"');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('rel="noopener noreferrer"');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('prevents attribute breakout via quote in URL (CVE regression)', () => {
|
|
const payload = 'http://evil.tld/"onmouseover="alert(1)"x="';
|
|
const result = plainTextToSafeHtml(payload);
|
|
// The anchor tag must not contain any unescaped attribute beyond href/target/rel.
|
|
expect(result).not.toMatch(/<a [^>]*onmouseover/i);
|
|
expect(result).not.toMatch(/<a [^>]*style=/i);
|
|
// Quotes from the payload must be entity-encoded wherever they land.
|
|
expect(result).toContain('"');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('prevents attribute breakout via style injection', () => {
|
|
const payload = 'http://evil.tld/"style="background:red"x="';
|
|
const result = plainTextToSafeHtml(payload);
|
|
expect(result).not.toMatch(/href="[^"]*"[^>]*style=/);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('terminates URL at quote, keeping rest as escaped text', () => {
|
|
const result = plainTextToSafeHtml('http://evil.tld/"injected');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('<a href="http://evil.tld/"');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('"injected');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('applies linkClass when provided and escapes it', () => {
|
|
const result = plainTextToSafeHtml('http://x.com', 'text-primary hover:underline');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('class="text-primary hover:underline"');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('does not linkify non-http schemes', () => {
|
|
const result = plainTextToSafeHtml('try javascript:alert(1) or file:///etc/passwd');
|
|
expect(result).not.toContain('<a ');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('javascript:alert(1)');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('sanitizeSignatureHtmlForDisplay', () => {
|
|
// Signatures render into the main document (identity-form preview, composer
|
|
// block), not the sandboxed iframe, so a target-less anchor navigates the
|
|
// whole app away and takes the unsaved draft/signature with it.
|
|
it('forces target=_blank and rel on signature links', () => {
|
|
const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtmlForDisplay('<p><a href="https://example.com">Site</a></p>');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('target="_blank"');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('rel="noopener noreferrer"');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('overrides a target the user supplied themselves', () => {
|
|
const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtmlForDisplay('<a href="https://example.com" target="_top">x</a>');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('target="_blank"');
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('_top');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('keeps the image restrictions of the storage sanitizer', () => {
|
|
const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtmlForDisplay(
|
|
'<img src="http://insecure.example.com/l.png"><img src="https://cdn.example.com/l.png">',
|
|
);
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('insecure.example.com');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('https://cdn.example.com/l.png');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('does not leak target into the stored or sent signature', () => {
|
|
// sanitizeSignatureHtml feeds both storage and the outgoing message body.
|
|
const stored = sanitizeSignatureHtml('<p><a href="https://example.com">Site</a></p>');
|
|
expect(stored).toContain('href="https://example.com"');
|
|
expect(stored).not.toContain('target=');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('handles empty input', () => {
|
|
expect(sanitizeSignatureHtmlForDisplay('')).toBe('');
|
|
expect(sanitizeSignatureHtmlForDisplay(' ')).toBe('');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml', () => {
|
|
// This branch renders into the main document, not the sandboxed iframe, so
|
|
// an anchor that loses target="_blank" navigates the whole app away.
|
|
it('preserves target and rel on links emitted by plainTextToSafeHtml', () => {
|
|
const rendered = sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml(
|
|
plainTextToSafeHtml('see https://github.com/honzup/webmail/pull/560'),
|
|
);
|
|
expect(rendered).toContain('target="_blank"');
|
|
expect(rendered).toContain('rel="noopener noreferrer"');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('still strips dangerous schemes and tags', () => {
|
|
const rendered = sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml(
|
|
'<a href="javascript:alert(1)" target="_blank">x</a><script>alert(1)</script>',
|
|
);
|
|
expect(rendered).not.toContain('javascript:');
|
|
expect(rendered).not.toContain('<script');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// A plugin that offloads an attachment hands back a link block that goes
|
|
// into the host document and into the message the user sends, so it is
|
|
// untrusted input even though the plugin is installed.
|
|
describe('sanitizePluginBodyHtml', () => {
|
|
it('keeps the link block an offload plugin returns', () => {
|
|
const out = sanitizePluginBodyHtml(
|
|
'<p>Attachment: <a href="https://drop.example/f/abc">report.pdf</a> (12 MB)</p>',
|
|
);
|
|
expect(out).toContain('href="https://drop.example/f/abc"');
|
|
expect(out).toContain('report.pdf');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('strips script, event handlers and javascript: URLs', () => {
|
|
const out = sanitizePluginBodyHtml(
|
|
'<script>steal()</script><img src=x onerror="steal()"><a href="javascript:steal()">go</a>',
|
|
);
|
|
expect(out).not.toContain('<script');
|
|
expect(out).not.toContain('onerror');
|
|
expect(out).not.toContain('javascript:');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('returns empty string for empty input', () => {
|
|
expect(sanitizePluginBodyHtml('')).toBe('');
|
|
expect(sanitizePluginBodyHtml(' ')).toBe('');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP excludes image/svg+xml on purpose (DOMPurify cannot see
|
|
// inside a data: URI), but its media-tag carve-out short-circuits that check
|
|
// before the regexp runs - so every data: URI reached <img> and friends.
|
|
describe('restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode', () => {
|
|
const blocked = [
|
|
['svg base64', ''],
|
|
['svg inline', ''],
|
|
['javascript', 'data:application/javascript,alert(1)'],
|
|
['svg, leading space', ' data:image/svg+xml,x'],
|
|
['svg, control chars in scheme', 'da\tta:image/svg+xml,x'],
|
|
] as const;
|
|
|
|
for (const [label, uri] of blocked) {
|
|
it(`drops ${label} from an img src`, () => {
|
|
expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe(`<img src="${uri}">`)).not.toContain('data:');
|
|
expect(sanitizeEmailHtml(`<img src="${uri}">`)).not.toContain('data:');
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
it('covers the other media tags DOMPurify waves through', () => {
|
|
for (const tag of ['video', 'audio', 'source', 'track']) {
|
|
const html = `<${tag} src="data:image/svg+xml,x"></${tag}>`;
|
|
expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe(html)).not.toContain('data:');
|
|
}
|
|
// <image> is rewritten to <img> by the parser, href included.
|
|
expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe('<image href="data:image/svg+xml,x">')).not.toContain('data:');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('keeps inline raster images and every other allowed scheme', () => {
|
|
expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe('<img src="">')).toContain('data:image/png');
|
|
expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe('<img src="">')).toContain('data:image/gif');
|
|
expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe('<img src="">')).toContain('data:image/jpeg');
|
|
expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe('<img src="cid:part1">')).toContain('cid:part1');
|
|
expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe('<img src="https://example.com/a.png">')).toContain('https://example.com/a.png');
|
|
expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe('<img src="blob:https://example.com/x">')).toContain('blob:');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('leaves non-media elements to ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP', () => {
|
|
const node = parseHtmlSafely('<a href="data:image/svg+xml,x">x</a>').querySelector('a')!;
|
|
restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode(node);
|
|
expect(node.getAttribute('href')).toBe('data:image/svg+xml,x');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// The blocked-external placeholder shares this hook pass, so it must not be
|
|
// a data: URI the restriction would strip right back out.
|
|
it('preserves the blocked-image placeholder', () => {
|
|
const node = parseHtmlSafely('<img src="https://tracker.example/p.gif">').querySelector('img')!;
|
|
blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node);
|
|
restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode(node);
|
|
expect(node.getAttribute('src')).toBe(TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// DOMPurify URI-tests srcset as one string, so an allowed first candidate
|
|
// would wave an SVG second candidate through (#717 review finding). The
|
|
// guard re-checks every data: occurrence and drops the whole attribute.
|
|
it('drops a srcset that smuggles an svg candidate behind a raster one', () => {
|
|
const html = '<img srcset=" 1x, data:image/svg+xml,<svg onload=alert(1)></svg> 2x">';
|
|
expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe(html)).not.toContain('svg');
|
|
expect(sanitizeEmailHtml(html)).not.toContain('svg');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('drops a <picture><source srcset> with a disallowed data: candidate', () => {
|
|
const html = '<picture><source srcset=" 1x, "></picture>';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe(html);
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('svg');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('keeps an all-raster srcset and non-data candidates', () => {
|
|
const raster = '<img srcset=" 1x,  2x">';
|
|
expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe(raster)).toContain('srcset');
|
|
const node = parseHtmlSafely('<img srcset="https://example.com/a.png 1x, https://example.com/b.png 2x">').querySelector('img')!;
|
|
restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode(node);
|
|
expect(node.getAttribute('srcset')).toContain('example.com/a.png');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// The plain (non-base64) data: form ends its metadata with a comma; the
|
|
// srcset verdict must match the src verdict for the same URI.
|
|
it('keeps the comma-form raster data: URI a src would allow', () => {
|
|
const node = parseHtmlSafely('<img srcset="data:image/gif,R0lGODlh 1x">').querySelector('img')!;
|
|
restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode(node);
|
|
expect(node.getAttribute('srcset')).toContain('data:image/gif,R0lGODlh');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// The external blocker stashes the whole srcset before this guard runs in
|
|
// the shared hook pass - the stash must not keep the disallowed candidate.
|
|
it('scrubs the data-blocked-srcset stash the external blocker leaves', () => {
|
|
const node = parseHtmlSafely('<img srcset="https://tracker.example/a.png 1x, data:image/svg+xml,<svg/> 2x">').querySelector('img')!;
|
|
blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node);
|
|
expect(node.getAttribute('data-blocked-srcset')).toContain('svg');
|
|
restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode(node);
|
|
expect(node.hasAttribute('data-blocked-srcset')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(node.hasAttribute('srcset')).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// The one sanitizer every rendered body goes through - including the HTML a
|
|
// decryption plugin hands back from onRenderEmailBody, which used to skip the
|
|
// external-content policy entirely (#797).
|
|
describe('sanitizeEmailBodyForIframe', () => {
|
|
it('blocks external images and reports it when blocking is on', () => {
|
|
const result = sanitizeEmailBodyForIframe(
|
|
'<p>hi</p><img src="https://tracker.example/pixel.gif">',
|
|
true,
|
|
);
|
|
expect(result.blockedExternalContent).toBe(true);
|
|
// The real URL survives only in the restore stash, behind the placeholder.
|
|
const img = parseHtmlSafely(result.html).querySelector('img')!;
|
|
expect(img.getAttribute('src')).toBe(TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL);
|
|
expect(img.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toBe('https://tracker.example/pixel.gif');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('keeps a leading <style> block when it blocks an image', () => {
|
|
// Collapsing the emptied image cell re-parses the HTML; a <style> at the
|
|
// very start used to land in <head> there and get dropped, so the mail
|
|
// lost all its CSS until remote content was allowed.
|
|
const result = sanitizeEmailBodyForIframe(
|
|
'<style>.card { background: #fff; }</style><table><tr><td><img src="https://cdn.example/a.png"></td></tr></table>',
|
|
true,
|
|
);
|
|
expect(result.blockedExternalContent).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(result.html).toContain('<style>.card { background: #fff; }</style>');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('leaves external images alone when blocking is off', () => {
|
|
const result = sanitizeEmailBodyForIframe('<img src="https://cdn.example/a.png">', false);
|
|
expect(result.blockedExternalContent).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(result.html).toContain('src="https://cdn.example/a.png"');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('covers the non-img vectors a decrypted newsletter can carry', () => {
|
|
const html = [
|
|
'<img srcset="https://t.example/a.png 1x">',
|
|
'<video poster="https://t.example/p.jpg"></video>',
|
|
'<table><tr><td background="https://t.example/bg.gif">x</td></tr></table>',
|
|
'<div style="background:url(https://t.example/bg.png)"></div>',
|
|
'<style>body{background:url(https://t.example/s.png)}</style>',
|
|
].join('');
|
|
const result = sanitizeEmailBodyForIframe(html, true);
|
|
expect(result.blockedExternalContent).toBe(true);
|
|
// Live attributes gone; only the data-blocked-* restore stashes remain,
|
|
// so assert on the parsed DOM rather than on substrings of the markup.
|
|
const doc = parseHtmlSafely(result.html);
|
|
expect(doc.querySelector('img')!.hasAttribute('srcset')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(doc.querySelector('video')!.hasAttribute('poster')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(doc.querySelector('td')!.hasAttribute('background')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(doc.querySelector('div')!.getAttribute('style')).not.toContain('t.example/bg.png');
|
|
expect(doc.querySelector('style')!.textContent).not.toContain('t.example/s.png');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('drops <link> only in blocking mode (it is a remote-sheet vector)', () => {
|
|
const html = '<link rel="stylesheet" href="https://t.example/s.css"><p>x</p>';
|
|
expect(sanitizeEmailBodyForIframe(html, true).html).not.toContain('<link');
|
|
// Not blocking: <link> is still forbidden by the base iframe config.
|
|
expect(sanitizeEmailBodyForIframe(html, false).html).not.toContain('t.example/s.css');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('keeps inline cid:/blob:/data: images while blocking', () => {
|
|
const result = sanitizeEmailBodyForIframe(
|
|
'<img src="blob:https://app.example/x"><img src="">',
|
|
true,
|
|
);
|
|
expect(result.blockedExternalContent).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(result.html).toContain('blob:https://app.example/x');
|
|
expect(result.html).toContain('data:image/png');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('still strips scripts, keeps <style>, and opens http links in a new tab', () => {
|
|
const result = sanitizeEmailBodyForIframe(
|
|
'<script>alert(1)</script><style>p{color:red}</style>'
|
|
+ '<a href="https://example.com">a</a><a href="mailto:x@y.z">b</a>',
|
|
true,
|
|
);
|
|
expect(result.html).not.toContain('<script');
|
|
expect(result.html).toContain('<style>');
|
|
expect(result.html).toContain('target="_blank"');
|
|
expect(result.html).toContain('rel="noopener noreferrer"');
|
|
expect(result.html).toContain('href="mailto:x@y.z"');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('does not leave hooks behind for the next sanitizer call', () => {
|
|
sanitizeEmailBodyForIframe('<img src="https://t.example/p.gif">', true);
|
|
// A plain sanitize afterwards must not inherit the blocking hook.
|
|
expect(sanitizeEmailHtml('<img src="https://cdn.example/a.png">'))
|
|
.toContain('https://cdn.example/a.png');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('isOpenableLinkHref (message-body click -> window.open gate, GHSA-xvjh-v9c6-qcvc)', () => {
|
|
it('lets web links and external protocol handlers through', () => {
|
|
expect(isOpenableLinkHref('https://example.com/x')).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(isOpenableLinkHref('HTTP://example.com')).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(isOpenableLinkHref('//example.com/x')).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(isOpenableLinkHref('tel:+4912345')).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(isOpenableLinkHref('sms:+4912345')).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(isOpenableLinkHref('ftp://example.com/f')).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('refuses anything that would open inside the webmail origin', () => {
|
|
expect(isOpenableLinkHref('blob:https://mail.example/0f3d-ab12')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(isOpenableLinkHref('data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(isOpenableLinkHref('')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(isOpenableLinkHref('statement.pdf')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(isOpenableLinkHref('/en/mail/folder/inbox/statement.pdf')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(isOpenableLinkHref('./x')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(isOpenableLinkHref('cid:unresolved')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(isOpenableLinkHref('javascript:alert(1)')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(isOpenableLinkHref('')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(isOpenableLinkHref(null)).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('ignores leading control characters and whitespace when reading the scheme', () => {
|
|
expect(isOpenableLinkHref('blob:https://mail.example/x')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(isOpenableLinkHref(' tel:123')).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|