fix(auth): enforce monotonic privilege on user token lifecycle endpoints (#9371)

backend/.sqlx/query-7f832370916794ab0e5645053688c24678f1519d49ee7263a86dba71d45b8e8c.json

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+{
+  "db_name": "PostgreSQL",
+  "query": "INSERT INTO token\n            (token_hash, token_prefix, token, email, label, expiration, super_admin, scopes, read_only)\n            VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, now() + ($6 || ' seconds')::interval, $7, $8, $9)",
+  "describe": {
+    "columns": [],
+    "parameters": {
+      "Left": [
+        "Varchar",
+        "Varchar",
+        "Varchar",
+        "Varchar",
+        "Varchar",
+        "Text",
+        "Bool",
+        "TextArray",
+        "Bool"
+      ]
+    },
+    "nullable": []
+  },
+  "hash": "7f832370916794ab0e5645053688c24678f1519d49ee7263a86dba71d45b8e8c"
+}

backend/ee-repo-ref.txt

@@ -1 +1 @@
-08e3b9b818f9f1b439e9a6ba477fd5fdbcab944e
+3742e0659c5e97aab03b9efeea14cd94a3ac658a

backend/windmill-api-auth/src/lib.rs

@@ -235,6 +235,202 @@ where
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Returns the caller's "real" scope restrictions: every scope other than
+/// `if_jobs:filter_tags:` tag filters. `None` means the token is unscoped and
+/// has the full privileges of its user; `Some` means it is restricted to the
+/// returned scopes. An empty or filter-tags-only scope list is treated as
+/// unscoped, mirroring `check_scopes`/`check_route_access`.
+fn scope_restrictions(scopes: Option<&[String]>) -> Option<Vec<&String>> {
+    let restrictions: Vec<&String> = scopes?
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|s| !s.starts_with("if_jobs:filter_tags:"))
+        .collect();
+    (!restrictions.is_empty()).then_some(restrictions)
+}
+
+/// Enforce monotonic privilege when a token lifecycle endpoint mints or rescopes
+/// a credential on behalf of `authed`: the resulting credential must never be
+/// more privileged than the caller's own token.
+///
+/// - An unscoped caller may grant any scopes (this is the existing UI/CLI flow).
+/// - A scope-restricted caller may only grant scopes that are a subset of its
+///   own, and may never produce an unscoped credential.
+///
+/// Without this, a `users:write` token could create or rescope a token to be
+/// unscoped, and a `users:read` token could refresh into an unscoped session —
+/// escaping its own restrictions.
+pub fn ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+    authed: &ApiAuthed,
+    requested_scopes: Option<&[String]>,
+) -> error::Result<()> {
+    if let Some(caller_restrictions) = scope_restrictions(authed.scopes.as_deref()) {
+        let Some(requested_restrictions) = scope_restrictions(requested_scopes) else {
+            return Err(Error::PermissionDenied(
+                "A scope-restricted token cannot create or update a token with broader (unscoped) \
+                 privileges"
+                    .to_string(),
+            ));
+        };
+
+        // MCP scopes (`mcp:all`, `mcp:favorites`, `mcp:scripts:*`, etc.) use a
+        // custom format that ScopeDefinition::from_scope_string parses
+        // permissively but the MCP runtime interprets via its own parser
+        // (parse_mcp_scopes). The two views disagree — e.g. the generic parser
+        // accepts `mcp:scripts` as an unrestricted-resource scope, while the
+        // MCP runtime ignores it as unrecognized but interprets `mcp:scripts:*`
+        // as granting all scripts. So generic containment would silently allow
+        // `mcp:scripts` → `mcp:scripts:*` (a widening). Legitimate MCP token
+        // issuance goes through the OAuth gateway (mcp/oauth_server.rs), not
+        // these user-token endpoints, so require byte-identical match for MCP
+        // scopes here rather than trying to mirror MCP semantics in two places.
+        // Unparseable non-MCP caller scopes are intentionally dropped
+        // (fail-closed): a caller scope that fails to parse can only narrow
+        // the set of requested scopes that get covered, never widen it.
+        // Unparseable requested scopes surface as `BadRequest`, which is what
+        // we want — the client is sending garbage.
+        let parsed_caller: Vec<ScopeDefinition> = caller_restrictions
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|s| !s.starts_with("mcp:"))
+            .filter_map(|s| ScopeDefinition::from_scope_string(s).ok())
+            .collect();
+        let caller_mcp: std::collections::HashSet<&str> = caller_restrictions
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|s| s.starts_with("mcp:"))
+            .map(|s| s.as_str())
+            .collect();
+
+        for requested in requested_restrictions {
+            if requested.starts_with("mcp:") {
+                if !caller_mcp.contains(requested.as_str()) {
+                    return Err(Error::PermissionDenied(format!(
+                        "A scope-restricted token cannot grant MCP scope '{requested}' unless the \
+                         caller holds the same scope verbatim"
+                    )));
+                }
+                continue;
+            }
+            let requested_scope = ScopeDefinition::from_scope_string(requested)?;
+            let covered = parsed_caller
+                .iter()
+                .any(|caller_scope| scope_contains(caller_scope, &requested_scope));
+            if !covered {
+                return Err(Error::PermissionDenied(format!(
+                    "A scope-restricted token cannot grant scope '{requested}' which exceeds its \
+                     own scopes"
+                )));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    // `if_jobs:filter_tags:` fences which job tags a token can run on (enforced
+    // at job operations as `v2_job.tag = ANY(...)`), and is checked independently
+    // of domain/action/resource subset. A caller restricted by filter_tags must
+    // not be able to mint or rescope a credential that drops or widens the fence
+    // — even if the caller has no other scope restrictions (filter_tags-only
+    // tokens otherwise look "unscoped" to `scope_restrictions`).
+    if let Some(caller_tags) = first_filter_tags(authed.scopes.as_deref()) {
+        let Some(requested_tags) = first_filter_tags(requested_scopes) else {
+            return Err(Error::PermissionDenied(
+                "A token restricted by if_jobs:filter_tags cannot mint or rescope a token that \
+                 drops the tag restriction"
+                    .to_string(),
+            ));
+        };
+        let caller_set: std::collections::HashSet<&str> = caller_tags.iter().copied().collect();
+        for tag in &requested_tags {
+            if !caller_set.contains(tag) {
+                return Err(Error::PermissionDenied(format!(
+                    "A token restricted by if_jobs:filter_tags cannot grant tag '{tag}' which is \
+                     not within its own filter_tags"
+                )));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Tags from the first `if_jobs:filter_tags:<a,b,...>` scope, matching the
+/// semantics of [`get_scope_tags`] (which is what the job runtime consults).
+/// Returns `None` if no such scope is present.
+fn first_filter_tags(scopes: Option<&[String]>) -> Option<Vec<&str>> {
+    scopes?.iter().find_map(|s| {
+        s.strip_prefix("if_jobs:filter_tags:")
+            .map(|tags| tags.split(',').collect())
+    })
+}
+
+/// Whether `caller` grants at least everything `requested` grants (directional
+/// containment).
+///
+/// This is intentionally NOT `ScopeDefinition::includes`: that method answers
+/// "does this scope grant access to a required action" using OR semantics over
+/// resources (any overlap counts, and a `*` on either side matches), which is
+/// correct for access checks but unsafe for subset checks — it would let a
+/// token scoped to `scripts:read:f/team/a` mint `scripts:read:*` or
+/// `scripts:read:f/team/a,f/other/b`. Subset containment instead requires that
+/// EVERY requested resource is covered by SOME caller resource.
+fn scope_contains(caller: &ScopeDefinition, requested: &ScopeDefinition) -> bool {
+    if caller.domain != requested.domain {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    // write subsumes read; otherwise the action must match exactly.
+    match (caller.action.as_str(), requested.action.as_str()) {
+        (c, r) if c == r || (c == "write" && r == "read") => {}
+        _ => return false,
+    }
+
+    if caller.domain == "jobs" && caller.action == "run" {
+        match (&caller.kind, &requested.kind) {
+            (Some(caller_kind), Some(requested_kind)) if caller_kind != requested_kind => {
+                return false
+            }
+            // Caller pinned to a kind, but the request covers any kind.
+            (Some(_), None) => return false,
+            _ => {}
+        }
+    }
+
+    match (&caller.resource, &requested.resource) {
+        // Caller is unrestricted on resources: covers everything.
+        (None, _) => true,
+        // Caller is resource-restricted but the request is not: broader.
+        (Some(_), None) => false,
+        (Some(caller_resources), Some(requested_resources)) => {
+            resource_set_contains(caller_resources, requested_resources)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Every resource in `requested` must be covered by some resource in `caller`.
+fn resource_set_contains(caller: &[String], requested: &[String]) -> bool {
+    if caller.iter().any(|r| r == "*") {
+        return true;
+    }
+    requested
+        .iter()
+        .all(|req| req != "*" && caller.iter().any(|c| resource_covers(c, req)))
+}
+
+/// Directional: does the single caller resource pattern cover `requested`?
+/// `caller` may be an exact path or a `<prefix>/*` subtree wildcard; `requested`
+/// may itself be a subtree wildcard, in which case the whole requested subtree
+/// must fall within the caller's subtree.
+fn resource_covers(caller: &str, requested: &str) -> bool {
+    if caller == requested {
+        return true;
+    }
+    let Some(prefix) = caller.strip_suffix("/*") else {
+        // An exact caller resource only covers itself (handled above).
+        return false;
+    };
+    let requested_base = requested.strip_suffix("/*").unwrap_or(requested);
+    requested_base == prefix
+        || (requested_base.starts_with(prefix)
+            && requested_base.as_bytes().get(prefix.len()) == Some(&b'/'))
+}
+
 /// Returns a predicate that checks whether `path` is within the token's
 /// scope for `{domain}:{action}:{path}`. For tokens without scope
 /// restrictions (no scopes at all, or only `if_jobs:filter_tags:*` scopes),
@@ -574,6 +770,13 @@ impl NewToken {
     }
 }
 
+/// Low-level token mint shared by trusted callers (the user-facing
+/// `tokens/create` handler and internal mints such as native-trigger webhook
+/// tokens). It does NOT enforce that `token_config.scopes` is within the
+/// caller's own scopes — callers exposed to untrusted input must call
+/// [`ensure_scopes_within_caller`] first (internal narrowing mints intentionally
+/// skip it, since their scopes derive from the action being authorized, not the
+/// caller's token).
 pub async fn create_token_internal(
     tx: &mut sqlx::PgConnection,
     db: &DB,
@@ -908,4 +1111,278 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(allowed("u/alice/foo"));
         assert!(!allowed("u/alice/bar"));
     }
+
+    fn opt_scopes(scopes: Option<Vec<&str>>) -> Option<Vec<String>> {
+        scopes.map(|v| v.into_iter().map(String::from).collect())
+    }
+
+    // Regression tests for WIN-1999: scoped user tokens must not be able to
+    // mint or rescope credentials with broader privileges than themselves.
+
+    #[test]
+    fn unscoped_caller_can_grant_anything() {
+        let authed = authed_with_scopes(None);
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(&authed, None).is_ok());
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &authed,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["jobs:run:scripts"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn filter_tags_only_caller_is_unrestricted_on_domain_action_dimension() {
+        // The domain/action/resource subset check treats filter-tags-only as
+        // unrestricted, mirroring check_scopes/check_route_access. The tag
+        // dimension is checked separately (see filter_tags_dimension_is_monotonic).
+        let authed = authed_with_scopes(Some(vec!["if_jobs:filter_tags:default"]));
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &authed,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["users:write", "if_jobs:filter_tags:default"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn filter_tags_dimension_is_monotonic() {
+        // Caller restricted to tag fence "a" cannot drop the fence …
+        let single = authed_with_scopes(Some(vec!["if_jobs:filter_tags:a"]));
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(&single, None).is_err());
+        assert!(
+            ensure_scopes_within_caller(&single, opt_scopes(Some(vec!["users:read"])).as_deref())
+                .is_err(),
+            "minting a token without filter_tags must be rejected"
+        );
+        // … cannot widen to a tag it lacks …
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &single,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["if_jobs:filter_tags:a,b"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_err());
+        // … and cannot mint a token fenced on a disjoint tag.
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &single,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["if_jobs:filter_tags:b"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_err());
+        // Narrowing or matching the tag fence is allowed.
+        let multi = authed_with_scopes(Some(vec!["if_jobs:filter_tags:a,b"]));
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &multi,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["if_jobs:filter_tags:a"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_ok());
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &multi,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["if_jobs:filter_tags:a,b"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_ok());
+        // A caller with a real scope plus a tag fence cannot drop just the fence.
+        let mixed = authed_with_scopes(Some(vec!["jobs:run:scripts", "if_jobs:filter_tags:a"]));
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &mixed,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["jobs:run:scripts"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_err());
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &mixed,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["jobs:run:scripts", "if_jobs:filter_tags:a"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_ok());
+        // An unrestricted caller may grant filter_tags freely.
+        let unscoped = authed_with_scopes(None);
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &unscoped,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["if_jobs:filter_tags:x"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn scoped_caller_cannot_mint_unscoped_token() {
+        // Primitive 2 in the report: a users:write token minting an unscoped token.
+        let authed = authed_with_scopes(Some(vec!["users:write"]));
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(&authed, None).is_err());
+        // Empty scope list is effectively unscoped and must also be rejected.
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(&authed, Some(&[])).is_err());
+        // A scope list of only tag filters is effectively unscoped too.
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &authed,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["if_jobs:filter_tags:default"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn scoped_caller_cannot_remove_its_own_scopes() {
+        // Primitive 3 in the report: a users:write token setting its scopes to null.
+        let authed = authed_with_scopes(Some(vec!["users:write"]));
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(&authed, None).is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn scoped_caller_cannot_grant_scope_it_lacks() {
+        let authed = authed_with_scopes(Some(vec!["users:write"]));
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &authed,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["jobs:run:scripts"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn scoped_caller_can_grant_subset_of_own_scopes() {
+        let authed = authed_with_scopes(Some(vec!["users:write", "jobs:run:scripts"]));
+        // Equal scope is allowed.
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &authed,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["jobs:run:scripts"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_ok());
+        // write implies read, so a narrower read scope is allowed.
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &authed,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["users:read"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_ok());
+        // Tag filters narrow further and are always permitted.
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &authed,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["users:read", "if_jobs:filter_tags:default"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn scoped_caller_cannot_broaden_resource_scope() {
+        let authed = authed_with_scopes(Some(vec!["scripts:read:f/team/*"]));
+        // Narrower resource within the subtree is allowed.
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &authed,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["scripts:read:f/team/sub"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_ok());
+        // A nested subtree within the caller's subtree is allowed.
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &authed,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["scripts:read:f/team/sub/*"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_ok());
+        // The subtree root itself is allowed.
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &authed,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["scripts:read:f/team"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_ok());
+        // A path outside the subtree is rejected.
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &authed,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["scripts:read:f/other/x"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_err());
+        // read caller cannot grant write.
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &authed,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["scripts:write:f/team/db"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn mcp_scopes_require_byte_identical_match() {
+        // Regression for the access-grant-OR vs runtime-MCP-parser confusion:
+        // ScopeDefinition treats `mcp:scripts` as an unrestricted-resource scope
+        // and `mcp:scripts:*` as a strictly narrower one, so generic containment
+        // would silently allow widening. The MCP runtime however ignores
+        // `mcp:scripts` (unrecognized) while `mcp:scripts:*` grants all scripts.
+        // Legitimate MCP token issuance is the OAuth gateway, not these
+        // user-token endpoints, so MCP scopes must match the caller verbatim.
+
+        // The bypass the reviewer flagged: malformed `mcp:scripts` would widen
+        // into the real `mcp:scripts:*` under generic containment.
+        let bypass = authed_with_scopes(Some(vec!["users:write", "mcp:scripts"]));
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &bypass,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["users:write", "mcp:scripts:*"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_err());
+
+        // A caller without any MCP scope cannot grant one (widening on the MCP
+        // dimension), even if the rest of the requested scopes are within reach.
+        let no_mcp = authed_with_scopes(Some(vec!["users:write"]));
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &no_mcp,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["users:write", "mcp:scripts:*"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_err());
+
+        // Byte-identical MCP scope passes; an additional non-matching MCP scope
+        // alongside it does not.
+        let mcp_caller = authed_with_scopes(Some(vec!["mcp:scripts:*"]));
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &mcp_caller,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["mcp:scripts:*"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_ok());
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &mcp_caller,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["mcp:scripts:*", "mcp:flows:*"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_err());
+
+        // Even a narrowing within MCP semantics (`mcp:all` → `mcp:scripts:*`)
+        // is rejected by the byte-identical rule. This is intentional — these
+        // endpoints are not the legitimate path for narrowing MCP tokens.
+        let mcp_all = authed_with_scopes(Some(vec!["mcp:all"]));
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &mcp_all,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["mcp:scripts:*"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn scoped_caller_cannot_escalate_to_wildcard_or_superset() {
+        // Regression for the access-grant-OR vs subset-containment confusion:
+        // ScopeDefinition::includes would (incorrectly) allow all of these.
+        let star = authed_with_scopes(Some(vec!["scripts:read:f/team/a"]));
+        // Minting `*` from a single-path scope must be rejected.
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &star,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["scripts:read:*"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_err());
+        // Minting a broader subtree must be rejected.
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &star,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["scripts:read:f/team/*"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_err());
+
+        // A comma-separated list that adds an uncovered resource must be rejected,
+        // even though one element overlaps the caller's scope.
+        let list = authed_with_scopes(Some(vec!["scripts:read:f/team/a"]));
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &list,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["scripts:read:f/team/a,f/other/b"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_err());
+
+        // A subset of a multi-resource caller scope is allowed.
+        let multi = authed_with_scopes(Some(vec!["scripts:read:f/team/a,f/team/b"]));
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &multi,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["scripts:read:f/team/a"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_ok());
+
+        // A wildcard caller covers any subset, but not `*`-less escalation rules apply
+        // only when the caller itself lacks `*`.
+        let wildcard = authed_with_scopes(Some(vec!["scripts:read:*"]));
+        assert!(ensure_scopes_within_caller(
+            &wildcard,
+            opt_scopes(Some(vec!["scripts:read:f/team/a"])).as_deref()
+        )
+        .is_ok());
+    }
 }

backend/windmill-api-users/src/users.rs

@@ -1964,7 +1964,8 @@ async fn login(
             windmill_common::login_rate_limit::record_login_failure(&email);
             Err(Error::BadRequest("Invalid login".to_string()))
         } else {
-            let token = create_session_token(&email, super_admin, &mut tx, cookies).await?;
+            let token =
+                create_session_token(&email, super_admin, None, false, &mut tx, cookies).await?;
 
             let audit_author = AuditAuthor {
                 email: email.clone(),
@@ -2036,7 +2037,15 @@ async fn refresh_token(
     .await?
     .unwrap_or(false);
 
-    let new_token = create_session_token(&authed.email, super_admin, &mut tx, cookies).await?;
+    let new_token = create_session_token(
+        &authed.email,
+        super_admin,
+        authed.scopes.as_deref(),
+        authed.read_only,
+        &mut tx,
+        cookies,
+    )
+    .await?;
 
     audit_log(
         &mut *tx,
@@ -2066,6 +2075,8 @@ lazy_static::lazy_static! {
 pub async fn create_session_token<'c>(
     email: &str,
     super_admin: bool,
+    scopes: Option<&[String]>,
+    read_only: bool,
     tx: &mut sqlx::Transaction<'c, sqlx::Postgres>,
     cookies: Cookies,
 ) -> Result<String> {
@@ -2108,15 +2119,17 @@ pub async fn create_session_token<'c>(
 
     sqlx::query!(
         "INSERT INTO token
-            (token_hash, token_prefix, token, email, label, expiration, super_admin)
+            (token_hash, token_prefix, token, email, label, expiration, super_admin, scopes, read_only)
-            VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, now() + ($6 || ' seconds')::interval, $7)",
+            VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, now() + ($6 || ' seconds')::interval, $7, $8, $9)",
         t_hash,
         t_prefix,
         plaintext as Option<&str>,
         email,
         "session",
         &MAX_SESSION_VALIDITY_SECONDS.to_string(),
-        super_admin
+        super_admin,
+        scopes,
+        read_only,
     )
     .execute(&mut **tx)
     .await?;
@@ -2146,6 +2159,8 @@ async fn create_token(
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, String)> {
     check_token_create_rate_limit(&authed.username)?;
 
+    windmill_api_auth::ensure_scopes_within_caller(&authed, token_config.scopes.as_deref())?;
+
     let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
 
     let token = create_token_internal(&mut *tx, &db, &authed, token_config).await?;
@@ -2353,6 +2368,8 @@ async fn update_token_scopes(
     Path(token_prefix): Path<String>,
     Json(req): Json<UpdateTokenScopesRequest>,
 ) -> Result<String> {
+    windmill_api_auth::ensure_scopes_within_caller(&authed, req.scopes.as_deref())?;
+
     let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
 
     let updated: Option<String> = sqlx::query_scalar!(