diff --git a/backend/tests/wm_token_confinement.rs b/backend/tests/wm_token_confinement.rs
index 39b86c59a1..23d88301b7 100644
--- a/backend/tests/wm_token_confinement.rs
+++ b/backend/tests/wm_token_confinement.rs
@@ -318,19 +318,35 @@ async fn test_wm_token_is_confined_to_its_workspace(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyho
             resp.text().await?
         );
     }
-    // ...and the one `settings/global` key on the allowlist, which the CLI reads before
-    // creating a user on a git-sync push. `ws_base_url` is the control: the handler leaves
-    // it as ungated as `automate_username_creation`, so only the allowlist stops it.
+    // ...and the `settings/global` keys on the allowlist, which the CLI reads from a job: on a
+    // git-sync push, and in `u/admin/hub_sync`. `ws_base_url` is the control: the handler
+    // leaves it as ungated as these, so only the allowlist stops it.
+    for key in ["automate_username_creation", "uid", "hub_base_url"] {
+        let resp = authed(
+            client().get(format!("{api}/settings/global/{key}")),
+            &user_wm,
+        )
+        .send()
+        .await?;
+        assert_eq!(
+            resp.status(),
+            200,
+            "WM_TOKEN must still read {key}: {}",
+            resp.text().await?
+        );
+    }
+    // The same hub pull reads `hub_api_secret` for a private Hub, but a secret stays out of
+    // a job's reach even when the token borrows a superadmin.
     let resp = authed(
-        client().get(format!("{api}/settings/global/automate_username_creation")),
-        &user_wm,
+        client().get(format!("{api}/settings/global/hub_api_secret")),
+        &sa_wm,
     )
     .send()
     .await?;
-    assert_eq!(
-        resp.status(),
-        200,
-        "WM_TOKEN must still read automate_username_creation: {}",
+    let status = resp.status().as_u16();
+    assert!(
+        status == 401 || status == 403,
+        "superadmin WM_TOKEN must not read hub_api_secret ({status}): {}",
         resp.text().await?
     );
     let resp = authed(
diff --git a/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/scopes.rs b/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/scopes.rs
index 47ea12c04b..29ee0fe36a 100644
--- a/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/scopes.rs
+++ b/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/scopes.rs
@@ -1073,12 +1073,15 @@ fn scope_grants_access(
 /// the caller's own row; `email` and `allowed_domain_auto_invite` are derived from the
 /// token itself and touch no table.
 ///
-/// `settings/global/automate_username_creation` is the one instance setting on the list.
-/// `get_global_setting` exempts a handful of keys from its own super-admin gate, that one
-/// among them, so the boolean is already readable by every authenticated user; it is here
-/// because the CLI reads it before creating a user during a git-sync push, which runs as a
-/// job. The other ungated keys have no such caller, so they stay confined — being ungated
-/// earns a key nothing on its own.
+/// Three instance settings are on the list. `get_global_setting` exempts a handful of keys
+/// from its own super-admin gate, these among them, so each is already readable by every
+/// authenticated user; each is here because the CLI reads it from a job:
+/// `automate_username_creation` before creating a user during a git-sync push, `uid` and
+/// `hub_base_url` when `u/admin/hub_sync` pulls resource types from the Hub. The other
+/// ungated keys have no such caller, so they stay confined — being ungated earns a key
+/// nothing on its own. Listing a gated key earns it nothing either: `require_super_admin`
+/// refuses every job token, so `hub_api_secret`, which that pull reads for a private Hub,
+/// stays out of a job's reach whatever this list says.
 ///
 /// Deliberately absent, as each crosses that line: `users/list_invites` (returns the
 /// workspace ids the identity was invited to), `users/tokens/list` (credential metadata
@@ -1096,6 +1099,8 @@ fn is_global_read_open_to_job_token(route_path: &str) -> bool {
             | "/api/users/tutorial_progress"
             | "/api/workspaces/allowed_domain_auto_invite"
             | "/api/settings/global/automate_username_creation"
+            | "/api/settings/global/uid"
+            | "/api/settings/global/hub_base_url"
             | "/api/docs/search"
             | "/api/docs/page"
             | "/api/integrations/hub/list"
diff --git a/backend/windmill-api-settings/src/lib.rs b/backend/windmill-api-settings/src/lib.rs
index e7be0d5ede..0b975fda98 100644
--- a/backend/windmill-api-settings/src/lib.rs
+++ b/backend/windmill-api-settings/src/lib.rs
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ use windmill_common::{
         GITHUB_APP_WEBHOOK_BASE_URL_SETTING, HTTP_ROUTE_WORKSPACED_ROUTE_SETTING,
         HUB_ACCESSIBLE_URL_SETTING, HUB_BASE_URL_SETTING, INSTANCE_BANNER_SETTING,
         MAX_RETENTION_OVERRIDE_WORKSPACES, RETENTION_PERIOD_SECS_OVERRIDES_SETTING,
-        RUFF_CONFIG_SETTING, WORKSPACE_FAIRNESS_DURATION_SECS_SETTING,
+        RUFF_CONFIG_SETTING, UNIQUE_ID_SETTING, WORKSPACE_FAIRNESS_DURATION_SECS_SETTING,
         WORKSPACE_FAIRNESS_ENABLED_SETTING, WORKSPACE_FAIRNESS_MAX_PERCENT_SETTING,
         WORKSPACE_FAIRNESS_MIN_TOTAL_SETTING, WS_BASE_URL_SETTING,
     },
@@ -1321,6 +1321,9 @@ pub async fn get_global_setting(
         && key != AUTOMATE_USERNAME_CREATION_SETTING
         && key != DEFAULT_TAGS_WORKSPACES_SETTING
         && key != HUB_BASE_URL_SETTING
+        // `wmill hub pull` reads it from a job, and no job token clears the gate. It binds an
+        // offline license only together with `license_key`, which stays gated.
+        && key != UNIQUE_ID_SETTING
         && key != HUB_ACCESSIBLE_URL_SETTING
         && key != DISABLE_HUB_SETTING
         && key != EMAIL_DOMAIN_SETTING