From fce635d3c4c8962f448140ceb55a00fb99012701 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ruben Fiszel Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 20:47:28 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 01/16] feat: guest app execution mode, a role that takes no seat (#10929) * feat: guest app execution mode, a fourth role that takes no seat Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: make the guest grant a server-minted label, not a declarable scope Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * chore: pin ee-repo-ref to the guest session companion branch Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: close the relabel hole, guest embed tokens, read-path switch, custom-path entry Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guest tokens are not rescopable and guest embed tokens keep the sentinel Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guest-derived tokens share one constraint set; gate sign-in on guest discovery Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: the label alone governs a guest; refuse guests with accounts; unserialize discovery Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guest discovery fails closed; SAML aborts if the guest cookie write fails Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * refactor: enforce the guest switch once at the auth door; sign-in for a guest of another app Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guest app-mode decided once at the on-behalf resolver; clear a stale guest session before offering another app's sign-in Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: a guest may use anonymous apps; await the stale-session logout; trim comments Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: a guest's path confinement waits for the app's mode, so anonymous apps stay open to it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guest target survives http (Lax cookie), rides SAML RelayState; tell account holders on arrival * fix: a guest uses an anonymous app as itself; S3 uploads confined by app mode * fix: a guest upload needs an app policy; a missing app does not skip the confinement * fix: guests are gated on the Enterprise plan server-side; pin ee-repo-ref * fix: the guest plan gate fails closed on non-enterprise builds; settings report the effective switch * fix: guest controls read the plan, not the key; gate the guest tests on the features they need * docs: tighten the guest session invariant comments * feat: 100 free guests per 30 days, then a quarter seat each on Enterprise and a hard cap elsewhere; superadmin guest list; refusals reach the page Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: the cap is exact, an account ends a guest session at the door, popups close, and guest mode survives the CLI round trip Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * feat: a superadmin switch over guests for the whole instance; the pre-existing-user flag keeps its meaning Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: drop the dead guest-access helper, name the instance setting once, guests tab states, CE save order Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: a guest app path is refused at the mint if it could widen the scope; the instance toggle waits for its reload Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guests stop at the launched-by-me job grant; canonical app paths at the mint and discovery; the toggle ends on the stored value Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: only the scope grammar's own characters bar an app path from guests, refused at deploy as well as at the mint Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: the deploy-time guest path guard checks the destination of a rename and refuses a leading slash Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: a workspace rename keeps the guest switch; the rename guard reads the deployed mode under the row lock Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guest_activity follows a workspace rename and goes with a workspace delete Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * chore: pin ee-repo-ref to the state-bound guest target Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * chore: pin ee-repo-ref; the guest cookie is never cleared by a callback Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * docs: the workspace-scoped guest_activity delete moves an instance-wide count; assert the mint records the guest Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * test: the seeded allowance is a day old, so only the mint can write today's guest_activity row Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 1a10132e4f3cb442c7d0c2cf6e5d92d150bf6e07 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #769 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 32841072aa396bff91d30bd91854fa348cb3c439 New ee-repo-ref: 1a10132e4f3cb442c7d0c2cf6e5d92d150bf6e07 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] --- ...f1f8a93060fe062a0b727f164329ab56387a2.json | 214 ++++ ...f02200df0007291133033f2b9013c2e508fe1.json | 21 + ...fe0d9644b8d6a08d0c73daac73c48b5933afe.json | 15 + ...3c62bae004b2842a4828c6807232570f83a1.json} | 4 +- ...63e81438c7483ac892b971fe8a20709555cc1.json | 23 + ...2909be7dc7eb9b6deac7ea439eb637d728477.json | 15 + ...eb6b9c48ec164b05b149b3477351df7a1bd60.json | 44 + ...acd7ec38166533d217b718b294826889145f2.json | 12 + ...ea3c9346271b8404863256071cfdf884036a.json} | 4 +- ...e3620111119abf8dda4bde5b835ff934e4f1.json} | 4 +- ...bc76b5afa1af6ed324376989117b1054c3447.json | 82 ++ backend/Cargo.lock | 2 + backend/Cargo.toml | 2 + backend/ee-repo-ref.txt | 2 +- .../20260901192755_guest_app_access.down.sql | 2 + .../20260901192755_guest_app_access.up.sql | 28 + backend/src/monitor.rs | 9 + backend/summarized_schema.txt | 3 +- backend/tests/app_guest_allowance.rs | 159 +++ backend/tests/app_guest_execution_mode.rs | 1077 +++++++++++++++++ backend/windmill-api-auth/src/auth.rs | 65 +- backend/windmill-api-auth/src/scopes.rs | 53 + backend/windmill-api-users/src/users.rs | 188 ++- .../windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs | 68 +- .../src/workspaces_extra.rs | 16 +- backend/windmill-api/openapi.yaml | 235 +++- backend/windmill-api/src/apps.rs | 451 +++++-- backend/windmill-api/src/jobs.rs | 6 +- backend/windmill-api/src/users.rs | 53 + backend/windmill-common/src/auth.rs | 34 +- .../windmill-common/src/global_settings.rs | 4 + backend/windmill-common/src/workspaces.rs | 201 +++ cli/src/commands/app/app.ts | 38 +- cli/src/commands/app/raw_apps.ts | 19 +- cli/src/commands/sync/sync.ts | 10 +- cli/test/app_access_mode_unit.test.ts | 28 + .../lib/components/InstanceSettings.svelte | 12 +- frontend/src/lib/components/Login.svelte | 47 +- .../components/SuperadminSettingsInner.svelte | 61 +- .../apps/editor/AppEditorHeaderDeploy.svelte | 136 ++- .../components/apps/editor/PublicApp.svelte | 36 +- .../apps/editor/PublicAppFrame.svelte | 124 +- .../instanceSettings/GuestActivityList.svelte | 120 ++ .../components/settings/TokensTable.svelte | 1 + .../workspaceSettings/RulesetEditor.svelte | 30 +- .../(logged)/workspace_settings/+page.svelte | 66 +- frontend/src/routes/a/[...path]/+page.svelte | 51 + .../[workspace]/[...secret]/+page.svelte | 57 + .../login_callback/[client_name]/+page.svelte | 15 +- 49 files changed, 3753 insertions(+), 194 deletions(-) create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-00a61afc5faa3826c283660417ff1f8a93060fe062a0b727f164329ab56387a2.json create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-1553608e0d5a9a9b22c1a2c200bf02200df0007291133033f2b9013c2e508fe1.json create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-21e9629bdf5824b676bf88709f4fe0d9644b8d6a08d0c73daac73c48b5933afe.json rename backend/.sqlx/{query-c0da3f1f2c55900dbdf92b16ebbfdb7b4cc11a648460f175e4f57d080a0005a5.json => query-31ed2fb85c0c726e3cf6392be2a73c62bae004b2842a4828c6807232570f83a1.json} (54%) create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-391139a04bd48319a5512e7859b63e81438c7483ac892b971fe8a20709555cc1.json create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-76c0331b18eed478a50572e35642909be7dc7eb9b6deac7ea439eb637d728477.json create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-8b28332dd5b3932dfdaa9fcb2e3eb6b9c48ec164b05b149b3477351df7a1bd60.json create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-cf0c44d83ec921d104bee9cbdb7acd7ec38166533d217b718b294826889145f2.json rename backend/.sqlx/{query-a7a20412e303568b271f949642de55e9880ef05786fe59f05de5e025ef315726.json => query-d17645b5001d7f8da1dc451c5d35ea3c9346271b8404863256071cfdf884036a.json} (65%) rename backend/.sqlx/{query-0c5b02b6b70fb8fd2ab3e6c57897038750a44a67360d342b6ef705ef2e4d3007.json => query-e2eee8de61337b7d093f38e3e393e3620111119abf8dda4bde5b835ff934e4f1.json} (51%) create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-ede15bff96152f209aff756830cbc76b5afa1af6ed324376989117b1054c3447.json create mode 100644 backend/migrations/20260901192755_guest_app_access.down.sql create mode 100644 backend/migrations/20260901192755_guest_app_access.up.sql create mode 100644 backend/tests/app_guest_allowance.rs create mode 100644 backend/tests/app_guest_execution_mode.rs create mode 100644 cli/test/app_access_mode_unit.test.ts create mode 100644 frontend/src/lib/components/instanceSettings/GuestActivityList.svelte diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-00a61afc5faa3826c283660417ff1f8a93060fe062a0b727f164329ab56387a2.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-00a61afc5faa3826c283660417ff1f8a93060fe062a0b727f164329ab56387a2.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a6a2b0c00a --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-00a61afc5faa3826c283660417ff1f8a93060fe062a0b727f164329ab56387a2.json @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "\n SELECT\n workspace_id,\n slack_team_id,\n teams_team_id,\n teams_team_name,\n teams_team_guid,\n slack_name,\n slack_command_script,\n teams_command_script,\n slack_email,\n slack_oauth_client_id,\n slack_oauth_client_secret,\n customer_id,\n plan,\n webhook,\n ai_config,\n dbt_warehouses,\n large_file_storage,\n datatable,\n ducklake,\n git_sync,\n deploy_ui,\n default_app,\n default_scripts,\n mute_critical_alerts,\n color,\n operator_settings,\n git_app_installations,\n auto_invite,\n error_handler,\n success_handler,\n public_app_execution_limit_per_minute,\n error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts,\n guest_access_enabled\n FROM\n workspace_settings\n WHERE\n workspace_id = $1\n ", + "describe": { + "columns": [ + { + "ordinal": 0, + "name": "workspace_id", + "type_info": "Varchar" + }, + { + "ordinal": 1, + "name": "slack_team_id", + "type_info": "Varchar" + }, + { + "ordinal": 2, + "name": "teams_team_id", + "type_info": "Text" + }, + { + "ordinal": 3, + "name": "teams_team_name", + "type_info": "Text" + }, + { + "ordinal": 4, + "name": "teams_team_guid", + "type_info": "Text" + }, + { + "ordinal": 5, + "name": "slack_name", + "type_info": "Varchar" + }, + { + "ordinal": 6, + "name": "slack_command_script", + "type_info": "Varchar" + }, + { + "ordinal": 7, + "name": "teams_command_script", + "type_info": "Text" + }, + { + "ordinal": 8, + "name": "slack_email", + "type_info": "Varchar" + }, + { + "ordinal": 9, + "name": "slack_oauth_client_id", + "type_info": "Varchar" + }, + { + "ordinal": 10, + "name": "slack_oauth_client_secret", + "type_info": "Varchar" + }, + { + "ordinal": 11, + "name": "customer_id", + "type_info": "Varchar" + }, + { + "ordinal": 12, + "name": "plan", + "type_info": "Varchar" + }, + { + "ordinal": 13, + "name": "webhook", + "type_info": "Text" + }, + { + "ordinal": 14, + "name": "ai_config", + "type_info": "Jsonb" + }, + { + "ordinal": 15, + "name": "dbt_warehouses", + "type_info": "Jsonb" + }, + { + "ordinal": 16, + "name": "large_file_storage", + "type_info": "Jsonb" + }, + { + "ordinal": 17, + "name": "datatable", + "type_info": "Jsonb" + }, + { + "ordinal": 18, + "name": "ducklake", + "type_info": "Jsonb" + }, + { + "ordinal": 19, + "name": "git_sync", + "type_info": "Jsonb" + }, + { + "ordinal": 20, + "name": "deploy_ui", + "type_info": "Jsonb" + }, + { + "ordinal": 21, + "name": "default_app", + "type_info": "Varchar" + }, + { + "ordinal": 22, + "name": "default_scripts", + "type_info": "Jsonb" + }, + { + "ordinal": 23, + "name": "mute_critical_alerts", + "type_info": "Bool" + }, + { + "ordinal": 24, + "name": "color", + "type_info": "Varchar" + }, + { + "ordinal": 25, + "name": "operator_settings", + "type_info": "Jsonb" + }, + { + "ordinal": 26, + "name": "git_app_installations", + "type_info": "Jsonb" + }, + { + "ordinal": 27, + "name": "auto_invite", + "type_info": "Jsonb" + }, + { + "ordinal": 28, + "name": "error_handler", + "type_info": "Jsonb" + }, + { + "ordinal": 29, + "name": "success_handler", + "type_info": "Jsonb" + }, + { + "ordinal": 30, + "name": "public_app_execution_limit_per_minute", + "type_info": "Int4" + }, + { + "ordinal": 31, + "name": "error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts", + "type_info": "Bool" + }, + { + "ordinal": 32, + "name": "guest_access_enabled", + "type_info": "Bool" + } + ], + "parameters": { + "Left": [ + "Text" + ] + }, + "nullable": [ + false, + true, + true, + true, + true, + true, + true, + true, + false, + true, + true, + true, + true, + true, + true, + true, + true, + true, + true, + true, + true, + true, + true, + true, + true, + true, + false, + true, + true, + true, + true, + false, + false + ] + }, + "hash": "00a61afc5faa3826c283660417ff1f8a93060fe062a0b727f164329ab56387a2" +} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-1553608e0d5a9a9b22c1a2c200bf02200df0007291133033f2b9013c2e508fe1.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-1553608e0d5a9a9b22c1a2c200bf02200df0007291133033f2b9013c2e508fe1.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3e4b85a916 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-1553608e0d5a9a9b22c1a2c200bf02200df0007291133033f2b9013c2e508fe1.json @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "INSERT INTO token\n (token_hash, token_prefix, token, email, label, expiration, super_admin, scopes, workspace_id)\n VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, now() + ($6 || ' seconds')::interval, false, $7, $8)", + "describe": { + "columns": [], + "parameters": { + "Left": [ + "Varchar", + "Varchar", + "Varchar", + "Varchar", + "Varchar", + "Text", + "TextArray", + "Varchar" + ] + }, + "nullable": [] + }, + "hash": "1553608e0d5a9a9b22c1a2c200bf02200df0007291133033f2b9013c2e508fe1" +} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-21e9629bdf5824b676bf88709f4fe0d9644b8d6a08d0c73daac73c48b5933afe.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-21e9629bdf5824b676bf88709f4fe0d9644b8d6a08d0c73daac73c48b5933afe.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ca9f2cbc29 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-21e9629bdf5824b676bf88709f4fe0d9644b8d6a08d0c73daac73c48b5933afe.json @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "INSERT INTO guest_activity (email, workspace_id, day)\n VALUES ($1, $2, CURRENT_DATE)\n ON CONFLICT (email, workspace_id, day)\n DO UPDATE SET last_seen_at = now()", + "describe": { + "columns": [], + "parameters": { + "Left": [ + "Varchar", + "Varchar" + ] + }, + "nullable": [] + }, + "hash": "21e9629bdf5824b676bf88709f4fe0d9644b8d6a08d0c73daac73c48b5933afe" +} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-c0da3f1f2c55900dbdf92b16ebbfdb7b4cc11a648460f175e4f57d080a0005a5.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-31ed2fb85c0c726e3cf6392be2a73c62bae004b2842a4828c6807232570f83a1.json similarity index 54% rename from backend/.sqlx/query-c0da3f1f2c55900dbdf92b16ebbfdb7b4cc11a648460f175e4f57d080a0005a5.json rename to backend/.sqlx/query-31ed2fb85c0c726e3cf6392be2a73c62bae004b2842a4828c6807232570f83a1.json index 774b47f825..556bd7c317 100644 --- a/backend/.sqlx/query-c0da3f1f2c55900dbdf92b16ebbfdb7b4cc11a648460f175e4f57d080a0005a5.json +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-31ed2fb85c0c726e3cf6392be2a73c62bae004b2842a4828c6807232570f83a1.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "db_name": "PostgreSQL", - "query": "UPDATE token SET label = $1\n WHERE email = $2 AND token_prefix = $3\n AND (label IS NULL OR (\n label <> 'session'\n AND lower(label) NOT LIKE 'ephemeral%'\n AND label <> 'debugger-token'\n AND label NOT LIKE 'mcp-oauth-%'\n ))\n RETURNING token_prefix", + "query": "UPDATE token SET label = $1\n WHERE email = $2 AND token_prefix = $3\n AND (label IS NULL OR (\n label <> 'session'\n AND label <> 'guest_session'\n AND lower(label) NOT LIKE 'ephemeral%'\n AND label <> 'debugger-token'\n AND label NOT LIKE 'mcp-oauth-%'\n ))\n RETURNING token_prefix", "describe": { "columns": [ { @@ -20,5 +20,5 @@ false ] }, - "hash": "c0da3f1f2c55900dbdf92b16ebbfdb7b4cc11a648460f175e4f57d080a0005a5" + "hash": "31ed2fb85c0c726e3cf6392be2a73c62bae004b2842a4828c6807232570f83a1" } diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-391139a04bd48319a5512e7859b63e81438c7483ac892b971fe8a20709555cc1.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-391139a04bd48319a5512e7859b63e81438c7483ac892b971fe8a20709555cc1.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8fcb8140f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-391139a04bd48319a5512e7859b63e81438c7483ac892b971fe8a20709555cc1.json @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "SELECT path FROM app WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2", + "describe": { + "columns": [ + { + "ordinal": 0, + "name": "path", + "type_info": "Varchar" + } + ], + "parameters": { + "Left": [ + "Int8", + "Text" + ] + }, + "nullable": [ + false + ] + }, + "hash": "391139a04bd48319a5512e7859b63e81438c7483ac892b971fe8a20709555cc1" +} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-76c0331b18eed478a50572e35642909be7dc7eb9b6deac7ea439eb637d728477.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-76c0331b18eed478a50572e35642909be7dc7eb9b6deac7ea439eb637d728477.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ebd492abf3 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-76c0331b18eed478a50572e35642909be7dc7eb9b6deac7ea439eb637d728477.json @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "UPDATE workspace_settings SET guest_access_enabled = $1 WHERE workspace_id = $2", + "describe": { + "columns": [], + "parameters": { + "Left": [ + "Bool", + "Text" + ] + }, + "nullable": [] + }, + "hash": "76c0331b18eed478a50572e35642909be7dc7eb9b6deac7ea439eb637d728477" +} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-8b28332dd5b3932dfdaa9fcb2e3eb6b9c48ec164b05b149b3477351df7a1bd60.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-8b28332dd5b3932dfdaa9fcb2e3eb6b9c48ec164b05b149b3477351df7a1bd60.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8533137a2c --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-8b28332dd5b3932dfdaa9fcb2e3eb6b9c48ec164b05b149b3477351df7a1bd60.json @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "\n SELECT\n (SELECT MIN(day) FROM guest_activity) AS since,\n (SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT email) FROM guest_activity\n WHERE day > CURRENT_DATE - 30)::INT AS \"guest_count!\",\n (SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT workspace_id) FROM guest_activity\n WHERE day > CURRENT_DATE - 30)::INT AS \"guest_workspace_count!\",\n (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM workspace_settings ws JOIN workspace w ON w.id = ws.workspace_id\n WHERE ws.guest_access_enabled AND NOT w.deleted)::INT AS \"guest_enabled_workspace_count!\",\n (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM workspace WHERE NOT deleted)::INT AS \"workspace_count!\"\n ", + "describe": { + "columns": [ + { + "ordinal": 0, + "name": "since", + "type_info": "Date" + }, + { + "ordinal": 1, + "name": "guest_count!", + "type_info": "Int4" + }, + { + "ordinal": 2, + "name": "guest_workspace_count!", + "type_info": "Int4" + }, + { + "ordinal": 3, + "name": "guest_enabled_workspace_count!", + "type_info": "Int4" + }, + { + "ordinal": 4, + "name": "workspace_count!", + "type_info": "Int4" + } + ], + "parameters": { + "Left": [] + }, + "nullable": [ + null, + null, + null, + null, + null + ] + }, + "hash": "8b28332dd5b3932dfdaa9fcb2e3eb6b9c48ec164b05b149b3477351df7a1bd60" +} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-cf0c44d83ec921d104bee9cbdb7acd7ec38166533d217b718b294826889145f2.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-cf0c44d83ec921d104bee9cbdb7acd7ec38166533d217b718b294826889145f2.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9ff8b3ace5 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-cf0c44d83ec921d104bee9cbdb7acd7ec38166533d217b718b294826889145f2.json @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "DELETE FROM guest_activity WHERE day < CURRENT_DATE - 60", + "describe": { + "columns": [], + "parameters": { + "Left": [] + }, + "nullable": [] + }, + "hash": "cf0c44d83ec921d104bee9cbdb7acd7ec38166533d217b718b294826889145f2" +} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-a7a20412e303568b271f949642de55e9880ef05786fe59f05de5e025ef315726.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-d17645b5001d7f8da1dc451c5d35ea3c9346271b8404863256071cfdf884036a.json similarity index 65% rename from backend/.sqlx/query-a7a20412e303568b271f949642de55e9880ef05786fe59f05de5e025ef315726.json rename to backend/.sqlx/query-d17645b5001d7f8da1dc451c5d35ea3c9346271b8404863256071cfdf884036a.json index d507609d8e..c3134373f6 100644 --- a/backend/.sqlx/query-a7a20412e303568b271f949642de55e9880ef05786fe59f05de5e025ef315726.json +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-d17645b5001d7f8da1dc451c5d35ea3c9346271b8404863256071cfdf884036a.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "db_name": "PostgreSQL", - "query": "UPDATE token SET scopes = $1\n WHERE email = $2 AND token_prefix = $3\n RETURNING token_prefix", + "query": "UPDATE token SET scopes = $1\n WHERE email = $2 AND token_prefix = $3\n AND (label IS NULL OR label <> 'guest_session')\n RETURNING token_prefix", "describe": { "columns": [ { @@ -20,5 +20,5 @@ false ] }, - "hash": "a7a20412e303568b271f949642de55e9880ef05786fe59f05de5e025ef315726" + "hash": "d17645b5001d7f8da1dc451c5d35ea3c9346271b8404863256071cfdf884036a" } diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-0c5b02b6b70fb8fd2ab3e6c57897038750a44a67360d342b6ef705ef2e4d3007.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-e2eee8de61337b7d093f38e3e393e3620111119abf8dda4bde5b835ff934e4f1.json similarity index 51% rename from backend/.sqlx/query-0c5b02b6b70fb8fd2ab3e6c57897038750a44a67360d342b6ef705ef2e4d3007.json rename to backend/.sqlx/query-e2eee8de61337b7d093f38e3e393e3620111119abf8dda4bde5b835ff934e4f1.json index e74bd5de0e..4d49d34d10 100644 --- a/backend/.sqlx/query-0c5b02b6b70fb8fd2ab3e6c57897038750a44a67360d342b6ef705ef2e4d3007.json +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-e2eee8de61337b7d093f38e3e393e3620111119abf8dda4bde5b835ff934e4f1.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "db_name": "PostgreSQL", - "query": "INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts) SELECT $1, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $2", + "query": "INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled) SELECT $1, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $2", "describe": { "columns": [], "parameters": { @@ -11,5 +11,5 @@ }, "nullable": [] }, - "hash": "0c5b02b6b70fb8fd2ab3e6c57897038750a44a67360d342b6ef705ef2e4d3007" + "hash": "e2eee8de61337b7d093f38e3e393e3620111119abf8dda4bde5b835ff934e4f1" } diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-ede15bff96152f209aff756830cbc76b5afa1af6ed324376989117b1054c3447.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-ede15bff96152f209aff756830cbc76b5afa1af6ed324376989117b1054c3447.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1c247ad5b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-ede15bff96152f209aff756830cbc76b5afa1af6ed324376989117b1054c3447.json @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "\n SELECT\n workspace_id,\n slack_team_id,\n slack_name,\n teams_team_id,\n teams_team_name,\n teams_team_guid,\n mute_critical_alerts,\n guest_access_enabled,\n deploy_ui,\n large_file_storage,\n datatable\n FROM\n workspace_settings\n WHERE\n workspace_id = $1\n ", + "describe": { + "columns": [ + { + "ordinal": 0, + "name": "workspace_id", + "type_info": "Varchar" + }, + { + "ordinal": 1, + "name": "slack_team_id", + "type_info": "Varchar" + }, + { + "ordinal": 2, + "name": "slack_name", + "type_info": "Varchar" + }, + { + "ordinal": 3, + "name": "teams_team_id", + "type_info": "Text" + }, + { + "ordinal": 4, + "name": "teams_team_name", + "type_info": "Text" + }, + { + "ordinal": 5, + "name": "teams_team_guid", + "type_info": "Text" + }, + { + "ordinal": 6, + "name": "mute_critical_alerts", + "type_info": "Bool" + }, + { + "ordinal": 7, + "name": "guest_access_enabled", + "type_info": "Bool" + }, + { + "ordinal": 8, + "name": "deploy_ui", + "type_info": "Jsonb" + }, + { + "ordinal": 9, + "name": "large_file_storage", + "type_info": "Jsonb" + }, + { + "ordinal": 10, + "name": "datatable", + "type_info": "Jsonb" + } + ], + "parameters": { + "Left": [ + "Text" + ] + }, + "nullable": [ + false, + true, + true, + true, + true, + true, + true, + false, + true, + true, + true + ] + }, + "hash": "ede15bff96152f209aff756830cbc76b5afa1af6ed324376989117b1054c3447" +} diff --git a/backend/Cargo.lock b/backend/Cargo.lock index d314168b35..fc66ec630d 100644 --- a/backend/Cargo.lock +++ b/backend/Cargo.lock @@ -14791,6 +14791,7 @@ dependencies = [ "tikv-jemallocator", "tokio", "tokio-stream", + "tower-cookies", "tracing", "tracing-subscriber", "url", @@ -14802,6 +14803,7 @@ dependencies = [ "windmill-api-client", "windmill-api-scripts", "windmill-api-settings", + "windmill-api-users", "windmill-autoscaling", "windmill-common", "windmill-dep-map", diff --git a/backend/Cargo.toml b/backend/Cargo.toml index f432f022c5..4fcfcdad6e 100644 --- a/backend/Cargo.toml +++ b/backend/Cargo.toml @@ -351,6 +351,8 @@ windmill-trigger-sqs.workspace = true windmill-trigger-gcp.workspace = true windmill-trigger-azure.workspace = true windmill-api-auth.workspace = true +tower-cookies.workspace = true +windmill-api-users.workspace = true axum.workspace = true serde.workspace = true windmill-api-client.workspace = true diff --git a/backend/ee-repo-ref.txt b/backend/ee-repo-ref.txt index dc5fe7ce82..086b9611a0 100644 --- a/backend/ee-repo-ref.txt +++ b/backend/ee-repo-ref.txt @@ -1 +1 @@ -b9aeffa83f0e601f123c7eab536b235719786da1 +1a10132e4f3cb442c7d0c2cf6e5d92d150bf6e07 diff --git a/backend/migrations/20260901192755_guest_app_access.down.sql b/backend/migrations/20260901192755_guest_app_access.down.sql new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..065e60c0c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/migrations/20260901192755_guest_app_access.down.sql @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +DROP TABLE IF EXISTS guest_activity; +ALTER TABLE workspace_settings DROP COLUMN guest_access_enabled; diff --git a/backend/migrations/20260901192755_guest_app_access.up.sql b/backend/migrations/20260901192755_guest_app_access.up.sql new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a29582ba99 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/migrations/20260901192755_guest_app_access.up.sql @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +-- Guest app access: a workspace-level switch, off by default. An app whose policy says +-- `execution_mode: guest` only admits guests where this is on, and the check runs where +-- the guest session is minted -- an app definition carries its policy, so git-sync and +-- the CLI push `guest` past every UI gate. +ALTER TABLE workspace_settings + ADD COLUMN guest_access_enabled BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false; + +-- A guest leaves no `usr` or `password` row, which is what keeps them off every seat +-- counter, so this is the only durable record that one was here: a row per guest, +-- workspace and day, written when the session is minted. +-- +-- Deliberately not the audit log. The seat scan is served by a partial index whose +-- predicate names the login operations literally, and `audit_partitioned` is a +-- partitioned table, where `CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY` is unsupported -- adding a +-- guest operation to that predicate means a locking rebuild on the largest table an +-- instance has. Guest logins still write `users.login_guest` for the audit trail; +-- nothing counts them from there. +CREATE TABLE guest_activity ( + email VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL, + workspace_id VARCHAR(50) NOT NULL, + day DATE NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_DATE, + last_seen_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(), + PRIMARY KEY (email, workspace_id, day) +); + +-- The retention delete filters on day alone; the PK only reaches it through two +-- other columns. +CREATE INDEX idx_guest_activity_day ON guest_activity (day); diff --git a/backend/src/monitor.rs b/backend/src/monitor.rs index 86e75b7de9..a11ed55882 100644 --- a/backend/src/monitor.rs +++ b/backend/src/monitor.rs @@ -1937,6 +1937,15 @@ pub async fn delete_expired_items(db: &DB) -> () { tracing::error!("Error deleting old feature_usage rows: {e}"); } + // Guest sign-ins, kept a month longer than the seat window they feed so a late + // telemetry send still sees a whole month. + if let Err(e) = sqlx::query!("DELETE FROM guest_activity WHERE day < CURRENT_DATE - 60") + .execute(db) + .await + { + tracing::error!("Error deleting old guest_activity rows: {e}"); + } + match sqlx::query_scalar!( "DELETE FROM agent_token_blacklist WHERE expires_at <= now() RETURNING token", ) diff --git a/backend/summarized_schema.txt b/backend/summarized_schema.txt index dfd0305e57..fe889705e4 100644 --- a/backend/summarized_schema.txt +++ b/backend/summarized_schema.txt @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ folder_permission_history: id(bigint), workspace_id(char), folder_name(char), ch FK: (workspace_id, folder_name) -> folder(workspace_id, name) gcp_trigger: gcp_resource_path(char), topic_id(char), subscription_id(char), delivery_type(delivery_mode), delivery_config(jsonb), path(char), script_path(char), is_flow(bool), workspace_id(char), edited_by(char), email(char), edited_at(ts), extra_perms(jsonb), server_id(char), last_server_ping(ts), error(text), subscription_mode(gcp_subscription_mode), error_handler_path(char), error_handler_args(jsonb), retry(jsonb), auto_acknowledge_msg(bool), ack_deadline(int), mode(trigger_mode), labels(text[]) global_settings: name(char), value(jsonb), updated_at(ts) +guest_activity: email(char), workspace_id(char), day(date), last_seen_at(timestamptz) group_: workspace_id(char), name(char), summary(text), extra_perms(jsonb) FK: (workspace_id) -> workspace(id) group_permission_history: id(bigint), workspace_id(char), group_name(char), changed_by(char), changed_at(ts), change_type(char), member_affected(char) @@ -222,7 +223,7 @@ workspace_protection_rule: workspace_id(char), name(char), rules(int), bypass_gr FK: (workspace_id) -> workspace(id) workspace_runnable_dependencies: flow_path(char), runnable_path(char), script_hash(bigint), runnable_is_flow(bool), workspace_id(char), app_path(char) FK: (app_path, workspace_id) -> app(path, workspace_id) | (flow_path, workspace_id) -> flow(path, workspace_id) -workspace_settings: workspace_id(char), slack_team_id(char), slack_name(char), slack_command_script(char), slack_email(char), customer_id(char), plan(char), webhook(text), ai_config(jsonb), large_file_storage(jsonb), git_sync(jsonb), default_app(char), default_scripts(jsonb), deploy_ui(jsonb), mute_critical_alerts(bool), color(char), operator_settings(jsonb), teams_command_script(text), teams_team_id(text), teams_team_name(text), git_app_installations(jsonb), ducklake(jsonb), slack_oauth_client_id(char), slack_oauth_client_secret(char), datatable(jsonb), teams_team_guid(text), auto_invite(jsonb), error_handler(jsonb), success_handler(jsonb), public_app_execution_limit_per_minute(int), dbt_warehouses(jsonb) +workspace_settings: workspace_id(char), slack_team_id(char), slack_name(char), slack_command_script(char), slack_email(char), customer_id(char), plan(char), webhook(text), ai_config(jsonb), large_file_storage(jsonb), git_sync(jsonb), default_app(char), default_scripts(jsonb), deploy_ui(jsonb), mute_critical_alerts(bool), color(char), operator_settings(jsonb), teams_command_script(text), teams_team_id(text), teams_team_name(text), git_app_installations(jsonb), ducklake(jsonb), slack_oauth_client_id(char), slack_oauth_client_secret(char), datatable(jsonb), teams_team_guid(text), auto_invite(jsonb), error_handler(jsonb), success_handler(jsonb), public_app_execution_limit_per_minute(int), dbt_warehouses(jsonb), guest_access_enabled(bool) FK: (workspace_id) -> workspace(id) zombie_job_counter: job_id(uuid), counter(int) FK: (job_id) -> v2_job(id) diff --git a/backend/tests/app_guest_allowance.rs b/backend/tests/app_guest_allowance.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..88626b1c81 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/tests/app_guest_allowance.rs @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +//! The guest allowance: free up to `FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW` distinct emails over the +//! trailing window. Past it, a hard-capped instance (Community, Pro) refuses a stranger +//! and lets a returning guest back in; a metered one (Enterprise) admits everyone and +//! counts seats. Its own binary: the plan is read from a process-wide key id that this +//! test flips, which no test sharing the process could tolerate. +//! +//! Users from the `base` fixture: +//! test-user (admin, token SECRET_TOKEN) + +use serde_json::json; +use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres}; +use windmill_common::workspaces::{FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW, GUEST_WINDOW_DAYS}; +use windmill_test_utils::*; + +const ADMIN_TOKEN: &str = "SECRET_TOKEN"; +const APP_PATH: &str = "u/test-user/guest_app"; + +fn client() -> reqwest::Client { + reqwest::Client::new() +} + +fn authed(builder: reqwest::RequestBuilder, token: &str) -> reqwest::RequestBuilder { + builder.header("Authorization", format!("Bearer {}", token)) +} + +/// Community and Pro are capped, Enterprise is metered. Only a build with both +/// `private` (the key id) and `enterprise` (the plan read) can meter; every other build +/// is capped whatever this says. +fn set_plan(pro: bool) { + #[cfg(feature = "private")] + windmill_common::ee::LICENSE_KEY_ID.store(std::sync::Arc::new( + if pro { "test_pro" } else { "" }.to_string(), + )); + let _ = pro; +} + +async fn mint(db: &Pool, email: &str) -> windmill_common::error::Result { + let mut tx = db.begin().await.unwrap(); + let minted = windmill_api_users::users::create_guest_session_token( + email, + "test-workspace", + APP_PATH, + &mut tx, + tower_cookies::Cookies::default(), + ) + .await; + tx.commit().await.unwrap(); + minted +} + +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn the_allowance_caps_strangers_and_meters_an_enterprise_plan( + db: Pool, +) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace"); + + authed( + client().post(format!("{ws}/workspaces/edit_guest_access")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ "guest_access_enabled": true })) + .send() + .await?; + let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/create")), ADMIN_TOKEN) + .json(&json!({ + "path": APP_PATH, + "summary": "Guest app", + "value": {}, + "policy": { "execution_mode": "guest", "triggerables_v2": {} } + })) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?); + // The whole allowance, used yesterday: still in the window, and a day the mint + // does not write, so a row dated today can only be the mint's own. + sqlx::query( + "INSERT INTO guest_activity (email, workspace_id, day) + SELECT 'g' || i || '@example.com', 'test-workspace', CURRENT_DATE - 1 + FROM generate_series(1, $1) AS i", + ) + .bind(FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW) + .execute(&db) + .await?; + + set_plan(true); + let refused = mint(&db, "stranger@example.com").await.unwrap_err(); + assert!( + matches!(&refused, windmill_common::error::Error::PermissionDenied(m) + if m.contains(&format!("limit of {FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW} guests over {GUEST_WINDOW_DAYS} days"))), + "a stranger past the allowance is refused with the message the visitor reads: {refused:?}" + ); + mint(&db, "g1@example.com") + .await + .expect("a guest already in the window is let back in"); + let recorded: bool = sqlx::query_scalar( + "SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM guest_activity + WHERE email = 'g1@example.com' AND workspace_id = 'test-workspace' + AND day = CURRENT_DATE)", + ) + .fetch_one(&db) + .await?; + assert!( + recorded, + "the mint writes today's guest_activity row, the allowance's unit" + ); + + let list: serde_json::Value = authed( + client().get(format!( + "http://localhost:{port}/api/users/guests?per_page=5" + )), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .send() + .await? + .json() + .await?; + assert_eq!(list["usage"]["guest_count"], FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW); + assert_eq!(list["usage"]["metered"], false); + assert_eq!(list["usage"]["guest_seats"], 0); + assert_eq!(list["guests"].as_array().map(Vec::len), Some(5)); + assert_eq!(list["guests"][0]["workspaces"], json!(["test-workspace"])); + let usage: serde_json::Value = authed( + client().get(format!("{ws}/workspaces/guest_usage")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .send() + .await? + .json() + .await?; + assert_eq!(usage["guest_count"], FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW); + + #[cfg(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise"))] + { + set_plan(false); + mint(&db, "stranger@example.com") + .await + .expect("a metered plan admits past the allowance"); + let usage: serde_json::Value = authed( + client().get(format!("{ws}/workspaces/guest_usage")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .send() + .await? + .json() + .await?; + assert_eq!(usage["guest_count"], FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW + 1); + assert_eq!(usage["metered"], true); + assert_eq!(usage["billable_guests"], 1); + assert_eq!( + usage["guest_seats"], 1, + "one guest past the allowance is a whole seat" + ); + } + + Ok(()) +} diff --git a/backend/tests/app_guest_execution_mode.rs b/backend/tests/app_guest_execution_mode.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a47129e600 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/tests/app_guest_execution_mode.rs @@ -0,0 +1,1077 @@ +//! Tests for the `guest` app execution mode. +//! +//! A guest (`ExecutionMode::Guest`) has no account and so no ACL of its own: its +//! token's scopes are its entire grant. These tests pin the three things that would +//! silently undo it: +//! +//! * what makes a token a guest — the server-minted label, never a scope anyone +//! could type into `users/tokens/create`; +//! * the confinement — a guest reaches the one app it was let in for and nothing +//! else; +//! * the switches — an app's own `execution_mode: guest` is inert unless the +//! workspace and the instance allow guests, checked at the door rather than only +//! where a policy is written (git-sync and the CLI push policies past every UI); +//! the allowance on top of them has a binary of its own. +//! +//! The token is inserted directly: how a guest session is minted is the identity +//! provider's business (EE), what one can do is this file's. +//! +//! Users from the `base` fixture: +//! test-user (admin, token SECRET_TOKEN) + +use serde_json::json; +use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres}; +use windmill_test_utils::*; + +const ADMIN_TOKEN: &str = "SECRET_TOKEN"; +const GUEST_TOKEN: &str = "GUEST_SECRET_TOKEN"; +const APP_PATH: &str = "u/test-user/guest_app"; + +fn client() -> reqwest::Client { + reqwest::Client::new() +} + +fn authed(builder: reqwest::RequestBuilder, token: &str) -> reqwest::RequestBuilder { + builder.header("Authorization", format!("Bearer {}", token)) +} + +async fn enable_guests(port: u16, ws: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + authed( + client().post(format!( + "http://localhost:{port}/api/w/{ws}/workspaces/edit_guest_access" + )), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ "guest_access_enabled": true })) + .send() + .await?; + Ok(()) +} + +fn guest_scopes() -> Vec { + vec![ + "guest".to_string(), + "jobs:read".to_string(), + "resources:run".to_string(), + "users:read".to_string(), + "folders:read".to_string(), + format!("apps:read:{APP_PATH}"), + format!("apps:run:{APP_PATH}"), + ] +} + +/// Insert a guest session for `test-workspace`, scoped to `APP_PATH`. Mirrors +/// `create_guest_session_token`: the server-minted label, the narrow reads, the two +/// path-scoped app grants, the workspace pin, and an expiry — a derived token's +/// lifetime is capped at it, so a guest session without one cannot mint. +async fn insert_guest_token(db: &Pool, workspace: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + sqlx::query( + "INSERT INTO token (token_hash, token_prefix, token, email, label, scopes, workspace_id, expiration) + VALUES (encode(sha256($1::bytea), 'hex'), 'GUEST_SECR', $2, 'guest@example.com', + 'guest_session', $3, $4, now() + interval '8 hours')", + ) + .bind(GUEST_TOKEN.as_bytes()) + .bind(GUEST_TOKEN) + .bind(guest_scopes()) + .bind(workspace) + .execute(db) + .await?; + Ok(()) +} + +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn guest_session_is_confined_to_its_app(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace"); + + enable_guests(port, "test-workspace").await?; + insert_guest_token(&db, "test-workspace").await?; + + // Its own identity resolves, and reports the role rather than falling through to + // the non-member branch that hands out a `superadmin` shape. + let resp = authed(client().get(format!("{ws}/users/whoami")), GUEST_TOKEN) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200, "guest whoami must resolve"); + let me: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await?; + assert_eq!( + me["role"], + json!("guest"), + "guest must not read as superadmin" + ); + assert_eq!(me["operator"], json!(true)); + assert_eq!(me["is_admin"], json!(false)); + + // `resources/list_names` and the type schemas stay open — a guest drives an app, + // and app pickers need them — so the line to pin is the value-returning route. + for route in [ + "jobs/list", + "scripts/list", + "flows/list", + "variables/list", + "resources/get_value/u/test-user/secret", + "apps/list", + ] { + let resp = authed(client().get(format!("{ws}/{route}")), GUEST_TOKEN) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 403, + "guest must be denied {route}, got {}", + resp.status() + ); + } + + Ok(()) +} + +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn guest_token_does_not_cross_workspaces(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + + // A second workspace with an app at the SAME path: without the token's workspace + // pin, `apps:run:` would unlock it too, since a path is not unique across + // workspaces. + sqlx::query( + "INSERT INTO workspace (id, name, owner) VALUES ('other-ws', 'other-ws', 'test-user')", + ) + .execute(&db) + .await?; + sqlx::query("INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id) VALUES ('other-ws')") + .execute(&db) + .await?; + + insert_guest_token(&db, "test-workspace").await?; + + let resp = authed( + client().get(format!( + "http://localhost:{port}/api/w/other-ws/apps/get/p/{APP_PATH}" + )), + GUEST_TOKEN, + ) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 401, + "a guest token pinned to one workspace must not authenticate against another" + ); + + Ok(()) +} + +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn guest_entry_needs_both_the_app_mode_and_the_workspace_switch( + db: Pool, +) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace"); + + let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/create")), ADMIN_TOKEN) + .json(&json!({ + "path": APP_PATH, + "summary": "Guest app", + "value": {}, + "policy": { "execution_mode": "guest", "triggerables": {} } + })) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?); + + let secret: String = authed( + client().get(format!("{ws}/apps/secret_of/{APP_PATH}")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .send() + .await? + .text() + .await?; + + // The app says guest, the workspace has not opted in: inert. + let resp = client() + .get(format!("{ws}/apps_u/guest_entry/{secret}")) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 404, + "a guest app in a workspace that has not enabled guests must not advertise entry" + ); + + authed( + client().post(format!("{ws}/workspaces/edit_guest_access")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ "guest_access_enabled": true })) + .send() + .await?; + + // Unauthenticated on purpose: this is what a signed-out visitor reads. + let resp = client() + .get(format!("{ws}/apps_u/guest_entry/{secret}")) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200, "{}", resp.text().await?); + let entry: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await?; + assert_eq!(entry["app_path"], json!(APP_PATH)); + + // Turning the switch back off closes the door again even though the app's own + // policy is unchanged. + authed( + client().post(format!("{ws}/workspaces/edit_guest_access")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ "guest_access_enabled": false })) + .send() + .await?; + let resp = client() + .get(format!("{ws}/apps_u/guest_entry/{secret}")) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 404, + "turning guests off must stop advertising entry for an app already set to guest" + ); + + Ok(()) +} + +/// The guest grant is the server-minted label, never the `guest` scope. Scopes on a +/// user-created token are whatever the caller typed, so if the scope granted anything +/// then any member of any workspace could mint themselves non-member access to every +/// guest-mode app on the instance. +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn a_self_declared_guest_scope_grants_nothing(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace"); + + // `users/tokens/create` must refuse the label outright... + let resp = authed( + client().post(format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/users/tokens/create")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ "label": "guest_session", "scopes": guest_scopes() })) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 400, + "the guest session label must be server-minted only" + ); + + // ...and so must relabelling an ordinary token into it, or the pin-less user + // token would become a guest session that authenticates in every workspace. + let resp = authed( + client().post(format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/users/tokens/create")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ "label": "mine", "scopes": guest_scopes() })) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?); + let prefix: String = sqlx::query_scalar( + "SELECT token_prefix FROM token WHERE email = 'test@windmill.dev' AND label = 'mine'", + ) + .fetch_one(&db) + .await?; + let resp = authed( + client().post(format!( + "http://localhost:{port}/api/users/tokens/update_label/{prefix}" + )), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ "label": "guest_session" })) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 400, + "relabelling into the guest namespace must be refused: {}", + resp.text().await? + ); + + // ...and a token that carries the scopes under any other label authenticates as + // nothing in a workspace its owner is not a member of. + // An email with no `usr` row anywhere: exactly the identity the guest arm exists + // to admit, and the one a forged scope must not admit. + sqlx::query( + "INSERT INTO token (token_hash, token_prefix, token, email, label, scopes) + VALUES (encode(sha256($1::bytea), 'hex'), 'FORGED_SCO', $2, 'outsider@example.com', + 'forged', $3)", + ) + .bind(b"FORGED_SCOPES".as_slice()) + .bind("FORGED_SCOPES") + .bind(guest_scopes()) + .execute(&db) + .await?; + + let resp = authed(client().get(format!("{ws}/users/whoami")), "FORGED_SCOPES") + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 401, + "declaring the guest scope must not turn a non-member into an identity" + ); + + Ok(()) +} + +/// A guest-mode policy that names one runnable, so an `execute_component` request +/// gets past the triggerables lookup and reaches the guest gate. `sandbox` is what +/// makes the embed-token endpoint actually mint a token. +fn guest_app_with_runnable(path: &str, sandbox: bool) -> serde_json::Value { + app_with_runnable(path, "guest", sandbox) +} + +fn app_with_runnable(path: &str, execution_mode: &str, sandbox: bool) -> serde_json::Value { + json!({ + "path": path, + "summary": "App", + "value": {}, + "policy": { + "execution_mode": execution_mode, + "sandbox": sandbox, + "triggerables_v2": { + "script/u/test-user/noop": { "static_inputs": {}, "one_of_inputs": {} } + } + } + }) +} + +fn execute(port: u16, ws: &str, app: &str, token: &str) -> reqwest::RequestBuilder { + authed( + client().post(format!( + "http://localhost:{port}/api/w/{ws}/apps_u/execute_component/{app}" + )), + token, + ) + .json(&json!({ + "component": "a", + "path": "script/u/test-user/noop", + "args": {} + })) +} + +/// The workspace switch is enforced at the auth door for every guest request, not +/// remembered per handler. This is what stands between a `guest` policy pushed by +/// git-sync and execution once an admin has turned guests off — and it closes the +/// app to sessions already issued. +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn the_door_re_checks_the_workspace_switch(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace"); + + let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/create")), ADMIN_TOKEN) + .json(&guest_app_with_runnable(APP_PATH, false)) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?); + insert_guest_token(&db, "test-workspace").await?; + + // Switch off: the session does not authenticate at all, even though the app's + // policy says guest and the session was (in this fixture) issued regardless. On + // the authed route that is a 401; on the optional-auth run route the rejected + // token reads as no token, and a guest-mode app then refuses the anonymous + // caller — a denial either way. + let resp = authed(client().get(format!("{ws}/users/whoami")), GUEST_TOKEN) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 401, + "a guest must not authenticate while guests are off" + ); + let resp = execute(port, "test-workspace", APP_PATH, GUEST_TOKEN) + .send() + .await?; + assert!( + resp.status().is_client_error() && resp.status() != 404, + "a guest must not run while guests are off, got {}", + resp.status() + ); + + // Switch on: through the door. What follows the run is the runnable lookup, + // which fails on the nonexistent script — the point is that it is no longer a + // denial. + enable_guests(port, "test-workspace").await?; + let resp = execute(port, "test-workspace", APP_PATH, GUEST_TOKEN) + .send() + .await?; + assert!( + resp.status() != 401 && resp.status() != 403, + "with guests on, the door must let the run through: {}", + resp.status() + ); + + Ok(()) +} + +/// The path scope is what keeps a guest to the one app it was let in for: the route +/// layer is resource-blind for `apps:run`, so this line is drawn in the handler. +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn guest_cannot_run_another_guest_app(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace"); + + authed( + client().post(format!("{ws}/workspaces/edit_guest_access")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ "guest_access_enabled": true })) + .send() + .await?; + let other = "u/test-user/other_guest_app"; + let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/create")), ADMIN_TOKEN) + .json(&guest_app_with_runnable(other, false)) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?); + insert_guest_token(&db, "test-workspace").await?; // scoped to APP_PATH, not `other` + + let resp = execute(port, "test-workspace", other, GUEST_TOKEN) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 403, + "a guest session scoped to one app must not run another, even one open to guests" + ); + + Ok(()) +} + +/// The app path is spliced into the session's scopes, whose grammar reserves `:`, `,` +/// and `*`: a path carrying one would scope the guest to more than the one app it was +/// let in for, so the mint refuses it before anything else. Anything else in a path +/// (spaces, `@`) is literal to that grammar and stays admissible. +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn a_scope_metacharacter_in_the_app_path_is_refused( + db: Pool, +) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let mint = |path: &'static str| { + let db = db.clone(); + async move { + let mut tx = db.begin().await?; + let minted = windmill_api_users::users::create_guest_session_token( + "guest@example.com", + "test-workspace", + path, + &mut tx, + tower_cookies::Cookies::default(), + ) + .await; + anyhow::Ok(minted) + } + }; + for path in [ + "u/test-user/entry,u/test-user/hidden", + "u/test-user/*", + "u/test-user/entry:run", + ] { + let minted = mint(path).await?; + assert!( + matches!(minted, Err(windmill_common::error::Error::BadRequest(ref m)) if m.contains("cannot be scoped")), + "{path}: {minted:?}" + ); + } + for path in ["u/test-user/My App", "u/admin@windmill.dev/x"] { + let minted = mint(path).await?; + assert!( + !matches!(minted, Err(windmill_common::error::Error::BadRequest(ref m)) if m.contains("cannot be scoped")), + "{path} is literal to the scope grammar and must get past the guard: {minted:?}" + ); + } + Ok(()) +} + +/// A guest reads the jobs it launched and nothing else: with no membership behind it, +/// it must stop where an app embed token stops, before the share-token and ACL grants +/// a member would get, and with the same "not found" so it cannot probe for jobs. +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn a_guest_cannot_read_a_job_it_did_not_launch(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace"); + + enable_guests(port, "test-workspace").await?; + insert_guest_token(&db, "test-workspace").await?; + let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{ws}/scripts/create")), ADMIN_TOKEN) + .json(&json!({ + "path": "u/test-user/noop", + "summary": "", + "description": "", + "content": "echo 42", + "language": "bash", + })) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?); + let resp = authed( + client().post(format!("{ws}/jobs/run/p/u/test-user/noop")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({})) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?); + let job_id = resp.text().await?; + + let resp = authed( + client().get(format!("{ws}/jobs_u/getupdate/{job_id}")), + GUEST_TOKEN, + ) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 404, + "another caller's job is not found for a guest: {}", + resp.text().await? + ); + + Ok(()) +} + +/// Guests mode cannot land on a path the scope grammar cannot hold, however it gets +/// there: set at creation, set on update, or a rename of an app already in that mode. +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn guests_mode_needs_a_scopable_path(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace"); + + let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/create")), ADMIN_TOKEN) + .json(&guest_app_with_runnable("u/test-user/a:b", false)) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 400, "created into Guests on a `:` path"); + + let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/create")), ADMIN_TOKEN) + .json(&guest_app_with_runnable(APP_PATH, false)) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?); + let resp = authed( + client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/update/{APP_PATH}")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ "path": "u/test-user/a,b" })) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 400, "renamed to a `,` path while in Guests"); + let resp = authed( + client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/update/{APP_PATH}")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ "path": "u/test-user/My App" })) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 200, + "a space is literal: {}", + resp.text().await? + ); + + // Set on update: an app that already sits on such a path cannot be switched. + let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/create")), ADMIN_TOKEN) + .json(&json!({ + "path": "u/test-user/x:y", + "summary": "App", + "value": {}, + "policy": { "execution_mode": "publisher", "triggerables_v2": {} } + })) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?); + let resp = authed( + client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/update/u/test-user/x:y")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ "policy": { "execution_mode": "guest", "triggerables_v2": {} } })) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 400, "switched to Guests on a `:` path"); + + Ok(()) +} + +/// Renaming a workspace copies its settings; the guest switch must travel with them, +/// or the rename silently shuts every guest app of the workspace. +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn a_workspace_rename_keeps_the_guest_switch(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + + enable_guests(port, "test-workspace").await?; + sqlx::query( + "INSERT INTO guest_activity (email, workspace_id, day) + VALUES ('guest@example.com', 'test-workspace', CURRENT_DATE)", + ) + .execute(&db) + .await?; + let resp = authed( + client().post(format!( + "http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace/workspaces/change_workspace_id" + )), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ "new_id": "test-workspace-2", "new_name": "Test workspace 2" })) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200, "{}", resp.text().await?); + let enabled: bool = sqlx::query_scalar( + "SELECT guest_access_enabled FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace-2'", + ) + .fetch_one(&db) + .await?; + assert!(enabled, "the guest switch travels with the workspace"); + let moved: bool = sqlx::query_scalar( + "SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM guest_activity WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace-2') + AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM guest_activity WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace')", + ) + .fetch_one(&db) + .await?; + assert!(moved, "the guests seen in the workspace follow its new id"); + + Ok(()) +} + +/// The superadmin switch sits above every workspace's: off, no guest session stands and +/// no app discovers as open, whatever the workspace and the app say. +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn the_instance_switch_closes_every_workspace(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace"); + + enable_guests(port, "test-workspace").await?; + let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/create")), ADMIN_TOKEN) + .json(&guest_app_with_runnable(APP_PATH, false)) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?); + insert_guest_token(&db, "test-workspace").await?; + let set_instance_switch = |disabled: bool| { + authed( + client().post(format!( + "http://localhost:{port}/api/settings/global/guest_access_disabled" + )), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ "value": disabled })) + .send() + }; + + let secret: String = authed( + client().get(format!("{ws}/apps/secret_of/{APP_PATH}")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .send() + .await? + .text() + .await?; + + set_instance_switch(true).await?.error_for_status()?; + let resp = authed(client().get(format!("{ws}/users/whoami")), GUEST_TOKEN) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 401, + "the instance switch closes an issued session" + ); + let resp = client() + .get(format!("{ws}/apps_u/guest_entry/{secret}")) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 404, + "and nothing discovers as open to guests" + ); + + set_instance_switch(false).await?.error_for_status()?; + let resp = authed(client().get(format!("{ws}/users/whoami")), GUEST_TOKEN) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200, "back on, the session stands again"); + + Ok(()) +} + +/// An account holder is never a guest, and that holds after the mint too: a session +/// minted before the account existed ends at the door the moment one does, so an +/// account provisioned in a race with the mint cannot outlive the rule. +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn an_account_ends_the_guest_session(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace"); + + enable_guests(port, "test-workspace").await?; + insert_guest_token(&db, "test-workspace").await?; + let resp = authed(client().get(format!("{ws}/users/whoami")), GUEST_TOKEN) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200, "guest whoami must resolve"); + + sqlx::query( + "INSERT INTO password (email, password_hash, login_type, super_admin, verified, name) + VALUES ('guest@example.com', 'not-a-real-hash', 'password', false, true, 'Guest')", + ) + .execute(&db) + .await?; + let resp = authed(client().get(format!("{ws}/users/whoami")), GUEST_TOKEN) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 401, + "an account created after the mint ends the guest session at the door" + ); + + Ok(()) +} + +/// An upload goes through an app's `s3_inputs` policy or not at all for a guest: the +/// legacy branch for an app without one uploads with the caller's own standing, which a +/// guest has none of, and an app path with no row must not slip past the confinement. +#[cfg(feature = "parquet")] +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn a_guest_cannot_upload_outside_a_policy(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace"); + + enable_guests(port, "test-workspace").await?; + let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/create")), ADMIN_TOKEN) + .json(&guest_app_with_runnable(APP_PATH, false)) // no `s3_inputs` + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?); + insert_guest_token(&db, "test-workspace").await?; + + let upload = |app: &str| { + authed( + client().post(format!( + "{ws}/apps_u/upload_s3_file/{app}?file_key=anything" + )), + GUEST_TOKEN, + ) + .body("x") + .send() + }; + let resp = upload("u/test-user/no_such_app").await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 403, + "a path with no app must not escape the guest's confinement: {}", + resp.text().await? + ); + let resp = upload(APP_PATH).await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 400, + "without an upload policy a guest is refused like an anonymous caller: {}", + resp.text().await? + ); + + Ok(()) +} + +/// An anonymous app is open to anyone, a guest included, and the guest uses it as +/// itself: the component run and the result read that follows are one identity, so +/// the read's launched-by-me grant matches. Acting as nobody for the run and as the +/// guest for the read would start a job whose result the page can never fetch. +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn a_guest_uses_an_anonymous_app_as_itself(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace"); + + enable_guests(port, "test-workspace").await?; + let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{ws}/scripts/create")), ADMIN_TOKEN) + .json(&json!({ + "path": "u/test-user/noop", + "summary": "", + "description": "", + "content": "echo 42", + "language": "bash", + })) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?); + let anon = "u/test-user/anon_app"; + let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/create")), ADMIN_TOKEN) + .json(&app_with_runnable(anon, "anonymous", false)) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?); + insert_guest_token(&db, "test-workspace").await?; // scoped to APP_PATH, not `anon` + + let resp = execute(port, "test-workspace", anon, GUEST_TOKEN) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200, "{}", resp.text().await?); + let job_id = resp.text().await?; + + let resp = authed( + client().get(format!("{ws}/jobs_u/getupdate/{job_id}")), + GUEST_TOKEN, + ) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 200, + "the guest that started the run must be able to read it back: {}", + resp.text().await? + ); + + Ok(()) +} + +/// The embed token a guest mints for a sandboxed app is the one credential handed to +/// untrusted app JS. It must be a guest twice over — resolve like its minter (the +/// label) and be governed like its minter (the sentinel) — or every guest control +/// silently skips the most exposed credential there is. +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn a_guest_minted_embed_token_stays_a_guest(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace"); + + enable_guests(port, "test-workspace").await?; + let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/create")), ADMIN_TOKEN) + .json(&guest_app_with_runnable(APP_PATH, true)) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?); + let secret: String = authed( + client().get(format!("{ws}/apps/secret_of/{APP_PATH}")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .send() + .await? + .text() + .await?; + insert_guest_token(&db, "test-workspace").await?; + + // The guest page mints the iframe's token from the guest session. + let resp = authed( + client().get(format!("{ws}/apps_u/embed_token/{secret}")), + GUEST_TOKEN, + ) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 200, + "a guest must be able to mint: {}", + resp.text().await? + ); + let body: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await?; + let embed = body["token"] + .as_str() + .expect("mint must return a token for an authenticated guest") + .to_string(); + + // Its lifetime is capped at the session that minted it: the requested embed + // validity (12h) is longer than the guest session's (8h in this fixture), and the + // session's expiry is a guest's only revocation. + let parent_exp: chrono::DateTime = + sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT expiration FROM token WHERE token_prefix = 'GUEST_SECR'") + .fetch_one(&db) + .await?; + let child_exp: chrono::DateTime = body["expiration"] + .as_str() + .and_then(|e| e.parse().ok()) + .expect("mint must return the token's expiration"); + assert!( + child_exp <= parent_exp, + "a guest's embed token must not outlive the session that minted it ({child_exp} > {parent_exp})" + ); + + // Resolves — and as a guest, not as the non-member superadmin shape. + let resp = authed(client().get(format!("{ws}/users/whoami")), &embed) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200, "the minted token must authenticate"); + let me: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await?; + assert_eq!(me["role"], json!("guest")); + + // Governed: the workspace switch closes it at the door, iframe or not. + authed( + client().post(format!("{ws}/workspaces/edit_guest_access")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ "guest_access_enabled": false })) + .send() + .await?; + let resp = authed(client().get(format!("{ws}/users/whoami")), &embed) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 401, + "turning guests off must stop a guest's embed token authenticating" + ); + let resp = execute(port, "test-workspace", APP_PATH, &embed) + .send() + .await?; + assert!( + resp.status().is_client_error() && resp.status() != 404, + "and running components, got {}", + resp.status() + ); + enable_guests(port, "test-workspace").await?; + + // And its scopes are not something the guest's email can later rewrite. The + // guest session itself cannot reach `/users/*` (workspace pin), so model the real + // threat: the same email after promotion, holding an ordinary unpinned session. + sqlx::query( + "INSERT INTO token (token_hash, token_prefix, token, email, label) + VALUES (encode(sha256($1::bytea), 'hex'), 'PROMOTED_S', $2, 'guest@example.com', + 'session')", + ) + .bind(b"PROMOTED_SESSION".as_slice()) + .bind("PROMOTED_SESSION") + .execute(&db) + .await?; + for prefix in [&embed[..10], &GUEST_TOKEN[..10]] { + let resp = authed( + client().post(format!( + "http://localhost:{port}/api/users/tokens/update_scopes/{prefix}" + )), + "PROMOTED_SESSION", + ) + .json(&json!({ "scopes": null })) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 404, + "a promoted account must not be able to rescope its old guest credentials" + ); + } + + Ok(()) +} + +/// The label is the single source of truth: a guest-labelled credential is governed +/// as a guest even if its scopes carry no sentinel. Otherwise every mint that derives +/// a token from a guest session is one forgotten `push` away from an ungoverned +/// non-member credential. +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn a_guest_label_is_governed_without_the_sentinel(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace"); + + enable_guests(port, "test-workspace").await?; + let scopes: Vec = guest_scopes() + .into_iter() + .filter(|s| s != "guest") + .collect(); + sqlx::query( + "INSERT INTO token (token_hash, token_prefix, token, email, label, scopes, workspace_id, expiration) + VALUES (encode(sha256($1::bytea), 'hex'), 'NOSENTINE_', $2, 'guest@example.com', + 'guest_session', $3, 'test-workspace', now() + interval '8 hours')", + ) + .bind(b"NOSENTINEL".as_slice()) + .bind("NOSENTINEL") + .bind(scopes) + .execute(&db) + .await?; + + let resp = authed(client().get(format!("{ws}/users/whoami")), "NOSENTINEL") + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200); + let me: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await?; + assert_eq!( + me["role"], + json!("guest"), + "the label alone must make a credential a guest" + ); + let resp = authed(client().get(format!("{ws}/jobs/list")), "NOSENTINEL") + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 403, "and confine it like one"); + + Ok(()) +} + +/// A guest is someone with no account at all — including a deactivated one. The +/// sign-in path's own account lookup filters on `disabled = false`, so a disabled +/// account reads as absent there; the mint has to refuse on its own or deactivation +/// (manual or SCIM, whose revocation is "delete the tokens") walks straight back in. +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn a_disabled_account_cannot_become_a_guest(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace"); + + authed( + client().post(format!("{ws}/workspaces/edit_guest_access")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ "guest_access_enabled": true })) + .send() + .await?; + let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/create")), ADMIN_TOKEN) + .json(&guest_app_with_runnable(APP_PATH, false)) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?); + sqlx::query( + "INSERT INTO password (email, password_hash, login_type, super_admin, verified, disabled) + VALUES ('gone@example.com', 'x', 'password', false, true, true)", + ) + .execute(&db) + .await?; + + let mut tx = db.begin().await?; + let cookies = tower_cookies::Cookies::default(); + let minted = windmill_api_users::users::create_guest_session_token( + "gone@example.com", + "test-workspace", + APP_PATH, + &mut tx, + cookies, + ) + .await; + assert!( + matches!(minted, Err(windmill_common::error::Error::NotAuthorized(_))), + "a deactivated account must be refused a guest session, got {minted:?}" + ); + + Ok(()) +} diff --git a/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/auth.rs b/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/auth.rs index bef59aea6c..0663c0b97b 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/auth.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/auth.rs @@ -138,12 +138,28 @@ impl AuthCache { w_id: Option, token: &str, ) -> Option { - let mut opt_job_authed = self.get_opt_job_authed_inner(w_id, token).await?; + let mut opt_job_authed = self.get_opt_job_authed_inner(w_id.clone(), token).await?; // Single source of truth: mirror the resolved job_id onto the authed so // every consumer (require_super_admin, ...) sees that this identity came // from a job's WM_TOKEN, even on an AUTH_CACHE hit whose cached authed // predates this field. opt_job_authed.authed.job_id = opt_job_authed.job_id; + // The workspace's guest switch is enforced here, once, for every guest request + // — not per handler, where each guest-reachable route would have to remember + // it. Uncached, so turning guests off takes effect on the next request of every + // guest session and every token derived from one. + if crate::scopes::has_guest_sentinel(opt_job_authed.authed.scopes.as_deref()) { + let Some(w_id) = w_id else { return None }; + let email = &opt_job_authed.authed.email; + match windmill_common::workspaces::guest_session_stands(&self.db, &w_id, email).await { + Ok(true) => {} + Ok(false) => return None, + Err(e) => { + tracing::error!("guest session check failed for {w_id}: {e:#}"); + return None; + } + } + } Some(opt_job_authed) } @@ -427,6 +443,8 @@ impl AuthCache { } (_, Some(email), super_admin, scopes, label, read_only) => { let is_session_token = is_session_label(label.as_deref()); + let is_guest_session = + windmill_common::auth::is_guest_session_label(label.as_deref()); let (username_override, username_override_is_token_label) = username_override_from_label(label); if w_id.is_some() { @@ -509,6 +527,36 @@ impl AuthCache { } } } + // A guest session: IdP-authenticated, member of + // nothing. No `usr` lookup, groups or folders, so + // every ACL denies it and the token's scopes are + // its whole grant. After the superadmin arm, so + // that token is never demoted into this one. + None if is_guest_session => { + // The server-minted label is the grant, never + // the `guest` scope (a user-minted token's + // scopes are whatever the caller typed); the + // sentinel is pinned on here so every guest + // control downstream sees a guest regardless. + let scopes = Some(crate::scopes::with_guest_sentinel( + scopes.unwrap_or_default(), + )); + Some(ApiAuthed { + username: email.clone(), + email, + is_admin: false, + is_operator: true, + groups: vec![], + folders: vec![], + scopes, + username_override, + username_override_is_token_label, + is_session_token, + token_prefix: Some(safe_token_prefix(token)), + read_only, + job_id: None, + }) + } None => None, } } else { @@ -934,10 +982,17 @@ pub(crate) fn username_override_from_label(label: Option) -> (Option ( - Some(format!("{}{label}", crate::GENERIC_TOKEN_LABEL_PREFIX)), - true, - ), + Some(label) + if label != "ephemeral-script" + && label != "session" + && label != windmill_common::auth::GUEST_SESSION_LABEL + && !label.is_empty() => + { + ( + Some(format!("{}{label}", crate::GENERIC_TOKEN_LABEL_PREFIX)), + true, + ) + } _ => (None, false), } } diff --git a/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/scopes.rs b/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/scopes.rs index 05de1183cd..519d814f15 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/scopes.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/scopes.rs @@ -500,6 +500,24 @@ pub fn check_route_access( } } + // A guest session carries the same broad read scopes as an embed token and for + // the same handful of routes, so it gets the same default-deny. + if has_guest_sentinel(Some(token_scopes)) { + if let Some(suffix) = route_suffix.as_deref() { + if guest_route_denied(required_domain, suffix) { + return Err(Error::PermissionDenied(format!( + "a guest session cannot access {route_path}" + ))); + } + // Same rationale as the embed branch: re-running a component supersedes + // its in-flight run, and `cancel_job_api` confines this to the caller's + // own jobs. + if suffix.starts_with("jobs_u/queue/cancel/") { + return Ok(()); + } + } + } + // Each declared scope must grant what its prompt said and no more: // `jobs:run` only deployed runnables, `users:read` only the viewer's identity. if has_raw_app_sdk_sentinel(Some(token_scopes)) { @@ -753,6 +771,28 @@ pub fn has_app_embed_sentinel(scopes: Option<&[String]>) -> bool { scopes.is_some_and(|s| s.iter().any(|x| x == APP_EMBED_SENTINEL)) } +/// Sentinel in a guest session token: someone the identity provider authenticated +/// who is a member of no workspace. Grants nothing itself — it only confines the +/// session to the app surface, the same way `app_embed` does. What makes a session a +/// guest at all is the server-minted label +/// [`windmill_common::auth::GUEST_SESSION_LABEL`]; a forged sentinel here can only +/// narrow its own token. +pub const GUEST_SENTINEL: &str = "guest"; + +/// True if a token is a guest session, whose scopes are its entire grant: it has no ACL +/// of its own, so every ACL check denies it unaided. +pub fn has_guest_sentinel(scopes: Option<&[String]>) -> bool { + scopes.is_some_and(|s| s.iter().any(|x| x == GUEST_SENTINEL)) +} + +/// `scopes` with the guest sentinel present exactly once. +pub fn with_guest_sentinel(mut scopes: Vec) -> Vec { + if !scopes.iter().any(|x| x == GUEST_SENTINEL) { + scopes.push(GUEST_SENTINEL.to_string()); + } + scopes +} + /// Sentinel in raw-app SDK tokens. Grants nothing; `check_route_access` uses it /// to narrow the declared scopes to what the viewer's prompt promised. pub const RAW_APP_SDK_SENTINEL: &str = "raw_app_sdk"; @@ -815,6 +855,19 @@ fn app_embed_apps_route_allowed(suffix: &str) -> bool { suffix.starts_with("apps/get/p/") || suffix.starts_with("apps_u/") } +/// Routes a guest session is denied: the app-embed allowlist, plus the embed-token +/// mint. A guest session is the *embedder* — the viewer's own browser rendering the +/// app page — not the app's own JS, and the page mints the iframe's token from it. +/// +/// Everything else stays default-denied, so a guest reaches the app it was let in +/// for and nothing around it. +fn guest_route_denied(domain: ScopeDomain, suffix: &str) -> bool { + if domain == ScopeDomain::Apps && suffix.starts_with("apps_u/embed_token") { + return false; + } + app_embed_route_denied(domain, suffix) +} + /// Job routes a running app uses (the by-id poll/cancel surface driven by the /// frontend JobLoader). Everything else in the jobs domain — enumeration, counts, /// exports, and the `job_signature`/`resume_urls` capability-minting routes — is diff --git a/backend/windmill-api-users/src/users.rs b/backend/windmill-api-users/src/users.rs index 47b520736a..bda651a8cf 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api-users/src/users.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api-users/src/users.rs @@ -657,15 +657,17 @@ async fn logout( let t_prefix = token.get(..TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN).unwrap_or(&token); let email = if *INVALIDATE_ALL_SESSIONS_ON_LOGOUT { - sqlx::query_scalar!( + // A guest's browser session is a session too: this is its one user-driven revocation. + sqlx::query_scalar::<_, Option>( "WITH email_lookup AS ( SELECT email FROM token WHERE token_hash = $1 ) DELETE FROM token - WHERE email = (SELECT email FROM email_lookup) AND label = 'session' + WHERE email = (SELECT email FROM email_lookup) + AND label IN ('session', 'guest_session') RETURNING email", - t_hash ) + .bind(&t_hash) .fetch_optional(&mut *tx) .await? } else { @@ -745,7 +747,30 @@ async fn whoami( Path(w_id): Path, authed: ApiAuthed, ) -> JsonResult { + let is_guest = windmill_api_auth::scopes::has_guest_sentinel(authed.scopes.as_deref()); let ApiAuthed { username, email, is_admin, groups, folders, .. } = authed; + // A guest would otherwise fall through to the non-member branch below and be + // handed a `superadmin` role. Answer it here, as the operator-shaped identity it is. + if is_guest { + return Ok(Json(UserInfo { + workspace_id: w_id, + email, + username, + name: None, + is_admin: false, + is_super_admin: false, + created_at: chrono::Utc::now(), + groups: vec![], + operator: true, + disabled: false, + role: Some("guest".to_string()), + folders_read: vec![], + folders: vec![], + folders_owners: vec![], + is_service_account: false, + non_member: true, + })); + } let user = get_user(&w_id, &username, &db).await?; // Only treat the row as "this user is a member" when its email matches; the // derived username is instance-unique so a match on a different email should @@ -2882,7 +2907,12 @@ pub async fn create_session_token<'c>( .execute(&mut **tx) .await?; - let mut cookie = Cookie::new(COOKIE_NAME, token.clone()); + set_session_cookie(&cookies, &token, *MAX_SESSION_VALIDITY_SECONDS); + Ok(token) +} + +fn set_session_cookie(cookies: &Cookies, token: &str, validity_seconds: i64) { + let mut cookie = Cookie::new(COOKIE_NAME, token.to_string()); cookie.set_secure(IS_SECURE.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed)); cookie.set_same_site(Some(tower_cookies::cookie::SameSite::Lax)); cookie.set_http_only(true); @@ -2892,9 +2922,150 @@ pub async fn create_session_token<'c>( } let mut expire: OffsetDateTime = time::OffsetDateTime::now_utc(); - expire += time::Duration::seconds(*MAX_SESSION_VALIDITY_SECONDS); + expire += time::Duration::seconds(validity_seconds); cookie.set_expires(expire); cookies.add(cookie); +} + +lazy_static::lazy_static! { + /// A guest session is the only credential held by someone with no account, so + /// there is nothing to disable when the workspace revokes guest access or the + /// identity provider removes them — the expiry is the revocation. Much shorter + /// than a member session for that reason. + static ref GUEST_SESSION_VALIDITY_SECONDS: i64 = std::env::var("GUEST_SESSION_VALIDITY_SECONDS") + .ok() + .and_then(|x| x.parse::().ok()) + .unwrap_or(8 * 60 * 60); +} + +/// Scopes a guest session carries. Mirrors `APP_EMBED_SCOPES` — the same broad-looking +/// reads narrowed to a route allowlist by the sentinel (`guest_route_denied`) — plus the +/// two path-scoped app grants minted per app. With no ACL of its own, this list is the +/// whole of what a guest can do. +/// +/// The `guest` sentinel here only narrows. What makes the session a guest at all is the +/// server-minted label ([`windmill_common::auth::GUEST_SESSION_LABEL`]). +fn guest_session_scopes(app_path: &str) -> Result> { + if !windmill_common::auth::is_scope_literal_path(app_path) { + return Err(Error::BadRequest(format!( + "app path {app_path} cannot be scoped: `:`, `,` and `*` are reserved in scopes, \ + and a leading `/` never matches a route" + ))); + } + Ok(vec![ + windmill_api_auth::scopes::GUEST_SENTINEL.to_string(), + "jobs:read".to_string(), + "resources:run".to_string(), + "users:read".to_string(), + "folders:read".to_string(), + format!("apps:read:{app_path}"), + format!("apps:run:{app_path}"), + ]) +} + +/// Mint a browser session for someone the identity provider authenticated who is a +/// member of no workspace, so they can open one guest-mode app. Writes no `password` +/// and no `usr` row: that absence is what keeps a guest off every seat counter, so +/// nothing here may be "helpfully" upgraded into provisioning. +/// +/// Pinned to `w_id` (`AuthCache` matches on `token.workspace_id`): without the pin an +/// `apps:run:` scope would unlock a same-path app elsewhere. So a guest cannot +/// authenticate on any workspace-less route (`/api/users/*`, `/api/settings/*`); a +/// page that needs one for a guest must become workspace-scoped, not loosen the pin. +/// +/// Refuses unless every gate says yes (`guest_app_admits`, then the allowance in +/// `guest_admission`), so no caller can mint where a guest is not wanted, whatever it +/// believed when it decided to call. All that is left to the caller is the +/// authentication of `email`. +pub async fn create_guest_session_token<'c>( + email: &str, + w_id: &str, + app_path: &str, + tx: &mut sqlx::Transaction<'c, sqlx::Postgres>, + cookies: Cookies, +) -> Result { + use windmill_common::min_version::MIN_VERSION_SUPPORTS_TOKEN_HASH; + + let token = rd_string(32); + let t_hash = windmill_common::auth::hash_token(&token); + let t_prefix = token.get(..TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN).unwrap_or(&token); + let plaintext: Option<&str> = if MIN_VERSION_SUPPORTS_TOKEN_HASH.met().await { + None + } else { + Some(&token) + }; + let scopes = guest_session_scopes(app_path)?; + + // No account at all (see `ExecutionMode::Guest`): a deactivated `password` row + // counts, since the sign-in path's own lookup filters on `disabled = false` and a + // SCIM-offboarded account would otherwise read as absent; so does a `usr` row in + // any workspace, which is what a service account has instead of a password. + let has_account: bool = sqlx::query_scalar( + "SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM password WHERE email = $1) + OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM usr WHERE email = $1)", + ) + .bind(email) + .fetch_one(&mut **tx) + .await?; + if has_account { + return Err(Error::NotAuthorized( + "an existing account cannot hold a guest session".to_string(), + )); + } + if !windmill_common::workspaces::guest_app_admits(&mut **tx, w_id, app_path).await? { + return Err(Error::NotAuthorized(format!( + "app {app_path} is not open to guests" + ))); + } + windmill_common::workspaces::guest_admission(&mut **tx, email).await?; + + sqlx::query!( + "INSERT INTO token + (token_hash, token_prefix, token, email, label, expiration, super_admin, scopes, workspace_id) + VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, now() + ($6 || ' seconds')::interval, false, $7, $8)", + t_hash, + t_prefix, + plaintext as Option<&str>, + email, + windmill_common::auth::GUEST_SESSION_LABEL, + &GUEST_SESSION_VALIDITY_SECONDS.to_string(), + &scopes, + w_id, + ) + .execute(&mut **tx) + .await?; + + // The only durable record that a guest was here, and the set the allowance is + // counted on; not the audit log, see the migration. Idempotent per email, + // workspace and day. + sqlx::query!( + "INSERT INTO guest_activity (email, workspace_id, day) + VALUES ($1, $2, CURRENT_DATE) + ON CONFLICT (email, workspace_id, day) + DO UPDATE SET last_seen_at = now()", + email, + w_id, + ) + .execute(&mut **tx) + .await?; + + audit_log( + &mut **tx, + &AuditAuthor { + email: email.to_string(), + username: email.to_string(), + username_override: None, + token_prefix: Some(t_prefix.to_string()), + }, + "users.login_guest", + ActionKind::Create, + w_id, + Some(app_path), + None, + ) + .await?; + + set_session_cookie(&cookies, &token, *GUEST_SESSION_VALIDITY_SECONDS); Ok(token) } @@ -3159,9 +3330,13 @@ async fn update_token_scopes( let mut tx = db.begin().await?; + // A guest-labelled token is never rescoped: its scopes are its whole confinement, + // and after promotion the same email owns an account that could otherwise strip + // them from the still-valid guest credential. Same shape as the relabel guard. let updated: Option = sqlx::query_scalar!( "UPDATE token SET scopes = $1 WHERE email = $2 AND token_prefix = $3 + AND (label IS NULL OR label <> 'guest_session') RETURNING token_prefix", req.scopes.as_deref(), &authed.email, @@ -3172,7 +3347,7 @@ async fn update_token_scopes( let prefix = updated.ok_or_else(|| { Error::NotFound(format!( - "token {token_prefix} not found or not owned by user" + "token {token_prefix} not found, not owned by user, or not rescopable" )) })?; @@ -3242,6 +3417,7 @@ async fn update_token_label( WHERE email = $2 AND token_prefix = $3 AND (label IS NULL OR ( label <> 'session' + AND label <> 'guest_session' AND lower(label) NOT LIKE 'ephemeral%' AND label <> 'debugger-token' AND label NOT LIKE 'mcp-oauth-%' diff --git a/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs b/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs index cb5c639d46..f8bb95fd7d 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs @@ -151,6 +151,8 @@ pub fn workspaced_service() -> Router { ) .route("/edit_deploy_ui_config", post(edit_deploy_ui_config)) .route("/edit_default_app", post(edit_default_app)) + .route("/edit_guest_access", post(edit_guest_access)) + .route("/guest_usage", get(get_guest_usage)) .route("/default_app", get(get_default_app)) .route( "/default_scripts", @@ -317,6 +319,9 @@ pub struct WorkspaceSettings { #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] pub public_app_execution_limit_per_minute: Option, pub error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts: bool, + /// Whether this workspace admits guest sessions (`ExecutionMode::Guest`). An app's + /// own `execution_mode: guest` is inert while this is off. + pub guest_access_enabled: bool, } /// Subset of `WorkspaceSettings` that is safe to return to any workspace @@ -339,6 +344,9 @@ pub struct WorkspacePublicSettings { pub teams_team_guid: Option, #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] pub mute_critical_alerts: Option, + /// Not sensitive, and the app editor needs it to say whether the guest rung is + /// live -- an app can be set to `guest` while the workspace has guests off. + pub guest_access_enabled: bool, #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] pub deploy_ui: Option, #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] @@ -1073,7 +1081,8 @@ async fn get_settings( error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, - error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts + error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, + guest_access_enabled FROM workspace_settings WHERE @@ -1112,6 +1121,7 @@ async fn get_public_settings( teams_team_name, teams_team_guid, mute_critical_alerts, + guest_access_enabled, deploy_ui, large_file_storage, datatable @@ -1132,6 +1142,18 @@ async fn get_public_settings( Ok(Json(settings)) } +/// The instance's standing against the guest allowance: counts only, no emails, so any +/// member may read it. Instance-wide, since a licence is per instance and one email is +/// one guest however many workspaces it opens; the settings card and the editor's +/// Guests rung show it so nobody discovers the cap from a visitor's complaint. +async fn get_guest_usage( + _authed: ApiAuthed, + Extension(db): Extension, + Path(_w_id): Path, +) -> JsonResult { + Ok(Json(windmill_common::workspaces::guest_usage(&db).await?)) +} + #[derive(Deserialize)] pub struct GitSyncDeployModeQuery { /// The branch the caller would push. @@ -4595,6 +4617,50 @@ async fn edit_default_app( )); } +#[derive(Deserialize)] +struct EditGuestAccess { + guest_access_enabled: bool, +} + +/// Turn guest sessions on or off for this workspace. Off by default, and off is +/// authoritative and immediate: the switch is re-read where a guest session is +/// minted (`guest_app_admits`) and at the auth door on every guest request, so an app +/// whose policy already says `guest` — pushed by git-sync, say — closes to guests on +/// the next request, sessions already issued included. +async fn edit_guest_access( + authed: ApiAuthed, + Extension(db): Extension, + Path(w_id): Path, + Json(EditGuestAccess { guest_access_enabled }): Json, +) -> Result { + require_admin(authed.is_admin, &authed.username)?; + + let mut tx = db.begin().await?; + sqlx::query!( + "UPDATE workspace_settings SET guest_access_enabled = $1 WHERE workspace_id = $2", + guest_access_enabled, + &w_id + ) + .execute(&mut *tx) + .await?; + + audit_log( + &mut *tx, + &authed, + "workspaces.edit_guest_access", + ActionKind::Update, + &w_id, + Some(&guest_access_enabled.to_string()), + None, + ) + .await?; + tx.commit().await?; + + Ok(format!( + "Guest access set to {guest_access_enabled} for workspace {w_id}" + )) +} + async fn edit_default_scripts( authed: ApiAuthed, Extension(db): Extension, diff --git a/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces_extra.rs b/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces_extra.rs index 1968437e40..dfb6e49921 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces_extra.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces_extra.rs @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn change_workspace_id( // Duplicate workspace settings (keep copy in old workspace for reference) info!("Duplicating workspace_settings table"); sqlx::query!( - "INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts) SELECT $1, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $2", + "INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled) SELECT $1, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $2", &rw.new_id, &old_id ) @@ -187,6 +187,13 @@ pub(crate) async fn change_workspace_id( .execute(&mut *tx) .await?; + info!("Updating guest_activity table"); + sqlx::query("UPDATE guest_activity SET workspace_id = $1 WHERE workspace_id = $2") + .bind(&rw.new_id) + .bind(&old_id) + .execute(&mut *tx) + .await?; + info!("Updating workspace_invite table"); sqlx::query!( "UPDATE workspace_invite SET workspace_id = $1 WHERE workspace_id = $2", @@ -1112,6 +1119,13 @@ pub(crate) async fn delete_workspace( .execute(&mut *tx) .await?; + // Unlike the rest of this list, this also moves an instance-wide figure: the guest + // allowance and the seats past it are counted over every workspace's rows. + sqlx::query("DELETE FROM guest_activity WHERE workspace_id = $1") + .bind(&w_id) + .execute(&mut *tx) + .await?; + sqlx::query!("DELETE FROM token WHERE workspace_id = $1", &w_id) .execute(&mut *tx) .await?; diff --git a/backend/windmill-api/openapi.yaml b/backend/windmill-api/openapi.yaml index a27be7d295..a2fe3ee19b 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api/openapi.yaml +++ b/backend/windmill-api/openapi.yaml @@ -861,6 +861,34 @@ paths: items: $ref: "#/components/schemas/ExternalJwtToken" + /users/guests: + get: + summary: list the distinct guests of the trailing window (superadmin only) + description: >- + The set the guest allowance is counted on: every distinct email that held a + guest session in the last `window_days`, with the workspaces it opened and the + days it was first and last seen, most recently seen first. `usage` is the + instance's standing against the allowance and the meter. + operationId: listGuests + tags: + - user + parameters: + - name: page + in: query + schema: + type: integer + - name: per_page + in: query + schema: + type: integer + responses: + "200": + description: the guests of the window and the allowance they count against + content: + application/json: + schema: + $ref: "#/components/schemas/GuestList" + /users/onboarding: post: summary: Submit user onboarding data @@ -3667,8 +3695,12 @@ paths: $ref: "#/components/schemas/WorkspaceDeployUISettings" mute_critical_alerts: type: boolean + guest_access_enabled: + type: boolean + description: Whether this workspace admits guest sessions. An app's own `guest` execution mode is inert while this is false. required: - workspace_id + - guest_access_enabled /w/{workspace}/workspaces/get_settings: get: @@ -3750,6 +3782,9 @@ paths: error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts: type: boolean description: Report failed jobs to the instance critical alert channels when no workspace error handler is set. + guest_access_enabled: + type: boolean + description: Whether this workspace admits guest sessions. An app's own `guest` execution mode is inert while this is false. /w/{workspace}/workspaces/get_deploy_to: get: @@ -5739,6 +5774,60 @@ paths: schema: type: string + /w/{workspace}/workspaces/edit_guest_access: + post: + summary: enable or disable guest sessions for this workspace + description: >- + Guests are people the identity provider authenticates who have no Windmill + account; the `guest` app execution mode admits them. Off by default. Re-read + where a guest session is minted and at the auth door on every guest request, so + turning it off takes effect immediately, for sessions already issued and for + apps whose policy already says `guest`. + operationId: editGuestAccess + tags: + - workspace + parameters: + - $ref: "#/components/parameters/WorkspaceId" + requestBody: + description: Whether guest sessions are admitted + required: true + content: + application/json: + schema: + type: object + properties: + guest_access_enabled: + type: boolean + required: + - guest_access_enabled + responses: + "200": + description: status + content: + text/plain: + schema: + type: string + + /w/{workspace}/workspaces/guest_usage: + get: + summary: the instance's standing against the guest allowance + description: >- + Instance-wide, since a licence is per instance and one email is one guest however + many workspaces it opens. Read by workspace admins and app publishers to see how + close the cap (Community and Pro) or the meter (Enterprise) is. + operationId: getGuestUsage + tags: + - workspace + parameters: + - $ref: "#/components/parameters/WorkspaceId" + responses: + "200": + description: guest usage + content: + application/json: + schema: + $ref: "#/components/schemas/GuestUsage" + /w/{workspace}/workspaces/default_scripts: post: summary: edit default scripts for workspace @@ -8806,6 +8895,27 @@ paths: required: - app + /apps_u/guest_entry_by_custom_path/{custom_path}: + get: + summary: whether the app behind a custom path admits guests + description: >- + The custom-path counterpart of `getGuestEntry`. Unauthenticated; 404 unless + the app's execution mode is `guest` AND its workspace has + `guest_access_enabled` AND the instance has not set `guest_access_disabled`. + Returns the workspace too, since a custom URL may not carry it. + operationId: getGuestEntryByCustomPath + tags: + - app + parameters: + - $ref: "#/components/parameters/CustomPath" + responses: + "200": + description: the app is open to guests + content: + application/json: + schema: + $ref: "#/components/schemas/GuestEntry" + /apps_u/public_app_by_custom_path/{custom_path}: get: summary: get public app by custom path @@ -12966,6 +13076,30 @@ paths: schema: type: string + /w/{workspace}/apps_u/guest_entry/{path}: + get: + summary: whether the app behind a share secret admits guests + description: >- + Unauthenticated: what a signed-out visitor reads to learn that signing in + would let them in. 404 unless the app's execution mode is `guest` AND the + workspace has `guest_access_enabled` AND the instance has not set the + `guest_access_disabled` global setting, so it says nothing about apps that + are not open to guests. Discloses only the app path, to a caller already + holding the share secret. + operationId: getGuestEntry + tags: + - app + parameters: + - $ref: "#/components/parameters/WorkspaceId" + - $ref: "#/components/parameters/Path" + responses: + "200": + description: the app is open to guests + content: + application/json: + schema: + $ref: "#/components/schemas/GuestEntry" + /w/{workspace}/apps_u/public_app/{path}: get: summary: get public app by secret @@ -28727,6 +28861,76 @@ components: - is_operator - last_used_at + GuestUsage: + type: object + description: >- + Guests are free up to `free_allowance` distinct emails over the trailing + `window_days`. Past that an Enterprise plan meters them (`metered`, four guests + to one seat: `billable_guests`, `guest_seats`); every other plan and build + admits no new email until the count drops. `instance_enabled` is the superadmin + switch (`guest_access_disabled` global setting) every workspace switch sits under. + properties: + instance_enabled: + type: boolean + guest_count: + type: integer + format: int64 + window_days: + type: integer + free_allowance: + type: integer + format: int64 + metered: + type: boolean + billable_guests: + type: integer + format: int64 + guest_seats: + type: integer + format: int64 + required: + - instance_enabled + - guest_count + - window_days + - free_allowance + - metered + - billable_guests + - guest_seats + + GuestActivity: + type: object + properties: + email: + type: string + workspaces: + type: array + items: + type: string + first_seen: + type: string + format: date + last_seen: + type: string + format: date + required: + - email + - workspaces + - first_seen + - last_seen + + GuestList: + type: object + properties: + usage: + $ref: "#/components/schemas/GuestUsage" + guests: + type: array + items: + $ref: "#/components/schemas/GuestActivity" + required: + - usage + - guests + NewToken: type: object properties: @@ -33137,14 +33341,17 @@ components: type: string execution_mode: type: string - enum: [viewer, publisher, anonymous] + enum: [viewer, publisher, guest, anonymous] description: >- - Who the app's runnables execute as. Optional, and what omitting it - means depends on the operation: creating an app defaults it to - `publisher` (runs on behalf of the app's publisher and requires an - authenticated viewer), while updating one keeps the mode the app is - already deployed under. Either way `anonymous`, which makes the app - publicly executable, is never assumed + Who may open the app, and who its runnables execute as. Optional, and + what omitting it means depends on the operation: creating an app + defaults it to `publisher` (runs on behalf of the app's publisher and + requires an authenticated viewer), while updating one keeps the mode + the app is already deployed under. Neither `anonymous`, which makes + the app publicly executable, nor `guest`, which opens it to anyone the + identity provider authenticates, is ever assumed. A guest is only + admitted where the workspace also has `guest_access_enabled`, which is + checked when the session is minted and again on every guest request on_behalf_of: type: string on_behalf_of_email: @@ -33195,7 +33402,7 @@ components: format: date-time execution_mode: type: string - enum: [viewer, publisher, anonymous] + enum: [viewer, publisher, guest, anonymous] raw_app: type: boolean labels: @@ -35009,6 +35216,17 @@ components: description: Configuration of protection restrictions items: $ref: "#/components/schemas/ProtectionRuleKind" + GuestEntry: + type: object + description: What a signed-out visitor needs to start a guest sign-in. + properties: + workspace_id: + type: string + app_path: + type: string + required: + - workspace_id + - app_path ProtectionRuleKind: type: string enum: @@ -35017,6 +35235,7 @@ components: - RestrictDeployToDeployers - RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment - RestrictPublicRunSharing + - RestrictGuestAppDeployment RuleBypasserGroups: type: array description: Groups that can bypass this ruleset diff --git a/backend/windmill-api/src/apps.rs b/backend/windmill-api/src/apps.rs index 0d29c1c369..ad8799da3b 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api/src/apps.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api/src/apps.rs @@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ pub fn unauthed_service() -> Router { ) .route("/load_csv_preview/{*path}", get(app_load_csv_preview)) .route("/public_app/{secret}", get(get_public_app_by_secret)) + .route("/guest_entry/{secret}", get(get_guest_entry)) .route("/embed_token/{secret}", get(get_app_embed_token)) .route("/public_resource/{*path}", get(get_public_resource)) .route("/get_data/v/{*id}", get(get_raw_app_data)) @@ -288,6 +289,15 @@ pub type AllowUserResources = Vec; #[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")] pub enum ExecutionMode { Anonymous, + /// Login required, workspace membership not: anyone the instance's identity + /// provider authenticates may open the app, and the runnables execute as the + /// publisher exactly as in [`ExecutionMode::Publisher`]. Such a viewer holds a + /// guest session: an identity with no account at all (no `password` row, no `usr` + /// row anywhere), which is what keeps it off every row-based seat counter; what a + /// guest costs instead is the allowance in `windmill_common::workspaces`. Honored + /// only where `workspace_settings.guest_access_enabled` is on, re-read at the auth + /// door on every guest request. + Guest, /// Default for a policy that omits `execution_mode`. It MUST stay a mode /// that requires an authenticated viewer: an omitted field must never be /// able to publish an app anonymously (publicly executable). @@ -296,6 +306,136 @@ pub enum ExecutionMode { Viewer, } +impl ExecutionMode { + /// The serialized form, matching this enum's `rename_all = "lowercase"`. + pub fn as_str(&self) -> &'static str { + match self { + ExecutionMode::Anonymous => "anonymous", + ExecutionMode::Guest => "guest", + ExecutionMode::Publisher => "publisher", + ExecutionMode::Viewer => "viewer", + } + } +} + +/// The protection rule gating a *transition into* `mode`, if any. Anonymous and +/// guest each widen who may open an app past the workspace's own members, so each +/// carries its own rule; the two member-only modes are ungated. +fn deployment_rule_for_mode(mode: ExecutionMode) -> Option { + match mode { + ExecutionMode::Anonymous => Some(ProtectionRuleKind::RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment), + ExecutionMode::Guest => Some(ProtectionRuleKind::RestrictGuestAppDeployment), + ExecutionMode::Publisher | ExecutionMode::Viewer => None, + } +} + +/// A guest session is scoped to its app by path, so an app whose path the scope +/// grammar cannot hold as one literal (`is_scope_literal_path`) can never admit a +/// guest; refuse the mode at deploy time rather than advertise an app nobody enters. +/// `path` is where the app ends up: on a rename, the destination. +fn refuse_unscopable_guest_app(path: &str, mode: ExecutionMode) -> Result<()> { + if matches!(mode, ExecutionMode::Guest) && !windmill_common::auth::is_scope_literal_path(path) { + return Err(Error::BadRequest(format!( + "app {path} cannot be set to Guests: a path with `:`, `,` or `*`, or a leading `/`, \ + cannot be scoped" + ))); + } + Ok(()) +} + +/// Gate a viewer on the app's `execution_mode`, as far as can be decided without an +/// ACL probe. `Ok(true)` means already authorized — anonymous admits anyone, guest +/// admits anyone signed in; `Ok(false)` means the caller is a member and still owes +/// the read-access check its caller performs. +/// +/// A guest is authorized by its token's scope and never by an ACL probe: it holds no +/// `usr` row, so RLS finds nothing for it and every guest would read as having no +/// access. That scope is also what keeps a guest session to the one app it was minted +/// for, even though the mode itself admits anyone signed in. The workspace's guest +/// switch is not checked here: `AuthCache` enforces it for every guest request. +pub fn authorize_non_member_viewer( + mode: ExecutionMode, + app_path: &str, + opt_authed: &Option, +) -> Result { + if matches!(mode, ExecutionMode::Anonymous) { + return Ok(true); + } + let Some(authed) = opt_authed.as_ref() else { + return Err(Error::NotAuthorized( + "App visibility does not allow public access and you are not logged in".to_string(), + )); + }; + let is_guest = windmill_api_auth::scopes::has_guest_sentinel(authed.scopes.as_deref()); + if matches!(mode, ExecutionMode::Guest) { + if is_guest { + check_scopes(authed, || format!("apps:read:{}", app_path))?; + } + return Ok(true); + } + if is_guest { + return Err(Error::PermissionDenied(format!( + "app {app_path} is not open to guests" + ))); + } + Ok(false) +} + +/// Confines a guest to its app once the app's mode is known; a no-op for every other +/// caller. An anonymous app is open to anyone, so the guest stays the caller there, +/// as itself: the run and the reads that follow it (job results, S3 provenance) must +/// carry one identity. Anywhere else a mismatch is refused. +fn guest_caller_for_mode( + opt_authed: Option, + mode: ExecutionMode, + app_path: &str, +) -> Result> { + let Some(authed) = opt_authed.as_ref() else { + return Ok(None); + }; + if !windmill_api_auth::scopes::has_guest_sentinel(authed.scopes.as_deref()) + || matches!(mode, ExecutionMode::Anonymous) + { + return Ok(opt_authed); + } + check_scopes(authed, || format!("apps:run:{app_path}")) + .or_else(|_| check_scopes(authed, || format!("apps:read:{app_path}")))?; + Ok(opt_authed) +} + +/// [`authorize_non_member_viewer`] plus the member read-access probe, for the +/// entry points that address an app by id. +async fn authorize_app_viewer( + mode: ExecutionMode, + app_path: &str, + app_id: i64, + w_id: &str, + user_db: &UserDB, + opt_authed: &Option, +) -> Result<()> { + if authorize_non_member_viewer(mode, app_path, opt_authed)? { + return Ok(()); + } + let authed = opt_authed + .as_ref() + .ok_or_else(|| Error::internal_err("authorize_app_viewer: unauthenticated".to_string()))?; + let mut tx = user_db.clone().begin(authed).await?; + let is_visible = sqlx::query_scalar!( + "SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM app WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2)", + app_id, + w_id + ) + .fetch_one(&mut *tx) + .await?; + tx.commit().await?; + if !is_visible.unwrap_or(false) { + return Err(Error::NotAuthorized( + "App visibility does not allow public access and you are logged in but you have no read-access to that app".to_string(), + )); + } + Ok(()) +} + #[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, Default)] pub struct PolicyTriggerableInputs { static_inputs: StaticFields, @@ -1218,29 +1358,15 @@ async fn get_public_app_by_secret( let policy = serde_json::from_str::(app.policy.0.get()).map_err(to_anyhow)?; - if !matches!(policy.execution_mode(), ExecutionMode::Anonymous) { - if opt_authed.is_none() { - return Err(Error::NotAuthorized( - "App visibility does not allow public access and you are not logged in".to_string(), - )); - } else { - let authed = opt_authed.unwrap(); - let mut tx = user_db.begin(&authed).await?; - let is_visible = sqlx::query_scalar!( - "SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM app WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2)", - id, - &w_id - ) - .fetch_one(&mut *tx) - .await?; - tx.commit().await?; - if !is_visible.unwrap_or(false) { - return Err(Error::NotAuthorized( - "App visibility does not allow public access and you are logged in but you have no read-access to that app".to_string(), - )); - } - } - } + authorize_app_viewer( + policy.execution_mode(), + &app.path, + id, + &w_id, + &user_db, + &opt_authed, + ) + .await?; // Compute bundle_secret for raw apps if app.raw_app { @@ -1356,9 +1482,18 @@ async fn mint_raw_app_sdk_token( ensure_scopes_within_caller(authed, Some(scopes))?; let mut scopes = scopes.to_vec(); scopes.push(windmill_api_auth::scopes::RAW_APP_SDK_SENTINEL.to_string()); - let expiration = chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(APP_EMBED_TOKEN_VALIDITY_HOURS); + let requested_exp = + chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(APP_EMBED_TOKEN_VALIDITY_HOURS); + let (label, expiration) = + match guest_derived_token_constraints(db, authed, requested_exp).await? { + Some((label, exp)) => { + scopes.push(windmill_api_auth::scopes::GUEST_SENTINEL.to_string()); + (label, exp) + } + None => (format!("sdk_app:{app_path}"), requested_exp), + }; let token_config = NewToken::new( - Some(format!("sdk_app:{app_path}")), + Some(label), Some(expiration), None, Some(scopes), @@ -1373,6 +1508,39 @@ async fn mint_raw_app_sdk_token( Ok((token, expiration)) } +/// Label and expiry a token minted *by* a guest session must carry, or `None` for a +/// non-guest minter. The label is what lets it resolve; the caller pushes the `guest` +/// sentinel so every guest control still applies; the expiry is capped at the parent's, +/// since that expiry is a guest's only revocation short of logging out. +async fn guest_derived_token_constraints( + db: &DB, + authed: &ApiAuthed, + requested: chrono::DateTime, +) -> Result)>> { + if !windmill_api_auth::scopes::has_guest_sentinel(authed.scopes.as_deref()) { + return Ok(None); + } + // The minter is known by prefix only; MIN over a (theoretical) prefix collision is + // the conservative side. + let parent: Option>> = sqlx::query_scalar( + "SELECT MIN(expiration) FROM token WHERE token_prefix = $1 AND email = $2 AND label = $3", + ) + .bind(authed.token_prefix.as_deref().unwrap_or("")) + .bind(&authed.email) + .bind(windmill_common::auth::GUEST_SESSION_LABEL) + .fetch_optional(db) + .await?; + let Some(parent_exp) = parent.flatten() else { + return Err(Error::NotAuthorized( + "guest session not found or has no expiry".to_string(), + )); + }; + Ok(Some(( + windmill_common::auth::GUEST_SESSION_LABEL.to_string(), + requested.min(parent_exp), + ))) +} + /// Shared tail of the three embed-token endpoints: which credential the viewer /// gets. Sandboxed low-code gets the embed token; a sandboxed raw app declaring /// `frontend_sdk_scopes` gets the SDK token once `sdk_consent` is set — the @@ -1400,7 +1568,22 @@ pub async fn build_embed_token_response( && opt_authed.is_some() && !policy.frontend_sdk_scopes.is_empty() { - Some(policy.frontend_sdk_scopes.clone()) + // An SDK token runs as the viewer, and a guest's session is the ceiling on what + // it may delegate — the mint enforces that. Advertise only what a guest can + // actually be granted, so the consent prompt never promises a scope the mint + // would then refuse. + let declared = policy.frontend_sdk_scopes.clone(); + let offered = match opt_authed { + Some(a) if windmill_api_auth::scopes::has_guest_sentinel(a.scopes.as_deref()) => { + let held = a.scopes.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(); + declared + .into_iter() + .filter(|sc| held.iter().any(|h| h == sc)) + .collect::>() + } + _ => declared, + }; + (!offered.is_empty()).then_some(offered) } else { None }; @@ -1556,9 +1739,13 @@ pub async fn mint_app_embed_token( "App embed tokens cannot mint or renew embed tokens".to_string(), )); } - let expiration = + let requested_exp = chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::hours(APP_EMBED_TOKEN_VALIDITY_HOURS); - let mut scopes: Vec = APP_EMBED_SCOPES.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect(); + let mut scopes: Vec = APP_EMBED_SCOPES + .iter() + .filter(|s| **s != windmill_api_auth::scopes::APP_EMBED_SENTINEL) + .map(|s| s.to_string()) + .collect(); // Path-scoped read so the app can fetch its OWN definition (apps/get/p, // which the in-workspace sandboxed viewer uses) — but no other app's. The // public viewer fetches via apps_u/public_app and doesn't rely on this. @@ -1569,10 +1756,22 @@ pub async fn mint_app_embed_token( scopes.push(format!("apps:run:{app_path}")); // A scope-restricted caller token must not bootstrap a broader-scoped // embed token (`create_token_internal` deliberately does not check this - // itself). No-op for unscoped sessions — the normal embed flow. + // itself). Checked on the real scopes only: a sentinel is a one-part string + // that `ScopeDefinition::from_scope_string` rejects, so leaving it in the + // requested set makes this fail outright for any scoped caller — which a + // guest session is. `mint_raw_app_sdk_token` has the same shape. ensure_scopes_within_caller(authed, Some(&scopes))?; + scopes.push(windmill_api_auth::scopes::APP_EMBED_SENTINEL.to_string()); + let (label, expiration) = + match guest_derived_token_constraints(db, authed, requested_exp).await? { + Some((label, exp)) => { + scopes.push(windmill_api_auth::scopes::GUEST_SENTINEL.to_string()); + (label, exp) + } + None => (format!("embed_app:{app_path}"), requested_exp), + }; let token_config = NewToken::new( - Some(format!("embed_app:{app_path}")), + Some(label), Some(expiration), None, Some(scopes), @@ -1601,6 +1800,40 @@ pub async fn mint_app_embed_token( }) } +#[derive(Serialize)] +pub struct GuestEntry { + /// The workspace and app path to name when starting a guest sign-in. The + /// workspace is redundant on the secret route and load-bearing on the custom-path + /// one, which may not carry it in its URL. + pub workspace_id: String, + pub app_path: String, +} + +/// Whether the app behind this share secret admits guests, and under what path. +/// +/// Unauthenticated on purpose: it is what a signed-out visitor reads to learn that +/// signing in would get them in. It discloses only the app's path, to a caller who +/// already holds the share secret — the secret is the capability here. A 404 when the +/// app is not open to guests, so it says nothing about apps that are not. +async fn get_guest_entry( + Extension(db): Extension, + Path((w_id, secret)): Path<(String, String)>, +) -> JsonResult { + let id = get_id_from_secret(&db, &w_id, secret, None).await?; + let app = sqlx::query!( + "SELECT path FROM app WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2", + id, + &w_id + ) + .fetch_optional(&db) + .await?; + let app = not_found_if_none(app, "App", id.to_string())?; + if !windmill_common::workspaces::guest_app_admits(&db, &w_id, &app.path).await? { + return Err(Error::NotFound("App is not open to guests".to_string())); + } + Ok(Json(GuestEntry { workspace_id: w_id, app_path: app.path })) +} + /// Issue an embed token for a public app addressed by its (secret) share id. /// Mirrors the access check in [`get_public_app_by_secret`]: anonymous apps are /// reachable without auth, otherwise the caller must be logged in and have read @@ -1646,29 +1879,18 @@ async fn get_app_embed_token( let authed_for_token = if policy.anonymous_execution { // Anonymous app: still mint a scoped token if the viewer happens to be - // logged in (so the app sees their identity), otherwise stay anonymous. - opt_authed + // logged in (so the app sees their identity), otherwise stay anonymous. A + // guest's session names another app and cannot contain this one's scopes, + // so it renders anonymously here rather than being refused. + opt_authed.filter(|a| !windmill_api_auth::scopes::has_guest_sentinel(a.scopes.as_deref())) } else { - let authed = opt_authed.ok_or_else(|| { - Error::NotAuthorized( - "App visibility does not allow public access and you are not logged in".to_string(), - ) - })?; - let mut tx = user_db.begin(&authed).await?; - let is_visible = sqlx::query_scalar!( - "SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM app WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2)", - id, - &w_id - ) - .fetch_one(&mut *tx) - .await?; - tx.commit().await?; - if !is_visible.unwrap_or(false) { - return Err(Error::NotAuthorized( - "App visibility does not allow public access and you are logged in but you have no read-access to that app".to_string(), - )); - } - Some(authed) + let mode = if policy.guest_execution { + ExecutionMode::Guest + } else { + ExecutionMode::Publisher + }; + authorize_app_viewer(mode, &app.path, id, &w_id, &user_db, &opt_authed).await?; + opt_authed }; let resp = build_embed_token_response( @@ -1694,6 +1916,9 @@ async fn get_app_embed_token( /// strictest access interpretation. pub struct EmbedPolicyView { pub anonymous_execution: bool, + /// Open to anyone the identity provider authenticates. Like + /// `anonymous_execution`, an unknown mode reads as `false` — the strict side. + pub guest_execution: bool, pub sandbox: bool, /// Raw apps: author-declared scopes for the frontend SDK token; empty when /// the app doesn't use the frontend SDK (non-string entries are ignored). @@ -1704,6 +1929,7 @@ pub fn parse_embed_policy(policy_str: &str) -> Result { let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(policy_str).map_err(to_anyhow)?; Ok(EmbedPolicyView { anonymous_execution: v.get("execution_mode").and_then(|m| m.as_str()) == Some("anonymous"), + guest_execution: v.get("execution_mode").and_then(|m| m.as_str()) == Some("guest"), sandbox: v.get("sandbox").and_then(|b| b.as_bool()).unwrap_or(false), frontend_sdk_scopes: v .get("frontend_sdk_scopes") @@ -2287,10 +2513,11 @@ async fn create_app_internal<'a>( // Pin the mode the app is created under, so the stored policy states one // even when the caller did not. app.policy.set_execution_mode(app.policy.execution_mode()); - if matches!(app.policy.execution_mode(), ExecutionMode::Anonymous) { + refuse_unscopable_guest_app(&app.path, app.policy.execution_mode())?; + if let Some(rule) = deployment_rule_for_mode(app.policy.execution_mode()) { if let RuleCheckResult::Blocked(msg) = check_user_against_rule( w_id, - &ProtectionRuleKind::RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment, + &rule, &authed.username, &authed.groups, authed.is_admin, @@ -3201,6 +3428,28 @@ async fn update_app_internal<'a>( if npath != path { require_owner_of_path(&authed, path)?; + // The destination is what a guest session would be scoped to. A rename + // that carries no policy keeps the deployed mode, read under the row + // lock so a policy update landing alongside cannot slip a guest app + // onto a path it cannot be scoped to. + let mode = match ns.policy.as_ref().and_then(|p| p.stated_execution_mode()) { + Some(mode) => mode, + None => sqlx::query_scalar::<_, Option>( + "SELECT policy->>'execution_mode' FROM app + WHERE path = $1 AND workspace_id = $2 FOR UPDATE", + ) + .bind(path) + .bind(w_id) + .fetch_optional(&mut *tx) + .await? + .flatten() + .and_then(|m| { + serde_json::from_value::(serde_json::Value::String(m)).ok() + }) + .unwrap_or_default(), + }; + refuse_unscopable_guest_app(npath, mode)?; + let exists = sqlx::query_scalar!( "SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM app WHERE path = $1 AND workspace_id = $2)", npath, @@ -3308,21 +3557,26 @@ async fn update_app_internal<'a>( .unwrap_or_default(), ); } - if matches!(npolicy.execution_mode(), ExecutionMode::Anonymous) && !authed.is_admin { - // Restricted users may keep deploying an app that is already - // public, but flipping an app to anonymous (public) access is - // gated by the RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment protection rule. - // An unreadable deployed policy reads as not-anonymous, the - // strict direction. - let already_anonymous = deployed + refuse_unscopable_guest_app( + ns.path.as_deref().unwrap_or(path), + npolicy.execution_mode(), + )?; + if let Some(rule) = + deployment_rule_for_mode(npolicy.execution_mode()).filter(|_| !authed.is_admin) + { + // Restricted users may keep deploying an app that is already open + // to this audience, but widening one is gated by the matching + // protection rule. An unreadable deployed policy reads as not + // already-widened, the strict direction. + let already_in_mode = deployed .as_ref() .and_then(|p| p.get("execution_mode")) .and_then(|m| m.as_str()) - == Some("anonymous"); - if !already_anonymous { + == Some(npolicy.execution_mode().as_str()); + if !already_in_mode { if let RuleCheckResult::Blocked(msg) = check_user_against_rule( w_id, - &ProtectionRuleKind::RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment, + &rule, &authed.username, &authed.groups, authed.is_admin, @@ -3561,6 +3815,21 @@ async fn get_on_behalf_details_from_policy_and_authed( policy: &Policy, opt_authed: &Option, ) -> Result<(String, String, String)> { + // A guest acts only through an app open to guests — or to everyone. A members-only + // mode means the policy changed after the session was issued. Decided here, in the + // one resolver every on-behalf path (runs, S3 reads, uploads) goes through. + if opt_authed + .as_ref() + .is_some_and(|a| windmill_api_auth::scopes::has_guest_sentinel(a.scopes.as_deref())) + && !matches!( + policy.execution_mode(), + ExecutionMode::Guest | ExecutionMode::Anonymous + ) + { + return Err(Error::PermissionDenied( + "this app is not open to guests".to_string(), + )); + } let (username, permissioned_as, email) = match policy.execution_mode() { ExecutionMode::Anonymous => { let username = opt_authed @@ -3570,7 +3839,9 @@ async fn get_on_behalf_details_from_policy_and_authed( let (permissioned_as, email) = get_on_behalf_of(&policy)?; (username, permissioned_as, email) } - ExecutionMode::Publisher => { + // Guest runs as the publisher exactly as Publisher does; the two differ only + // in who is let through the door, which is settled before we get here. + ExecutionMode::Publisher | ExecutionMode::Guest => { let username = opt_authed .as_ref() .map(|a| a.username.clone()) @@ -3655,8 +3926,12 @@ async fn execute_component( // Authorize before touching the payload: the route layer is resource-blind, so a // path-scoped caller (app embed token, or a picker-minted `apps:run|write:`) // is confined to its own app only here. No-op for unscoped callers; anonymous ones - // are policy-gated below. - if let Some(authed) = opt_authed.as_ref() { + // are policy-gated below, and a guest's confinement waits for the app's mode + // (`guest_caller_for_mode`). + if let Some(authed) = opt_authed + .as_ref() + .filter(|a| !windmill_api_auth::scopes::has_guest_sentinel(a.scopes.as_deref())) + { check_scopes(authed, || format!("apps:run:{}", path))?; } // Only honor temp_script_refs for the inline-script preview path: @@ -3873,8 +4148,16 @@ async fn execute_component( } }; - // Check rate limit for anonymous (public) executions - if matches!(policy.execution_mode(), ExecutionMode::Anonymous) && opt_authed.is_none() { + // Rate limit for executions by callers the workspace does not know: anonymous + // viewers, and guests — on an instance whose provider accepts any consumer + // account, "anyone the IdP authenticates" is close to the anonymous population, + // and each run costs a job as the publisher. + let is_guest_caller = opt_authed + .as_ref() + .is_some_and(|a| windmill_api_auth::scopes::has_guest_sentinel(a.scopes.as_deref())); + if (matches!(policy.execution_mode(), ExecutionMode::Anonymous) && opt_authed.is_none()) + || is_guest_caller + { if let Some(limit) = crate::workspaces::get_public_app_rate_limit(&db, &w_id).await? { if limit > 0 { crate::public_app_rate_limit::check_and_increment(&w_id, limit)?; @@ -3882,6 +4165,8 @@ async fn execute_component( } } + let opt_authed = guest_caller_for_mode(opt_authed, policy.execution_mode(), path)?; + // Execution is publisher and an user is authenticated: check if the user is authorized to // execute the app. if let (ExecutionMode::Publisher, Some(authed)) = (policy.execution_mode(), opt_authed.as_ref()) @@ -4217,8 +4502,11 @@ async fn upload_s3_file_from_app( request: axum::extract::Request, ) -> JsonResult { // Same path confinement as `execute_component`: without it a token scoped to app A - // could drive app B's upload policy. - if let Some(authed) = opt_authed.as_ref() { + // could drive app B's upload policy. A guest's waits for the app's mode, below. + if let Some(authed) = opt_authed + .as_ref() + .filter(|a| !windmill_api_auth::scopes::has_guest_sentinel(a.scopes.as_deref())) + { check_scopes(authed, || format!("apps:run:{}", path.to_path()))?; } let policy = if let Some(file_key_regex) = query.force_viewer_file_key_regex { @@ -4271,6 +4559,14 @@ async fn upload_s3_file_from_app( .map(|p| serde_json::from_value::(p).map_err(to_anyhow)) .transpose()? }; + let opt_authed = guest_caller_for_mode( + opt_authed, + policy + .as_ref() + .map(Policy::execution_mode) + .unwrap_or_default(), + path.to_path(), + )?; let user_db = UserDB::new(db.clone()); @@ -4428,8 +4724,12 @@ async fn upload_s3_file_from_app( } } else { // backward compatibility (no policy) - // if no policy but logged in, use the user's auth to get the s3 resource - if let Some(authed) = opt_authed { + // if no policy but logged in, use the user's auth to get the s3 resource. A guest + // has no standing of its own to upload with, so without a policy it is refused + // exactly as an anonymous caller is. + if let Some(authed) = opt_authed + .filter(|a| !windmill_api_auth::scopes::has_guest_sentinel(a.scopes.as_deref())) + { let file_key = query .file_key .unwrap_or_else(|| get_random_file_name(query.file_extension)); @@ -4687,6 +4987,7 @@ async fn get_on_behalf_authed_from_app( }) }; + let opt_authed = guest_caller_for_mode(opt_authed.clone(), policy.execution_mode(), path)?; let (username, permissioned_as, email) = get_on_behalf_details_from_policy_and_authed(&policy, &opt_authed).await?; @@ -4843,6 +5144,10 @@ fn check_app_s3_read_scope(opt_authed: &Option, path: &str) -> Result let Some(authed) = opt_authed.as_ref() else { return Ok(()); }; + // A guest's confinement waits for the app's mode (`get_on_behalf_authed_from_app`). + if windmill_api_auth::scopes::has_guest_sentinel(authed.scopes.as_deref()) { + return Ok(()); + } check_scopes(authed, || format!("apps:run:{}", path)) .or_else(|_| check_scopes(authed, || format!("apps:read:{}", path))) } diff --git a/backend/windmill-api/src/jobs.rs b/backend/windmill-api/src/jobs.rs index 53044ee020..8b1dfe18d6 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api/src/jobs.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api/src/jobs.rs @@ -1594,7 +1594,11 @@ pub(crate) async fn require_job_read_access( // this token, and letting it reach any job merely visible to the viewer would // expose unrelated runs' results/logs. Stop at the launched-by-viewer grant. // NotFound (not PermissionDenied) so the untrusted app can't probe job existence. - if windmill_api_auth::scopes::has_app_embed_sentinel(authed.scopes.as_deref()) { + // A guest stops here too: it has no membership behind it, so a share token whose + // audience is the workspace's members must not read for it either. + if windmill_api_auth::scopes::has_app_embed_sentinel(authed.scopes.as_deref()) + || windmill_api_auth::scopes::has_guest_sentinel(authed.scopes.as_deref()) + { return Err(Error::NotFound(format!("Job {job_id} not found"))); } diff --git a/backend/windmill-api/src/users.rs b/backend/windmill-api/src/users.rs index 8804004f2b..ed66eb5e74 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api/src/users.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api/src/users.rs @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ pub fn global_service() -> Router { .route("/rename/{user}", post(rename_user)) .route("/onboarding", post(submit_onboarding_data)) .route("/ext_jwt_tokens", get(list_ext_jwt_tokens)) + .route("/guests", get(list_guests)) .route( "/offboard_preview/{user}", get(crate::offboarding::global_offboard_preview), @@ -141,6 +142,58 @@ async fn list_ext_jwt_tokens( Ok(Json(rows)) } +#[derive(serde::Serialize, sqlx::FromRow)] +pub struct GuestActivity { + pub email: String, + pub workspaces: Vec, + pub first_seen: chrono::NaiveDate, + pub last_seen: chrono::NaiveDate, +} + +#[derive(serde::Serialize)] +pub struct GuestList { + pub usage: windmill_common::workspaces::GuestUsage, + pub guests: Vec, +} + +#[derive(serde::Deserialize)] +struct ListGuestsQuery { + page: Option, + per_page: Option, +} + +/// The distinct guests of the trailing window, the set the allowance is counted on, +/// most recently seen first. +async fn list_guests( + authed: ApiAuthed, + Extension(db): Extension, + Query(query): Query, +) -> Result> { + require_super_admin(&db, &authed).await?; + + let (per_page, offset) = windmill_common::utils::paginate(windmill_common::utils::Pagination { + page: query.page, + per_page: query.per_page, + }); + let usage = windmill_common::workspaces::guest_usage(&db).await?; + let guests = sqlx::query_as::<_, GuestActivity>( + "SELECT email, array_agg(DISTINCT workspace_id) AS workspaces, + MIN(day) AS first_seen, MAX(day) AS last_seen + FROM guest_activity + WHERE day > CURRENT_DATE - $3 + GROUP BY email + ORDER BY MAX(day) DESC, email + LIMIT $1 OFFSET $2", + ) + .bind(per_page as i64) + .bind(offset as i64) + .bind(windmill_common::workspaces::GUEST_WINDOW_DAYS) + .fetch_all(&db) + .await?; + + Ok(Json(GuestList { usage, guests })) +} + async fn set_password( Extension(db): Extension, Extension(argon2): Extension>>, diff --git a/backend/windmill-common/src/auth.rs b/backend/windmill-common/src/auth.rs index fa1bc96334..b51186f464 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-common/src/auth.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-common/src/auth.rs @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ use crate::{ }; /// Whether `label` denotes a user-created token rather than a system token -/// (`session`, `ephemeral*`, `debugger-token`, `mcp-oauth-*`). System-token +/// (`session`, `guest_session`, `ephemeral*`, `debugger-token`, `mcp-oauth-*`). System-token /// labels are load-bearing — session cleanup, super_admin propagation, expiry /// notifications and username overrides all key off them — so they must not be /// user-editable. `None` (no label) is treated as a user token. @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ pub fn is_user_token(label: Option<&str>) -> bool { // frontend mirror (`label.toLowerCase().startsWith('ephemeral')`) and // the SQL `lower(label) NOT LIKE 'ephemeral%'` guard. l != "session" + && l != GUEST_SESSION_LABEL && !l.to_lowercase().starts_with("ephemeral") && l != "debugger-token" && !l.starts_with("mcp-oauth-") @@ -56,9 +57,40 @@ pub fn is_server_minted_label(label: &str) -> bool { || label.starts_with("ephemeral-script-end-user-") || label == "ephemeral-script" || label == "session" + || label == GUEST_SESSION_LABEL || label.starts_with("mcp-oauth-") } +/// Label on a guest session (the `guest` app execution mode). This is the *grant*: +/// `AuthCache` will resolve a token carrying it into an identity with no account behind +/// it, which nothing else can do. It must therefore stay unforgeable, which is what +/// listing it in [`is_server_minted_label`] buys — `/users/tokens/create` refuses it. +/// +/// Do not move this test onto the token's scopes. Scopes on a user-minted token are +/// caller-supplied and only ever *narrow* (`app_embed`, `raw_app_sdk`), so a scope +/// that granted non-member access would be free for anyone to declare. +pub const GUEST_SESSION_LABEL: &str = "guest_session"; + +/// Whether `label` marks a guest session. See [`GUEST_SESSION_LABEL`]. +/// +/// Reserved in [`is_user_token`] as well as [`is_server_minted_label`]: the former +/// gates relabelling, and a user token that could be relabelled *into* this +/// namespace would become a guest session with no workspace pin — one that +/// authenticates everywhere. +pub fn is_guest_session_label(label: Option<&str>) -> bool { + label == Some(GUEST_SESSION_LABEL) +} + +/// Whether `path` can be spliced into a scope as one literal resource. The scope +/// grammar reserves three characters: `:` separates the parts, `,` separates +/// resources, `*` is a wildcard. App paths are otherwise free-form (spaces, `@`). A +/// leading `/` is refused too: routes strip it, so the scope would never match. +pub fn is_scope_literal_path(path: &str) -> bool { + !path.is_empty() + && !path.starts_with('/') + && !path.chars().any(|c| matches!(c, ':' | ',' | '*')) +} + /// Whether `label` is the one minted for a browser session at login. [`is_server_minted_label`] /// stops a member minting it directly, but `/users/refresh_token` hands one to any authenticated /// caller, so this attributes a request to the UI without proving it: never gate authority on it. diff --git a/backend/windmill-common/src/global_settings.rs b/backend/windmill-common/src/global_settings.rs index d38396562b..8180e820f2 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-common/src/global_settings.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-common/src/global_settings.rs @@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ pub const EXPOSE_METRICS_SETTING: &str = "expose_metrics"; pub const EXPOSE_DEBUG_METRICS_SETTING: &str = "expose_debug_metrics"; pub const KEEP_JOB_DIR_SETTING: &str = "keep_job_dir"; pub const REQUIRE_PREEXISTING_USER_FOR_OAUTH_SETTING: &str = "require_preexisting_user_for_oauth"; +/// Superadmin switch over guest sessions for the whole instance, above the per-workspace +/// one. Read from the table, uncached, by the same gates that read the workspace switch; +/// the superadmin Guests list writes it through `/settings/global/{key}` by this name. +pub const GUEST_ACCESS_DISABLED_SETTING: &str = "guest_access_disabled"; pub const JOB_ISOLATION_SETTING: &str = "job_isolation"; pub const NSJAIL_TMPFS_SIZE_MB_SETTING: &str = "nsjail_tmpfs_size_mb"; pub const NSJAIL_TMP_BACKING_SETTING: &str = "nsjail_tmp_backing"; diff --git a/backend/windmill-common/src/workspaces.rs b/backend/windmill-common/src/workspaces.rs index 697fc69e44..b6d10cb7df 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-common/src/workspaces.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-common/src/workspaces.rs @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ bitflags::bitflags! { const RESTRICT_DEPLOY_TO_DEPLOYERS = 1 << 2; const RESTRICT_ANONYMOUS_APP_DEPLOYMENT = 1 << 3; const RESTRICT_PUBLIC_RUN_SHARING = 1 << 4; + const RESTRICT_GUEST_APP_DEPLOYMENT = 1 << 5; } } @@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ pub enum ProtectionRuleKind { RestrictDeployToDeployers, RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment, RestrictPublicRunSharing, + RestrictGuestAppDeployment, } impl ProtectionRuleKind { @@ -103,6 +105,9 @@ impl ProtectionRuleKind { ProtectionRuleKind::RestrictPublicRunSharing => { ProtectionRules::RESTRICT_PUBLIC_RUN_SHARING } + ProtectionRuleKind::RestrictGuestAppDeployment => { + ProtectionRules::RESTRICT_GUEST_APP_DEPLOYMENT + } } } @@ -121,6 +126,9 @@ impl ProtectionRuleKind { ProtectionRuleKind::RestrictPublicRunSharing => { "Sharing a run publicly (readable without login) is restricted in this workspace" } + ProtectionRuleKind::RestrictGuestAppDeployment => { + "Opening an app to guests (anyone who can sign in) is restricted in this workspace" + } } } } @@ -767,6 +775,185 @@ pub struct BillableSeats { pub seats: i64, } +/// Guests are free up to `FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW` distinct emails over the trailing +/// `GUEST_WINDOW_DAYS`. Past that, an Enterprise plan meters them, `GUESTS_PER_SEAT` +/// guests to one seat, while every other plan and build stops admitting new emails. +pub const GUEST_WINDOW_DAYS: i32 = 30; +pub const FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW: i64 = 100; +pub const GUESTS_PER_SEAT: i64 = 4; + +/// Whether guests past the allowance are metered (Enterprise plan) rather than refused. +/// A build without `enterprise` has no plan and is capped, like a Pro key. +pub async fn guests_are_metered() -> bool { + #[cfg(feature = "enterprise")] + { + matches!( + crate::ee_oss::get_license_plan().await, + crate::ee_oss::LicensePlan::Enterprise + ) + } + #[cfg(not(feature = "enterprise"))] + { + false + } +} + +/// Seats the guests past the free allowance consume: `ceil(billable / GUESTS_PER_SEAT)`. +pub fn guest_seats(distinct_guests: i64) -> i64 { + let billable = (distinct_guests - FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW).max(0); + (billable + GUESTS_PER_SEAT - 1) / GUESTS_PER_SEAT +} + +/// Distinct guest emails over the trailing window, today included. +pub async fn guest_count_in_window<'c, E: sqlx::Executor<'c, Database = sqlx::Postgres>>( + executor: E, +) -> Result { + sqlx::query_scalar( + "SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT email) FROM guest_activity WHERE day > CURRENT_DATE - $1", + ) + .bind(GUEST_WINDOW_DAYS) + .fetch_one(executor) + .await + .map_err(|e| Error::internal_err(format!("counting guests: {e:#}"))) +} + +/// The instance's standing against the guest allowance, as every surface reports it. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize)] +pub struct GuestUsage { + /// The superadmin switch (`GUEST_ACCESS_DISABLED_SETTING`), which every workspace + /// switch sits under. + pub instance_enabled: bool, + /// Distinct guest emails over the trailing `window_days`. + pub guest_count: i64, + pub window_days: i32, + pub free_allowance: i64, + /// Enterprise plan: guests past the allowance take `guest_seats`. Otherwise no new + /// email is admitted past it. + pub metered: bool, + pub billable_guests: i64, + pub guest_seats: i64, +} + +/// SQL for "the instance admits guests": the superadmin switch, absent meaning on. The +/// setting is read as text before the cast so `true` and `"true"` both count. +fn instance_admits_guests_sql() -> String { + format!( + "NOT COALESCE((SELECT (value #>> '{{}}')::boolean FROM global_settings \ + WHERE name = '{}'), false)", + crate::global_settings::GUEST_ACCESS_DISABLED_SETTING + ) +} + +pub async fn guest_usage(db: &crate::DB) -> Result { + let instance_admits = instance_admits_guests_sql(); + let instance_enabled: bool = sqlx::query_scalar(&format!("SELECT {instance_admits}")) + .fetch_one(db) + .await + .map_err(|e| Error::internal_err(format!("reading the instance guest switch: {e:#}")))?; + let guest_count = guest_count_in_window(db).await?; + let metered = guests_are_metered().await; + let billable_guests = if metered { + (guest_count - FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW).max(0) + } else { + 0 + }; + Ok(GuestUsage { + instance_enabled, + guest_count, + window_days: GUEST_WINDOW_DAYS, + free_allowance: FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW, + metered, + billable_guests, + guest_seats: if metered { guest_seats(guest_count) } else { 0 }, + }) +} + +/// Whether `email` may be admitted as a guest right now. Checked once, where a session +/// is minted: a returning guest (already in the window) is always let back in, so the +/// cap only ever refuses a stranger, and a metered instance refuses nobody. +/// +/// Must run inside the transaction that then records the guest in `guest_activity`: +/// it takes a transaction-scoped lock so concurrent strangers count each other, and the +/// lock is what keeps the cap exact rather than approximate. +pub async fn guest_admission(conn: &mut sqlx::PgConnection, email: &str) -> Result<()> { + if guests_are_metered().await { + return Ok(()); + } + sqlx::query("SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext('guest_allowance'))") + .execute(&mut *conn) + .await + .map_err(|e| Error::internal_err(format!("locking the guest allowance: {e:#}")))?; + let (in_window, count): (bool, i64) = sqlx::query_as( + "SELECT + EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM guest_activity WHERE email = $1 AND day > CURRENT_DATE - $2), + (SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT email) FROM guest_activity WHERE day > CURRENT_DATE - $2)", + ) + .bind(email) + .bind(GUEST_WINDOW_DAYS) + .fetch_one(&mut *conn) + .await + .map_err(|e| Error::internal_err(format!("checking the guest allowance: {e:#}")))?; + if in_window || count < FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW { + return Ok(()); + } + Err(Error::PermissionDenied(format!( + "This instance has reached its limit of {FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW} guests over \ + {GUEST_WINDOW_DAYS} days. Guest sign-in beyond that needs an Enterprise license." + ))) +} + +/// Whether a guest session for `email` in `w_id` still stands: the instance and the +/// workspace admit guests, and the email still has no account. Read at the auth door on +/// every guest request, so turning either switch off, or an account provisioned after +/// the mint (or racing it), ends the session on its next request. +pub async fn guest_session_stands(db: &crate::DB, w_id: &str, email: &str) -> Result { + let instance_admits = instance_admits_guests_sql(); + let stands: Option = sqlx::query_scalar(&format!( + "SELECT guest_access_enabled + AND {instance_admits} + AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM password WHERE email = $2) + AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM usr WHERE email = $2) + FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $1" + )) + .bind(w_id) + .bind(email) + .fetch_optional(db) + .await + .map_err(|e| Error::internal_err(format!("checking the guest session of {email}: {e:#}")))?; + Ok(stands.unwrap_or(false)) +} + +/// Every switch at once: the instance's, the workspace's, and `app_path` being in +/// `guest` execution mode. The single answer to "may a guest session be minted for this +/// app", used by the mint itself and by the sign-in branch that decides whether to call +/// it. A missing app or a policy with no stated mode reads as "no". The allowance is +/// `guest_admission`. +pub async fn guest_app_admits<'c, E: sqlx::Executor<'c, Database = sqlx::Postgres>>( + executor: E, + w_id: &str, + app_path: &str, +) -> Result { + // The mint refuses a path it cannot scope, so discovery must not advertise one. + if !crate::auth::is_scope_literal_path(app_path) { + return Ok(false); + } + let instance_admits = instance_admits_guests_sql(); + let admits: Option = sqlx::query_scalar(&format!( + "SELECT COALESCE(ws.guest_access_enabled AND app.policy->>'execution_mode' = 'guest', false) + AND {instance_admits} + FROM app JOIN workspace_settings ws ON ws.workspace_id = app.workspace_id + WHERE app.workspace_id = $1 AND app.path = $2" + )) + .bind(w_id) + .bind(app_path) + .fetch_optional(executor) + .await + .map_err(|e| { + Error::internal_err(format!("checking guest access to {w_id}/{app_path}: {e:#}")) + })?; + Ok(admits.unwrap_or(false)) +} + /// Billable members of `w_id` and the seats they cost, as `ceil(developers + operators/2)`. Service /// accounts cannot log in and do not take a seat; a disabled member is not billed either. /// @@ -2804,3 +2991,17 @@ pub async fn dbt_warehouse_resource( .map(|t| t.to_string()); Ok((path, target)) } + +#[cfg(test)] +mod guest_allowance_tests { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn guest_seats_round_up_past_the_allowance() { + assert_eq!(guest_seats(0), 0); + assert_eq!(guest_seats(FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW), 0); + assert_eq!(guest_seats(FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW + 1), 1); + assert_eq!(guest_seats(FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW + GUESTS_PER_SEAT), 1); + assert_eq!(guest_seats(FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW + GUESTS_PER_SEAT + 1), 2); + } +} diff --git a/cli/src/commands/app/app.ts b/cli/src/commands/app/app.ts index 7772dafedd..0f46ec76be 100644 --- a/cli/src/commands/app/app.ts +++ b/cli/src/commands/app/app.ts @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import type { PermissionedAsContext } from "../../core/permissioned_as.ts"; import { applyExtraPermsDiff } from "../../core/extra_perms.ts"; export interface AppFile { + guests?: boolean; value: any; public?: boolean; summary: string; @@ -110,6 +111,28 @@ export function replaceInlineScripts( export function isExecutionModeAnonymous(app: any) { return app?.["policy"]?.["execution_mode"] == "anonymous"; } +export function isExecutionModeGuest(app: any) { + return app?.["policy"]?.["execution_mode"] == "guest"; +} +export type AppExecutionMode = "anonymous" | "guest" | "publisher"; +/** The access mode is the one policy field a tracked app keeps, as `public` (anonymous) + * or `guests` (guest); the rest of the policy is regenerated on push. */ +export function markAccessFromPolicy(app: any) { + if (isExecutionModeAnonymous(app)) { + app.public = true; + } else if (isExecutionModeGuest(app)) { + app.guests = true; + } +} +export function executionModeFromAppFile(app: any): AppExecutionMode { + if (app?.["public"] ?? isExecutionModeAnonymous(app)) { + return "anonymous"; + } + if (app?.["guests"] ?? isExecutionModeGuest(app)) { + return "guest"; + } + return "publisher"; +} export async function pushApp( workspace: string, remotePath: string, @@ -140,9 +163,7 @@ export async function pushApp( remoteOnBehalfOfEmail = app.policy.on_behalf_of_email; } - if (isExecutionModeAnonymous(app)) { - app.public = true; - } + markAccessFromPolicy(app); // console.log(app); if (app) { app.policy = undefined; @@ -155,12 +176,7 @@ export async function pushApp( const localApp = (await yamlParseFile(path)) as AppFile; replaceInlineScripts(localApp.value, localPath, true); - await generatingPolicy( - localApp, - remotePath, - localApp?.["public"] ?? - localApp?.["policy"]?.["execution_mode"] == "anonymous" - ); + await generatingPolicy(localApp, remotePath, executionModeFromAppFile(localApp)); const preserveFields: { preserve_on_behalf_of?: boolean } = {}; if (permissionedAsContext?.userIsAdminOrDeployer) { @@ -230,12 +246,12 @@ export async function pushApp( export async function generatingPolicy( app: any, path: string, - publicApp: boolean + executionMode: AppExecutionMode ) { log.info(colors.gray(`Generating fresh policy for app ${path}...`)); try { app.policy = await windmillUtils.updatePolicy(app.value, undefined); - app.policy.execution_mode = publicApp ? "anonymous" : "publisher"; + app.policy.execution_mode = executionMode; } catch (e) { log.error(colors.red(`Error generating policy for app ${path}: ${e}`)); throw e; diff --git a/cli/src/commands/app/raw_apps.ts b/cli/src/commands/app/raw_apps.ts index 9f83d0322a..901a47593f 100644 --- a/cli/src/commands/app/raw_apps.ts +++ b/cli/src/commands/app/raw_apps.ts @@ -15,7 +15,13 @@ import { readdir } from "node:fs/promises"; import { GlobalOptions, isSuperset } from "../../types.ts"; import { deepEqual, readTextFile } from "../../utils/utils.ts"; -import { replaceInlineScripts, repopulateFields } from "./app.ts"; +import { + type AppExecutionMode, + executionModeFromAppFile, + markAccessFromPolicy, + replaceInlineScripts, + repopulateFields, +} from "./app.ts"; import { createBundle, detectFrameworks } from "./bundle.ts"; import { APP_BACKEND_FOLDER, RECORDINGS_FOLDER } from "./app_metadata.ts"; import { writeIfChanged } from "../../utils/utils.ts"; @@ -27,6 +33,7 @@ import { } from "../../../windmill-utils-internal/src/path-utils/path-assigner.ts"; export interface AppFile { + guests?: boolean; runnables?: any; custom_path?: string; public?: boolean; @@ -369,9 +376,7 @@ export async function pushRawApp( } catch { //ignore } - if (app?.["policy"]?.["execution_mode"] == "anonymous") { - app.public = true; - } + markAccessFromPolicy(app); // console.log(app); if (app) { app.policy = undefined; @@ -422,7 +427,7 @@ export async function pushRawApp( await generatingPolicy( appForPolicy, remotePath, - localApp?.["public"] ?? false, + executionModeFromAppFile(localApp), ); const files = await collectAppFiles(localPath); @@ -526,7 +531,7 @@ export async function pushRawApp( export async function generatingPolicy( app: any, path: string, - publicApp: boolean, + executionMode: AppExecutionMode, ) { log.info(colors.gray(`Generating fresh policy for app ${path}...`)); try { @@ -534,7 +539,7 @@ export async function generatingPolicy( app.runnables, app.policy, ); - app.policy.execution_mode = publicApp ? "anonymous" : "publisher"; + app.policy.execution_mode = executionMode; } catch (e) { log.error(colors.red(`Error generating policy for app ${path}: ${e}`)); throw e; diff --git a/cli/src/commands/sync/sync.ts b/cli/src/commands/sync/sync.ts index bab9967b3c..be5d9e5639 100644 --- a/cli/src/commands/sync/sync.ts +++ b/cli/src/commands/sync/sync.ts @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ import { extractCurrentMapping, } from "../../../windmill-utils-internal/src/inline-scripts/extractor.ts"; import { generateFlowLockInternal } from "../flow/flow_metadata.ts"; -import { isExecutionModeAnonymous } from "../app/app.ts"; +import { markAccessFromPolicy } from "../app/app.ts"; import { APP_BACKEND_FOLDER, generateAppLocksInternal, @@ -1393,9 +1393,7 @@ export function ZipFSElement( }; } - if (isExecutionModeAnonymous(app)) { - app.public = true; - } + markAccessFromPolicy(app); app.policy = undefined; yield { isDirectory: false, @@ -1413,9 +1411,7 @@ export function ZipFSElement( log.error(`Failed to parse app.yaml at path: ${p}`); throw error; } - if (rawApp?.["policy"]?.["execution_mode"] == "anonymous") { - rawApp.public = true; - } + markAccessFromPolicy(rawApp); // console.log("rawApp", rawApp); rawApp.policy = undefined; // custom_path is derived from the file path, don't store it diff --git a/cli/test/app_access_mode_unit.test.ts b/cli/test/app_access_mode_unit.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..12185d6d99 --- /dev/null +++ b/cli/test/app_access_mode_unit.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +import { expect, test } from "bun:test"; +import { + executionModeFromAppFile, + generatingPolicy, + markAccessFromPolicy, +} from "../src/commands/app/app.ts"; + +// The access mode is the one policy field a tracked app keeps; a pull then a push must +// deploy the mode that was pulled, guest included, not a default. +test("the access mode survives the app.yaml round trip", async () => { + const guest: any = { policy: { execution_mode: "guest" }, value: {} }; + markAccessFromPolicy(guest); + guest.policy = undefined; + expect(guest.guests).toBe(true); + expect(guest.public).toBeUndefined(); + expect(executionModeFromAppFile(guest)).toBe("guest"); + await generatingPolicy(guest, "u/test/app", executionModeFromAppFile(guest)); + expect(guest.policy.execution_mode).toBe("guest"); + + const anonymous: any = { policy: { execution_mode: "anonymous" }, value: {} }; + markAccessFromPolicy(anonymous); + anonymous.policy = undefined; + expect(anonymous.public).toBe(true); + expect(executionModeFromAppFile(anonymous)).toBe("anonymous"); + + expect(executionModeFromAppFile({ policy: { execution_mode: "publisher" } })).toBe("publisher"); + expect(executionModeFromAppFile({})).toBe("publisher"); +}); diff --git a/frontend/src/lib/components/InstanceSettings.svelte b/frontend/src/lib/components/InstanceSettings.svelte index b321e76693..19f2477e37 100644 --- a/frontend/src/lib/components/InstanceSettings.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/lib/components/InstanceSettings.svelte @@ -1059,7 +1059,11 @@
  • instance base URL
  • login type usage (login type, count)
  • worker usage (worker, worker instance, vCPUs, memory)
    • -
  • user usage (author count, operator count)
    • +
  • user usage (author count, operator count, the distinct guests of the last 30 days, + the seats they add past the free allowance, and the workspaces that allow + guests)
  • superadmin email addresses
  • development instance status
    • @@ -1120,7 +1124,11 @@
  • job usage (language, total duration, count)
  • login type usage (login type, count)
  • worker usage (worker, worker instance, vCPUs, memory)
    • -
  • user usage (author count, operator count)
    • +
  • user usage (author count, operator count, the distinct guests of the last 30 days, + the seats they add past the free allowance, and the workspaces that allow + guests)
  • development instance status
  • feature usage (counts of which product features are used, including AI provider and diff --git a/frontend/src/lib/components/Login.svelte b/frontend/src/lib/components/Login.svelte index 10f996a33f..3406a66600 100644 --- a/frontend/src/lib/components/Login.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/lib/components/Login.svelte @@ -63,10 +63,18 @@ firstTime?: boolean autoRedirect?: boolean onLoginSuccess?: () => void + /** A refusal the popup relayed back, in the server's words. */ + onLoginError?: (message: string) => void preview?: LoginPreview /** Reports the instance's login options once loaded, so the page around the card can * adapt its heading: a third-party login also creates the account on first use. */ onOptionsLoaded?: (options: { hasThirdParty: boolean }) => void + /** `/` when this sign-in is someone opening an app that is + * open to guests. A third-party login then mints a guest session -- no account, + * no seat -- instead of creating a user. Omitting it is what promotion is: the + * same sign-in without this, which provisions them for real. Password login + * ignores it: a guest has no stored credential to check. */ + guestApp?: string | undefined } let { @@ -78,8 +86,10 @@ firstTime = false, autoRedirect = true, onLoginSuccess = undefined, + onLoginError = undefined, preview = undefined, - onOptionsLoaded = undefined + onOptionsLoaded = undefined, + guestApp = undefined }: Props = $props() // The harness never takes effect in a production bundle, whatever a caller passes. @@ -477,7 +487,9 @@ function processPopupData(data) { if (data.type === 'error') { + clearPendingLoginMethod() sendUserToast(data.error, true) + onLoginError?.(data.error) } else if (data.type === 'success') { finishOauthFlow('postMessage') } @@ -539,7 +551,11 @@ if (previewConfig) return true markLoginMethodPending({ kind: 'oauth', provider }) persistRd() - let url = base + '/api/oauth/login/' + provider + (popup ? '?close=true' : '') + const params = new URLSearchParams() + if (popup) params.set('close', 'true') + if (guestApp) params.set('guest_app', guestApp) + const query = params.size > 0 ? '?' + params.toString() : '' + let url = base + '/api/oauth/login/' + provider + query console.log('storeRedirect', popup, url) if (popup) { @@ -585,8 +601,14 @@ console.log('oauth: popup closed before login completed') return } + // A guest session is pinned to its workspace and cannot answer the global + // probe; an ordinary session for a non-member cannot answer the workspace + // one. Either answering means the popup signed someone in. + const guestWorkspace = guestApp?.split('/')[0] + const probes: Promise[] = [UserService.getCurrentEmail()] + if (guestWorkspace) probes.push(UserService.whoami({ workspace: guestWorkspace })) try { - await UserService.getCurrentEmail() + await Promise.any(probes) } catch { return } @@ -610,7 +632,17 @@ // full URLs (e.g. the page URL from /a/[...path]) are reduced to their // path component first. The backend re-validates. Cross-origin or // otherwise unsafe values fall through to the localStorage fallback. - const safePath = toSameOriginRelativePath(rd) + // A guest entry rides in the same RelayState as a `guest_app` query parameter + // the ACS lifts out: SAML never passes through `/api/oauth/login/`, + // where the OAuth path hands its target to the server. + let safePath = toSameOriginRelativePath(rd) + if (guestApp && safePath) { + const hashAt = safePath.indexOf('#') + const pathAndQuery = hashAt === -1 ? safePath : safePath.slice(0, hashAt) + const hash = hashAt === -1 ? '' : safePath.slice(hashAt) + const sep = pathAndQuery.includes('?') ? '&' : '?' + safePath = `${pathAndQuery}${sep}guest_app=${encodeURIComponent(guestApp)}${hash}` + } if (safePath) { try { const url = new URL(saml) @@ -621,6 +653,13 @@ console.error('Could not set SAML RelayState', e) } } + if (guestApp && !relayStateSet) { + // Without the target the callback provisions an account, so a guest + // sign-in that cannot carry it does not start. + clearPendingLoginMethod() + sendUserToast('Could not start sign-in, please try again.', true) + return false + } // Only use the localStorage fallback when RelayState is NOT carrying the // deep link. With RelayState the ACS redirects straight to the target and // /user/login never consumes/clears the key, so a persisted value would diff --git a/frontend/src/lib/components/SuperadminSettingsInner.svelte b/frontend/src/lib/components/SuperadminSettingsInner.svelte index e74154b406..97b15fe443 100644 --- a/frontend/src/lib/components/SuperadminSettingsInner.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/lib/components/SuperadminSettingsInner.svelte @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ { refresh = requestTokenRefresh loadApp() @@ -135,6 +185,7 @@ {notExists} {noPermission} {jwtError} + {guestAppPath} {app} onLoginSuccess={() => loadApp()} > diff --git a/frontend/src/routes/public/[workspace]/[...secret]/+page.svelte b/frontend/src/routes/public/[workspace]/[...secret]/+page.svelte index 1f142590d9..de2b4755be 100644 --- a/frontend/src/routes/public/[workspace]/[...secret]/+page.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/routes/public/[workspace]/[...secret]/+page.svelte @@ -16,6 +16,16 @@ let notExists = $state(false) let noPermission = $state(false) let jwtError = $state(false) + /** `/` when this app is open to guests, so the sign-in card can + * offer a guest session rather than a dead end. 404 (the common case) leaves it + * undefined. */ + let guestAppPath: string | undefined = $state(undefined) + /** The frame's sign-in card must not mount before this is known: a configured + * auto-login would otherwise fire an ordinary sign-in and provision an account. + * Only the card waits — the app load itself runs in parallel with discovery. + * Only a confirmed 404 means "not a guest app"; any other failure is `error`, since + * offering an ordinary sign-in on a transient fault would provision an account. */ + let guestEntry: 'pending' | 'none' | 'guest' | 'error' = $state('pending') function parseSecret(secret: string): { secret: string; jwt: string | undefined } { const parts = secret.split('/') @@ -83,9 +93,53 @@ } else { notExists = true } + // The app exists and admits guests; the load failed only for want of a + // session, so offer one instead of the not-found page. + await loadGuestEntry() + if (guestAppPath) { + notExists = false + noPermission = true + } } } + // Settled once: `loadApp` calls this again on failure, and a later transient fault + // must not overwrite an answer already in hand. A function, not a narrowed local: + // the value changes across the awaits below. + const guestEntrySettled = () => guestEntry === 'guest' || guestEntry === 'none' + async function loadGuestEntry() { + if (guestEntrySettled()) return + for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 3; attempt++) { + try { + const entry = await AppService.getGuestEntry({ workspace, path: parsedSecret.secret }) + guestAppPath = `${workspace}/${entry.app_path}` + guestEntry = 'guest' + return + } catch (e) { + if (e?.status === 404) { + guestAppPath = undefined + guestEntry = 'none' + return + } + await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 500 * (attempt + 1))) + // A concurrent call may have settled it meanwhile. + if (guestEntrySettled()) return + } + } + if (!guestEntrySettled()) { + guestAppPath = undefined + guestEntry = 'error' + } + } + + // Eager, not on the failure path: PublicAppFrame asks for the embed token and + // renders its own sign-in gate before `onViewerReady` ever fires, so resolving + // this only after a failed `loadApp` would be too late for the case that matters + // most — a signed-out visitor. + if (BROWSER) { + loadGuestEntry() + } + if (BROWSER) { setLicense() } @@ -94,6 +148,8 @@ { refresh = requestTokenRefresh loadApp() @@ -106,6 +162,7 @@ {notExists} {noPermission} {jwtError} + {guestAppPath} onLoginSuccess={() => loadApp()} > {/snippet} diff --git a/frontend/src/routes/user/login_callback/[client_name]/+page.svelte b/frontend/src/routes/user/login_callback/[client_name]/+page.svelte index 3d4a4adf7a..e45b43b871 100644 --- a/frontend/src/routes/user/login_callback/[client_name]/+page.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/routes/user/login_callback/[client_name]/+page.svelte @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ if (error) { sendUserToast(`Error trying to login with ${clientName} ${error}`, true) if (closeUponLogin) { - goto('/user/close') + closeUponLoginError(`Error trying to login with ${clientName} ${error}`) return } await logoutWithRedirect(rd ?? undefined) @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ await UserService.loginWithOauth({ requestBody: { code, state }, clientName }) } catch (e) { if (closeUponLogin) { - goto('/user/close') + closeUponLoginError(e.body ?? e.message) return } await logoutWithRedirect(rd ?? undefined) @@ -140,7 +140,16 @@ applyDarkModeVariant() function closeUponLoginSuccess() { - const message = { type: 'success' } + relayToOpener({ type: 'success' }) + } + + /** The popup is the only window that saw the server's answer, and it closes: a + * refusal that stayed here would leave the page that opened it with nothing to show. */ + function closeUponLoginError(error: string) { + relayToOpener({ type: 'error', error: typeof error === 'string' ? error : String(error) }) + } + + function relayToOpener(message: { type: 'success' } | { type: 'error'; error: string }) { if (window.opener) { window.opener.postMessage(message, '*') } else { From 1e31ab3a1ee4140cebd576ff748d15f20f2dccd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ruben Fiszel Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2026 07:23:50 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 02/16] test: fit the relock no-op tests inside the 60s worker cap (#10984) * test: fit the relock no-op tests inside the worker timeout Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwxTTC4GsAANBjEZki2cft * test: share one wait budget in the relock no-op tests Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwxTTC4GsAANBjEZki2cft * test: bound a whole relock wait on one deadline and idle the drain Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwxTTC4GsAANBjEZki2cft * test: drop the redundant drain sleep in the relock no-op tests Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwxTTC4GsAANBjEZki2cft --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) --- backend/tests/relock_noop.rs | 100 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/tests/relock_noop.rs b/backend/tests/relock_noop.rs index 5cb8e3f51e..a480fc57ae 100644 --- a/backend/tests/relock_noop.rs +++ b/backend/tests/relock_noop.rs @@ -1,3 +1,7 @@ +// These pin language-independent behaviour, and Python is the cheapest runtime that still +// generates a real lock out of relative imports, so the whole file needs that feature. +#![cfg(feature = "python")] + use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres}; use tokio_stream::StreamExt; use windmill_api_client::types::NewScript; @@ -6,21 +10,27 @@ use windmill_test_utils::*; const W: &str = "test-workspace"; -const A: &str = r#"export async function main() { return "a" }"#; -const A_COMMENTED: &str = r#"// same dependencies, different content -export async function main() { return "a" }"#; -const A_WITH_LODASH: &str = r#"import _ from "lodash@4.17.21"; -export async function main() { return _.trim(" a ") }"#; -const B: &str = r#"import { main as a } from "/f/rel/a.ts"; -export async function main() { return "b" + (await a()) }"#; -const C: &str = r#"import { main as b } from "/f/rel/b.ts"; -export async function main() { return "c" + (await b()) }"#; +/// Budget for one wait below, counted completions and drain together. Even against a cold cache +/// these settle in a few seconds, so it only bounds a step that is stuck, and it stays under the +/// 60s cap `in_test_worker` puts on the whole body so the panic names what was being waited on +/// rather than surfacing as a worker timeout. +const WAIT_BUDGET: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(30); -fn bun_script(path: &str, content: &str, parent_hash: Option) -> NewScript { +/// How often the waits below re-check. The drain reads the queue once per completion it waits +/// this long for, so it doubles as the floor on one turn of that loop. +const POLL: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_millis(20); + +const A: &str = "def main():\n return 'a'\n"; +const A_COMMENTED: &str = "# same dependencies, different content\ndef main():\n return 'a'\n"; +const A_WITH_TINY: &str = "import tiny\n\ndef main():\n return 'a'\n"; +const B: &str = "from f.rel.a import main as a\n\ndef main():\n return 'b' + a()\n"; +const C: &str = "from f.rel.b import main as b\n\ndef main():\n return 'c' + b()\n"; + +fn py_script(path: &str, content: &str, parent_hash: Option) -> NewScript { NewScript { draft_only: None, content: content.into(), - language: windmill_api_client::types::ScriptLang::Bun, + language: windmill_api_client::types::ScriptLang::Python3, lock: None, parent_hash, path: path.into(), @@ -96,17 +106,33 @@ async fn dependency_jobs_since( } async fn wait_for_jobs( + db: &Pool, completed: &mut (impl futures::Stream + Unpin), count: usize, ) { - for _ in 0..count { - completed.next().await; + let deadline = tokio::time::Instant::now() + WAIT_BUDGET; + for i in 0..count { + tokio::time::timeout_at(deadline, completed.next()) + .await + .unwrap_or_else(|_| panic!("only {i} of {count} jobs completed")); } // Then let anything else that was queued run out, so a job the assertions say must not - // exist would have shown up here. - while let Ok(Some(_)) = - tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2), completed.next()).await - {} + // exist would have shown up here. A dependency job queues its fan-out before it completes, + // so an empty queue is a fixpoint rather than a lull. + loop { + while let Ok(Some(_)) = tokio::time::timeout(POLL, completed.next()).await {} + let queued: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT count(*) FROM v2_job_queue") + .fetch_one(db) + .await + .unwrap(); + if queued == 0 { + return; + } + assert!( + tokio::time::Instant::now() < deadline, + "the queue never emptied" + ); + } } /// A redeploy of an imported script whose dependencies did not move relocks its importer, @@ -128,10 +154,10 @@ async fn relative_import_relock_deploys_only_when_the_lock_changed( // importer whose edges are recorded is what a later relock of it can skip on. for (path, content) in [("f/rel/a", A), ("f/rel/b", B), ("f/rel/c", C)] { client - .create_script(W, &bun_script(path, content, None)) + .create_script(W, &py_script(path, content, None)) .await .unwrap(); - wait_for_jobs(&mut completed, 1).await; + wait_for_jobs(&db, &mut completed, 1).await; } let b_before = versions(&db, "f/rel/b").await; let c_before = versions(&db, "f/rel/c").await; @@ -144,11 +170,11 @@ async fn relative_import_relock_deploys_only_when_the_lock_changed( client .create_script( W, - &bun_script("f/rel/a", A_COMMENTED, Some(format!("{a_hash:016x}"))), + &py_script("f/rel/a", A_COMMENTED, Some(format!("{a_hash:016x}"))), ) .await .unwrap(); - wait_for_jobs(&mut completed, 2).await; + wait_for_jobs(&db, &mut completed, 2).await; let jobs = dependency_jobs_since(&db, since).await; let paths: Vec<&str> = jobs.iter().map(|(p, _, _)| p.as_str()).collect(); @@ -181,11 +207,11 @@ async fn relative_import_relock_deploys_only_when_the_lock_changed( client .create_script( W, - &bun_script("f/rel/a", A_WITH_LODASH, Some(format!("{a_hash:016x}"))), + &py_script("f/rel/a", A_WITH_TINY, Some(format!("{a_hash:016x}"))), ) .await .unwrap(); - wait_for_jobs(&mut completed, 3).await; + wait_for_jobs(&db, &mut completed, 3).await; let jobs = dependency_jobs_since(&db, since).await; let paths: Vec<&str> = jobs.iter().map(|(p, _, _)| p.as_str()).collect(); @@ -203,7 +229,7 @@ async fn relative_import_relock_deploys_only_when_the_lock_changed( ); assert!(vs[0].created_at < vs[1].created_at, "{path}: lineage order"); assert!( - vs[1].lock.as_deref().unwrap_or("").contains("lodash"), + vs[1].lock.as_deref().unwrap_or("").contains("tiny"), "{path}: the new version carries the new lock: {:?}", vs[1].lock ); @@ -233,10 +259,10 @@ async fn relock_waiting_on_a_deploy_requeues_for_its_successor( async { for (path, content) in [("f/rel/a", A), ("f/rel/b", B)] { client - .create_script(W, &bun_script(path, content, None)) + .create_script(W, &py_script(path, content, None)) .await .unwrap(); - wait_for_jobs(&mut completed, 1).await; + wait_for_jobs(&db, &mut completed, 1).await; } // A deploy of b that holds its head's row lock for as long as this transaction lives. @@ -251,14 +277,15 @@ async fn relock_waiting_on_a_deploy_requeues_for_its_successor( client .create_script( W, - &bun_script("f/rel/a", A_COMMENTED, Some(format!("{a_hash:016x}"))), + &py_script("f/rel/a", A_COMMENTED, Some(format!("{a_hash:016x}"))), ) .await .unwrap(); // b's relock skips generation and reaches its commit, where it waits on the lock. + let deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + WAIT_BUDGET; let mut waiting = false; - for _ in 0..300 { + while !waiting && std::time::Instant::now() < deadline { waiting = sqlx::query_scalar( "SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_stat_activity WHERE datname = current_database() AND wait_event_type = 'Lock' @@ -267,10 +294,9 @@ async fn relock_waiting_on_a_deploy_requeues_for_its_successor( .fetch_one(&db) .await .unwrap(); - if waiting { - break; + if !waiting { + tokio::time::sleep(POLL).await; } - tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(100)).await; } assert!(waiting, "b's relock never reached the row lock"); @@ -284,7 +310,7 @@ async fn relock_waiting_on_a_deploy_requeues_for_its_successor( deploy.commit().await.unwrap(); // a's own job, the relock that waited, and the relock it queued for the successor. - wait_for_jobs(&mut completed, 3).await; + wait_for_jobs(&db, &mut completed, 3).await; let jobs = dependency_jobs_since(&db, since).await; let paths: Vec<&str> = jobs.iter().map(|(p, _, _)| p.as_str()).collect(); @@ -324,7 +350,6 @@ async fn relock_waiting_on_a_deploy_requeues_for_its_successor( /// A multi-file importer: on a skipped relock each module gets its own last lock back, not the /// parent script's, so an import's content-only redeploy leaves the importer alone as well. -#[cfg(feature = "python")] #[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] async fn multi_file_importer_relock_is_a_no_op_too(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { std::env::set_var("DEPENDENCY_JOB_DEBOUNCE_DELAY", "0"); @@ -332,8 +357,7 @@ async fn multi_file_importer_relock_is_a_no_op_too(db: Pool) -> anyhow let mut completed = listen_for_completed_jobs(&db).await; let py = |path: &str, content: &str, parent_hash: Option, with_module: bool| { - let mut ns = bun_script(path, content, parent_hash); - ns.language = windmill_api_client::types::ScriptLang::Python3; + let mut ns = py_script(path, content, parent_hash); if with_module { ns.modules = Some(std::collections::HashMap::from([( "helper.py".to_string(), @@ -363,7 +387,7 @@ async fn multi_file_importer_relock_is_a_no_op_too(db: Pool) -> anyhow .create_script(W, &py("f/rel/pa", "def main():\n return 'a'\n", None, false)) .await .unwrap(); - wait_for_jobs(&mut completed, 1).await; + wait_for_jobs(&db, &mut completed, 1).await; client .create_script( W, @@ -376,7 +400,7 @@ async fn multi_file_importer_relock_is_a_no_op_too(db: Pool) -> anyhow ) .await .unwrap(); - wait_for_jobs(&mut completed, 1).await; + wait_for_jobs(&db, &mut completed, 1).await; let lock_before = module_lock(&db).await; assert!(lock_before.is_some(), "the module got a lock of its own on deploy"); @@ -394,7 +418,7 @@ async fn multi_file_importer_relock_is_a_no_op_too(db: Pool) -> anyhow ) .await .unwrap(); - wait_for_jobs(&mut completed, 2).await; + wait_for_jobs(&db, &mut completed, 2).await; let jobs = dependency_jobs_since(&db, since).await; let paths: Vec<&str> = jobs.iter().map(|(p, _, _)| p.as_str()).collect(); From b5ae12bdf2fd31dfe5c034ef52bf5ceddb62ee40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ruben Fiszel Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2026 07:25:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 03/16] unbreak backend-test by bumping the ee ref past a test arity break (#10987) * fix: bump the ee ref past the seats_consumed test arity break Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwxTTC4GsAANBjEZki2cft * chore: update ee-repo-ref to fb1c5c109846d6c47aff70ab6cc631f4fd773678 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #781 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: d197b7b1c76e2aa7cde6cef2e2d9556607cce4c6 New ee-repo-ref: fb1c5c109846d6c47aff70ab6cc631f4fd773678 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] --- backend/ee-repo-ref.txt | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/backend/ee-repo-ref.txt b/backend/ee-repo-ref.txt index 086b9611a0..a7825f4ee7 100644 --- a/backend/ee-repo-ref.txt +++ b/backend/ee-repo-ref.txt @@ -1 +1 @@ -1a10132e4f3cb442c7d0c2cf6e5d92d150bf6e07 +fb1c5c109846d6c47aff70ab6cc631f4fd773678 From ebfac29096f12c4da2df45d5d82db83d352f3426 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ruben Fiszel Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2026 08:05:15 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 04/16] fix: render the MCP OAuth consent page without a workspace (#10988) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014EeEWKSqcnCEcPKe9uUuHC Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) --- .../{+page.svelte => +page@(root).svelte} | 12 ++++++++++-- .../oauth/mcp_authorize/layoutReset.test.ts | 14 ++++++++++++++ frontend/src/routes/(root)/+layout.svelte | 5 ++++- 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) rename frontend/src/routes/(root)/(logged)/oauth/mcp_authorize/{+page.svelte => +page@(root).svelte} (90%) create mode 100644 frontend/src/routes/(root)/(logged)/oauth/mcp_authorize/layoutReset.test.ts diff --git a/frontend/src/routes/(root)/(logged)/oauth/mcp_authorize/+page.svelte b/frontend/src/routes/(root)/(logged)/oauth/mcp_authorize/+page@(root).svelte similarity index 90% rename from frontend/src/routes/(root)/(logged)/oauth/mcp_authorize/+page.svelte rename to frontend/src/routes/(root)/(logged)/oauth/mcp_authorize/+page@(root).svelte index 3750c56d97..830e545719 100644 --- a/frontend/src/routes/(root)/(logged)/oauth/mcp_authorize/+page.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/routes/(root)/(logged)/oauth/mcp_authorize/+page@(root).svelte @@ -1,3 +1,7 @@ + {#if !redirectUriValid} -

    Error: invalid or unsafe redirect_uri

    + +

    Error: invalid or unsafe redirect_uri

    +     {:else if !isGateway && !workspaceId} -

    Error: missing workspace_id

    + +

    Error: missing workspace_id

    +     {:else} {#if success} diff --git a/frontend/src/routes/(root)/(logged)/oauth/mcp_authorize/layoutReset.test.ts b/frontend/src/routes/(root)/(logged)/oauth/mcp_authorize/layoutReset.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6ba4469e27 --- /dev/null +++ b/frontend/src/routes/(root)/(logged)/oauth/mcp_authorize/layoutReset.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +import { readdirSync } from 'node:fs' +import { dirname } from 'node:path' +import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url' +import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest' + +// Renaming the page back drops it into the (logged) layout, where it hangs on +// "Loading user..." with no type error and no other failing test — see the page header. +const routeDir = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)) + +describe('mcp oauth consent route', () => { + it('escapes the (logged) layout', () => { + expect(readdirSync(routeDir)).toContain('+page@(root).svelte') + }) +}) diff --git a/frontend/src/routes/(root)/+layout.svelte b/frontend/src/routes/(root)/+layout.svelte index 0e404afbcc..4de44442a2 100644 --- a/frontend/src/routes/(root)/+layout.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/routes/(root)/+layout.svelte @@ -147,7 +147,10 @@ } else { if ( (!page.url.pathname.startsWith('/user/') || page.url.pathname.startsWith('/user/cli')) && - !page.url.pathname.startsWith('/oauth/mcp_authorize') && + // The MCP consent page carries its own workspace picker, so it is left to + // run without one. Nothing sets `$userStore` on this branch, which is why + // that page must stay outside the (logged) layout — see its `@(root)` name. + !page.url.pathname.startsWith(`${base}/oauth/mcp_authorize`) && // The hub import wizard asks for the destination itself, and may end in a // workspace that does not exist yet — bouncing it to the picker would // force the very choice it exists to make. From 9d37b6f489b0263d1a45f8066335ac55c2de7643 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ruben Fiszel Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2026 09:10:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 05/16] test: keep the mcp preprocessor header test off the dependency job (#10989) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YESK92Dtojyu4XMg19GHfp Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) --- .../tests/mcp_preprocessor_headers.rs | 23 ++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/backend/windmill-api-integration-tests/tests/mcp_preprocessor_headers.rs b/backend/windmill-api-integration-tests/tests/mcp_preprocessor_headers.rs index 3e1035ff82..25942e845c 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api-integration-tests/tests/mcp_preprocessor_headers.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api-integration-tests/tests/mcp_preprocessor_headers.rs @@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ use windmill_test_utils::*; const SCRIPT_PATH: &str = "u/test-user/mcp_hdr_probe"; +/// A bun lock the executor accepts without installing anything: no dependencies +/// in the `package.json` half, `` for the `bun.lock` half. The empty +/// string is not a substitute: a lock carrying no `//bun.lock` separator is +/// rejected at run time. +const EMPTY_BUN_LOCK: &str = "{}\n//bun.lock\n"; + /// Echoes the two halves of the event separately, so the assertions can tell /// which one a value arrived in. const PREPROCESSOR_SCRIPT: &str = r#" @@ -84,7 +90,7 @@ async fn test_mcp_preprocessor_receives_the_callers_headers( "description": "", "content": PREPROCESSOR_SCRIPT, "language": "bun", - "lock": "", + "lock": EMPTY_BUN_LOCK, "schema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "type": "object", @@ -101,13 +107,14 @@ async fn test_mcp_preprocessor_receives_the_callers_headers( resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default() ); - // A script counts as deployed once it has a lock, which normally arrives from - // a dependency job. Planting an empty one keeps the test to the path under - // test instead of a bun resolution whose timing it does not control. - sqlx::query("UPDATE script SET lock = '' WHERE path = $1 AND workspace_id = 'test-workspace'") - .bind(SCRIPT_PATH) - .execute(&db) - .await?; + // A supplied lock queues no dependency job, so the version is deployed (hence + // listable and runnable) as soon as the create returns. + let queued: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar( + "SELECT count(*) FROM v2_job_queue WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace'", + ) + .fetch_one(&db) + .await?; + assert_eq!(queued, 0, "the supplied lock must queue no dependency job"); let tools = mcp_post( port, From 54287102b22dd17903cdd4b48c5828875e5b9be4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ruben Fiszel Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2026 09:11:29 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 06/16] fix: meter WAC compute per segment, not the whole sleep (#10985) * fix: clear started_at when a WAC parent suspends Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AzS5d5Dc3GL49kWZPQAQCg * fix: restore started_at on the WAC dispatch rollback, fail loudly on a no-op suspend Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AzS5d5Dc3GL49kWZPQAQCg * fix: restore the pulled segment start on the WAC dispatch rollback Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AzS5d5Dc3GL49kWZPQAQCg * feat: meter WAC execution per segment instead of only the last one Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AzS5d5Dc3GL49kWZPQAQCg * fix: make the cloud feature self-sufficient per crate Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AzS5d5Dc3GL49kWZPQAQCg * chore: name windmill-common/cloud directly in the worker cloud feature Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AzS5d5Dc3GL49kWZPQAQCg --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) --- ...1369067c41870be4561e1c26733ac30419801.json | 15 ++++ ...b7ab1f2fc29a2ba79a39576551bdf66b592b6.json | 15 ---- ...7cfd7ac33ac2616d9f68ab4cb62da105cae57.json | 25 ++++++ ...3e6e08f808f423c8f2d58b9c849aba7d176f5.json | 14 ---- ...05e6f5c25e23b7c41ce1c0e5a83bf7b118bfd.json | 22 ++++++ ...2808e90cb068d1048717f82992f476377cc20.json | 15 ---- backend/tests/wac_suspend_started_at.rs | 55 ++++++++++++++ backend/windmill-queue/Cargo.toml | 2 +- backend/windmill-queue/src/jobs.rs | 31 +++++++- backend/windmill-worker/Cargo.toml | 2 +- backend/windmill-worker/src/bun_executor.rs | 74 ++++++++++-------- backend/windmill-worker/src/wac_executor.rs | 76 +++++++++++++++++++ .../src/lib/components/runs/RunRow.svelte | 2 + 13 files changed, 267 insertions(+), 81 deletions(-) create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-0e277240d2be50383ac53d844c71369067c41870be4561e1c26733ac30419801.json delete mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-10af387fce25f6ea7af275e8e93b7ab1f2fc29a2ba79a39576551bdf66b592b6.json create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-5dc28b4609bff15ca4895e726c27cfd7ac33ac2616d9f68ab4cb62da105cae57.json delete mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-a684f160d1a366c1928fef27c613e6e08f808f423c8f2d58b9c849aba7d176f5.json create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-e12f852fa196d16862151ab490b05e6f5c25e23b7c41ce1c0e5a83bf7b118bfd.json delete mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-f56c58fea9f27d2e55d33720e032808e90cb068d1048717f82992f476377cc20.json create mode 100644 backend/tests/wac_suspend_started_at.rs diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-0e277240d2be50383ac53d844c71369067c41870be4561e1c26733ac30419801.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-0e277240d2be50383ac53d844c71369067c41870be4561e1c26733ac30419801.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..359a7eeefd --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-0e277240d2be50383ac53d844c71369067c41870be4561e1c26733ac30419801.json @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "UPDATE v2_job_queue\n SET suspend = 0, suspend_until = NULL,\n started_at = coalesce(started_at, $2, now())\n WHERE id = $1", + "describe": { + "columns": [], + "parameters": { + "Left": [ + "Uuid", + "Timestamptz" + ] + }, + "nullable": [] + }, + "hash": "0e277240d2be50383ac53d844c71369067c41870be4561e1c26733ac30419801" +} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-10af387fce25f6ea7af275e8e93b7ab1f2fc29a2ba79a39576551bdf66b592b6.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-10af387fce25f6ea7af275e8e93b7ab1f2fc29a2ba79a39576551bdf66b592b6.json deleted file mode 100644 index 3f39982319..0000000000 --- a/backend/.sqlx/query-10af387fce25f6ea7af275e8e93b7ab1f2fc29a2ba79a39576551bdf66b592b6.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -{ - "db_name": "PostgreSQL", - "query": "UPDATE v2_job_queue SET suspend = $2, suspend_until = now() + interval '14 day' WHERE id = $1", - "describe": { - "columns": [], - "parameters": { - "Left": [ - "Uuid", - "Int4" - ] - }, - "nullable": [] - }, - "hash": "10af387fce25f6ea7af275e8e93b7ab1f2fc29a2ba79a39576551bdf66b592b6" -} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-5dc28b4609bff15ca4895e726c27cfd7ac33ac2616d9f68ab4cb62da105cae57.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-5dc28b4609bff15ca4895e726c27cfd7ac33ac2616d9f68ab4cb62da105cae57.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a93f92c4e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-5dc28b4609bff15ca4895e726c27cfd7ac33ac2616d9f68ab4cb62da105cae57.json @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "WITH prev AS (\n SELECT started_at FROM v2_job_queue WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2\n )\n UPDATE v2_job_queue q\n SET suspend = $3, suspend_until = now() + make_interval(secs => $4), started_at = null\n FROM prev\n WHERE q.id = $1 AND q.workspace_id = $2\n RETURNING (extract(epoch FROM now() - prev.started_at) * 1000)::bigint", + "describe": { + "columns": [ + { + "ordinal": 0, + "name": "int8", + "type_info": "Int8" + } + ], + "parameters": { + "Left": [ + "Uuid", + "Text", + "Int4", + "Float8" + ] + }, + "nullable": [ + null + ] + }, + "hash": "5dc28b4609bff15ca4895e726c27cfd7ac33ac2616d9f68ab4cb62da105cae57" +} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-a684f160d1a366c1928fef27c613e6e08f808f423c8f2d58b9c849aba7d176f5.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-a684f160d1a366c1928fef27c613e6e08f808f423c8f2d58b9c849aba7d176f5.json deleted file mode 100644 index 7a45e6c402..0000000000 --- a/backend/.sqlx/query-a684f160d1a366c1928fef27c613e6e08f808f423c8f2d58b9c849aba7d176f5.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "db_name": "PostgreSQL", - "query": "UPDATE v2_job_queue SET running = false, started_at = null WHERE id = $1", - "describe": { - "columns": [], - "parameters": { - "Left": [ - "Uuid" - ] - }, - "nullable": [] - }, - "hash": "a684f160d1a366c1928fef27c613e6e08f808f423c8f2d58b9c849aba7d176f5" -} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-e12f852fa196d16862151ab490b05e6f5c25e23b7c41ce1c0e5a83bf7b118bfd.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-e12f852fa196d16862151ab490b05e6f5c25e23b7c41ce1c0e5a83bf7b118bfd.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ae893b6791 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-e12f852fa196d16862151ab490b05e6f5c25e23b7c41ce1c0e5a83bf7b118bfd.json @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "WITH prev AS (SELECT started_at FROM v2_job_queue WHERE id = $1)\n UPDATE v2_job_queue q SET running = false, started_at = null\n FROM prev WHERE q.id = $1\n RETURNING (extract(epoch FROM now() - prev.started_at) * 1000)::bigint", + "describe": { + "columns": [ + { + "ordinal": 0, + "name": "int8", + "type_info": "Int8" + } + ], + "parameters": { + "Left": [ + "Uuid" + ] + }, + "nullable": [ + null + ] + }, + "hash": "e12f852fa196d16862151ab490b05e6f5c25e23b7c41ce1c0e5a83bf7b118bfd" +} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-f56c58fea9f27d2e55d33720e032808e90cb068d1048717f82992f476377cc20.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-f56c58fea9f27d2e55d33720e032808e90cb068d1048717f82992f476377cc20.json deleted file mode 100644 index 72acab6120..0000000000 --- a/backend/.sqlx/query-f56c58fea9f27d2e55d33720e032808e90cb068d1048717f82992f476377cc20.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -{ - "db_name": "PostgreSQL", - "query": "UPDATE v2_job_queue SET suspend = 1, suspend_until = now() + make_interval(secs => $2) WHERE id = $1", - "describe": { - "columns": [], - "parameters": { - "Left": [ - "Uuid", - "Float8" - ] - }, - "nullable": [] - }, - "hash": "f56c58fea9f27d2e55d33720e032808e90cb068d1048717f82992f476377cc20" -} diff --git a/backend/tests/wac_suspend_started_at.rs b/backend/tests/wac_suspend_started_at.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f374a25220 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/tests/wac_suspend_started_at.rs @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +//! Guards the two things `suspend_wac_parent` promises: the `started_at` invariant +//! documented on it, and the segment length it hands back for metering. + +use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres}; +use uuid::Uuid; +use windmill_worker::wac_executor::suspend_wac_parent; + +#[sqlx::test] +async fn wac_suspend_clears_started_at(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + let job_id = Uuid::new_v4(); + sqlx::query( + "INSERT INTO v2_job_queue (id, workspace_id, scheduled_for, running, started_at) \ + VALUES ($1, 'test-workspace', now(), true, now() - interval '4 days')", + ) + .bind(job_id) + .execute(&db) + .await?; + + let mut tx = db.begin().await?; + let segment_ms = suspend_wac_parent(&mut tx, &job_id, "test-workspace", 1, 3600.0).await?; + tx.commit().await?; + + // The segment is what gets billed, so it must be the run that just ended, measured + // from the pull — not the park ahead of it, and not zero. + let four_days_ms = 4 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; + assert!( + segment_ms.is_some_and(|ms| (ms - four_days_ms).abs() < 60_000), + "expected the ended segment (~{four_days_ms}ms), got {segment_ms:?}" + ); + + let (started_at, running, suspend, suspend_until): ( + Option>, + bool, + i32, + Option>, + ) = sqlx::query_as( + "SELECT started_at, running, suspend, suspend_until FROM v2_job_queue WHERE id = $1", + ) + .bind(job_id) + .fetch_one(&db) + .await?; + + assert_eq!( + started_at, None, + "a parked parent must not carry the previous segment's started_at" + ); + assert_eq!(suspend, 1); + assert!(suspend_until.is_some()); + assert!( + running, + "running stays true so the normal pull query skips the parked row" + ); + + Ok(()) +} diff --git a/backend/windmill-queue/Cargo.toml b/backend/windmill-queue/Cargo.toml index b9bd6fd28e..6dc5d8ba42 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-queue/Cargo.toml +++ b/backend/windmill-queue/Cargo.toml @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ path = "src/lib.rs" default = [] private = [] enterprise = ["windmill-common/enterprise"] -cloud = [] +cloud = ["windmill-common/cloud"] benchmark = ["windmill-common/benchmark"] failpoints = [] prometheus = ["dep:prometheus"] diff --git a/backend/windmill-queue/src/jobs.rs b/backend/windmill-queue/src/jobs.rs index 8ac4fd390a..d7f847a73d 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-queue/src/jobs.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-queue/src/jobs.rs @@ -2065,10 +2065,35 @@ fn apply_completed_job_cloud_usage( queued_job: &MiniCompletedJob, _duration: i64, ) { - if *CLOUD_HOSTED && !queued_job.is_flow() && _duration > 1000 { + if !queued_job.is_flow() { + meter_execution_seconds( + db, + &queued_job.workspace_id, + &queued_job.permissioned_as_email, + _duration, + ); + } +} + +/// Charge `_duration` of execution time to the cloud usage meters: the workspace's +/// monthly row, plus the per-user row on non-premium plans. +/// +/// The unit is one finished **segment**, not one job. A Workflow-as-Code parent parks on +/// a sleep, an approval or its children and resumes with a fresh timer, so its compute +/// arrives here as several calls; metering only the one at completion would drop +/// everything it ran before its first park. +/// +/// Fire-and-forget, like every other write to `usage`: billing must never hold up the +/// job that produced it. +/// +/// `w_id` and `email` are billed as given and authorize nothing on their own — take them +/// from a job the caller already holds, never from request input. +#[cfg(feature = "cloud")] +pub fn meter_execution_seconds(db: &Pool, w_id: &str, email: &str, _duration: i64) { + if *CLOUD_HOSTED && _duration > 1000 { let db = db.clone(); - let w_id = queued_job.workspace_id.clone(); - let email = queued_job.permissioned_as_email.clone(); + let w_id = w_id.to_string(); + let email = email.to_string(); let w_id2 = w_id.clone(); let email2 = email.clone(); tokio::task::spawn(async move { diff --git a/backend/windmill-worker/Cargo.toml b/backend/windmill-worker/Cargo.toml index 0390e1c366..e75afc053e 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-worker/Cargo.toml +++ b/backend/windmill-worker/Cargo.toml @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ benchmark = ["windmill-queue/benchmark", "windmill-common/benchmark"] parquet = ["windmill-common/parquet", "windmill-object-store/parquet"] flow_testing = [] failpoints = [] -cloud = [] +cloud = ["windmill-queue/cloud", "windmill-common/cloud"] sqlx = [] deno_core = ["dep:windmill-runtime-nativets"] libffi_mac = ["dep:libffi-sys"] diff --git a/backend/windmill-worker/src/bun_executor.rs b/backend/windmill-worker/src/bun_executor.rs index 77221edf22..ac1eebe723 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-worker/src/bun_executor.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-worker/src/bun_executor.rs @@ -2819,6 +2819,7 @@ pub async fn handle_wac_v2_output( // Step 1: Save checkpoint, suspend parent, and seed child checkpoints // in a single transaction — all BEFORE children become visible. + let segment_ms; { let mut tx = db.begin().await?; @@ -2871,24 +2872,16 @@ pub async fn handle_wac_v2_output( })?; } - // Suspend parent before children become visible. - // Keep running = true so the normal pull query ignores it. - // The suspended pull query picks it up when suspend reaches 0 - // (it checks: suspend_until IS NOT NULL AND suspend <= 0). - let suspend_count = num_steps as i32; - sqlx::query!( - "UPDATE v2_job_queue SET suspend = $2, suspend_until = now() + interval '14 day' WHERE id = $1", - job.id, - suspend_count, + // Suspend parent before children become visible, so a child that + // completes immediately finds a parked parent to decrement. + segment_ms = crate::wac_executor::suspend_wac_parent( + &mut tx, + &job.id, + &job.workspace_id, + num_steps as i32, + 14.0 * 24.0 * 3600.0, ) - .execute(&mut *tx) - .await - .map_err(|e| { - error::Error::internal_err(format!( - "Failed to suspend WAC parent job {}: {e}", - job.id - )) - })?; + .await?; tx.commit().await?; } @@ -3167,10 +3160,17 @@ pub async fn handle_wac_v2_output( .execute(db) .await; - // Unsuspend parent so the error propagates instead of a 14-day hang + // Unsuspend parent so the error propagates instead of a 14-day hang. + // Unlike the other suspend exits this one completes the job for real, so + // it needs its segment start back — the in-memory copy is what the pull + // stamped, before the suspend cleared the column. let _ = sqlx::query!( - "UPDATE v2_job_queue SET suspend = 0, suspend_until = NULL WHERE id = $1", + "UPDATE v2_job_queue + SET suspend = 0, suspend_until = NULL, + started_at = coalesce(started_at, $2, now()) + WHERE id = $1", job.id, + job.started_at, ) .execute(db) .await; @@ -3183,6 +3183,7 @@ pub async fn handle_wac_v2_output( "WAC v2 parent job suspended" ); + crate::wac_executor::end_wac_segment(conn, job, segment_ms); Err(error::Error::WacSuspended(format!( "WAC v2 job {} suspended waiting for {} child job(s)", job.id, num_steps @@ -3361,15 +3362,17 @@ pub async fn handle_wac_v2_output( } // Suspend parent with suspend=1 (waiting for 1 approval event) - sqlx::query!( - "UPDATE v2_job_queue SET suspend = 1, suspend_until = now() + make_interval(secs => $2) WHERE id = $1", - job.id, + let segment_ms = crate::wac_executor::suspend_wac_parent( + &mut tx, + &job.id, + &job.workspace_id, + 1, timeout_secs, ) - .execute(&mut *tx) .await?; tx.commit().await?; + crate::wac_executor::end_wac_segment(conn, job, segment_ms); tracing::info!( job_id = %job.id, @@ -3453,18 +3456,19 @@ pub async fn handle_wac_v2_output( })?; } - // Suspend parent — it will auto-resume when suspend_until passes. // Use suspend=1 (not 0) so the suspended pull query only picks it up // when `suspend_until <= now()`, not via `suspend <= 0`. - sqlx::query!( - "UPDATE v2_job_queue SET suspend = 1, suspend_until = now() + make_interval(secs => $2) WHERE id = $1", - job.id, + let segment_ms = crate::wac_executor::suspend_wac_parent( + &mut tx, + &job.id, + &job.workspace_id, + 1, sleep_secs, ) - .execute(&mut *tx) .await?; tx.commit().await?; + crate::wac_executor::end_wac_segment(conn, job, segment_ms); tracing::info!( job_id = %job.id, @@ -3514,19 +3518,25 @@ pub async fn handle_wac_v2_output( // Reset running=false so the job is immediately eligible for pickup. // Unlike dispatch (which sets suspend>0), inline checkpoints don't suspend — // the job should be re-run right away to continue past the cached step. - sqlx::query!( - "UPDATE v2_job_queue SET running = false, started_at = null WHERE id = $1", + // `prev` holds the pre-update row: RETURNING would see the cleared column. + let segment_ms = sqlx::query_scalar!( + "WITH prev AS (SELECT started_at FROM v2_job_queue WHERE id = $1) + UPDATE v2_job_queue q SET running = false, started_at = null + FROM prev WHERE q.id = $1 + RETURNING (extract(epoch FROM now() - prev.started_at) * 1000)::bigint", job.id, ) - .execute(&mut *tx) + .fetch_optional(&mut *tx) .await .map_err(|e| { error::Error::internal_err(format!( "Failed to reset running state for inline checkpoint: {e}" )) - })?; + })? + .flatten(); tx.commit().await?; + crate::wac_executor::end_wac_segment(conn, job, segment_ms); Err(error::Error::WacSuspended(format!( "WAC v2 job {} inline checkpoint for step {}", diff --git a/backend/windmill-worker/src/wac_executor.rs b/backend/windmill-worker/src/wac_executor.rs index 3e9b7bbc9b..1402c7aed9 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-worker/src/wac_executor.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-worker/src/wac_executor.rs @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ use serde::Deserialize; use serde_json::value::RawValue; use serde_json::Value; +use sqlx::{Postgres, Transaction}; use uuid::Uuid; use windmill_common::error::{self, Error}; @@ -85,6 +86,81 @@ fn default_dispatch_type() -> String { "inline".to_string() } +/// Park a WAC v2 parent in the queue until `suspend` reaches 0 or `suspend_secs` +/// elapses, whichever comes first. `running` stays true so the normal pull query +/// skips the row; only the suspended pull query takes it back. The `id`/`workspace_id` +/// pair is a consistency check, not an authorization one — callers must already hold +/// the job (every one of them passes a job its own worker pulled). +/// +/// `started_at` is cleared because the parent holds no worker while parked. The pull +/// re-stamps it (`started_at = coalesce(started_at, now())`), and every path that +/// completes a job without a worker-measured duration — a cancel, the child-failure +/// handler — falls back to `now() - started_at`. Left pointing at the first segment, +/// that fallback reports the whole sleep or approval wait as execution time. +/// +/// Returns the segment that just ended, in milliseconds, for the caller to hand to +/// `end_wac_segment`. +pub async fn suspend_wac_parent( + tx: &mut Transaction<'_, Postgres>, + job_id: &Uuid, + w_id: &str, + suspend: i32, + suspend_secs: f64, +) -> error::Result> { + // `prev` holds the pre-update row: RETURNING sees the new one, where `started_at` + // has already been cleared. + let parked = sqlx::query_scalar!( + "WITH prev AS ( + SELECT started_at FROM v2_job_queue WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2 + ) + UPDATE v2_job_queue q + SET suspend = $3, suspend_until = now() + make_interval(secs => $4), started_at = null + FROM prev + WHERE q.id = $1 AND q.workspace_id = $2 + RETURNING (extract(epoch FROM now() - prev.started_at) * 1000)::bigint", + job_id, + w_id, + suspend, + suspend_secs, + ) + .fetch_optional(&mut **tx) + .await + .map_err(|e| Error::internal_err(format!("Failed to suspend WAC parent job {job_id}: {e}")))?; + + // Silently parking nothing is unrecoverable on the dispatch arm: the children are + // pushed right after and decrement a `suspend` that was never set, so the parent + // sits out its whole suspend window instead of resuming. + match parked { + Some(segment_ms) => Ok(segment_ms), + None => Err(Error::internal_err(format!( + "WAC parent job {job_id} not in the queue of workspace {w_id} to suspend" + ))), + } +} + +/// Charge the execution segment a WAC parent just finished. Segments are metered as they +/// end rather than summed at completion, so a workflow that sleeps for days is billed for +/// the compute it used, when it used it — and the final segment is charged by the ordinary +/// completion path. +/// +/// Call this only where the parent really parks. On a rollback that goes on to complete +/// the job, the completion charges the same segment and it would be billed twice. +pub(crate) fn end_wac_segment( + _conn: &windmill_common::worker::Connection, + _job: &windmill_queue::MiniPulledJob, + _segment_ms: Option, +) { + #[cfg(feature = "cloud")] + if let (windmill_common::worker::Connection::Sql(db), Some(segment_ms)) = (_conn, _segment_ms) { + windmill_queue::meter_execution_seconds( + db, + &_job.workspace_id, + &_job.permissioned_as_email, + segment_ms, + ); + } +} + /// Parse the WAC result from result.json content. pub fn parse_wac_output(result: &RawValue) -> error::Result { serde_json::from_str(result.get()) diff --git a/frontend/src/lib/components/runs/RunRow.svelte b/frontend/src/lib/components/runs/RunRow.svelte index 27341d7743..959ee2fd06 100644 --- a/frontend/src/lib/components/runs/RunRow.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/lib/components/runs/RunRow.svelte @@ -127,6 +127,8 @@ {/if} {:else if `scheduled_for` in job && job.scheduled_for && forLater(job.scheduled_for)} Waiting executor () + {:else if 'running' in job && job.running && job.suspend} + Suspended (created ) {:else} Waiting executor () {/if} From f977f5bf8b1ac70d3afbdc8ad6fcbe072cc51ebc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ruben Fiszel Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2026 09:41:15 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 07/16] fix: stand the WAC park down for a cancel that beat it to the row (#10990) * fix: stand the WAC park down for a cancel that beat it to the row Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GHfNFFJh3ozZYgyyoaEepu * refactor: share the cancel result payload with canceled_job_to_result Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GHfNFFJh3ozZYgyyoaEepu --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) --- ...7cfd7ac33ac2616d9f68ab4cb62da105cae57.json | 25 ------ ...d3413ad3c0fbe8f3dca9aea11cb49fd4a28ef.json | 35 ++++++++ ...49bf8b3523d8dde1ef6b8f1950423830cc6ed.json | 17 ++++ backend/tests/wac_suspend_started_at.rs | 64 ++++++++++++- backend/windmill-queue/src/jobs.rs | 16 ++-- backend/windmill-worker/src/bun_executor.rs | 39 ++++++-- .../windmill-worker/src/python_executor.rs | 1 + backend/windmill-worker/src/wac_executor.rs | 90 ++++++++++++++----- 8 files changed, 220 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-5dc28b4609bff15ca4895e726c27cfd7ac33ac2616d9f68ab4cb62da105cae57.json create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-e749663a4b9248a9d120f77e86fd3413ad3c0fbe8f3dca9aea11cb49fd4a28ef.json create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-f0498c9bddc0d4d8948167f3ed849bf8b3523d8dde1ef6b8f1950423830cc6ed.json diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-5dc28b4609bff15ca4895e726c27cfd7ac33ac2616d9f68ab4cb62da105cae57.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-5dc28b4609bff15ca4895e726c27cfd7ac33ac2616d9f68ab4cb62da105cae57.json deleted file mode 100644 index a93f92c4e2..0000000000 --- a/backend/.sqlx/query-5dc28b4609bff15ca4895e726c27cfd7ac33ac2616d9f68ab4cb62da105cae57.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,25 +0,0 @@ -{ - "db_name": "PostgreSQL", - "query": "WITH prev AS (\n SELECT started_at FROM v2_job_queue WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2\n )\n UPDATE v2_job_queue q\n SET suspend = $3, suspend_until = now() + make_interval(secs => $4), started_at = null\n FROM prev\n WHERE q.id = $1 AND q.workspace_id = $2\n RETURNING (extract(epoch FROM now() - prev.started_at) * 1000)::bigint", - "describe": { - "columns": [ - { - "ordinal": 0, - "name": "int8", - "type_info": "Int8" - } - ], - "parameters": { - "Left": [ - "Uuid", - "Text", - "Int4", - "Float8" - ] - }, - "nullable": [ - null - ] - }, - "hash": "5dc28b4609bff15ca4895e726c27cfd7ac33ac2616d9f68ab4cb62da105cae57" -} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-e749663a4b9248a9d120f77e86fd3413ad3c0fbe8f3dca9aea11cb49fd4a28ef.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-e749663a4b9248a9d120f77e86fd3413ad3c0fbe8f3dca9aea11cb49fd4a28ef.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..328465fdf1 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-e749663a4b9248a9d120f77e86fd3413ad3c0fbe8f3dca9aea11cb49fd4a28ef.json @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "SELECT canceled_by, canceled_reason,\n (extract(epoch FROM now() - started_at) * 1000)::bigint AS segment_ms\n FROM v2_job_queue WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2 FOR UPDATE", + "describe": { + "columns": [ + { + "ordinal": 0, + "name": "canceled_by", + "type_info": "Varchar" + }, + { + "ordinal": 1, + "name": "canceled_reason", + "type_info": "Text" + }, + { + "ordinal": 2, + "name": "segment_ms", + "type_info": "Int8" + } + ], + "parameters": { + "Left": [ + "Uuid", + "Text" + ] + }, + "nullable": [ + true, + true, + null + ] + }, + "hash": "e749663a4b9248a9d120f77e86fd3413ad3c0fbe8f3dca9aea11cb49fd4a28ef" +} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-f0498c9bddc0d4d8948167f3ed849bf8b3523d8dde1ef6b8f1950423830cc6ed.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-f0498c9bddc0d4d8948167f3ed849bf8b3523d8dde1ef6b8f1950423830cc6ed.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5f86fb97d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-f0498c9bddc0d4d8948167f3ed849bf8b3523d8dde1ef6b8f1950423830cc6ed.json @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "UPDATE v2_job_queue\n SET suspend = $3, suspend_until = now() + make_interval(secs => $4), started_at = null\n WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2", + "describe": { + "columns": [], + "parameters": { + "Left": [ + "Uuid", + "Text", + "Int4", + "Float8" + ] + }, + "nullable": [] + }, + "hash": "f0498c9bddc0d4d8948167f3ed849bf8b3523d8dde1ef6b8f1950423830cc6ed" +} diff --git a/backend/tests/wac_suspend_started_at.rs b/backend/tests/wac_suspend_started_at.rs index f374a25220..5a83730d24 100644 --- a/backend/tests/wac_suspend_started_at.rs +++ b/backend/tests/wac_suspend_started_at.rs @@ -1,9 +1,10 @@ -//! Guards the two things `suspend_wac_parent` promises: the `started_at` invariant -//! documented on it, and the segment length it hands back for metering. +//! Guards what `suspend_wac_parent` promises: the `started_at` invariant documented on +//! it, the segment length it hands back for metering, and that it stands down for a +//! cancel already on the row. use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres}; use uuid::Uuid; -use windmill_worker::wac_executor::suspend_wac_parent; +use windmill_worker::wac_executor::{suspend_wac_parent, WacPark}; #[sqlx::test] async fn wac_suspend_clears_started_at(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { @@ -17,7 +18,11 @@ async fn wac_suspend_clears_started_at(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> .await?; let mut tx = db.begin().await?; - let segment_ms = suspend_wac_parent(&mut tx, &job_id, "test-workspace", 1, 3600.0).await?; + let WacPark::Parked(segment_ms) = + suspend_wac_parent(&mut tx, &job_id, "test-workspace", 1, 3600.0).await? + else { + panic!("an uncancelled parent must park"); + }; tx.commit().await?; // The segment is what gets billed, so it must be the run that just ended, measured @@ -53,3 +58,54 @@ async fn wac_suspend_clears_started_at(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> Ok(()) } + +/// A soft cancel sets `canceled_by` and `suspend = 0` and leaves acting on it to the next +/// pull. Parking over that holds the row until `suspend_until` — a whole day on a +/// `sleep(86400)` — so the park has to stand down and let the job complete instead. +#[sqlx::test] +async fn wac_suspend_stands_down_for_a_cancel(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + let job_id = Uuid::new_v4(); + sqlx::query( + "INSERT INTO v2_job_queue \ + (id, workspace_id, scheduled_for, running, started_at, suspend, canceled_by, canceled_reason) \ + VALUES ($1, 'test-workspace', now(), true, now() - interval '30 seconds', 0, 'alice', 'no longer needed')", + ) + .bind(job_id) + .execute(&db) + .await?; + + let mut tx = db.begin().await?; + let parked = suspend_wac_parent(&mut tx, &job_id, "test-workspace", 1, 86400.0).await?; + tx.commit().await?; + + match &parked { + WacPark::Cancelled(cancel) => { + assert_eq!(cancel.username.as_deref(), Some("alice")); + assert_eq!(cancel.reason.as_deref(), Some("no longer needed")); + } + other => panic!("a cancelled parent must not park, got {other:?}"), + } + + let (suspend, suspend_until, started_at): ( + i32, + Option>, + Option>, + ) = sqlx::query_as( + "SELECT suspend, suspend_until, started_at FROM v2_job_queue WHERE id = $1", + ) + .bind(job_id) + .fetch_one(&db) + .await?; + + assert_eq!(suspend, 0, "the cancel's suspend = 0 must survive"); + assert_eq!( + suspend_until, None, + "a suspend_until would hold the row back for the whole park window" + ); + assert!( + started_at.is_some(), + "the segment ran, so its start must stay for the completion's duration" + ); + + Ok(()) +} diff --git a/backend/windmill-queue/src/jobs.rs b/backend/windmill-queue/src/jobs.rs index d7f847a73d..5bb9a1120f 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-queue/src/jobs.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-queue/src/jobs.rs @@ -7308,15 +7308,19 @@ async fn check_workspace_queue_cap<'c>( // Ok(()) // } -pub fn canceled_job_to_result(job: &MiniPulledJob) -> serde_json::Value { - let reason = job - .canceled_reason - .as_deref() - .unwrap_or_else(|| "no reason given"); - let canceler = job.canceled_by.as_deref().unwrap_or_else(|| "unknown"); +/// The result payload a job cancelled anywhere carries. Callers that hold the cancel +/// outside a `MiniPulledJob` — a row read after the pull, say — go through this rather +/// than rebuilding the shape. +pub fn canceled_result(reason: Option<&str>, canceler: Option<&str>) -> serde_json::Value { + let reason = reason.unwrap_or("no reason given"); + let canceler = canceler.unwrap_or("unknown"); serde_json::json!({"message": format!("Job canceled: {reason} by {canceler}"), "name": "Canceled", "reason": reason, "canceler": canceler}) } +pub fn canceled_job_to_result(job: &MiniPulledJob) -> serde_json::Value { + canceled_result(job.canceled_reason.as_deref(), job.canceled_by.as_deref()) +} + /// Helper function to create a restarted module for branch/iteration restart fn create_restarted_module( module: &FlowStatusModule, diff --git a/backend/windmill-worker/src/bun_executor.rs b/backend/windmill-worker/src/bun_executor.rs index ac1eebe723..7c112f5985 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-worker/src/bun_executor.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-worker/src/bun_executor.rs @@ -2572,7 +2572,8 @@ try {{ // WAC v2 post-execution: parse output and handle dispatch/suspend if is_wac_v2 { - return handle_wac_v2_output(result, job, conn, modules, new_args.as_ref()).await; + return handle_wac_v2_output(result, job, conn, canceled_by, modules, new_args.as_ref()) + .await; } Ok(result) @@ -2602,11 +2603,13 @@ pub async fn handle_wac_v2_output( result: Box, job: &MiniPulledJob, conn: &Connection, + canceled_by: &mut Option, modules: &Option>, preprocessed_args: Option<&HashMap>>, ) -> error::Result> { use crate::wac_executor::{ - load_checkpoint, parse_wac_output, update_checkpoint_for_dispatch, WacOutput, + load_checkpoint, parse_wac_output, update_checkpoint_for_dispatch, + wac_cancelled_mid_segment, WacOutput, WacPark, }; use serde_json::Value; use windmill_common::get_latest_flow_version_info_for_path; @@ -2874,14 +2877,22 @@ pub async fn handle_wac_v2_output( // Suspend parent before children become visible, so a child that // completes immediately finds a parked parent to decrement. - segment_ms = crate::wac_executor::suspend_wac_parent( + match crate::wac_executor::suspend_wac_parent( &mut tx, &job.id, &job.workspace_id, num_steps as i32, 14.0 * 24.0 * 3600.0, ) - .await?; + .await? + { + WacPark::Parked(ms) => segment_ms = ms, + // Returning here drops `tx`, unwriting the checkpoint and the timeline + // entries, so no child is ever pushed against a parent that never parked. + WacPark::Cancelled(cancel) => { + return Err(wac_cancelled_mid_segment(cancel, canceled_by)) + } + } tx.commit().await?; } @@ -3362,14 +3373,20 @@ pub async fn handle_wac_v2_output( } // Suspend parent with suspend=1 (waiting for 1 approval event) - let segment_ms = crate::wac_executor::suspend_wac_parent( + let segment_ms = match crate::wac_executor::suspend_wac_parent( &mut tx, &job.id, &job.workspace_id, 1, timeout_secs, ) - .await?; + .await? + { + WacPark::Parked(ms) => ms, + WacPark::Cancelled(cancel) => { + return Err(wac_cancelled_mid_segment(cancel, canceled_by)) + } + }; tx.commit().await?; crate::wac_executor::end_wac_segment(conn, job, segment_ms); @@ -3458,14 +3475,20 @@ pub async fn handle_wac_v2_output( // Use suspend=1 (not 0) so the suspended pull query only picks it up // when `suspend_until <= now()`, not via `suspend <= 0`. - let segment_ms = crate::wac_executor::suspend_wac_parent( + let segment_ms = match crate::wac_executor::suspend_wac_parent( &mut tx, &job.id, &job.workspace_id, 1, sleep_secs, ) - .await?; + .await? + { + WacPark::Parked(ms) => ms, + WacPark::Cancelled(cancel) => { + return Err(wac_cancelled_mid_segment(cancel, canceled_by)) + } + }; tx.commit().await?; crate::wac_executor::end_wac_segment(conn, job, segment_ms); diff --git a/backend/windmill-worker/src/python_executor.rs b/backend/windmill-worker/src/python_executor.rs index 883b035a32..38fb4bca32 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-worker/src/python_executor.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-worker/src/python_executor.rs @@ -1223,6 +1223,7 @@ mount {{ result, job, conn, + canceled_by, modules, new_args.as_ref(), )) diff --git a/backend/windmill-worker/src/wac_executor.rs b/backend/windmill-worker/src/wac_executor.rs index 1402c7aed9..cecf0e316c 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-worker/src/wac_executor.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-worker/src/wac_executor.rs @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ use uuid::Uuid; use windmill_common::error::{self, Error}; use windmill_common::scripts::ScriptLang; use windmill_common::DB; +use windmill_queue::CanceledBy; // Checkpoint model + persistence primitives live in windmill-common so the // API server can use them without pulling in the full worker crate. Re-export @@ -86,6 +87,16 @@ fn default_dispatch_type() -> String { "inline".to_string() } +/// What `suspend_wac_parent` did with the parent's queue row. +#[derive(Debug)] +pub enum WacPark { + /// Parked. Carries the segment that just ended, in milliseconds, for `end_wac_segment`. + Parked(Option), + /// A cancel reached the row while this segment was running, so the park was skipped. + /// Carries who cancelled, for the completion that must happen instead. + Cancelled(CanceledBy), +} + /// Park a WAC v2 parent in the queue until `suspend` reaches 0 or `suspend_secs` /// elapses, whichever comes first. `running` stays true so the normal pull query /// skips the row; only the suspended pull query takes it back. The `id`/`workspace_id` @@ -97,45 +108,76 @@ fn default_dispatch_type() -> String { /// completes a job without a worker-measured duration — a cancel, the child-failure /// handler — falls back to `now() - started_at`. Left pointing at the first segment, /// that fallback reports the whole sleep or approval wait as execution time. -/// -/// Returns the segment that just ended, in milliseconds, for the caller to hand to -/// `end_wac_segment`. pub async fn suspend_wac_parent( tx: &mut Transaction<'_, Postgres>, job_id: &Uuid, w_id: &str, suspend: i32, suspend_secs: f64, -) -> error::Result> { - // `prev` holds the pre-update row: RETURNING sees the new one, where `started_at` - // has already been cleared. - let parked = sqlx::query_scalar!( - "WITH prev AS ( - SELECT started_at FROM v2_job_queue WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2 - ) - UPDATE v2_job_queue q +) -> error::Result { + // `FOR UPDATE` orders this against a concurrent soft cancel, which writes `suspend = 0` + // and leaves acting on `canceled_by` to the next pull. Parking on top of that keeps the + // row unpullable until `suspend_until` — up to the full `sleep()` — so a cancel already + // on the row has to stand the park down rather than be overwritten by it. + let prev = sqlx::query!( + "SELECT canceled_by, canceled_reason, + (extract(epoch FROM now() - started_at) * 1000)::bigint AS segment_ms + FROM v2_job_queue WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2 FOR UPDATE", + job_id, + w_id, + ) + .fetch_optional(&mut **tx) + .await + .map_err(|e| Error::internal_err(format!("Failed to read WAC parent job {job_id}: {e}")))? + // Silently parking nothing is unrecoverable on the dispatch arm: the children are + // pushed right after and decrement a `suspend` that was never set, so the parent + // sits out its whole suspend window instead of resuming. + .ok_or_else(|| { + Error::internal_err(format!( + "WAC parent job {job_id} not in the queue of workspace {w_id} to suspend" + )) + })?; + + if let Some(username) = prev.canceled_by { + return Ok(WacPark::Cancelled(CanceledBy { + username: Some(username), + reason: prev.canceled_reason, + })); + } + + sqlx::query!( + "UPDATE v2_job_queue SET suspend = $3, suspend_until = now() + make_interval(secs => $4), started_at = null - FROM prev - WHERE q.id = $1 AND q.workspace_id = $2 - RETURNING (extract(epoch FROM now() - prev.started_at) * 1000)::bigint", + WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2", job_id, w_id, suspend, suspend_secs, ) - .fetch_optional(&mut **tx) + .execute(&mut **tx) .await .map_err(|e| Error::internal_err(format!("Failed to suspend WAC parent job {job_id}: {e}")))?; - // Silently parking nothing is unrecoverable on the dispatch arm: the children are - // pushed right after and decrement a `suspend` that was never set, so the parent - // sits out its whole suspend window instead of resuming. - match parked { - Some(segment_ms) => Ok(segment_ms), - None => Err(Error::internal_err(format!( - "WAC parent job {job_id} not in the queue of workspace {w_id} to suspend" - ))), - } + Ok(WacPark::Parked(prev.segment_ms)) +} + +/// Turn a cancel that landed mid-segment into the error the executor returns, so the job +/// completes on this pass instead of parking. Setting the worker's `canceled_by` is what +/// makes it land as `canceled` rather than `failure`: the row was cancelled after this +/// worker pulled the job, so the in-memory copy still reads as uncancelled. +/// +/// The completion charges the segment that just ended, so callers must not also hand it to +/// `end_wac_segment`. +pub(crate) fn wac_cancelled_mid_segment( + cancel: CanceledBy, + canceled_by: &mut Option, +) -> Error { + let payload = windmill_common::worker::to_raw_value(&windmill_queue::canceled_result( + cancel.reason.as_deref(), + cancel.username.as_deref(), + )); + *canceled_by = Some(cancel); + Error::ExecutionRawError(payload) } /// Charge the execution segment a WAC parent just finished. Segments are metered as they From 8aab5034a68a4aafb264b0e86d000ef58f4a8511 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ruben Fiszel Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2026 10:23:37 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 08/16] feat: guest JWT entry for embedded apps (#10954) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit * feat: guest JWT entry for embedded apps (jwt_guest_) A second way in for a guest, alongside the signed-in guest session: a JWT the embedding customer's backend mints and signs, verified per request against a per-workspace key (a PEM public key or a JWKS URL), resolving to the same seatless guest identity confined to the one app its app_path claim names. Bearer prefix jwt_guest_, stateless (no token row). See PR #10954. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 * feat: surface guest JWT as the embed method in the app deploy drawer The deploy drawer explained the secret-URL embed but not the guest JWT path, so the primary way to embed an app for a customer's own authenticated users was undiscoverable. For a guest-mode app with guests enabled, show how to mint a `jwt_guest_` token and append `guest.` to the app URL, with a copyable iframe template pre-filled with this app's workspace_id and app_path, and a note that new guest emails are refused past the instance's free allowance (the live count is shown just above). Also log a guest JWT allowance refusal at warn, not info: the caller gets a bare 401 (the reason must not leak to an unauthenticated caller), so the log is the admin's signal that the instance hit its guest cap. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 * fix: correct the guest JWT minting instructions in the embed block The block said "sign it with the workspace's guest JWT key", but that setting holds the public verification key. Clarify the keypair relationship (configure the public key or a JWKS URL in the workspace; sign with the matching private key), name the accepted algorithms (RS/PS/ES; HS* refused), and keep the required claims, so an embedder knows how to actually mint the token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 * feat: fall back to the instance JWT issuer for guest verification (off on cloud) A workspace with no guest key of its own now verifies guest JWTs against the instance issuer (JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL, already used by jwt_ext_), so an operator running one issuer configures it once. Verification and the guest grant are CE; granting a full login from that issuer stays EE (jwt_ext_, unchanged). Disabled under CLOUD_HOSTED, where one instance issuer must not be trusted to mint guests in every tenant's workspace — there the per-workspace key is the only source, which also stays the override everywhere. The workspace settings note (hidden on cloud) explains the fallback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 * fix: embed instructions cover both the workspace key and instance issuer The embed block said to set the workspace's guest JWT key; now it says Windmill verifies against the workspace key or, off cloud, the instance issuer (JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL) when no workspace key is set. The instance clause is hidden under isCloudHosted(). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 * fix: show the guest JWT embed block only when Embed is toggled It belongs with the iframe snippet, not the plain-URL view, so gate it on embedMode alongside the guest-mode / guests-enabled checks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 * fix: trust the instance issuer in the guest fallback; refresh stale docs P1 (CI review): the fallback wrapped JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL as a workspace JwksUrl, so it hit validate_guest_jwks_url and was refused for http/private issuers unless ALLOW_PRIVATE_GUEST_JWKS_URLS was also set — a self-hosted internal issuer that works for jwt_ext_ failed for guests, though the UI says setting the env var is enough. fetch_jwks now fetches the instance issuer without the https/private restriction (matching the jwt_ext_ loader; it stays operator-trusted), while a workspace-admin URL is validated and pinned as before. All the size/key/URL bounds still apply to both. P2 (CI review): refresh the stale docs that said a missing workspace key always refuses a guest JWT — the module, bearer, key-source, and EditGuestJwtKey field docs now describe the workspace key with the off-cloud instance-issuer fallback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 * fix: fetch the trusted instance issuer like the jwt_ext_ loader P1 (CI review): the instance-issuer fetch skipped SSRF validation but still disabled redirects and default cert validation, so an instance issuer that works for jwt_ext_ through a redirect or an operator-approved self-signed cert failed the guest fallback. Fetch it with HTTP_CLIENT_PERMISSIVE (follows redirects, honors ACCEPT_INVALID_CERTS) — the same behavior jwt_ext_ has — while a workspace-admin URL stays validated, DNS-pinned and redirect-free. The body size cap still bounds both. P2 (CI review): the WorkspaceSettings field doc still said None/None means no JWT guests; it now names the off-cloud instance-issuer fallback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 * docs: schema summary + OpenAPI cover the guest JWT columns and fallback P2 (CI review): summarized_schema.txt was missing guest_activity.jwt_entry and the two workspace_settings guest-JWT key columns (required by docs/validation.md after a schema change). The edit_guest_jwt_key OpenAPI description now notes that clearing the workspace key falls back to the instance issuer (JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL) off cloud rather than necessarily stopping guest JWTs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 * fix: keep JWKS single-flight locks in a self-cleaning map, not a bounded cache P1 (CI review): JWKS_FETCH_LOCKS was a 200-entry quick_cache. Past 200 cold URLs it can evict a lock whose fetch is still in flight; the next request for that URL then mints a fresh lock and starts a second fetch, so cycling configured workspaces defeats single-flight and can storm the issuers. Replace it with a plain map guarded by a JwksFetchLock RAII handle that removes each entry once its last holder drops, so the map only ever holds the fetches in flight and never evicts an in-flight lock. Add a unit test pinning the shared-lock and self-cleaning invariants. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 * chore: update ee-repo-ref to c2270eb5fe2d9f0968253e6b460c33186363f4e7 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #773 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 5a1d9dee34159512c0823fddcd3d096490edbcce New ee-repo-ref: c2270eb5fe2d9f0968253e6b460c33186363f4e7 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] --- ...e0e9ac63fc8756aeafac8d279841db117eac.json} | 14 +- ...938a298bfe29afe1fd7111340252877f8b86c.json | 23 + ...27c7ae2ef5f27d665ad9018f5cdea0f6f2cb1.json | 15 + ...450390addbfae85fecc61c991d94167e6e99.json} | 18 +- ...3e3620111119abf8dda4bde5b835ff934e4f1.json | 15 - ...59da15843f466c72159bf76712b124d7554b6.json | 28 + ...f420b03fd23304f78c382d6de14cb31bcd6b1.json | 16 + backend/Cargo.lock | 3 + backend/Cargo.toml | 3 + backend/ee-repo-ref.txt | 2 +- .../20260903071242_guest_jwt_entry.down.sql | 5 + .../20260903071242_guest_jwt_entry.up.sql | 15 + backend/summarized_schema.txt | 4 +- backend/tests/app_guest_execution_mode.rs | 19 +- backend/tests/app_guest_jwt_allowance.rs | 128 +++ backend/tests/app_guest_jwt_entry.rs | 494 ++++++++ backend/tests/postgres_trigger_scope.rs | 1 + backend/tests/trigger_listener_queries.rs | 1 + backend/tests/wm_token_confinement.rs | 1 + .../tests/dbt_pinned_graph.rs | 1 + backend/windmill-api-auth/src/auth.rs | 247 ++++ backend/windmill-api-auth/src/lib.rs | 7 + backend/windmill-api-auth/src/scopes.rs | 27 + .../tests/native_triggers.rs | 1 + backend/windmill-api-users/src/users.rs | 44 +- .../windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs | 77 +- .../src/workspaces_extra.rs | 2 +- backend/windmill-api/openapi.yaml | 43 + backend/windmill-api/src/apps.rs | 32 +- backend/windmill-api/src/jobs.rs | 1 + backend/windmill-api/src/lib.rs | 1 + backend/windmill-api/src/mcp/utils.rs | 1 + backend/windmill-common/Cargo.toml | 2 + backend/windmill-common/src/guest_jwt.rs | 1008 +++++++++++++++++ backend/windmill-common/src/lib.rs | 1 + backend/windmill-common/src/ssrf.rs | 38 + backend/windmill-common/src/users.rs | 23 + .../apps/editor/AppEditorHeaderDeploy.svelte | 40 +- .../(logged)/workspace_settings/+page.svelte | 111 +- frontend/src/routes/a/[...path]/+page.svelte | 42 +- .../[workspace]/[...secret]/+page.svelte | 25 +- 41 files changed, 2469 insertions(+), 110 deletions(-) rename backend/.sqlx/{query-8b28332dd5b3932dfdaa9fcb2e3eb6b9c48ec164b05b149b3477351df7a1bd60.json => query-06af616fe4fc61a3b0dcd996a2a1e0e9ac63fc8756aeafac8d279841db117eac.json} (55%) create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-0fc900f73ef119e4c89186cf120938a298bfe29afe1fd7111340252877f8b86c.json create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-77d599e4f7c574dffac4824f37127c7ae2ef5f27d665ad9018f5cdea0f6f2cb1.json rename backend/.sqlx/{query-00a61afc5faa3826c283660417ff1f8a93060fe062a0b727f164329ab56387a2.json => query-dc4a57df3becc610f631ef22c116450390addbfae85fecc61c991d94167e6e99.json} (89%) delete mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-e2eee8de61337b7d093f38e3e393e3620111119abf8dda4bde5b835ff934e4f1.json create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-f6fe63ef3518d2d1f321c2941bc59da15843f466c72159bf76712b124d7554b6.json create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-fbee9545c564f6fd611ca1a122cf420b03fd23304f78c382d6de14cb31bcd6b1.json create mode 100644 backend/migrations/20260903071242_guest_jwt_entry.down.sql create mode 100644 backend/migrations/20260903071242_guest_jwt_entry.up.sql create mode 100644 backend/tests/app_guest_jwt_allowance.rs create mode 100644 backend/tests/app_guest_jwt_entry.rs create mode 100644 backend/windmill-common/src/guest_jwt.rs diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-8b28332dd5b3932dfdaa9fcb2e3eb6b9c48ec164b05b149b3477351df7a1bd60.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-06af616fe4fc61a3b0dcd996a2a1e0e9ac63fc8756aeafac8d279841db117eac.json similarity index 55% rename from backend/.sqlx/query-8b28332dd5b3932dfdaa9fcb2e3eb6b9c48ec164b05b149b3477351df7a1bd60.json rename to backend/.sqlx/query-06af616fe4fc61a3b0dcd996a2a1e0e9ac63fc8756aeafac8d279841db117eac.json index 8533137a2c..843207dad7 100644 --- a/backend/.sqlx/query-8b28332dd5b3932dfdaa9fcb2e3eb6b9c48ec164b05b149b3477351df7a1bd60.json +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-06af616fe4fc61a3b0dcd996a2a1e0e9ac63fc8756aeafac8d279841db117eac.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "db_name": "PostgreSQL", - "query": "\n SELECT\n (SELECT MIN(day) FROM guest_activity) AS since,\n (SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT email) FROM guest_activity\n WHERE day > CURRENT_DATE - 30)::INT AS \"guest_count!\",\n (SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT workspace_id) FROM guest_activity\n WHERE day > CURRENT_DATE - 30)::INT AS \"guest_workspace_count!\",\n (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM workspace_settings ws JOIN workspace w ON w.id = ws.workspace_id\n WHERE ws.guest_access_enabled AND NOT w.deleted)::INT AS \"guest_enabled_workspace_count!\",\n (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM workspace WHERE NOT deleted)::INT AS \"workspace_count!\"\n ", + "query": "\n SELECT\n (SELECT MIN(day) FROM guest_activity) AS since,\n (SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT email) FROM guest_activity\n WHERE day > CURRENT_DATE - 30)::INT AS \"guest_count!\",\n (SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT email) FROM guest_activity\n WHERE jwt_entry AND day > CURRENT_DATE - 30)::INT AS \"guest_jwt_count!\",\n (SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT workspace_id) FROM guest_activity\n WHERE day > CURRENT_DATE - 30)::INT AS \"guest_workspace_count!\",\n (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM workspace_settings ws JOIN workspace w ON w.id = ws.workspace_id\n WHERE ws.guest_access_enabled AND NOT w.deleted)::INT AS \"guest_enabled_workspace_count!\",\n (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM workspace WHERE NOT deleted)::INT AS \"workspace_count!\"\n ", "describe": { "columns": [ { @@ -15,16 +15,21 @@ }, { "ordinal": 2, - "name": "guest_workspace_count!", + "name": "guest_jwt_count!", "type_info": "Int4" }, { "ordinal": 3, - "name": "guest_enabled_workspace_count!", + "name": "guest_workspace_count!", "type_info": "Int4" }, { "ordinal": 4, + "name": "guest_enabled_workspace_count!", + "type_info": "Int4" + }, + { + "ordinal": 5, "name": "workspace_count!", "type_info": "Int4" } @@ -37,8 +42,9 @@ null, null, null, + null, null ] }, - "hash": "8b28332dd5b3932dfdaa9fcb2e3eb6b9c48ec164b05b149b3477351df7a1bd60" + "hash": "06af616fe4fc61a3b0dcd996a2a1e0e9ac63fc8756aeafac8d279841db117eac" } diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-0fc900f73ef119e4c89186cf120938a298bfe29afe1fd7111340252877f8b86c.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-0fc900f73ef119e4c89186cf120938a298bfe29afe1fd7111340252877f8b86c.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..abdea8c942 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-0fc900f73ef119e4c89186cf120938a298bfe29afe1fd7111340252877f8b86c.json @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "INSERT INTO guest_activity (email, workspace_id, day, jwt_entry)\n VALUES ($1, $2, CURRENT_DATE, true)\n ON CONFLICT (email, workspace_id, day)\n DO UPDATE SET jwt_entry = true, last_seen_at = now()\n WHERE NOT guest_activity.jwt_entry\n RETURNING 1 AS \"audited!\"", + "describe": { + "columns": [ + { + "ordinal": 0, + "name": "audited!", + "type_info": "Int4" + } + ], + "parameters": { + "Left": [ + "Varchar", + "Varchar" + ] + }, + "nullable": [ + null + ] + }, + "hash": "0fc900f73ef119e4c89186cf120938a298bfe29afe1fd7111340252877f8b86c" +} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-77d599e4f7c574dffac4824f37127c7ae2ef5f27d665ad9018f5cdea0f6f2cb1.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-77d599e4f7c574dffac4824f37127c7ae2ef5f27d665ad9018f5cdea0f6f2cb1.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f504d7a809 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-77d599e4f7c574dffac4824f37127c7ae2ef5f27d665ad9018f5cdea0f6f2cb1.json @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url) SELECT $1, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $2", + "describe": { + "columns": [], + "parameters": { + "Left": [ + "Varchar", + "Text" + ] + }, + "nullable": [] + }, + "hash": "77d599e4f7c574dffac4824f37127c7ae2ef5f27d665ad9018f5cdea0f6f2cb1" +} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-00a61afc5faa3826c283660417ff1f8a93060fe062a0b727f164329ab56387a2.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-dc4a57df3becc610f631ef22c116450390addbfae85fecc61c991d94167e6e99.json similarity index 89% rename from backend/.sqlx/query-00a61afc5faa3826c283660417ff1f8a93060fe062a0b727f164329ab56387a2.json rename to backend/.sqlx/query-dc4a57df3becc610f631ef22c116450390addbfae85fecc61c991d94167e6e99.json index a6a2b0c00a..01c0fd19af 100644 --- a/backend/.sqlx/query-00a61afc5faa3826c283660417ff1f8a93060fe062a0b727f164329ab56387a2.json +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-dc4a57df3becc610f631ef22c116450390addbfae85fecc61c991d94167e6e99.json @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { "db_name": "PostgreSQL", - "query": "\n SELECT\n workspace_id,\n slack_team_id,\n teams_team_id,\n teams_team_name,\n teams_team_guid,\n slack_name,\n slack_command_script,\n teams_command_script,\n slack_email,\n slack_oauth_client_id,\n slack_oauth_client_secret,\n customer_id,\n plan,\n webhook,\n ai_config,\n dbt_warehouses,\n large_file_storage,\n datatable,\n ducklake,\n git_sync,\n deploy_ui,\n default_app,\n default_scripts,\n mute_critical_alerts,\n color,\n operator_settings,\n git_app_installations,\n auto_invite,\n error_handler,\n success_handler,\n public_app_execution_limit_per_minute,\n error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts,\n guest_access_enabled\n FROM\n workspace_settings\n WHERE\n workspace_id = $1\n ", + "query": "\n SELECT\n workspace_id,\n slack_team_id,\n teams_team_id,\n teams_team_name,\n teams_team_guid,\n slack_name,\n slack_command_script,\n teams_command_script,\n slack_email,\n slack_oauth_client_id,\n slack_oauth_client_secret,\n customer_id,\n plan,\n webhook,\n ai_config,\n dbt_warehouses,\n large_file_storage,\n datatable,\n ducklake,\n git_sync,\n deploy_ui,\n default_app,\n default_scripts,\n mute_critical_alerts,\n color,\n operator_settings,\n git_app_installations,\n auto_invite,\n error_handler,\n success_handler,\n public_app_execution_limit_per_minute,\n error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts,\n guest_access_enabled,\n guest_jwt_public_key,\n guest_jwt_jwks_url\n FROM\n workspace_settings\n WHERE\n workspace_id = $1\n ", "describe": { "columns": [ { @@ -167,6 +167,16 @@ "ordinal": 32, "name": "guest_access_enabled", "type_info": "Bool" + }, + { + "ordinal": 33, + "name": "guest_jwt_public_key", + "type_info": "Text" + }, + { + "ordinal": 34, + "name": "guest_jwt_jwks_url", + "type_info": "Text" } ], "parameters": { @@ -207,8 +217,10 @@ true, true, false, - false + false, + true, + true ] }, - "hash": "00a61afc5faa3826c283660417ff1f8a93060fe062a0b727f164329ab56387a2" + "hash": "dc4a57df3becc610f631ef22c116450390addbfae85fecc61c991d94167e6e99" } diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-e2eee8de61337b7d093f38e3e393e3620111119abf8dda4bde5b835ff934e4f1.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-e2eee8de61337b7d093f38e3e393e3620111119abf8dda4bde5b835ff934e4f1.json deleted file mode 100644 index 4d49d34d10..0000000000 --- a/backend/.sqlx/query-e2eee8de61337b7d093f38e3e393e3620111119abf8dda4bde5b835ff934e4f1.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -{ - "db_name": "PostgreSQL", - "query": "INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled) SELECT $1, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $2", - "describe": { - "columns": [], - "parameters": { - "Left": [ - "Varchar", - "Text" - ] - }, - "nullable": [] - }, - "hash": "e2eee8de61337b7d093f38e3e393e3620111119abf8dda4bde5b835ff934e4f1" -} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-f6fe63ef3518d2d1f321c2941bc59da15843f466c72159bf76712b124d7554b6.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-f6fe63ef3518d2d1f321c2941bc59da15843f466c72159bf76712b124d7554b6.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d9b9aabf58 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-f6fe63ef3518d2d1f321c2941bc59da15843f466c72159bf76712b124d7554b6.json @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "SELECT guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $1", + "describe": { + "columns": [ + { + "ordinal": 0, + "name": "guest_jwt_public_key", + "type_info": "Text" + }, + { + "ordinal": 1, + "name": "guest_jwt_jwks_url", + "type_info": "Text" + } + ], + "parameters": { + "Left": [ + "Text" + ] + }, + "nullable": [ + true, + true + ] + }, + "hash": "f6fe63ef3518d2d1f321c2941bc59da15843f466c72159bf76712b124d7554b6" +} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-fbee9545c564f6fd611ca1a122cf420b03fd23304f78c382d6de14cb31bcd6b1.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-fbee9545c564f6fd611ca1a122cf420b03fd23304f78c382d6de14cb31bcd6b1.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..20b5c53392 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-fbee9545c564f6fd611ca1a122cf420b03fd23304f78c382d6de14cb31bcd6b1.json @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "UPDATE workspace_settings SET guest_jwt_public_key = $1, guest_jwt_jwks_url = $2 WHERE workspace_id = $3", + "describe": { + "columns": [], + "parameters": { + "Left": [ + "Text", + "Text", + "Text" + ] + }, + "nullable": [] + }, + "hash": "fbee9545c564f6fd611ca1a122cf420b03fd23304f78c382d6de14cb31bcd6b1" +} diff --git a/backend/Cargo.lock b/backend/Cargo.lock index fc66ec630d..9678fbe993 100644 --- a/backend/Cargo.lock +++ b/backend/Cargo.lock @@ -14764,6 +14764,7 @@ dependencies = [ "git-version", "hex", "hmac", + "jsonwebtoken 8.3.0", "lazy_static", "once_cell", "opentelemetry 0.30.0", @@ -15601,6 +15602,7 @@ dependencies = [ "pep440_rs", "phf 0.11.3", "pin-project-lite", + "pkcs1", "postgres-native-tls 0.5.3", "prometheus", "quick_cache", @@ -15617,6 +15619,7 @@ dependencies = [ "serde_yml", "sha2 0.10.9", "size", + "spki", "sqlx", "strum", "strum_macros", diff --git a/backend/Cargo.toml b/backend/Cargo.toml index 4fcfcdad6e..8c6b6038b7 100644 --- a/backend/Cargo.toml +++ b/backend/Cargo.toml @@ -367,6 +367,7 @@ aws-config.workspace = true aws-credential-types.workspace = true hmac.workspace = true hex.workspace = true +jsonwebtoken = { workspace = true } [workspace.dependencies] @@ -599,6 +600,8 @@ const_format = { version = "0.2.35", features = ["rust_1_64", "rust_1_51"] } const-str = "0.5" constant_time_eq = "0.3.1" rsa = "^0" +spki = { version = "0.7", features = ["pem"] } +pkcs1 = "0.7" aes-gcm = "0.10.3" async_zip = { version = "0.0.17", features = ["tokio", "tokio-fs", "deflate", "chrono"] } once_cell = "1.17.1" diff --git a/backend/ee-repo-ref.txt b/backend/ee-repo-ref.txt index a7825f4ee7..a07d475cb9 100644 --- a/backend/ee-repo-ref.txt +++ b/backend/ee-repo-ref.txt @@ -1 +1 @@ -fb1c5c109846d6c47aff70ab6cc631f4fd773678 +c2270eb5fe2d9f0968253e6b460c33186363f4e7 diff --git a/backend/migrations/20260903071242_guest_jwt_entry.down.sql b/backend/migrations/20260903071242_guest_jwt_entry.down.sql new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f3e758819b --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/migrations/20260903071242_guest_jwt_entry.down.sql @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +ALTER TABLE guest_activity DROP COLUMN jwt_entry; +ALTER TABLE workspace_settings + DROP CONSTRAINT workspace_settings_guest_jwt_one_key, + DROP COLUMN guest_jwt_public_key, + DROP COLUMN guest_jwt_jwks_url; diff --git a/backend/migrations/20260903071242_guest_jwt_entry.up.sql b/backend/migrations/20260903071242_guest_jwt_entry.up.sql new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0cc449f539 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/migrations/20260903071242_guest_jwt_entry.up.sql @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +-- A second way in for a guest: a JWT minted by the embedding customer's own backend and +-- verified against a key the workspace admin configured. One key shape per workspace, +-- a PEM public key or a JWKS URL, never both: a token is verified against exactly one +-- source, and two would make "which one refused it" undiagnosable. +ALTER TABLE workspace_settings + ADD COLUMN guest_jwt_public_key TEXT, + ADD COLUMN guest_jwt_jwks_url TEXT, + ADD CONSTRAINT workspace_settings_guest_jwt_one_key + CHECK (guest_jwt_public_key IS NULL OR guest_jwt_jwks_url IS NULL); + +-- Whether the guest came in on a JWT that day (as opposed to, or as well as, an +-- identity-provider sign-in). The seat telemetry reports the two entries apart, since +-- an app-only user routed through a guest JWT is one that `jwt_ext_` would have counted. +ALTER TABLE guest_activity + ADD COLUMN jwt_entry BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false; diff --git a/backend/summarized_schema.txt b/backend/summarized_schema.txt index fe889705e4..61f8a66f85 100644 --- a/backend/summarized_schema.txt +++ b/backend/summarized_schema.txt @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ folder_permission_history: id(bigint), workspace_id(char), folder_name(char), ch FK: (workspace_id, folder_name) -> folder(workspace_id, name) gcp_trigger: gcp_resource_path(char), topic_id(char), subscription_id(char), delivery_type(delivery_mode), delivery_config(jsonb), path(char), script_path(char), is_flow(bool), workspace_id(char), edited_by(char), email(char), edited_at(ts), extra_perms(jsonb), server_id(char), last_server_ping(ts), error(text), subscription_mode(gcp_subscription_mode), error_handler_path(char), error_handler_args(jsonb), retry(jsonb), auto_acknowledge_msg(bool), ack_deadline(int), mode(trigger_mode), labels(text[]) global_settings: name(char), value(jsonb), updated_at(ts) -guest_activity: email(char), workspace_id(char), day(date), last_seen_at(timestamptz) +guest_activity: email(char), workspace_id(char), day(date), last_seen_at(timestamptz), jwt_entry(bool) group_: workspace_id(char), name(char), summary(text), extra_perms(jsonb) FK: (workspace_id) -> workspace(id) group_permission_history: id(bigint), workspace_id(char), group_name(char), changed_by(char), changed_at(ts), change_type(char), member_affected(char) @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ workspace_protection_rule: workspace_id(char), name(char), rules(int), bypass_gr FK: (workspace_id) -> workspace(id) workspace_runnable_dependencies: flow_path(char), runnable_path(char), script_hash(bigint), runnable_is_flow(bool), workspace_id(char), app_path(char) FK: (app_path, workspace_id) -> app(path, workspace_id) | (flow_path, workspace_id) -> flow(path, workspace_id) -workspace_settings: workspace_id(char), slack_team_id(char), slack_name(char), slack_command_script(char), slack_email(char), customer_id(char), plan(char), webhook(text), ai_config(jsonb), large_file_storage(jsonb), git_sync(jsonb), default_app(char), default_scripts(jsonb), deploy_ui(jsonb), mute_critical_alerts(bool), color(char), operator_settings(jsonb), teams_command_script(text), teams_team_id(text), teams_team_name(text), git_app_installations(jsonb), ducklake(jsonb), slack_oauth_client_id(char), slack_oauth_client_secret(char), datatable(jsonb), teams_team_guid(text), auto_invite(jsonb), error_handler(jsonb), success_handler(jsonb), public_app_execution_limit_per_minute(int), dbt_warehouses(jsonb), guest_access_enabled(bool) +workspace_settings: workspace_id(char), slack_team_id(char), slack_name(char), slack_command_script(char), slack_email(char), customer_id(char), plan(char), webhook(text), ai_config(jsonb), large_file_storage(jsonb), git_sync(jsonb), default_app(char), default_scripts(jsonb), deploy_ui(jsonb), mute_critical_alerts(bool), color(char), operator_settings(jsonb), teams_command_script(text), teams_team_id(text), teams_team_name(text), git_app_installations(jsonb), ducklake(jsonb), slack_oauth_client_id(char), slack_oauth_client_secret(char), datatable(jsonb), teams_team_guid(text), auto_invite(jsonb), error_handler(jsonb), success_handler(jsonb), public_app_execution_limit_per_minute(int), dbt_warehouses(jsonb), guest_access_enabled(bool), guest_jwt_public_key(text), guest_jwt_jwks_url(text) FK: (workspace_id) -> workspace(id) zombie_job_counter: job_id(uuid), counter(int) FK: (job_id) -> v2_job(id) diff --git a/backend/tests/app_guest_execution_mode.rs b/backend/tests/app_guest_execution_mode.rs index a47129e600..7af2e0794e 100644 --- a/backend/tests/app_guest_execution_mode.rs +++ b/backend/tests/app_guest_execution_mode.rs @@ -614,8 +614,8 @@ async fn guests_mode_needs_a_scopable_path(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result Ok(()) } -/// Renaming a workspace copies its settings; the guest switch must travel with them, -/// or the rename silently shuts every guest app of the workspace. +/// Renaming a workspace copies its settings; the guest switch and the guest JWT key must +/// travel with them, or the rename silently shuts every guest app or drops the key. #[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] async fn a_workspace_rename_keeps_the_guest_switch(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { initialize_tracing().await; @@ -629,6 +629,11 @@ async fn a_workspace_rename_keeps_the_guest_switch(db: Pool) -> anyhow ) .execute(&db) .await?; + sqlx::query( + "UPDATE workspace_settings SET guest_jwt_public_key = 'test-pem-key' WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace'", + ) + .execute(&db) + .await?; let resp = authed( client().post(format!( "http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace/workspaces/change_workspace_id" @@ -645,6 +650,16 @@ async fn a_workspace_rename_keeps_the_guest_switch(db: Pool) -> anyhow .fetch_one(&db) .await?; assert!(enabled, "the guest switch travels with the workspace"); + let jwt_key: Option = sqlx::query_scalar( + "SELECT guest_jwt_public_key FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace-2'", + ) + .fetch_one(&db) + .await?; + assert_eq!( + jwt_key.as_deref(), + Some("test-pem-key"), + "the guest JWT key travels with the workspace" + ); let moved: bool = sqlx::query_scalar( "SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM guest_activity WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace-2') AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM guest_activity WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace')", diff --git a/backend/tests/app_guest_jwt_allowance.rs b/backend/tests/app_guest_jwt_allowance.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..85cb51d39e --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/tests/app_guest_jwt_allowance.rs @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +//! The guest allowance reached through a guest JWT (`jwt_guest_`). Its own binary +//! because `set_plan` flips a process-global license key, which a test sharing the +//! process could not tolerate (see `app_guest_allowance.rs`). +//! +//! Users from the `base` fixture: +//! test-user (admin, token SECRET_TOKEN) + +use serde_json::json; +use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres}; +use windmill_common::workspaces::FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW; +use windmill_test_utils::*; + +const ADMIN_TOKEN: &str = "SECRET_TOKEN"; +const APP_PATH: &str = "u/test-user/guest_app"; + +fn client() -> reqwest::Client { + reqwest::Client::new() +} + +fn authed(builder: reqwest::RequestBuilder, token: &str) -> reqwest::RequestBuilder { + builder.header("Authorization", format!("Bearer {}", token)) +} + +/// Community and Pro are capped, Enterprise is metered. Only a build with both +/// `private` and `enterprise` can meter; every other build is capped whatever this says. +fn set_plan(pro: bool) { + #[cfg(feature = "private")] + windmill_common::ee::LICENSE_KEY_ID.store(std::sync::Arc::new( + if pro { "test_pro" } else { "" }.to_string(), + )); + let _ = pro; +} + +const JWT_PUB: &str = "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEzAfqyCh34iYOCW0vg4ejq/zzJlzL\nSZScjnVyPjLGTapEwo4gc6/y1Yudd/v54wKh0OdfTfzAKMPWx/2NWx/ugg==\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n"; +const JWT_PRIV: &str = "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgu27S2DbSwUh8BmQb\n/i4/VhNdoXV7PJekhnoceMULYLihRANCAATMB+rIKHfiJg4JbS+Dh6Or/PMmXMtJ\nlJyOdXI+MsZNqkTCjiBzr/LVi513+/njAqHQ519N/MAow9bH/Y1bH+6C\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n"; + +fn guest_jwt(email: &str) -> String { + use jsonwebtoken::{encode, Algorithm, EncodingKey, Header}; + let exp = std::time::SystemTime::now() + .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH) + .unwrap() + .as_secs() + + 3600; + let claims = json!({ + "email": email, + "workspace_id": "test-workspace", + "app_path": APP_PATH, + "exp": exp, + }); + let jwt = encode( + &Header::new(Algorithm::ES256), + &claims, + &EncodingKey::from_ec_pem(JWT_PRIV.as_bytes()).unwrap(), + ) + .unwrap(); + format!("jwt_guest_{jwt}") +} + +/// A JWT guest is subject to the same allowance as a signed-in one. Past the cap on a +/// capped instance, a stranger's JWT is refused (the auth arm returns 401; the visitor +/// message is only logged, since the arm cannot carry it), while a guest already in the +/// window is let back in. +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn a_guest_jwt_is_capped_like_a_signed_in_guest(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace"); + + authed( + client().post(format!("{ws}/workspaces/edit_guest_access")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ "guest_access_enabled": true })) + .send() + .await?; + let resp = authed( + client().post(format!("{ws}/workspaces/edit_guest_jwt_key")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ "public_key": JWT_PUB })) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200, "{}", resp.text().await?); + let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/create")), ADMIN_TOKEN) + .json(&json!({ + "path": APP_PATH, + "summary": "Guest app", + "value": {}, + "policy": { "execution_mode": "guest", "triggerables_v2": {} } + })) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?); + // The whole allowance, used today (g1..gN). + sqlx::query( + "INSERT INTO guest_activity (email, workspace_id, day) + SELECT 'g' || i || '@example.com', 'test-workspace', CURRENT_DATE + FROM generate_series(1, $1) AS i", + ) + .bind(FREE_GUESTS_PER_WINDOW) + .execute(&db) + .await?; + set_plan(true); + + let resp = authed( + client().get(format!("{ws}/users/whoami")), + &guest_jwt("stranger@example.com"), + ) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 401, "a stranger's JWT is refused past the cap"); + + let resp = authed( + client().get(format!("{ws}/users/whoami")), + &guest_jwt("g1@example.com"), + ) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 200, + "a returning guest's JWT is admitted: {}", + resp.text().await? + ); + + Ok(()) +} diff --git a/backend/tests/app_guest_jwt_entry.rs b/backend/tests/app_guest_jwt_entry.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7b84130a04 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/tests/app_guest_jwt_entry.rs @@ -0,0 +1,494 @@ +//! Tests for the guest JWT entry: a guest that enters through a JWT the embedding +//! customer's own backend mints and signs, with no identity-provider round-trip. +//! +//! The key is a per-workspace setting (a PEM public key here), and the token is +//! verified per request against it. A JWT guest is the same identity as a signed-in +//! guest: no `usr` row, no `password` row, no seat, confined to the one app its +//! `app_path` names. These tests pin what a token must carry to be honoured, and the +//! refusals that keep the door narrow: wrong workspace, wrong key, expired, a +//! symmetric algorithm, an email that already has an account, an app not in guest +//! mode, and the workspace switch off. +//! +//! The keys are fixed test vectors (EC P-256, PKCS8), so signing is deterministic and +//! needs no key generation at runtime. + +// Built with these like the sibling guest-execution suite: the guest run executes as +// the publisher through EE on-behalf-of code. CI builds with them. +#![cfg(all(feature = "enterprise", feature = "private"))] + +use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH}; + +use jsonwebtoken::{encode, Algorithm, EncodingKey, Header}; +use serde::Serialize; +use serde_json::json; +use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres}; +use windmill_test_utils::*; + +const ADMIN_TOKEN: &str = "SECRET_TOKEN"; +const APP_PATH: &str = "u/test-user/guest_app"; +const GUEST_EMAIL: &str = "guest@example.com"; + +// A P-256 keypair the workspace verifies against (PUB1), and a second private key +// (PRIV2) that it does not, for the wrong-key refusal. +const PRIV1: &str = "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgu27S2DbSwUh8BmQb\n/i4/VhNdoXV7PJekhnoceMULYLihRANCAATMB+rIKHfiJg4JbS+Dh6Or/PMmXMtJ\nlJyOdXI+MsZNqkTCjiBzr/LVi513+/njAqHQ519N/MAow9bH/Y1bH+6C\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n"; +const PUB1: &str = "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEzAfqyCh34iYOCW0vg4ejq/zzJlzL\nSZScjnVyPjLGTapEwo4gc6/y1Yudd/v54wKh0OdfTfzAKMPWx/2NWx/ugg==\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n"; +const PRIV2: &str = "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgjyhWYyI2+z5zTT0B\neI9EuJJ7v0tcNXhvHrq9y2AG1LihRANCAAS40dEdO+tTffhGt4YQv0dStkd6VcWN\n+CHI9QqZAHAJMsNS3Ld+sZe2M6Of0CNR300QJtfp4UIdEVbXBCIxL1D0\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n"; + +fn client() -> reqwest::Client { + reqwest::Client::new() +} + +fn authed(builder: reqwest::RequestBuilder, token: &str) -> reqwest::RequestBuilder { + builder.header("Authorization", format!("Bearer {token}")) +} + +fn now() -> u64 { + SystemTime::now() + .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH) + .unwrap() + .as_secs() +} + +#[derive(Serialize)] +struct Claims { + email: String, + workspace_id: String, + app_path: String, + exp: u64, + #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] + nbf: Option, + #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] + iat: Option, +} + +impl Claims { + fn valid() -> Self { + Claims { + email: GUEST_EMAIL.to_string(), + workspace_id: "test-workspace".to_string(), + app_path: APP_PATH.to_string(), + exp: now() + 3600, + nbf: None, + iat: None, + } + } +} + +/// Sign as a bearer (`jwt_guest_`). `priv_pem`/`alg` let a test sign with the +/// wrong key or a refused algorithm. +fn bearer(claims: &Claims, priv_pem: &str, alg: Algorithm) -> String { + let key = match alg { + Algorithm::HS256 => EncodingKey::from_secret(b"a-shared-secret"), + _ => EncodingKey::from_ec_pem(priv_pem.as_bytes()).unwrap(), + }; + let jwt = encode(&Header::new(alg), claims, &key).unwrap(); + format!("jwt_guest_{jwt}") +} + +async fn enable_guests(port: u16, ws: &str, on: bool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + let resp = authed( + client().post(format!( + "http://localhost:{port}/api/w/{ws}/workspaces/edit_guest_access" + )), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ "guest_access_enabled": on })) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200, "{}", resp.text().await?); + Ok(()) +} + +async fn set_guest_jwt_pem(port: u16, ws: &str, pem: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + let resp = authed( + client().post(format!( + "http://localhost:{port}/api/w/{ws}/workspaces/edit_guest_jwt_key" + )), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ "public_key": pem })) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200, "{}", resp.text().await?); + Ok(()) +} + +fn app(path: &str, execution_mode: &str, sandbox: bool) -> serde_json::Value { + json!({ + "path": path, + "summary": "App", + "value": {}, + "policy": { + "execution_mode": execution_mode, + "sandbox": sandbox, + "triggerables_v2": { + "script/u/test-user/noop": { "static_inputs": {}, "one_of_inputs": {} } + } + } + }) +} + +async fn create_app(port: u16, ws: &str, v: serde_json::Value) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + let resp = authed( + client().post(format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/{ws}/apps/create")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&v) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?); + Ok(()) +} + +fn whoami(port: u16, ws: &str, token: &str) -> reqwest::RequestBuilder { + authed( + client().get(format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/{ws}/users/whoami")), + token, + ) +} + +/// A valid guest JWT opens its app, runs a component as the publisher, reads the run +/// back, reports `role: guest`, and leaves exactly one `guest_activity` row however +/// many requests it makes. +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn a_valid_guest_jwt_opens_its_app(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = "test-workspace"; + + enable_guests(port, ws, true).await?; + set_guest_jwt_pem(port, ws, PUB1).await?; + let resp = authed( + client().post(format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/{ws}/scripts/create")), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .json(&json!({ + "path": "u/test-user/noop", + "summary": "", + "description": "", + "content": "echo 42", + "language": "bash", + })) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?); + create_app(port, ws, app(APP_PATH, "guest", false)).await?; + + // A distinct email: the activity write is deduplicated by a process-global cache + // keyed on email, workspace and day, and other tests in this binary share the + // guest email, so the count below is only this test's if its email is its own. + let mut claims = Claims::valid(); + claims.email = "activity-guest@example.com".to_string(); + let token = bearer(&claims, PRIV1, Algorithm::ES256); + + let resp = whoami(port, ws, &token).send().await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200, "guest JWT must authenticate"); + let me: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await?; + assert_eq!(me["role"], json!("guest"), "must read as a guest"); + assert_eq!(me["operator"], json!(true)); + assert_eq!(me["is_admin"], json!(false)); + + let resp = authed( + client().post(format!( + "http://localhost:{port}/api/w/{ws}/apps_u/execute_component/{APP_PATH}" + )), + &token, + ) + .json(&json!({ "component": "a", "path": "script/u/test-user/noop", "args": {} })) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200, "{}", resp.text().await?); + let job_id = resp.text().await?; + + let resp = authed( + client().get(format!( + "http://localhost:{port}/api/w/{ws}/jobs_u/getupdate/{job_id}" + )), + &token, + ) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 200, + "the guest that started the run must read it back: {}", + resp.text().await? + ); + + // Several requests, one row: the write is cached per email, workspace and day. + let count: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar( + "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM guest_activity WHERE email = $1 AND workspace_id = $2 AND jwt_entry", + ) + .bind(&claims.email) + .bind(ws) + .fetch_one(&db) + .await?; + assert_eq!(count, 1, "a JWT guest must leave exactly one activity row"); + + Ok(()) +} + +/// The refusals that keep the door narrow. Each presents a bearer on the workspace's +/// own `whoami`, which the arm reaches only after every gate, so a 401 is the arm +/// saying no rather than a handler. +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn guest_jwt_refusals(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = "test-workspace"; + + enable_guests(port, ws, true).await?; + set_guest_jwt_pem(port, ws, PUB1).await?; + create_app(port, ws, app(APP_PATH, "guest", false)).await?; + create_app(port, ws, app("u/test-user/members_app", "publisher", false)).await?; + + // Positive control: a token valid against this exact fixture is admitted. Without it a + // broken setup would 401 every bearer below and the whole suite would pass vacuously. + let control = whoami(port, ws, &bearer(&Claims::valid(), PRIV1, Algorithm::ES256)) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(control.status(), 200, "{}", control.text().await?); + + // wrong workspace: the claim must name the route's workspace. + let mut c = Claims::valid(); + c.workspace_id = "other-ws".to_string(); + let wrong_ws = bearer(&c, PRIV1, Algorithm::ES256); + + // wrong key: signed with a key the workspace does not hold. + let wrong_key = bearer(&Claims::valid(), PRIV2, Algorithm::ES256); + + // expired, past the verifier's clock-skew leeway. + let mut c = Claims::valid(); + c.exp = now() - 120; + let expired = bearer(&c, PRIV1, Algorithm::ES256); + + // a symmetric algorithm is never accepted. + let hs256 = bearer(&Claims::valid(), PRIV1, Algorithm::HS256); + + // an email that already has an account is refused, not downgraded. + let mut c = Claims::valid(); + c.email = "test@windmill.dev".to_string(); + let has_account = bearer(&c, PRIV1, Algorithm::ES256); + + // an app not in guest mode. + let mut c = Claims::valid(); + c.app_path = "u/test-user/members_app".to_string(); + let not_guest_app = bearer(&c, PRIV1, Algorithm::ES256); + + // an existing account addressed in a different case still counts as an account: + // the base fixture holds `test@windmill.dev`. + let mut c = Claims::valid(); + c.email = "Test@Windmill.Dev".to_string(); + let mixed_case_account = bearer(&c, PRIV1, Algorithm::ES256); + + // a lifetime past the 24h cap, even with a valid signature. + let mut c = Claims::valid(); + c.exp = now() + 25 * 3600; + let over_lifetime_cap = bearer(&c, PRIV1, Algorithm::ES256); + + // an email with no `@` would become the guest's username and could be read as a + // `u/` or `g/` principal; refused. + let mut c = Claims::valid(); + c.email = "group-admins".to_string(); + let group_shaped_email = bearer(&c, PRIV1, Algorithm::ES256); + + // an email longer than the `guest_activity.email` column: refused before auth, so a + // guest is never admitted without the activity row and audit event the count needs. + let mut c = Claims::valid(); + c.email = format!("{}@example.com", "a".repeat(250)); + let oversized_email = bearer(&c, PRIV1, Algorithm::ES256); + + // an app_path carrying a scope metacharacter would widen the guest's scopes. + let mut c = Claims::valid(); + c.app_path = "u/test-user/*".to_string(); + let wildcard_app_path = bearer(&c, PRIV1, Algorithm::ES256); + + // a valid, signed token past the length cap: without the cap it would deserialize into + // GuestJwtClaims (the extra claim ignored) and verify, so this pins the length check. + let mut payload = serde_json::to_value(Claims::valid()).unwrap(); + payload["padding"] = serde_json::json!("a".repeat(9000)); + let big_jwt = encode( + &Header::new(Algorithm::ES256), + &payload, + &EncodingKey::from_ec_pem(PRIV1.as_bytes()).unwrap(), + ) + .unwrap(); + let oversized_token = format!("jwt_guest_{big_jwt}"); + + // a repeated prefix must not strip down to a valid short token that verifies and is then + // cached under the full bearer key (trim_start_matches would; strip_prefix must not). + let repeated_prefix = format!( + "jwt_guest_{}", + bearer(&Claims::valid(), PRIV1, Algorithm::ES256) + ); + + for (label, token) in [ + ("wrong workspace", wrong_ws), + ("wrong key", wrong_key), + ("expired", expired), + ("HS256", hs256), + ("email with an account", has_account), + ("app not in guest mode", not_guest_app), + ("mixed-case account", mixed_case_account), + ("over the 24h lifetime cap", over_lifetime_cap), + ("group-shaped email", group_shaped_email), + ("oversized email", oversized_email), + ("wildcard app_path", wildcard_app_path), + ("oversized token", oversized_token), + ("repeated prefix", repeated_prefix), + ] { + let resp = whoami(port, ws, &token).send().await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 401, "{label} must be refused"); + } + + Ok(()) +} + +/// The workspace switch gates a JWT guest exactly as it gates a signed-in one, at the +/// auth door, so turning guests off closes the JWT entry too. +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn guest_jwt_needs_the_workspace_switch(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = "test-workspace"; + + set_guest_jwt_pem(port, ws, PUB1).await?; + create_app(port, ws, app(APP_PATH, "guest", false)).await?; + let token = bearer(&Claims::valid(), PRIV1, Algorithm::ES256); + + // Switch off (the default): refused. + let resp = whoami(port, ws, &token).send().await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 401, + "a JWT guest must be refused while guests are off" + ); + + // Switch on: through. + enable_guests(port, ws, true).await?; + let resp = whoami(port, ws, &token).send().await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 200, + "with guests on, the JWT guest is admitted" + ); + + // Off again: closed on the next request. + enable_guests(port, ws, false).await?; + let resp = whoami(port, ws, &token).send().await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 401, + "turning guests off closes the JWT guest again" + ); + + Ok(()) +} + +/// A guest JWT is pinned to the workspace its claim names, so it authenticates on no +/// workspace-less route: the arm has no workspace to check the claim against. +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn guest_jwt_rejected_on_workspaceless_route(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = "test-workspace"; + + enable_guests(port, ws, true).await?; + set_guest_jwt_pem(port, ws, PUB1).await?; + create_app(port, ws, app(APP_PATH, "guest", false)).await?; + let token = bearer(&Claims::valid(), PRIV1, Algorithm::ES256); + + let resp = authed( + client().get(format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/users/tokens/list")), + &token, + ) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!( + resp.status(), + 401, + "a guest JWT must not authenticate on a workspace-less route" + ); + + Ok(()) +} + +/// An embed token a JWT guest mints for a sandboxed app is capped at the JWT's own +/// expiry: a JWT has no token row, so the cap is carried through the auth cache. It +/// must not outlive the JWT, which is the guest's only revocation. +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn a_guest_jwt_derived_embed_token_is_capped(db: Pool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + initialize_tracing().await; + let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?; + let port = server.addr.port(); + let ws = "test-workspace"; + + enable_guests(port, ws, true).await?; + set_guest_jwt_pem(port, ws, PUB1).await?; + create_app(port, ws, app(APP_PATH, "guest", true)).await?; + let secret: String = authed( + client().get(format!( + "http://localhost:{port}/api/w/{ws}/apps/secret_of/{APP_PATH}" + )), + ADMIN_TOKEN, + ) + .send() + .await? + .text() + .await?; + + let claims = Claims::valid(); + let jwt_exp = claims.exp; + let token = bearer(&claims, PRIV1, Algorithm::ES256); + + let resp = authed( + client().get(format!( + "http://localhost:{port}/api/w/{ws}/apps_u/embed_token/{secret}" + )), + &token, + ) + .send() + .await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200, "{}", resp.text().await?); + let body: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await?; + let child_exp: chrono::DateTime = body["expiration"] + .as_str() + .and_then(|e| e.parse().ok()) + .expect("mint must return the token's expiration"); + assert!( + child_exp.timestamp() as u64 <= jwt_exp, + "the derived embed token ({child_exp}) must not outlive the JWT (exp {jwt_exp})" + ); + + // And it resolves as a guest. + let embed = body["token"].as_str().expect("mint must return a token"); + let resp = whoami(port, ws, embed).send().await?; + assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200); + let me: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await?; + assert_eq!(me["role"], json!("guest")); + + Ok(()) +} + +/// A workspace with no guest key of its own falls back to the instance issuer +/// (`JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL`), so an operator running one issuer configures it once. Verified as a +/// guest here in CE; a full login from that issuer stays EE (`jwt_ext_`). +#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))] +async fn no_workspace_key_falls_back_to_the_instance_issuer( + db: Pool, +) -> anyhow::Result<()> { + use windmill_common::guest_jwt::{key_source, GuestJwtKeySource}; + let url = "https://issuer.example.com/jwks.json"; + unsafe { std::env::set_var("JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL", url) }; + let src = key_source(&db, "test-workspace").await; + unsafe { std::env::remove_var("JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL") }; + assert!( + matches!(src?, Some(GuestJwtKeySource::JwksUrl(u)) if u == url), + "no workspace key falls back to the instance issuer" + ); + Ok(()) +} diff --git a/backend/tests/postgres_trigger_scope.rs b/backend/tests/postgres_trigger_scope.rs index e8ba36ebb9..1080138eb0 100644 --- a/backend/tests/postgres_trigger_scope.rs +++ b/backend/tests/postgres_trigger_scope.rs @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ fn scoped_authed(scopes: Vec<&str>) -> ApiAuthed { token_prefix: None, read_only: false, job_id: None, + credential_expiry: None, } } diff --git a/backend/tests/trigger_listener_queries.rs b/backend/tests/trigger_listener_queries.rs index 1463138167..0af99136e7 100644 --- a/backend/tests/trigger_listener_queries.rs +++ b/backend/tests/trigger_listener_queries.rs @@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ fn make_authed() -> windmill_api_auth::ApiAuthed { token_prefix: None, read_only: false, job_id: None, + credential_expiry: None, } } diff --git a/backend/tests/wm_token_confinement.rs b/backend/tests/wm_token_confinement.rs index 2d3f1373fe..39b86c59a1 100644 --- a/backend/tests/wm_token_confinement.rs +++ b/backend/tests/wm_token_confinement.rs @@ -1094,6 +1094,7 @@ async fn test_privilege_gates_reject_a_job_token_directly( token_prefix: None, read_only: false, job_id, + credential_expiry: None, } } diff --git a/backend/windmill-api-assets/tests/dbt_pinned_graph.rs b/backend/windmill-api-assets/tests/dbt_pinned_graph.rs index 7f4979a96f..f2bb98a46c 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api-assets/tests/dbt_pinned_graph.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api-assets/tests/dbt_pinned_graph.rs @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ fn outsider() -> ApiAuthed { token_prefix: None, read_only: false, job_id: None, + credential_expiry: None, } } diff --git a/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/auth.rs b/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/auth.rs index 0663c0b97b..6e5aa6b1da 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/auth.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/auth.rs @@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ impl AuthCache { if is_no_auth() { return Some(OptJobAuthed { authed: no_auth_admin_authed(), job_id: None }); } + // Reject an oversized guest bearer before the cache key is built from it: the key + // copies and hashes the whole token, so the cap should bound that work too. Log it + // like the other guest refusals, since get_opt_job_authed turns None into a bare 401. + if token.starts_with(windmill_common::guest_jwt::BEARER_PREFIX) + && token.len() > windmill_common::guest_jwt::MAX_GUEST_JWT_LEN + { + tracing::error!( + "guest JWT refused: bearer is longer than {} bytes", + windmill_common::guest_jwt::MAX_GUEST_JWT_LEN + ); + return None; + } let key = ( w_id.as_ref().unwrap_or(&"".to_string()).to_string(), token.to_string(), @@ -216,6 +228,111 @@ impl AuthCache { None } } + _ if token.starts_with(windmill_common::guest_jwt::BEARER_PREFIX) => { + // A workspace-less route never accepts a guest JWT: the identity is + // pinned to the workspace its claim names, like a DB guest session. + let Some(w_id) = w_id.as_deref() else { + return None; + }; + // Strip exactly one prefix: `trim_start_matches` would strip repeated prefixes, + // so `jwt_guest_jwt_guest_` would reduce to a valid token that verifies and + // is then cached under the full, non-canonical bearer key. + let jwt = token + .strip_prefix(windmill_common::guest_jwt::BEARER_PREFIX) + .unwrap_or(token); + let claims = + match windmill_common::guest_jwt::verify_for_workspace(&self.db, w_id, jwt) + .await + { + Ok(c) => c, + Err(e) => { + tracing::error!("guest JWT auth error for {w_id}: {e:#}"); + return None; + } + }; + // The workspace switch, the instance switch and the app being in guest + // mode, in one answer (guest_app_admits). The door re-reads the switches + // and the no-account rule per request through the sentinel below + // (guest_session_stands), so turning any of them off stops a cached JWT + // session on its next call. + match windmill_common::workspaces::guest_app_admits( + &self.db, + w_id, + &claims.app_path, + ) + .await + { + Ok(true) => {} + Ok(false) => return None, + Err(e) => { + tracing::error!("guest JWT admit check failed for {w_id}: {e:#}"); + return None; + } + } + // Resolve on the lowercased email: accounts are stored lowercased, so a + // mixed-case claim would otherwise slip past the no-account gate and + // resolve an account holder to a guest, and split the activity rows the + // seat count reads. + let email = claims.email.to_lowercase(); + // A guest is someone with no account at all; an account holder is refused, + // never downgraded (the same rule as the signed-in guest mint). + match windmill_common::users::has_any_account(&self.db, &email).await { + Ok(false) => {} + Ok(true) => return None, + Err(e) => { + tracing::error!("guest JWT account check failed: {e:#}"); + return None; + } + } + // The instance allowance, checked and recorded transactionally. A stranger + // past the cap on a capped instance is refused here; a returning guest + // always passes. Recording an account holder is avoided by the check above. + if !admit_and_record_guest_jwt(&self.db, w_id, &email, &claims.app_path).await { + return None; + } + // guest_session_scopes already carries the sentinel, and it is the whole + // grant; a JWT has no label, so the sentinel is what governs it. It also + // re-checks the path holds no scope metacharacter (verify already did). + let scopes = match crate::scopes::guest_session_scopes(&claims.app_path) { + Ok(s) => Some(s), + Err(e) => { + tracing::error!("guest JWT app_path cannot be scoped for {w_id}: {e:#}"); + return None; + } + }; + // The JWT's own expiry caps a token minted from this session. The auth + // cache entry itself is capped far shorter (GUEST_JWT_CACHE_TTL) so a + // rotated or cleared key stops the session on re-verification, within + // minutes, rather than only at exp (up to 24h away). + let credential_expiry = + chrono::Utc.timestamp_nanos(claims.exp as i64 * 1_000_000_000); + let cache_expiry = credential_expiry.min(chrono::Utc::now() + GUEST_JWT_CACHE_TTL); + let authed = ApiAuthed { + username: email.clone(), + email, + is_admin: false, + is_operator: true, + groups: vec![], + folders: vec![], + scopes, + username_override: None, + username_override_is_token_label: false, + is_session_token: false, + token_prefix: Some(safe_token_prefix(token)), + read_only: false, + job_id: None, + credential_expiry: Some(credential_expiry), + }; + AUTH_CACHE.insert( + key, + ExpiringAuthCache { + authed: authed.clone(), + expiry: cache_expiry, + job_id: None, + }, + ); + Some(OptJobAuthed { authed, job_id: None }) + } _ if token.starts_with("jwt_") => { let jwt_token = token.trim_start_matches("jwt_"); @@ -249,6 +366,7 @@ impl AuthCache { token_prefix: claims.audit_span, read_only: false, job_id: None, + credential_expiry: None, }; // Fail closed: a `job_id` claim that does not parse must reject // the token rather than resolve to `None`, which would clear the @@ -363,6 +481,7 @@ impl AuthCache { token_prefix: Some(safe_token_prefix(token)), read_only, job_id: None, + credential_expiry: None, }) } else { tracing::warn!( @@ -416,6 +535,7 @@ impl AuthCache { token_prefix: Some(safe_token_prefix(token)), read_only, job_id: None, + credential_expiry: None, }) } else { tracing::warn!( @@ -494,6 +614,7 @@ impl AuthCache { token_prefix: Some(safe_token_prefix(token)), read_only, job_id: None, + credential_expiry: None, }) } None if super_admin => { @@ -518,6 +639,7 @@ impl AuthCache { token_prefix: Some(safe_token_prefix(token)), read_only, job_id: None, + credential_expiry: None, }), Err(e) => { tracing::error!( @@ -555,6 +677,7 @@ impl AuthCache { token_prefix: Some(safe_token_prefix(token)), read_only, job_id: None, + credential_expiry: None, }) } None => None, @@ -574,6 +697,7 @@ impl AuthCache { token_prefix: Some(safe_token_prefix(token)), read_only, job_id: None, + credential_expiry: None, }) } } @@ -612,6 +736,7 @@ impl AuthCache { token_prefix: Some(safe_token_prefix(token)), read_only: false, job_id: None, + credential_expiry: None, }; Some(OptJobAuthed { authed, job_id: None }) } else { @@ -622,6 +747,127 @@ impl AuthCache { } } +/// How long a guest JWT resolves from the auth cache before the arm re-runs (and +/// re-reads the key). A guest JWT is not revocable except by the workspace switch or +/// by rotating the key, so the entry must be short enough that a rotated key bites +/// soon, unlike a normal token whose row can be deleted. Also what makes the +/// day-keyed activity dedupe below reachable across a midnight. +const GUEST_JWT_CACHE_TTL: chrono::Duration = chrono::Duration::minutes(5); + +/// A refused JWT (a stranger past the allowance) is remembered this long so a replayed +/// bearer does not take the instance-wide allowance advisory lock on every request. +/// Short, so a stranger admitted once the window frees is re-checked soon. +const GUEST_JWT_REFUSED_TTL: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(30); + +lazy_static::lazy_static! { + // One `guest_activity` upsert and one `users.login_guest` audit per email, + // workspace and day: the arm re-runs every GUEST_JWT_CACHE_TTL, and neither the + // seat scan nor the audit trail wants a write each time. LRU-bounded; the day is in + // the key, so a new day writes again. + static ref GUEST_JWT_ACTIVITY_CACHE: Cache = Cache::new(2000); + static ref GUEST_JWT_REFUSED_CACHE: Cache = Cache::new(2000); +} + +/// Admit a JWT guest against the instance allowance and record today's activity, in one +/// transaction so the advisory lock in `guest_admission` spans the count check and the +/// row that changes it. Returns false when the allowance refuses the email or on a DB +/// error, both of which deny the guest. Cached per email, workspace and day: a bearer +/// replayed every request runs this at most once a day, and a refused one is remembered +/// briefly so it does not re-take the allowance lock. `email` is already lowercased. +async fn admit_and_record_guest_jwt(db: &DB, w_id: &str, email: &str, app_path: &str) -> bool { + let cache_key = format!("{email}|{w_id}|{}", chrono::Utc::now().date_naive()); + if GUEST_JWT_ACTIVITY_CACHE.get(&cache_key).is_some() { + return true; + } + if GUEST_JWT_REFUSED_CACHE + .get(&cache_key) + .is_some_and(|at| at.elapsed() < GUEST_JWT_REFUSED_TTL) + { + return false; + } + let mut tx = match db.begin().await { + Ok(tx) => tx, + Err(e) => { + tracing::error!("guest JWT tx begin failed for {w_id}: {e:#}"); + return false; + } + }; + // The allowance and the row that changes it, in one transaction: guest_admission + // takes a transaction-scoped advisory lock, so the count check and the insert cannot + // race two strangers past the cap. Only a real allowance refusal is negative-cached; + // a transient DB error denies this request but must not lock the email out for 30s. + match windmill_common::workspaces::guest_admission(&mut *tx, email).await { + Ok(()) => {} + Err(e @ windmill_common::error::Error::PermissionDenied(_)) => { + // The guest hits a bare 401 (the reason must not leak to an unauthenticated caller); + // warn so an admin sees the cap in logs, since it is the actionable signal here. + tracing::warn!("guest JWT refused (guest allowance) for {w_id}: {e:#}"); + GUEST_JWT_REFUSED_CACHE.insert(cache_key, std::time::Instant::now()); + return false; + } + Err(e) => { + tracing::error!("guest JWT allowance check failed for {w_id}: {e:#}"); + return false; + } + } + // The conditional `WHERE NOT jwt_entry` flips the flag only on its false-to-true + // transition, so the upsert returns a row exactly once per email per day: on the + // fresh insert, or on the first JWT after an identity-provider sign-in created + // today's row with `jwt_entry = false`. The audit is gated on that, decided + // atomically by the conflicting tuple, so concurrent first requests (a metered + // instance takes no advisory lock) audit at most once. + let first_jwt = sqlx::query_scalar!( + r#"INSERT INTO guest_activity (email, workspace_id, day, jwt_entry) + VALUES ($1, $2, CURRENT_DATE, true) + ON CONFLICT (email, workspace_id, day) + DO UPDATE SET jwt_entry = true, last_seen_at = now() + WHERE NOT guest_activity.jwt_entry + RETURNING 1 AS "audited!""#, + email, + w_id, + ) + .fetch_optional(&mut *tx) + .await; + let first_jwt = match first_jwt { + Ok(v) => v.is_some(), + Err(e) => { + tracing::error!("recording guest JWT activity for {w_id}: {e:#}"); + return false; + } + }; + if let Err(e) = tx.commit().await { + tracing::error!("guest JWT tx commit failed for {w_id}: {e:#}"); + return false; + } + GUEST_JWT_ACTIVITY_CACHE.insert(cache_key, ()); + // Audit last, best-effort, on its own connection: the EE writer swallows an + // `audit_partitioned` failure but that failing statement still aborts the + // transaction it runs in, so auditing before the commit would let the whole + // activity row roll back while this returned success, admitting an uncounted guest. + if first_jwt { + let author = windmill_common::audit::AuditAuthor { + email: email.to_string(), + username: email.to_string(), + username_override: None, + token_prefix: None, + }; + if let Err(e) = windmill_audit::audit_oss::audit_log( + db, + &author, + "users.login_guest", + windmill_audit::ActionKind::Create, + w_id, + Some(app_path), + Some([("entry", "jwt")].into()), + ) + .await + { + tracing::error!("auditing guest JWT login for {w_id}: {e:#}"); + } + } + true +} + pub(crate) async fn extract_token(parts: &mut Parts, state: &S) -> Option { let auth_header = parts .headers @@ -822,6 +1068,7 @@ fn no_auth_admin_authed() -> ApiAuthed { token_prefix: None, read_only: false, job_id: None, + credential_expiry: None, } } diff --git a/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/lib.rs b/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/lib.rs index f2392839ba..b9edde3c6d 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/lib.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/lib.rs @@ -78,6 +78,11 @@ pub struct ApiAuthed { /// member can point at a superadmin, so it must never be trusted as a global /// superadmin (`require_super_admin`), GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr. pub job_id: Option, + /// When this credential itself expires, if it carries its own expiry rather than a + /// token row. Set for a guest JWT (its `exp`): a token minted from it is capped at + /// this, since the JWT's expiry is a guest's only revocation and there is no row to + /// look the limit up in. `None` for every credential whose limit lives in `token`. + pub credential_expiry: Option>, } impl ApiAuthed { @@ -165,6 +170,7 @@ impl From for ApiAuthed { token_prefix: value.token_prefix, read_only: false, job_id: None, + credential_expiry: None, } } } @@ -1074,6 +1080,7 @@ pub async fn fetch_api_authed_from_permissioned_as( token_prefix: authed.token_prefix, read_only: false, job_id: None, + credential_expiry: None, }; API_AUTHED_CACHE.insert( diff --git a/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/scopes.rs b/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/scopes.rs index 519d814f15..47ea12c04b 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/scopes.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api-auth/src/scopes.rs @@ -793,6 +793,33 @@ pub fn with_guest_sentinel(mut scopes: Vec) -> Vec { scopes } +/// Scopes a guest session carries. The broad-looking reads are narrowed to a route +/// allowlist by the sentinel (`guest_route_denied`), plus the two path-scoped app +/// grants. A guest has no `usr` row, so this list is the whole of what it can do. The +/// single source both the mint (a signed-in guest) and the JWT auth arm build from. +/// +/// The sentinel here only narrows. A signed-in guest is made one by the server-minted +/// label; a JWT guest has no label, so for it the sentinel is what governs. +pub fn guest_session_scopes(app_path: &str) -> windmill_common::error::Result> { + // The path is spliced into a scope, whose grammar reserves `:`, `,`, `*` and a leading + // `/`; app paths may otherwise carry spaces and `@`, so guard only those reserved chars. + if !windmill_common::auth::is_scope_literal_path(app_path) { + return Err(windmill_common::error::Error::BadRequest(format!( + "app path {app_path} is empty or cannot be scoped: `:`, `,` and `*` are reserved \ + in scopes, and a leading `/` never matches a route" + ))); + } + Ok(vec![ + GUEST_SENTINEL.to_string(), + "jobs:read".to_string(), + "resources:run".to_string(), + "users:read".to_string(), + "folders:read".to_string(), + format!("apps:read:{app_path}"), + format!("apps:run:{app_path}"), + ]) +} + /// Sentinel in raw-app SDK tokens. Grants nothing; `check_route_access` uses it /// to narrow the declared scopes to what the viewer's prompt promised. pub const RAW_APP_SDK_SENTINEL: &str = "raw_app_sdk"; diff --git a/backend/windmill-api-integration-tests/tests/native_triggers.rs b/backend/windmill-api-integration-tests/tests/native_triggers.rs index fe80e5fdf4..06c47cbb14 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api-integration-tests/tests/native_triggers.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api-integration-tests/tests/native_triggers.rs @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ fn test_authed() -> ApiAuthed { token_prefix: None, read_only: false, job_id: None, + credential_expiry: None, } } diff --git a/backend/windmill-api-users/src/users.rs b/backend/windmill-api-users/src/users.rs index bda651a8cf..afe7580055 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api-users/src/users.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api-users/src/users.rs @@ -2938,31 +2938,6 @@ lazy_static::lazy_static! { .unwrap_or(8 * 60 * 60); } -/// Scopes a guest session carries. Mirrors `APP_EMBED_SCOPES` — the same broad-looking -/// reads narrowed to a route allowlist by the sentinel (`guest_route_denied`) — plus the -/// two path-scoped app grants minted per app. With no ACL of its own, this list is the -/// whole of what a guest can do. -/// -/// The `guest` sentinel here only narrows. What makes the session a guest at all is the -/// server-minted label ([`windmill_common::auth::GUEST_SESSION_LABEL`]). -fn guest_session_scopes(app_path: &str) -> Result> { - if !windmill_common::auth::is_scope_literal_path(app_path) { - return Err(Error::BadRequest(format!( - "app path {app_path} cannot be scoped: `:`, `,` and `*` are reserved in scopes, \ - and a leading `/` never matches a route" - ))); - } - Ok(vec![ - windmill_api_auth::scopes::GUEST_SENTINEL.to_string(), - "jobs:read".to_string(), - "resources:run".to_string(), - "users:read".to_string(), - "folders:read".to_string(), - format!("apps:read:{app_path}"), - format!("apps:run:{app_path}"), - ]) -} - /// Mint a browser session for someone the identity provider authenticated who is a /// member of no workspace, so they can open one guest-mode app. Writes no `password` /// and no `usr` row: that absence is what keeps a guest off every seat counter, so @@ -2994,20 +2969,11 @@ pub async fn create_guest_session_token<'c>( } else { Some(&token) }; - let scopes = guest_session_scopes(app_path)?; + let scopes = windmill_api_auth::scopes::guest_session_scopes(app_path)?; - // No account at all (see `ExecutionMode::Guest`): a deactivated `password` row - // counts, since the sign-in path's own lookup filters on `disabled = false` and a - // SCIM-offboarded account would otherwise read as absent; so does a `usr` row in - // any workspace, which is what a service account has instead of a password. - let has_account: bool = sqlx::query_scalar( - "SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM password WHERE email = $1) - OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM usr WHERE email = $1)", - ) - .bind(email) - .fetch_one(&mut **tx) - .await?; - if has_account { + // No account at all (see `has_any_account`): an account holder is refused a guest + // session, never handed a second, cheaper identity. The same helper the JWT arm uses. + if windmill_common::users::has_any_account(&mut **tx, email).await? { return Err(Error::NotAuthorized( "an existing account cannot hold a guest session".to_string(), )); @@ -3061,7 +3027,7 @@ pub async fn create_guest_session_token<'c>( ActionKind::Create, w_id, Some(app_path), - None, + Some([("entry", "idp")].into()), ) .await?; diff --git a/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs b/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs index f8bb95fd7d..620e830a6a 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs @@ -12,10 +12,10 @@ use windmill_api_auth::{ }; use windmill_api_users::users::WorkspaceInvite; use windmill_common::email_oss::send_email_if_possible; -use windmill_dep_map::lock_hash::record_lock_hashes_for_workspace; use windmill_common::usernames::{get_instance_username_or_create_pending, VALID_USERNAME}; use windmill_common::webhook::WebhookShared; use windmill_common::{BASE_URL, DB}; +use windmill_dep_map::lock_hash::record_lock_hashes_for_workspace; use axum::{ extract::{Extension, Path, Query}, @@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ pub fn workspaced_service() -> Router { .route("/edit_deploy_ui_config", post(edit_deploy_ui_config)) .route("/edit_default_app", post(edit_default_app)) .route("/edit_guest_access", post(edit_guest_access)) + .route("/edit_guest_jwt_key", post(edit_guest_jwt_key)) .route("/guest_usage", get(get_guest_usage)) .route("/default_app", get(get_default_app)) .route( @@ -322,6 +323,14 @@ pub struct WorkspaceSettings { /// Whether this workspace admits guest sessions (`ExecutionMode::Guest`). An app's /// own `execution_mode: guest` is inert while this is off. pub guest_access_enabled: bool, + /// The key a guest JWT is verified against: a PEM public key, or a JWKS URL, at most + /// one (a DB CHECK enforces it). Public material, not a secret, so it is admin- + /// readable here. `None`/`None` falls back to the instance issuer (`JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL`) + /// off cloud, or accepts no JWT guest if none is set; `guest_access_enabled` is the switch. + #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] + pub guest_jwt_public_key: Option, + #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] + pub guest_jwt_jwks_url: Option, } /// Subset of `WorkspaceSettings` that is safe to return to any workspace @@ -1082,7 +1091,9 @@ async fn get_settings( success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, - guest_access_enabled + guest_access_enabled, + guest_jwt_public_key, + guest_jwt_jwks_url FROM workspace_settings WHERE @@ -4661,6 +4672,66 @@ async fn edit_guest_access( )) } +#[derive(Deserialize)] +struct EditGuestJwtKey { + /// A PEM public key (RS or ES family), or a JWKS URL, at most one. Both empty clears the + /// workspace key; verification then falls back to the instance issuer (`JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL`) + /// off cloud, or refuses the JWT if none is set. The off-switch is `guest_access_enabled`. + public_key: Option, + jwks_url: Option, +} + +/// Configure the key a guest JWT (`jwt_guest_`) is verified against for this workspace. +/// Workspace-admin gated, like the guest switch: guests are free up to the instance +/// allowance on any plan, so configuring their key needs no licence. The key is +/// validated before it is stored so a typo is refused here, not silently on every guest +/// later: a PEM must parse as an RS/ES public key (HS* has no PEM form and is +/// unreachable), and a JWKS URL must be fetchable and hold at least one usable signing key. +async fn edit_guest_jwt_key( + authed: ApiAuthed, + Extension(db): Extension, + Path(w_id): Path, + Json(EditGuestJwtKey { public_key, jwks_url }): Json, +) -> Result { + require_admin(authed.is_admin, &authed.username)?; + let public_key = public_key.filter(|s| !s.trim().is_empty()); + let jwks_url = jwks_url.filter(|s| !s.trim().is_empty()); + if public_key.is_some() && jwks_url.is_some() { + return Err(Error::BadRequest( + "Set a PEM public key or a JWKS URL, not both".to_string(), + )); + } + if let Some(pem) = public_key.as_deref() { + windmill_common::guest_jwt::decoding_key_from_pem(pem)?; + } + if let Some(url) = jwks_url.as_deref() { + windmill_common::guest_jwt::fetch_jwks(url).await?; + } + + let mut tx = db.begin().await?; + sqlx::query!( + "UPDATE workspace_settings SET guest_jwt_public_key = $1, guest_jwt_jwks_url = $2 WHERE workspace_id = $3", + public_key, + jwks_url, + &w_id + ) + .execute(&mut *tx) + .await?; + audit_log( + &mut *tx, + &authed, + "workspaces.edit_guest_jwt_key", + ActionKind::Update, + &w_id, + None, + None, + ) + .await?; + tx.commit().await?; + + Ok(format!("Guest JWT key updated for workspace {w_id}")) +} + async fn edit_default_scripts( authed: ApiAuthed, Extension(db): Extension, @@ -11172,6 +11243,7 @@ async fn load_workspace_authed( token_prefix: base_authed.token_prefix.clone(), read_only: base_authed.read_only, job_id: base_authed.job_id, + credential_expiry: base_authed.credential_expiry, }); }; @@ -11204,6 +11276,7 @@ async fn load_workspace_authed( token_prefix: base_authed.token_prefix.clone(), read_only: base_authed.read_only, job_id: base_authed.job_id, + credential_expiry: base_authed.credential_expiry, }) } diff --git a/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces_extra.rs b/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces_extra.rs index dfb6e49921..b2883e5f9a 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces_extra.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces_extra.rs @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn change_workspace_id( // Duplicate workspace settings (keep copy in old workspace for reference) info!("Duplicating workspace_settings table"); sqlx::query!( - "INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled) SELECT $1, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $2", + "INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url) SELECT $1, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $2", &rw.new_id, &old_id ) diff --git a/backend/windmill-api/openapi.yaml b/backend/windmill-api/openapi.yaml index a2fe3ee19b..574f1e0fda 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api/openapi.yaml +++ b/backend/windmill-api/openapi.yaml @@ -3785,6 +3785,12 @@ paths: guest_access_enabled: type: boolean description: Whether this workspace admits guest sessions. An app's own `guest` execution mode is inert while this is false. + guest_jwt_public_key: + type: string + description: PEM public key a guest JWT (`jwt_guest_`) is verified against for this workspace. Mutually exclusive with `guest_jwt_jwks_url`. + guest_jwt_jwks_url: + type: string + description: JWKS URL a guest JWT (`jwt_guest_`) is verified against for this workspace. Mutually exclusive with `guest_jwt_public_key`. /w/{workspace}/workspaces/get_deploy_to: get: @@ -5808,6 +5814,43 @@ paths: schema: type: string + /w/{workspace}/workspaces/edit_guest_jwt_key: + post: + summary: set the key guest JWTs are verified against for this workspace + description: >- + A guest JWT (`jwt_guest_`) is minted by the embedding customer's own backend and + verified against this key: a PEM public key (RS/ES family, HS* refused) or a JWKS + URL, at most one. Both empty clears the workspace key; off cloud, verification then + falls back to the instance issuer (`JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL`) if one is set, else no guest + JWT is accepted (`guest_access_enabled` is the on/off switch). Workspace-admin gated. + The key is validated before it is stored. + operationId: editGuestJwtKey + tags: + - workspace + parameters: + - $ref: "#/components/parameters/WorkspaceId" + requestBody: + description: The guest JWT verification key + required: true + content: + application/json: + schema: + type: object + properties: + public_key: + type: string + description: A PEM public key (RS or ES family). + jwks_url: + type: string + description: A JWKS URL whose keys are fetched and refreshed. + responses: + "200": + description: status + content: + text/plain: + schema: + type: string + /w/{workspace}/workspaces/guest_usage: get: summary: the instance's standing against the guest allowance diff --git a/backend/windmill-api/src/apps.rs b/backend/windmill-api/src/apps.rs index ad8799da3b..a674e6c38a 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api/src/apps.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api/src/apps.rs @@ -1520,20 +1520,24 @@ async fn guest_derived_token_constraints( if !windmill_api_auth::scopes::has_guest_sentinel(authed.scopes.as_deref()) { return Ok(None); } - // The minter is known by prefix only; MIN over a (theoretical) prefix collision is - // the conservative side. - let parent: Option>> = sqlx::query_scalar( - "SELECT MIN(expiration) FROM token WHERE token_prefix = $1 AND email = $2 AND label = $3", - ) - .bind(authed.token_prefix.as_deref().unwrap_or("")) - .bind(&authed.email) - .bind(windmill_common::auth::GUEST_SESSION_LABEL) - .fetch_optional(db) - .await?; - let Some(parent_exp) = parent.flatten() else { - return Err(Error::NotAuthorized( - "guest session not found or has no expiry".to_string(), - )); + // A guest JWT carries its own expiry and has no token row to look up; a signed-in + // guest session is a row found by prefix (MIN is the conservative side of a + // theoretical prefix collision). Either way the derived token caps on it, never on + // a fresh interval. + let parent_exp = if let Some(exp) = authed.credential_expiry { + exp + } else { + let parent: Option>> = sqlx::query_scalar( + "SELECT MIN(expiration) FROM token WHERE token_prefix = $1 AND email = $2 AND label = $3", + ) + .bind(authed.token_prefix.as_deref().unwrap_or("")) + .bind(&authed.email) + .bind(windmill_common::auth::GUEST_SESSION_LABEL) + .fetch_optional(db) + .await?; + parent.flatten().ok_or_else(|| { + Error::NotAuthorized("guest session not found or has no expiry".to_string()) + })? }; Ok(Some(( windmill_common::auth::GUEST_SESSION_LABEL.to_string(), diff --git a/backend/windmill-api/src/jobs.rs b/backend/windmill-api/src/jobs.rs index 8b1dfe18d6..dbf33cdddc 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api/src/jobs.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api/src/jobs.rs @@ -11716,6 +11716,7 @@ mod approval_view_gate_tests { token_prefix: None, read_only: false, job_id: None, + credential_expiry: None, } } diff --git a/backend/windmill-api/src/lib.rs b/backend/windmill-api/src/lib.rs index 054af0f2fa..4ba60428c9 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api/src/lib.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api/src/lib.rs @@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ async fn inject_agent_authed( token_prefix: None, read_only: false, job_id: None, + credential_expiry: None, }, job_id: None, }); diff --git a/backend/windmill-api/src/mcp/utils.rs b/backend/windmill-api/src/mcp/utils.rs index 65c8069b85..ce5cb478cf 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api/src/mcp/utils.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api/src/mcp/utils.rs @@ -1421,6 +1421,7 @@ mod tests { token_prefix: None, read_only: false, job_id, + credential_expiry: None, } } diff --git a/backend/windmill-common/Cargo.toml b/backend/windmill-common/Cargo.toml index e2c3233183..dcf3465a94 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-common/Cargo.toml +++ b/backend/windmill-common/Cargo.toml @@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ pep440_rs.workspace = true systemstat.workspace = true size.workspace = true rsa = { workspace = true, optional = true } +spki = { workspace = true } +pkcs1 = { workspace = true } aes-gcm = { workspace = true, optional = true } semver.workspace = true diff --git a/backend/windmill-common/src/guest_jwt.rs b/backend/windmill-common/src/guest_jwt.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fe05bec6b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/windmill-common/src/guest_jwt.rs @@ -0,0 +1,1008 @@ +//! The guest JWT contract: what a token minted by an embedding customer's own backend +//! must carry to open one guest-mode app, and how it is verified against the workspace's +//! configured key (or, off cloud, the instance issuer). Deliberately narrower than the external JWT scheme +//! (`jwt_ext_`), whose claims can assert admin, groups and folders: a guest key can +//! only ever mint guests, whatever the token says. + +use std::collections::HashMap; +use std::sync::Arc; +use std::time::{Duration, Instant}; + +use jsonwebtoken::{ + jwk::{AlgorithmParameters, Jwk, PublicKeyUse}, + Algorithm, DecodingKey, Validation, +}; +use quick_cache::sync::Cache; +use serde::Deserialize; + +use crate::error::{Error, Result}; +use crate::DB; + +/// A token is honoured at most this long past its issue, however far its `exp` lies: +/// a guest's expiry is its only revocation, and a long-lived token minted by mistake +/// would otherwise stay valid until it leaked. +pub const MAX_LIFETIME_SECS: u64 = 24 * 60 * 60; + +/// Bearer prefix. Stateless: no `token` row. Verified against the workspace's key (or, off +/// cloud, the instance issuer when the workspace set none) and resolved in the auth cache, +/// whose entry is short-lived (not the token's full `exp`) so a rotated key revokes within +/// minutes. See the arm in `windmill-api-auth`. +pub const BEARER_PREFIX: &str = "jwt_guest_"; + +const RSA_ALGORITHMS: [Algorithm; 6] = [ + Algorithm::RS256, + Algorithm::RS384, + Algorithm::RS512, + Algorithm::PS256, + Algorithm::PS384, + Algorithm::PS512, +]; +const EC_ALGORITHMS: [Algorithm; 2] = [Algorithm::ES256, Algorithm::ES384]; + +/// Every claim honoured. Extra claims are ignored; a missing one refuses the token. +/// `app_path` is mandatory: a token opens that one app, exactly as a signed-in guest +/// session does. +#[derive(Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct GuestJwtClaims { + pub email: String, + pub workspace_id: String, + pub app_path: String, + pub exp: u64, + pub nbf: Option, + pub iat: Option, +} + +/// How a guest JWT is verified: the workspace's configured key (a PEM public key or a JWKS +/// URL), or, off cloud, the instance issuer (`JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL`) when the workspace set none — +/// see `key_source`. When neither is set the JWT is refused whatever it carries. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum GuestJwtKeySource { + Pem(String), + JwksUrl(String), +} + +/// The instance-wide external JWT issuer (`JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL`, also used by `jwt_ext_`). Read +/// fresh rather than cached so it is testable and picks up config regardless of init order. +fn instance_ext_jwks_url() -> Option { + std::env::var("JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL") + .ok() + .filter(|s| !s.trim().is_empty()) +} + +pub async fn key_source(db: &DB, w_id: &str) -> Result> { + let row = sqlx::query!( + "SELECT guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $1", + w_id + ) + .fetch_optional(db) + .await + .map_err(|e| Error::internal_err(format!("reading guest JWT key of {w_id}: {e:#}")))?; + let per_workspace = row.and_then(|r| match (r.guest_jwt_public_key, r.guest_jwt_jwks_url) { + (Some(pem), _) => Some(GuestJwtKeySource::Pem(pem)), + (None, Some(url)) => Some(GuestJwtKeySource::JwksUrl(url)), + (None, None) => None, + }); + if per_workspace.is_some() { + return Ok(per_workspace); + } + // No workspace key: fall back to the instance issuer, so an operator running one issuer for + // both `jwt_ext_` and guests configures it once. Verifying it (and granting a *guest*) is + // done here in CE; granting a full login from it stays EE (`jwt_ext_`). Not on the shared + // cloud, where one instance issuer must not be trusted to mint guests in every tenant's + // workspace — there the per-workspace key is the only source. + if !*crate::worker::CLOUD_HOSTED { + if let Some(url) = instance_ext_jwks_url() { + return Ok(Some(GuestJwtKeySource::JwksUrl(url))); + } + } + Ok(None) +} + +/// Parse a PEM public key and the algorithms it may verify: RSA keys the RS/PS family, +/// EC keys the ES family. Anything symmetric has no PEM form, so HS* is unreachable +/// from here by construction; the JWKS path refuses it explicitly. +pub fn decoding_key_from_pem(pem: &str) -> Result<(DecodingKey, &'static [Algorithm])> { + use base64::{engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, Engine}; + use spki::der::Decode; + // The key is admin-set into an unbounded `TEXT` column and reparsed on every guest-JWT + // request; a well-formed key with an oversized modulus would pass the checks below. Refuse + // one larger than any real public key before decoding or storing it. Measure the untrimmed + // input: the endpoint stores what the admin sent, so whitespace padding counts too. + if pem.len() > MAX_GUEST_PEM_LEN { + return Err(Error::BadRequest(format!( + "guest key is longer than {MAX_GUEST_PEM_LEN} bytes" + ))); + } + let pem = pem.trim(); + // A verification key must be public. jsonwebtoken 8.3 keys the public/private distinction + // off the PEM label alone and never inspects the DER, so private material relabelled + // `PUBLIC KEY` would be stored and then served back through the settings response. Decode + // the body leniently, as jsonwebtoken does (tolerating any wrapping the strict RFC 7468 + // decoder would refuse), then require it to be a public-key structure: an SPKI (RSA or EC) + // or a PKCS#1 RSA public key. Private-key DER satisfies neither. + let der = STANDARD + .decode( + pem.lines() + .filter(|l| !l.trim_start().starts_with("-----")) + .flat_map(|l| l.split_whitespace()) + .collect::(), + ) + .map_err(|e| Error::BadRequest(format!("guest key is not valid PEM: {e}")))?; + let is_public = spki::SubjectPublicKeyInfoRef::from_der(&der).is_ok() + || pkcs1::RsaPublicKey::from_der(&der).is_ok(); + if !is_public { + return Err(Error::BadRequest( + "expected an RSA or EC public key in PEM form (-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----)".to_string(), + )); + } + if let Ok(key) = DecodingKey::from_rsa_pem(pem.as_bytes()) { + return Ok((key, &RSA_ALGORITHMS)); + } + if let Ok(key) = DecodingKey::from_ec_pem(pem.as_bytes()) { + return Ok((key, &EC_ALGORITHMS)); + } + Err(Error::BadRequest( + "not an RSA or EC public key in PEM form (expected -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----)".to_string(), + )) +} + +/// The algorithms a JWKS key may verify, or `None` if the key is unusable here: a +/// symmetric key (HS*, a shared secret the embedder would then have to hold), an +/// unsupported family, or a key not marked for signatures. A key that names its `alg` +/// pins that one; an RSA key that omits it accepts the whole RSA family, and an EC key +/// the algorithm its curve implies, mirroring how a PEM key is accepted. +pub fn jwk_algorithms(jwk: &Jwk) -> Option> { + if jwk.common.public_key_use.is_some() + && jwk.common.public_key_use != Some(PublicKeyUse::Signature) + { + return None; + } + // A key that lists its operations must allow verifying signatures; otherwise it is + // published for something else (encryption, key wrapping) and is not ours to use. + if jwk + .common + .key_operations + .as_ref() + .is_some_and(|ops| !ops.contains(&jsonwebtoken::jwk::KeyOperations::Verify)) + { + return None; + } + match (&jwk.algorithm, jwk.common.algorithm) { + (AlgorithmParameters::RSA(_), Some(alg)) if RSA_ALGORITHMS.contains(&alg) => { + Some(vec![alg]) + } + (AlgorithmParameters::RSA(_), None) => Some(RSA_ALGORITHMS.to_vec()), + (AlgorithmParameters::EllipticCurve(_), Some(alg)) if EC_ALGORITHMS.contains(&alg) => { + Some(vec![alg]) + } + (AlgorithmParameters::EllipticCurve(p), None) => match p.curve { + jsonwebtoken::jwk::EllipticCurve::P256 => Some(vec![Algorithm::ES256]), + jsonwebtoken::jwk::EllipticCurve::P384 => Some(vec![Algorithm::ES384]), + _ => None, + }, + _ => None, + } +} + +/// Verify `token` against `key`, honouring only the accepted `algorithms`, and check +/// every claim rule that needs no database: signature, `exp` (mandatory), `nbf` and +/// `iat` when present, the lifetime cap, that the token names `w_id`, that `email` is a +/// valid address bounded to 254 bytes, and that `app_path` carries no scope metacharacter. +pub fn verify( + token: &str, + key: &DecodingKey, + algorithms: &[Algorithm], + w_id: &str, +) -> Result { + let mut validation = Validation::new(algorithms[0]); + validation.algorithms = algorithms.to_vec(); + validation.validate_nbf = true; + let claims = jsonwebtoken::decode::(token, key, &validation) + .map_err(|e| Error::NotAuthorized(format!("guest JWT refused: {e}")))? + .claims; + let now = jsonwebtoken::get_current_timestamp(); + if claims.exp > now + MAX_LIFETIME_SECS { + return Err(Error::NotAuthorized(format!( + "guest JWT refused: exp is more than {MAX_LIFETIME_SECS} seconds ahead" + ))); + } + if let Some(iat) = claims.iat { + if iat > now + validation.leeway { + return Err(Error::NotAuthorized( + "guest JWT refused: iat is in the future".to_string(), + )); + } + if claims.exp.saturating_sub(iat) > MAX_LIFETIME_SECS { + return Err(Error::NotAuthorized(format!( + "guest JWT refused: lifetime exceeds {MAX_LIFETIME_SECS} seconds" + ))); + } + } + if claims.workspace_id != w_id { + return Err(Error::NotAuthorized( + "guest JWT refused: workspace_id does not match the workspace".to_string(), + )); + } + // The email becomes the guest's username; require the address shape the `usr` table + // accepts (`VALID_EMAIL`), so it always carries an `@` and `username_to_permissioned_as` + // can only ever read it as its own principal, never a `u/` or `g/`. + // Bound it to fit the `guest_activity.email` column: a longer one fails that insert + // while the guest is admitted uncounted. + if !crate::users::VALID_EMAIL.is_match(&claims.email) || claims.email.len() > 254 { + return Err(Error::NotAuthorized( + "guest JWT refused: email is not a valid, bounded email address".to_string(), + )); + } + // The app path is spliced into `apps:read:` and `apps:run:` scopes, whose + // grammar reserves `:`, `,`, `*` and a leading `/`; refuse those, the same guard + // `guest_session_scopes` applies at the mint. App paths may carry spaces and `@`. + if !crate::auth::is_scope_literal_path(&claims.app_path) { + return Err(Error::NotAuthorized( + "guest JWT refused: app_path is empty or cannot be scoped (`:`, `,`, `*` are \ + reserved and a leading `/` never matches a route)" + .to_string(), + )); + } + Ok(claims) +} + +struct JwksEntry { + keys: Arc>, + /// When this entry stops being served and the next request refetches. A good fetch + /// is served for `JWKS_TTL`, a failed one for `JWKS_NEGATIVE_TTL` (serving the last + /// good keys if there are any), so an unreachable issuer cannot be turned into one + /// outbound fetch per request by unauthenticated traffic. + expires_at: Instant, + /// When these keys were last fetched successfully. Stale keys are served only within + /// `JWKS_MAX_STALE` of this, and a stale re-serve preserves it, so a revoked `kid` or an + /// unreachable issuer stops minting new guest JWTs after a bounded window, not forever. + fetched_at: Instant, +} + +lazy_static::lazy_static! { + static ref JWKS_CACHE: Cache> = Cache::new(200); + /// Per-URL fetch lock: only one refresh per URL is in flight at a time, so a cold + /// or stale entry under a burst triggers one fetch, not one per request. This is a + /// plain map, not a capacity-bounded `Cache`: a `Cache` could evict a lock whose fetch + /// is still running, and the next request for that URL would then mint a fresh lock and + /// start a duplicate fetch, so cycling past 200 cold URLs could defeat single-flight and + /// storm the issuers. `JwksFetchLock` drops each entry once its last holder is gone, so + /// the map only ever holds the fetches in flight (bounded by concurrent distinct URLs). + static ref JWKS_FETCH_LOCKS: std::sync::Mutex>>> = + std::sync::Mutex::new(HashMap::new()); +} + +/// How long a good key set is served before a refresh; also the lag before a +/// rotated-in `kid` is picked up. The cadence of the instance-level external JWKS. +const JWKS_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(15 * 60); +/// How long a failed fetch is remembered before retrying, so an unreachable issuer is +/// hit at most once per this interval however much guest-JWT traffic arrives. +const JWKS_NEGATIVE_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30); +/// The absolute age past which cached keys are no longer served, even while revalidating: +/// once an issuer has been unreachable (or has revoked a `kid`) for this long, its old keys +/// stop authenticating and the request fails closed rather than trusting them indefinitely. +const JWKS_MAX_STALE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60 * 60); +/// A JWKS body larger than this is refused rather than buffered: the URL is admin-set +/// but the server it names may be attacker-controlled, and a real key set is a few KB. +const JWKS_MAX_BYTES: usize = 1 << 20; + +/// A cache entry retains only the usable signing keys, but nothing else bounds their combined +/// size: the response cap is 1 MiB and `from_jwk` decodes `n`/`e`/`x`/`y` without a length +/// limit, so one entry could retain ~1 MiB (a few hundred MB across the 200-entry LRU). Cap the +/// retained material instead; a real set is a few KB, so this is invisible to a legitimate one. +const JWKS_MAX_RETAINED_BYTES: usize = 64 * 1024; + +/// The retained-bytes cap counts key material; this caps the number of keys so the per-key +/// fixed cost (each `Jwk` and its map slot) is bounded too, not just their string content. +const JWKS_MAX_KEYS: usize = 50; + +/// Both JWKS caches key on the admin-supplied URL string. The column is unbounded `TEXT`, so +/// without this a workspace admin could grow the caches by the URL bytes alone. Enforced in +/// `fetch_jwks`, which `edit_guest_jwt_key` validates through, so an overlong URL is never +/// stored; the cache only ever sees a URL that was stored, hence a bounded one. +const MAX_JWKS_URL_LEN: usize = 2048; + +/// A guest verification key is admin-set into an unbounded `TEXT` column and reparsed on every +/// guest-JWT request. A real public key PEM is under a few KB (RSA-16384 SPKI is ~2.8 KB), so +/// this bounds the stored and reparsed bytes without refusing any real key. +const MAX_GUEST_PEM_LEN: usize = 8 * 1024; + +/// A guest JWT is refused past this before any signature work or caching: the auth cache keys +/// on the bearer, so an oversized token (unauthenticated at this point) would otherwise be +/// decoded and, if it verified, cached at its full size. A real JWT is well under this. +pub const MAX_GUEST_JWT_LEN: usize = 8 * 1024; + +/// Fetch a JWKS, keeping only the keys usable here. A workspace-admin URL is validated +/// against private ranges and the connect pinned to the validated addresses; redirects are +/// not followed for the same reason. The instance issuer (`JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL`) is exempt from +/// those restrictions — it is operator-configured and trusted (it also backs `jwt_ext_`), so a +/// self-hosted internal (http/private) issuer that works for `jwt_ext_` works for guests too. +/// The body is read with a cap so a hostile endpoint cannot exhaust memory. +pub async fn fetch_jwks(url: &str) -> Result> { + use futures::StreamExt; + if url.len() > MAX_JWKS_URL_LEN { + return Err(Error::BadRequest(format!( + "JWKS URL is longer than {MAX_JWKS_URL_LEN} bytes" + ))); + } + let resp = if instance_ext_jwks_url().as_deref() == Some(url) { + // Operator-trusted issuer: fetch it with the same permissive client `jwt_ext_` uses + // (follows redirects, honors ACCEPT_INVALID_CERTS), so an issuer that works for + // `jwt_ext_` through a redirect or an approved self-signed cert works for guests too. + crate::utils::HTTP_CLIENT_PERMISSIVE.get(url).send().await + } else { + // Workspace-admin URL: validate (https + private ranges), pin the connect to the + // validated addresses, and do not follow redirects — all against SSRF. + let client = crate::ssrf::validate_guest_jwks_url(url) + .await + .map_err(|e| Error::BadRequest(format!("JWKS URL is not allowed: {e}")))? + .apply_dns_pinning(crate::utils::configure_client(reqwest::ClientBuilder::new())) + .user_agent("windmill/beta") + .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none()) + .connect_timeout(Duration::from_secs(5)) + .timeout(Duration::from_secs(10)) + .build() + .map_err(|e| Error::internal_err(format!("building JWKS client: {e}")))?; + client.get(url).send().await + } + .and_then(|r| r.error_for_status()) + .map_err(|e| Error::BadRequest(format!("could not fetch JWKS: {e}")))?; + let mut stream = resp.bytes_stream(); + let mut body: Vec = Vec::new(); + while let Some(chunk) = stream.next().await { + let chunk = chunk.map_err(|e| Error::BadRequest(format!("reading JWKS: {e}")))?; + if body.len() + chunk.len() > JWKS_MAX_BYTES { + return Err(Error::BadRequest(format!( + "JWKS is larger than {JWKS_MAX_BYTES} bytes" + ))); + } + body.extend_from_slice(&chunk); + } + parse_jwks_keys(&body) +} + +/// The usable signing keys in a JWKS body, by `kid`. Each key is parsed on its own and +/// one that does not model as a JWT key is skipped, not fatal: a set may legitimately +/// carry an encryption key (say `alg: "RSA-OAEP"`, which is not in jsonwebtoken's signing +/// `Algorithm` enum and would fail whole-set deserialization) beside its signing keys. +/// +/// A key is kept only if its material actually decodes (`DecodingKey::from_jwk`): jsonwebtoken +/// carries `n`/`e`/`x`/`y` as strings and defers decoding to auth time, so without this a JWKS +/// whose only key is malformed would be accepted at save time and fail every token later. +fn parse_jwks_keys(body: &[u8]) -> Result> { + let set: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(body) + .map_err(|e| Error::BadRequest(format!("JWKS is not JSON: {e}")))?; + let entries = set + .get("keys") + .and_then(|k| k.as_array()) + .ok_or_else(|| Error::BadRequest("JWKS has no `keys` array".to_string()))?; + let keys: HashMap = entries + .iter() + .filter_map(|entry| serde_json::from_value::(entry.clone()).ok()) + .filter(|jwk| jwk_algorithms(jwk).is_some()) + .filter(|jwk| DecodingKey::from_jwk(jwk).is_ok()) + .filter_map(|jwk| jwk.common.key_id.clone().map(|kid| (kid, jwk))) + .collect(); + if keys.is_empty() { + return Err(Error::BadRequest( + "JWKS holds no RSA or EC signing key with a kid".to_string(), + )); + } + // Bound the usable keys two ways, both measured after filtering so a large mixed-use set + // (many encryption keys, few signing) is not refused for its size: their count (the per-key + // fixed cost) and their combined material bytes. + if keys.len() > JWKS_MAX_KEYS { + return Err(Error::BadRequest(format!( + "JWKS holds more than {JWKS_MAX_KEYS} usable signing keys" + ))); + } + let retained: usize = keys + .values() + .filter_map(|jwk| serde_json::to_vec(jwk).ok().map(|v| v.len())) + .sum(); + if retained > JWKS_MAX_RETAINED_BYTES { + return Err(Error::BadRequest(format!( + "JWKS signing keys retain more than {JWKS_MAX_RETAINED_BYTES} bytes" + ))); + } + Ok(keys) +} + +/// A cached entry that holds no keys is a remembered failure; serving it would report +/// an unreachable issuer as an unknown `kid`. Map it to an issuer-unreachable error. +fn servable(entry: Arc) -> Result> { + if entry.keys.is_empty() { + Err(Error::NotAuthorized( + "guest JWT refused: the JWKS issuer is unreachable".to_string(), + )) + } else { + Ok(entry) + } +} + +/// A held single-flight lock for one JWKS URL. Dropping it removes the URL from +/// `JWKS_FETCH_LOCKS` once no other holder remains, so the registry never keeps a lock past +/// its fetch and stays bounded by the number of fetches in flight, not by URLs ever seen. +struct JwksFetchLock { + url: String, + lock: Arc>, +} + +impl JwksFetchLock { + /// The lock for `url`, created on first use. Callers sharing a URL get the same `Arc`, + /// so one holds the inner mutex and fetches while the rest wait on it. + fn acquire(url: &str) -> Self { + let mut map = JWKS_FETCH_LOCKS.lock().unwrap(); + let lock = map + .entry(url.to_string()) + .or_insert_with(|| Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(()))) + .clone(); + JwksFetchLock { url: url.to_string(), lock } + } +} + +impl Drop for JwksFetchLock { + fn drop(&mut self) { + let mut map = JWKS_FETCH_LOCKS.lock().unwrap(); + // Clones are only taken while holding this same map lock, so the count is stable + // here: two Arcs (the map's and this one's) means we are the last holder and the + // entry can go; more means another request still needs it and will remove it in turn. + if map + .get(&self.url) + .is_some_and(|lock| Arc::strong_count(lock) <= 2) + { + map.remove(&self.url); + } + } +} + +/// Refresh a URL's JWKS off the request path, under the single-flight lock. A held +/// lock means a refresh is already running, so this is a no-op. A failed refresh +/// leaves the served stale keys in place rather than dropping them. +fn spawn_jwks_refresh(url: String) { + tokio::spawn(async move { + let fetch_lock = JwksFetchLock::acquire(&url); + let Ok(_guard) = fetch_lock.lock.try_lock() else { + return; + }; + match fetch_jwks(&url).await { + Ok(keys) => { + let now = Instant::now(); + JWKS_CACHE.insert( + url, + Arc::new(JwksEntry { + keys: Arc::new(keys), + expires_at: now + JWKS_TTL, + fetched_at: now, + }), + ); + } + Err(e) => tracing::warn!("guest JWKS background refresh failed for {url}: {e:#}"), + } + }); +} + +/// The workspace's JWKS. A fresh entry is served directly; a stale-but-good one is +/// served while a refresh runs off the request path (`spawn_jwks_refresh`), so a slow +/// issuer never stalls a request. Only a cold or negative entry blocks, under a per-URL +/// lock so a burst triggers one fetch; a failed fetch there caches a short-lived empty +/// entry that reads as "issuer unreachable", so an unreachable issuer is hit at most +/// once per `JWKS_NEGATIVE_TTL`. Fetches follow a schedule, never a per-request, +/// attacker-chosen `kid`. +async fn cached_jwks(url: &str) -> Result> { + if let Some(entry) = JWKS_CACHE.get(url) { + // Keys past JWKS_MAX_STALE are never served, even while revalidating: a stale re-serve + // bumps expires_at but keeps fetched_at, so a persistently failing refresh would + // otherwise serve revoked keys forever. Too-old keys fall through to the blocking + // refresh, which fails closed if the issuer is still down. + if entry.fetched_at.elapsed() < JWKS_MAX_STALE { + if entry.expires_at > Instant::now() { + return servable(entry); + } + // Stale but still holds good keys: serve them now and refresh off the request + // path, so a slow or hanging issuer adds no latency. Bump the entry first so the + // refresh window does not spawn a task per request. A negative (empty) entry + // falls through to the blocking refresh below. + if !entry.keys.is_empty() { + let served = Arc::new(JwksEntry { + keys: entry.keys.clone(), + expires_at: Instant::now() + JWKS_NEGATIVE_TTL, + fetched_at: entry.fetched_at, + }); + JWKS_CACHE.insert(url.to_string(), served.clone()); + spawn_jwks_refresh(url.to_string()); + return Ok(served); + } + } + } + // Cold or negative entry, nothing good to serve: block on a single-flight refresh. + // `JwksFetchLock::acquire` hands cold requests the same lock, so they share one fetch. + let fetch_lock = JwksFetchLock::acquire(url); + let _guard = fetch_lock.lock.lock().await; + // Another task may have refreshed while we waited for the lock (honour the age limit too, + // so a concurrent stale re-serve of too-old keys is not mistaken for a fresh entry). + if let Some(entry) = JWKS_CACHE.get(url) { + if entry.fetched_at.elapsed() < JWKS_MAX_STALE && entry.expires_at > Instant::now() { + return servable(entry); + } + } + match fetch_jwks(url).await { + Ok(keys) => { + let now = Instant::now(); + let entry = Arc::new(JwksEntry { + keys: Arc::new(keys), + expires_at: now + JWKS_TTL, + fetched_at: now, + }); + JWKS_CACHE.insert(url.to_string(), entry.clone()); + Ok(entry) + } + Err(e) => { + // Reached with no servable keys: either nothing cached, or keys too old to trust. + // Cache a short negative entry so the next requests do not each refetch, and + // surface the error, so an issuer that revoked a key or went down fails closed. + JWKS_CACHE.insert( + url.to_string(), + Arc::new(JwksEntry { + keys: Arc::new(HashMap::new()), + expires_at: Instant::now() + JWKS_NEGATIVE_TTL, + fetched_at: Instant::now(), + }), + ); + Err(e) + } + } +} + +/// The key a token's header selects from the workspace's JWKS, by `kid`, and the +/// algorithms it may verify. An unknown `kid` is refused against the cached set rather +/// than triggering a fetch, so varying `kid` cannot drive outbound requests; a +/// genuinely rotated-in key is picked up within `JWKS_TTL`. +pub async fn jwks_key_for(url: &str, token: &str) -> Result<(DecodingKey, Vec)> { + let header = jsonwebtoken::decode_header(token) + .map_err(|e| Error::NotAuthorized(format!("guest JWT refused: {e}")))?; + let kid = header.kid.ok_or_else(|| { + Error::NotAuthorized("guest JWT refused: no kid in the header".to_string()) + })?; + let entry = cached_jwks(url).await?; + let jwk = entry.keys.get(&kid).ok_or_else(|| { + Error::NotAuthorized(format!("guest JWT refused: kid {kid} is not in the JWKS")) + })?; + let algs = jwk_algorithms(jwk).ok_or_else(|| { + Error::NotAuthorized(format!("guest JWT refused: kid {kid} is not a signing key")) + })?; + let key = DecodingKey::from_jwk(jwk) + .map_err(|e| Error::internal_err(format!("unusable JWK {kid}: {e}")))?; + Ok((key, algs)) +} + +/// Verify `token` for `w_id` against whatever key the workspace configured. A PEM key +/// ignores `kid`; a JWKS selects by it. +pub async fn verify_for_workspace(db: &DB, w_id: &str, token: &str) -> Result { + if token.len() > MAX_GUEST_JWT_LEN { + return Err(Error::NotAuthorized(format!( + "guest JWT refused: token is longer than {MAX_GUEST_JWT_LEN} bytes" + ))); + } + let Some(source) = key_source(db, w_id).await? else { + return Err(Error::NotAuthorized(format!( + "guest JWT refused: workspace {w_id} has no guest JWT key" + ))); + }; + match source { + GuestJwtKeySource::Pem(pem) => { + let (key, algorithms) = decoding_key_from_pem(&pem)?; + verify(token, &key, algorithms, w_id) + } + GuestJwtKeySource::JwksUrl(url) => { + let (key, algorithms) = jwks_key_for(&url, token).await?; + verify(token, &key, &algorithms, w_id) + } + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + /// Serializes the tests that mutate the process-wide `ALLOW_PRIVATE_GUEST_JWKS_URLS`, so a + /// concurrent run cannot clear it out from under another (mirrors `ssrf.rs`'s test lock). + static TEST_ENV_LOCK: tokio::sync::Mutex<()> = tokio::sync::Mutex::const_new(()); + + fn jwk(v: serde_json::Value) -> Jwk { + serde_json::from_value(v).unwrap() + } + + #[test] + fn rsa_key_with_alg_pins_it() { + let k = jwk(serde_json::json!({"kty":"RSA","alg":"RS384","n":"aa","e":"AQAB"})); + assert_eq!(jwk_algorithms(&k), Some(vec![Algorithm::RS384])); + } + + #[test] + fn rsa_key_without_alg_takes_the_whole_family() { + // The bug this pins: an alg-less RSA key must not be forced to RS256, which + // would reject valid RS384/512 or PS* tokens. + let k = jwk(serde_json::json!({"kty":"RSA","n":"aa","e":"AQAB"})); + assert_eq!(jwk_algorithms(&k), Some(RSA_ALGORITHMS.to_vec())); + } + + #[test] + fn ec_key_takes_its_curve_algorithm() { + let k = jwk(serde_json::json!({"kty":"EC","crv":"P-256","x":"aa","y":"bb"})); + assert_eq!(jwk_algorithms(&k), Some(vec![Algorithm::ES256])); + } + + #[test] + fn symmetric_key_is_refused() { + let k = jwk(serde_json::json!({"kty":"oct","k":"c2VjcmV0"})); + assert_eq!(jwk_algorithms(&k), None); + } + + #[test] + fn a_key_marked_for_encryption_is_refused() { + let k = jwk(serde_json::json!({"kty":"RSA","use":"enc","n":"aa","e":"AQAB"})); + assert_eq!(jwk_algorithms(&k), None); + } + + #[test] + fn a_mixed_use_jwks_keeps_only_the_signing_keys() { + // An encryption key (RSA-OAEP is not in jsonwebtoken's signing Algorithm enum) + // beside a signing key must not fail the whole set. The signing key carries real + // coordinates so it survives the material check parse_jwks_keys now applies. + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "keys": [ + {"kty":"RSA","alg":"RSA-OAEP","kid":"enc","use":"enc","n":"aa","e":"AQAB"}, + {"kty":"EC","crv":"P-256","kid":"sig","x":PUB1_X,"y":PUB1_Y} + ] + }) + .to_string(); + let keys = parse_jwks_keys(body.as_bytes()).expect("the signing key survives"); + assert!(keys.contains_key("sig")); + assert!(!keys.contains_key("enc")); + } + + #[test] + fn a_jwks_with_only_malformed_key_material_is_refused() { + // Metadata (kty/alg/use) is fine but `n` is not valid base64url, so the key is + // unusable. Since it is the only key, configuring this JWKS must fail at save time + // rather than persist a URL whose tokens all fail later. + let body = serde_json::json!({ + "keys": [{"kty":"RSA","kid":"k1","n":"not base64url!!","e":"AQAB"}] + }) + .to_string(); + assert!(parse_jwks_keys(body.as_bytes()).is_err()); + } + + #[test] + fn too_many_usable_keys_is_refused() { + // All keys are usable (real coordinates), so this trips the count cap, not the + // empty-set path. Small material, so it is the count that refuses them, not the bytes. + let keys: Vec<_> = (0..=JWKS_MAX_KEYS) + .map(|i| { + serde_json::json!({"kty":"EC","crv":"P-256","kid":format!("k{i}"),"x":PUB1_X,"y":PUB1_Y}) + }) + .collect(); + let body = serde_json::json!({ "keys": keys }).to_string(); + let err = parse_jwks_keys(body.as_bytes()).unwrap_err().to_string(); + assert!(err.contains("usable signing keys"), "{err}"); + } + + #[test] + fn keys_retaining_too_many_bytes_is_refused() { + // Under the key count cap, but the material of these usable RSA keys exceeds the byte + // cap. `from_jwk` decodes any-length `n`, so this is reachable without the count cap. + let big_n = "A".repeat(2000); + let keys: Vec<_> = (0..40) + .map(|i| serde_json::json!({"kty":"RSA","kid":format!("k{i}"),"n":big_n,"e":"AQAB"})) + .collect(); + let body = serde_json::json!({ "keys": keys }).to_string(); + let err = parse_jwks_keys(body.as_bytes()).unwrap_err().to_string(); + assert!(err.contains("retain more than"), "{err}"); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn an_overlong_jwks_url_is_refused() { + // The cache keys on the URL string, so an unbounded URL is refused before it is cached. + // Assert the length error specifically: a bogus URL would fail the fetch regardless. + let url = format!( + "https://issuer.example.com/{}", + "a".repeat(MAX_JWKS_URL_LEN) + ); + let err = fetch_jwks(&url).await.unwrap_err().to_string(); + assert!(err.contains("longer than"), "{err}"); + } + + #[test] + fn an_oversized_pem_is_refused() { + // A well-formed key body padded past the cap: refused for its length before decoding, + // so an oversized-but-valid key cannot be stored and reparsed on every request. + let big = format!( + "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n{}\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n", + "A".repeat(MAX_GUEST_PEM_LEN) + ); + let err = decoding_key_from_pem(&big).err().unwrap().to_string(); + assert!(err.contains("longer than"), "{err}"); + // Whitespace padding must count: the endpoint stores the untrimmed value, so the cap is + // measured before trimming rather than on the small trimmed key it would otherwise see. + let padded = format!("{}{RSA_PUBLIC}", " ".repeat(MAX_GUEST_PEM_LEN)); + let err = decoding_key_from_pem(&padded).err().unwrap().to_string(); + assert!(err.contains("longer than"), "{err}"); + } + + #[test] + fn key_ops_without_verify_is_refused() { + let enc = jwk(serde_json::json!({"kty":"RSA","key_ops":["encrypt"],"n":"aa","e":"AQAB"})); + assert_eq!(jwk_algorithms(&enc), None); + let ver = jwk(serde_json::json!({"kty":"RSA","key_ops":["verify"],"n":"aa","e":"AQAB"})); + assert_eq!(jwk_algorithms(&ver), Some(RSA_ALGORITHMS.to_vec())); + } + + // PUB1's coordinates and its matching PKCS8 private key, for the JWKS-derived + // verification test. + const PUB1_X: &str = "zAfqyCh34iYOCW0vg4ejq_zzJlzLSZScjnVyPjLGTao"; + const PUB1_Y: &str = "RMKOIHOv8tWLnXf7-eMCodDnX038wCjD1sf9jVsf7oI"; + const PRIV1: &str = "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgu27S2DbSwUh8BmQb\n/i4/VhNdoXV7PJekhnoceMULYLihRANCAATMB+rIKHfiJg4JbS+Dh6Or/PMmXMtJ\nlJyOdXI+MsZNqkTCjiBzr/LVi513+/njAqHQ519N/MAow9bH/Y1bH+6C\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n"; + + #[test] + fn a_jwks_key_verifies_a_real_token() { + // The one path the PEM tests do not cover: a key rebuilt from a JWK verifies a + // token signed by its private half, and the algorithms come from the JWK. + let jwk = jwk(serde_json::json!({ + "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256", "kid": "k1", "x": PUB1_X, "y": PUB1_Y + })); + let algs = jwk_algorithms(&jwk).expect("EC signing key"); + assert_eq!(algs, vec![Algorithm::ES256]); + let key = jsonwebtoken::DecodingKey::from_jwk(&jwk).expect("usable JWK"); + let payload = serde_json::json!({ + "email": "g@example.com", + "workspace_id": "ws", + "app_path": "u/a/app", + "exp": jsonwebtoken::get_current_timestamp() + 600, + }); + let token = jsonwebtoken::encode( + &jsonwebtoken::Header::new(Algorithm::ES256), + &payload, + &jsonwebtoken::EncodingKey::from_ec_pem(PRIV1.as_bytes()).unwrap(), + ) + .unwrap(); + let out = verify(&token, &key, &algs, "ws").expect("verifies"); + assert_eq!(out.email, "g@example.com"); + // The workspace pin is part of verify. + assert!(verify(&token, &key, &algs, "other-ws").is_err()); + } + + #[test] + fn a_non_key_pem_is_rejected() { + assert!(decoding_key_from_pem( + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nnope\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----" + ) + .is_err()); + } + + // A real RSA public key (SPKI). Its private counterpart is RSA_PKCS1_PRIVATE below. + const RSA_PUBLIC: &str = "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n\ +MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAx3J0fQcHp2ZlMI4rCVsY\n\ +tirATZPWyPD7exoYWPInhV5xjbY2Fe8IVFaZszQcQbCXZjBtFp2fj0tBTow8BeOy\n\ +X9LJPyKeho/j68FycuDVg7JCzG0TWtsnh/V23WkrlKIfmMqS3+YUyFavROTcAN1T\n\ +5BcFHLAi/4Q2qy0JjXBdZ8avelzZrQ/T67/Kcsoct/pvnEDT2YRsSbA7VMWaxWh8\n\ +MYJ7GNV/10YT2c5CBJGSLbyRSVWk2IwfnM9Cl9n/5NE6TkSetYQ2xlqKTONp5W43\n\ +UzW1NAeqKCxPQfN/ADjwW18nk2o7xj1kMF4rBlhsTm9ClE71nwi5NxsvMOdVxytZ\n\ +ZQIDAQAB\n\ +-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n"; + + // A complete, valid PKCS#1 RSA *private* key (the counterpart of RSA_PUBLIC) with its + // armor relabelled `RSA PUBLIC KEY`. jsonwebtoken's from_rsa_pem accepts it under that + // label; the structural check refuses it (a 9-field RSAPrivateKey is neither an SPKI nor + // a 2-field RsaPublicKey). Complete on purpose: malformed DER would fail for the wrong + // reason and let a real bypass through unnoticed. + const RSA_PKCS1_PRIVATE_AS_PUBLIC: &str = "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n\ +MIIEogIBAAKCAQEAx3J0fQcHp2ZlMI4rCVsYtirATZPWyPD7exoYWPInhV5xjbY2\n\ +Fe8IVFaZszQcQbCXZjBtFp2fj0tBTow8BeOyX9LJPyKeho/j68FycuDVg7JCzG0T\n\ +Wtsnh/V23WkrlKIfmMqS3+YUyFavROTcAN1T5BcFHLAi/4Q2qy0JjXBdZ8avelzZ\n\ +rQ/T67/Kcsoct/pvnEDT2YRsSbA7VMWaxWh8MYJ7GNV/10YT2c5CBJGSLbyRSVWk\n\ +2IwfnM9Cl9n/5NE6TkSetYQ2xlqKTONp5W43UzW1NAeqKCxPQfN/ADjwW18nk2o7\n\ +xj1kMF4rBlhsTm9ClE71nwi5NxsvMOdVxytZZQIDAQABAoIBAD+IbaQQM7d3Dj/X\n\ +4cyyqJ4K40QzFmXfIfTWXLAkv0MkUR7XzsXQ5YHcLkzgCipAwxGp1m4wWs4OJmkL\n\ +kek8XatZnYLPl9j8iBmm/zqp9Unk5JNzIYm9KwwLvMgOAvRvaopE6WGKTM9+kYls\n\ +L8rUti7/yECZuSRU7Qc9KwBTrWVrXK+RBtBqZYQXb92BFxq0N3Qp+utLNdFcO5sW\n\ +7d8gKp3ipQt5z9ZAB2pYMw7ZTzonF4C7HdyrbYXztvYrxuw1imMkQ9iFFhdn3/76\n\ +qFR7XwaFrld8DECGaH/652kV6zaSQijbBTeXF4zsgwXY4BHMVmZKaXH5unw8Gbmo\n\ +WCoLbLcCgYEA4vTo5kCiKXnlBp3W1Zpg4cml6Wzo0UDldF4kkuXQxhdQA38c0ise\n\ +Cocf6qyAqz1L2TxQ/9WCL2oIP1AY9XqnQ0cJtYIosGWORz4tPe67M8inB/GBotFI\n\ +pmQNVSIjqbgKVi0x+UzmFjitINFPf461lDdJTwhsv9TQRbHrXErvON8CgYEA4PhV\n\ +GYMJu46tqFVtD/koWAQRLmeaZXhxP5lMSmQjdYCa3ys5lccvTlzoF9K8immMQkIx\n\ +gyOazmEtFnK4IXmEY1wg2NIHuJM7/maoM2rozbjXBxsYM7Xw2QX7BHXqG6Ia/Bij\n\ +ZaRJdumCVRJv7OshQTGuqDIzd3l5WEqg11XYgjsCgYAP3v6Wc3ijm+GXN9x5LYWO\n\ +5JIUo8gYMgiZvaejGi0iXSj8RZxXWiqMo+xodc29q9itBVnIuj6TYD/ZZZmJOR2P\n\ +R9128vYzd7aeZsu1JAe1VFfR52KgZzBEaoTAKlYCHVujsR9ohqckcKwyulBr5Cfw\n\ +iHk47KbmN1SlOw7xclAOUwKBgAuxHEsdIk5bFe9fsTFZU51vaK0uuTl4zvntL6fW\n\ +GHms21+p0W5VUcIS1gUW8LGI1r9CzWvxV8RODJfUEnm65QR870AVek0/aajJEQjL\n\ +D5pRdutpnxJg7El7JBaRQj95Z0mexi8sIJ1LeXiOYr6/YZUPzfHz2fTlnUbXahCG\n\ +55+tAoGAI811NTb7kuuIPYuj4raDW88QVNX2xB3+p9lXGolB4jPgsUEjgSvLgH9S\n\ +Q/LwEBiCYVyii8MvWsIZpHvSGyOoty2p19/CAvrAOfpEVlnXQeiX+mh09p1mQbfM\n\ +y9rTR828ADcaZ63Ej1oL4GcqmGhODxCLy1YKKcy0FHzChqPMV6g=\n\ +-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"; + + #[test] + fn a_private_pem_is_refused() { + // A verification key must be public and must never be stored otherwise: it is served + // back through the settings response. jsonwebtoken keys the public/private split off + // the PEM label, so private DER relabelled with a public armor slips a label check; + // only parsing the DER as a public-key structure (SPKI or PKCS#1 RSA public) refuses + // it. A real public key still parses, so the guard is not vacuous. + assert!(decoding_key_from_pem(RSA_PUBLIC).is_ok()); + // The same key with its body on one line (not 64-column wrapped): jsonwebtoken accepts + // any wrapping, so the guard must too rather than lean on the strict RFC 7468 decoder. + let body: String = RSA_PUBLIC + .lines() + .filter(|l| !l.starts_with("-----")) + .collect(); + let one_line = format!("-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n{body}\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n"); + assert!(decoding_key_from_pem(&one_line).is_ok()); + + assert!(decoding_key_from_pem(PRIV1).is_err()); + // The same PKCS#8 EC private key, relabelled `PUBLIC KEY`. + assert!(decoding_key_from_pem(&PRIV1.replace("PRIVATE KEY", "PUBLIC KEY")).is_err()); + assert!(decoding_key_from_pem(RSA_PKCS1_PRIVATE_AS_PUBLIC).is_err()); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn a_concurrent_cold_burst_makes_one_jwks_fetch() { + use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; + use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt; + let _env = TEST_ENV_LOCK.lock().await; + // The stub listens on loopback, which SSRF validation refuses without this. + unsafe { std::env::set_var("ALLOW_PRIVATE_GUEST_JWKS_URLS", "true") }; + let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap(); + let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap(); + let body = format!( + r#"{{"keys":[{{"kty":"EC","crv":"P-256","kid":"k1","x":"{PUB1_X}","y":"{PUB1_Y}"}}]}}"# + ); + let hits = std::sync::Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0)); + let hits_srv = hits.clone(); + tokio::spawn(async move { + loop { + let (mut sock, _) = listener.accept().await.unwrap(); + hits_srv.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst); + let resp = format!( + "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\nContent-Length: {}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n{}", + body.len(), + body + ); + // Delay so the other callers pile onto the single-flight lock before the + // leader's fetch returns. + tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(150)).await; + let _ = sock.write_all(resp.as_bytes()).await; + let _ = sock.shutdown().await; + } + }); + let url = format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/jwks.json", addr.port()); + let mut handles = Vec::new(); + for _ in 0..10 { + let u = url.clone(); + handles.push(tokio::spawn(async move { + cached_jwks(&u).await.map(|e| e.keys.len()) + })); + } + for h in handles { + assert_eq!( + h.await.unwrap().unwrap(), + 1, + "each caller resolves the one key" + ); + } + assert_eq!( + hits.load(Ordering::SeqCst), + 1, + "single-flight: a concurrent cold burst makes one fetch" + ); + unsafe { std::env::remove_var("ALLOW_PRIVATE_GUEST_JWKS_URLS") }; + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn jwks_fetch_locks_are_shared_and_self_cleaning() { + // The registry is a plain map, not a capacity-bounded cache: a cache could evict a + // lock mid-fetch, letting a later request for that URL start a duplicate fetch. Pin + // both halves of what keeps single-flight intact under many distinct URLs: the same + // URL hands back one shared lock, and the entry is removed once its last holder drops + // (so nothing evicts an in-flight lock and the map stays bounded by fetches in flight). + let url = "https://example.test/jwks-lock-probe.json"; + { + let a = JwksFetchLock::acquire(url); + let b = JwksFetchLock::acquire(url); + assert!(Arc::ptr_eq(&a.lock, &b.lock), "one lock per URL"); + assert!(JWKS_FETCH_LOCKS.lock().unwrap().contains_key(url)); + } + assert!( + !JWKS_FETCH_LOCKS.lock().unwrap().contains_key(url), + "the lock is dropped once idle" + ); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn stale_jwks_keys_stop_being_served_past_the_grace_window() { + let _env = TEST_ENV_LOCK.lock().await; + unsafe { std::env::set_var("ALLOW_PRIVATE_GUEST_JWKS_URLS", "true") }; + // A dead loopback port, so every refresh fails (connection refused). + let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap(); + let port = listener.local_addr().unwrap().port(); + drop(listener); + let jwk = jwk(serde_json::json!( + {"kty":"EC","crv":"P-256","kid":"k1","x":PUB1_X,"y":PUB1_Y} + )); + let keys: HashMap = [("k1".to_string(), jwk)].into_iter().collect(); + let stale = Instant::now().checked_sub(Duration::from_secs(1)).unwrap(); + + // Within the grace window, stale keys are still served while a (failing) refresh runs. + let within = format!("http://127.0.0.1:{port}/within"); + JWKS_CACHE.insert( + within.clone(), + Arc::new(JwksEntry { + keys: Arc::new(keys.clone()), + expires_at: stale, + fetched_at: Instant::now(), + }), + ); + assert!( + cached_jwks(&within).await.is_ok(), + "stale keys within the grace window are still served" + ); + + // Past the grace window, the keys are not served: the failing refresh fails closed. + let beyond = format!("http://127.0.0.1:{port}/beyond"); + JWKS_CACHE.insert( + beyond.clone(), + Arc::new(JwksEntry { + keys: Arc::new(keys), + expires_at: stale, + fetched_at: Instant::now() + .checked_sub(JWKS_MAX_STALE + Duration::from_secs(1)) + .unwrap(), + }), + ); + assert!( + cached_jwks(&beyond).await.is_err(), + "keys past the grace window fail closed once the refresh fails" + ); + unsafe { std::env::remove_var("ALLOW_PRIVATE_GUEST_JWKS_URLS") }; + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn a_plaintext_http_jwks_url_is_refused_by_default() { + let _env = TEST_ENV_LOCK.lock().await; + unsafe { std::env::remove_var("ALLOW_PRIVATE_GUEST_JWKS_URLS") }; + // The JWKS supplies the keys that authenticate guest JWTs; without the operator opt-in, + // a plaintext URL (which an on-path attacker could replace) is refused for its scheme. + assert!(matches!( + crate::ssrf::validate_guest_jwks_url("http://issuer.example.com/jwks.json").await, + Err(crate::ssrf::SsrfValidationError::HttpsRequired) + )); + } + + #[tokio::test] + async fn the_instance_issuer_bypasses_the_https_and_private_restriction() { + let _env = TEST_ENV_LOCK.lock().await; + unsafe { std::env::remove_var("ALLOW_PRIVATE_GUEST_JWKS_URLS") }; + // The instance issuer is operator-trusted (it also backs jwt_ext_), so an http/private + // URL is not refused for its scheme: it reaches the connect and fails there (dead port), + // not at validation. A different URL is not the instance issuer and is still refused. + let instance = "http://127.0.0.1:1/jwks.json"; + unsafe { std::env::set_var("JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL", instance) }; + let trusted = fetch_jwks(instance).await.err().unwrap().to_string(); + let other = fetch_jwks("http://127.0.0.1:1/other.json") + .await + .err() + .unwrap() + .to_string(); + unsafe { std::env::remove_var("JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL") }; + assert!( + !trusted.contains("not allowed") && !trusted.contains("must use https"), + "instance issuer skips validation: {trusted}" + ); + assert!( + other.contains("not allowed") || other.contains("https"), + "a non-instance http url is still refused: {other}" + ); + } +} diff --git a/backend/windmill-common/src/lib.rs b/backend/windmill-common/src/lib.rs index b4128f80d2..7fb5e85a69 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-common/src/lib.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-common/src/lib.rs @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ pub mod flow_status; pub mod flows; pub mod folders; pub mod global_settings; +pub mod guest_jwt; pub mod indexer; pub mod instance_config; pub mod job_metrics; diff --git a/backend/windmill-common/src/ssrf.rs b/backend/windmill-common/src/ssrf.rs index 4c50f597ff..713b2e0289 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-common/src/ssrf.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-common/src/ssrf.rs @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ pub const ALLOW_PRIVATE_MCP_SERVER_URLS_ENV: &str = "ALLOW_PRIVATE_MCP_SERVER_UR pub const ALLOW_PRIVATE_SAML_METADATA_URLS_ENV: &str = "ALLOW_PRIVATE_SAML_METADATA_URLS"; +pub const ALLOW_PRIVATE_GUEST_JWKS_URLS_ENV: &str = "ALLOW_PRIVATE_GUEST_JWKS_URLS"; + /// Why a URL failed SSRF validation. /// /// The distinction matters for callers that gate private endpoints behind a @@ -18,6 +20,9 @@ pub enum SsrfValidationError { InvalidUrl(String), /// Scheme is not `http`/`https`. DisallowedScheme(String), + /// The URL uses `http` where `https` is required (guest JWKS). The private-host opt-in + /// also permits `http`, so, unlike the other scheme errors, this one the flag can fix. + HttpsRequired, /// No host in the URL. MissingHost, /// DNS resolution failed for the host. @@ -37,6 +42,9 @@ impl std::fmt::Display for SsrfValidationError { f, "URL scheme '{s}' is not allowed, only http and https are permitted" ), + SsrfValidationError::HttpsRequired => { + write!(f, "URL must use https") + } SsrfValidationError::MissingHost => write!(f, "URL must have a host"), SsrfValidationError::ResolutionFailed { host, source } => { write!(f, "Failed to resolve host '{host}': {source}") @@ -213,6 +221,36 @@ pub async fn validate_saml_metadata_url(url: &str) -> Result Result { + let parsed = + url::Url::parse(url).map_err(|e| SsrfValidationError::InvalidUrl(e.to_string()))?; + + let allow_private = std::env::var(ALLOW_PRIVATE_GUEST_JWKS_URLS_ENV) + .ok() + .is_some_and(|v| v == "true" || v == "1"); + + match parsed.scheme() { + "https" => {} + // Plaintext HTTP only under the explicit operator opt-in that also allows private + // hosts (dev/loopback): the JWKS supplies the keys that authenticate guest JWTs, so an + // on-path attacker who could replace an http response could forge accepted tokens. + "http" if allow_private => {} + "http" => return Err(SsrfValidationError::HttpsRequired), + scheme => return Err(SsrfValidationError::DisallowedScheme(scheme.to_string())), + } + + let host = parsed.host_str().ok_or(SsrfValidationError::MissingHost)?; + + if allow_private { + return Ok(ValidatedTarget::unpinned(host)); + } + + validate_url_for_ssrf(url).await +} + pub async fn validate_mcp_server_url(url: &str) -> Result { let parsed = url::Url::parse(url).map_err(|e| SsrfValidationError::InvalidUrl(e.to_string()))?; diff --git a/backend/windmill-common/src/users.rs b/backend/windmill-common/src/users.rs index 925fe32a4a..3d00c5d312 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-common/src/users.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-common/src/users.rs @@ -31,6 +31,29 @@ pub const USERNAME_GROUP_PREFIX: &str = "group-"; /// columns runnables and triggers store one in. pub const PERMISSIONED_AS_MAX_LEN: usize = 55; +/// Whether any account exists for `email`: a `password` row (deactivated ones +/// included, since the sign-in path filters `disabled = false` and a re-enabled +/// account must not read as absent) or a `usr` row in any workspace (what a service +/// account has instead of a password). A guest is someone with none: the single rule +/// that keeps an account holder from ever holding a cheaper guest identity. +/// +/// The address is lowercased before the lookup: accounts are stored lowercased, so a +/// mixed-case address would otherwise miss an existing account and be let through. The +/// comparison stays a plain equality (not `lower(email)`), so it uses the email index. +pub async fn has_any_account<'c, E: sqlx::Executor<'c, Database = sqlx::Postgres>>( + executor: E, + email: &str, +) -> crate::error::Result { + sqlx::query_scalar::<_, bool>( + "SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM password WHERE email = $1) + OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM usr WHERE email = $1)", + ) + .bind(email.to_lowercase()) + .fetch_one(executor) + .await + .map_err(|e| crate::error::Error::internal_err(format!("checking account for {email}: {e:#}"))) +} + /// An email-shaped username is its own principal, which is how a superadmin acting without a /// `usr` row is named (`usr.username` is constrained to `[\w-]+`, so a member never is). It is /// decided before the group convention — an address is never a group's username — and one diff --git a/frontend/src/lib/components/apps/editor/AppEditorHeaderDeploy.svelte b/frontend/src/lib/components/apps/editor/AppEditorHeaderDeploy.svelte index 6d9e353d46..c88a20bc99 100644 --- a/frontend/src/lib/components/apps/editor/AppEditorHeaderDeploy.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/lib/components/apps/editor/AppEditorHeaderDeploy.svelte @@ -176,6 +176,10 @@ }${customPath}` ) + // The app URL a guest JWT rides on: append `guest.` and the viewer authenticates the + // token as a seatless guest. Uses the custom URL when set, else the public secret URL. + let guestJwtBase = $derived(customPath !== undefined ? fullCustomUrl : secretUrlHref) + // When embedding a raw app in an iframe inside another Windmill app (or any // cross-origin-isolated page), the embedded document must set COEP. The // `wm_coep` flag opts the public app into the cross-origin isolation headers. @@ -500,8 +504,8 @@ Anyone your identity provider authenticates can open this app without a Windmill account. They join no workspace. Members of this workspace can open it too. {#if guestUsage} - {guestUsage.guest_count} of {guestUsage.free_allowance} free guests used across this - instance in the last {guestUsage.window_days} days; beyond that, {guestUsage.metered + {guestUsage.guest_count} of {guestUsage.free_allowance} free guests used across this instance + in the last {guestUsage.window_days} days; beyond that, {guestUsage.metered ? 'every four guests count as one seat' : 'new guests are refused until the count drops'}. {/if} @@ -543,6 +547,38 @@ {/if} + {#if embedMode && policy.execution_mode == 'guest' && guestAccessEnabled && guestJwtBase} +
    +
    + Embed for your own authenticated users (guest JWT) +
    +
    + To open this app for a user your own product already authenticates, mint a short-lived JWT + in your backend and append it to the app URL as guest.<jwt>. Each token + is its own seatless guest, confined to this app — no shared secret and no Windmill + account, unlike the plain secret URL above. +
    +
    + Windmill verifies the token against the workspace's guest JWT key (Workspace settings → + Guests) — a PEM public key or a JWKS URL{#if !isCloudHosted()}, or the instance's + configured issuer (JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL) when no workspace key is set{/if}. Set + the public half there; in your backend, sign each token with the matching + private key using RS256/384/512, PS256/384/512 or ES256/384 (symmetric HS* is + refused), carrying email, workspace_id = {opWs}, + app_path = {appPath} and exp (at most 24h ahead). +
    + +
    + Replace YOUR_GUEST_JWT with the token your backend signs per user. Past the instance's + free guest allowance a new guest email is refused (see the count above); guests already seen + in the window keep working. +
    +
    + {/if} +
    {#if !($userStore?.is_admin || $userStore?.is_super_admin)} diff --git a/frontend/src/routes/(root)/(logged)/workspace_settings/+page.svelte b/frontend/src/routes/(root)/(logged)/workspace_settings/+page.svelte index 6e55c5994b..8590d87603 100644 --- a/frontend/src/routes/(root)/(logged)/workspace_settings/+page.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/routes/(root)/(logged)/workspace_settings/+page.svelte @@ -191,6 +191,19 @@ let guestAccessEnabled: boolean = $state(false) let guestUsage: GuestUsage | undefined = $state(undefined) let initialGuestAccessEnabled: boolean = $state(false) + // A guest JWT is verified against one key: a PEM public key, or a JWKS URL. The + // type picks which field is live; the other is cleared on save. + let guestJwtKeyType = $state<'pem' | 'jwks'>('pem') + let guestJwtPublicKey: string = $state('') + let guestJwtJwksUrl: string = $state('') + let initialGuestJwtPublicKey: string = $state('') + let initialGuestJwtJwksUrl: string = $state('') + // The pair actually saved: only the selected type's field, trimmed. The unselected + // one is empty, so switching type and saving clears what was there. + let effectiveGuestJwt = $derived({ + pem: guestJwtKeyType === 'pem' ? guestJwtPublicKey.trim() : '', + jwks: guestJwtKeyType === 'jwks' ? guestJwtJwksUrl.trim() : '' + }) let initialPublicAppRateLimitPerMinute: number | undefined = $state(undefined) let hasInstanceAiConfig = $state(false) @@ -526,11 +539,17 @@ } async function saveDefaultAppSettings(): Promise { - // Guests first: the only write of this card available on every plan, so a refused - // Enterprise-only write after it cannot swallow it. + // Guest access and the guest JWT key are the writes of this card available on every plan; + // save them first so a refused Enterprise-only write after cannot swallow them. if (guestAccessEnabled !== initialGuestAccessEnabled) { await editGuestAccess() } + if ( + effectiveGuestJwt.pem !== initialGuestJwtPublicKey || + effectiveGuestJwt.jwks !== initialGuestJwtJwksUrl + ) { + await editGuestJwtKey() + } if (workspaceDefaultAppPath !== initialWorkspaceDefaultAppPath) { await editWorkspaceDefaultApp() } @@ -539,6 +558,19 @@ } } + async function editGuestJwtKey(): Promise { + await WorkspaceService.editGuestJwtKey({ + workspace: $workspaceStore!, + requestBody: { + public_key: effectiveGuestJwt.pem || undefined, + jwks_url: effectiveGuestJwt.jwks || undefined + } + }) + initialGuestJwtPublicKey = effectiveGuestJwt.pem + initialGuestJwtJwksUrl = effectiveGuestJwt.jwks + sendUserToast('Guest JWT key updated') + } + async function editGuestAccess(): Promise { await WorkspaceService.editGuestAccess({ workspace: $workspaceStore!, @@ -647,6 +679,11 @@ initialPublicAppRateLimitPerMinute = settings.public_app_execution_limit_per_minute ?? undefined guestAccessEnabled = settings.guest_access_enabled ?? false initialGuestAccessEnabled = settings.guest_access_enabled ?? false + guestJwtPublicKey = settings.guest_jwt_public_key ?? '' + guestJwtJwksUrl = settings.guest_jwt_jwks_url ?? '' + initialGuestJwtPublicKey = guestJwtPublicKey + initialGuestJwtJwksUrl = guestJwtJwksUrl + guestJwtKeyType = guestJwtJwksUrl ? 'jwks' : 'pem' WorkspaceService.getGuestUsage({ workspace: $workspaceStore! }) .then((u) => (guestUsage = u)) .catch(() => (guestUsage = undefined)) @@ -1052,12 +1089,16 @@ savedValue: { defaultAppPath: initialWorkspaceDefaultAppPath, publicAppRateLimitPerMinute: initialPublicAppRateLimitPerMinute, - guestAccessEnabled: initialGuestAccessEnabled + guestAccessEnabled: initialGuestAccessEnabled, + guestJwtPem: initialGuestJwtPublicKey, + guestJwtJwks: initialGuestJwtJwksUrl }, modifiedValue: { defaultAppPath: workspaceDefaultAppPath, publicAppRateLimitPerMinute: publicAppRateLimitPerMinute, - guestAccessEnabled: guestAccessEnabled + guestAccessEnabled: guestAccessEnabled, + guestJwtPem: effectiveGuestJwt.pem, + guestJwtJwks: effectiveGuestJwt.jwks } } } @@ -1067,6 +1108,9 @@ workspaceDefaultAppPath = initialWorkspaceDefaultAppPath publicAppRateLimitPerMinute = initialPublicAppRateLimitPerMinute guestAccessEnabled = initialGuestAccessEnabled + guestJwtPublicKey = initialGuestJwtPublicKey + guestJwtJwksUrl = initialGuestJwtJwksUrl + guestJwtKeyType = initialGuestJwtJwksUrl ? 'jwks' : 'pem' } // Strip keys from extraArgs that are auto-managed by child components: @@ -2184,7 +2228,7 @@ export async function main( {:else if guestUsage} - {guestUsage.guest_count} of {guestUsage.free_allowance} free guests used across - this instance in the last {guestUsage.window_days} days. + {guestUsage.guest_count} of {guestUsage.free_allowance} free guests used across this + instance in the last {guestUsage.window_days} days. {#if guestUsage.metered} Beyond that, every four guests count as one seat{guestUsage.guest_seats > 0 ? ` (${guestUsage.guest_seats} now)` @@ -2210,6 +2254,54 @@ export async function main( {/if} {/if} +
    +
    + Guest JWT verification key +
    +
    + A guest can also enter through a JWT your own backend mints and signs, with no + identity-provider round-trip, for iframe embedding. The token must carry + email, workspace_id, app_path and + exp (lifetime capped at 24h); it opens only the app named by + app_path. Accepted algorithms: RS256/384/512, PS256/384/512, + ES256/384. Symmetric algorithms (HS*) are refused. Configure one key, a PEM + public key or a JWKS URL (which must be https). Point it at an issuer you + control: any token that key signs carrying these claims is accepted, so a shared + multi-tenant issuer is not a good fit. +
    + + {#snippet children({ item })} + + + {/snippet} + + {#if guestJwtKeyType === 'pem'} + + {:else} + + {/if} + {#if !isCloudHosted()} +
    + Leave empty to fall back to the instance's configured JWT issuer (JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL), if one is set. Set a key here to trust a different issuer for this + workspace. +
    + {/if} +
    {:else if tab == 'native_triggers'} {#if $workspaceStore} diff --git a/frontend/src/routes/a/[...path]/+page.svelte b/frontend/src/routes/a/[...path]/+page.svelte index b63d5086f7..e9fd20877c 100644 --- a/frontend/src/routes/a/[...path]/+page.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/routes/a/[...path]/+page.svelte @@ -19,30 +19,46 @@ let jwtError = $state(false) function isJwt(t: string) { - // simply check that the first part is a valid base64 encoded json + // A JWT is three dot-separated base64url segments; check the header decodes to + // JSON. `atob` wants standard base64, so normalise base64url first (a `kid` or a + // signature routinely contains `-`/`_`), or a valid token is taken for a path. try { const parts = t.split('.') - const header = atob(parts[0]) - JSON.parse(header) + if (parts.length !== 3) return false + const b64 = parts[0].replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/') + const pad = b64.length % 4 === 0 ? '' : '='.repeat(4 - (b64.length % 4)) + JSON.parse(atob(b64 + pad)) return true } catch (e) { return false } } - function parseCustomPath(customPath: string): { path: string; jwt: string | undefined } { + // The custom path may carry a trailing credential: an external JWT as its last + // segment, or a guest JWT in a `guest.` last segment (`/guest.`). The + // `guest.` prefix keeps the two apart; `viewerUrl` uses `path` alone, so neither + // reaches the opaque iframe. + function parseCustomPath(customPath: string): { + path: string + jwt: string | undefined + guestJwt: string | undefined + } { const parts = customPath.split('/') - if (parts.length > 1 && isJwt(parts[parts.length - 1])) { + const last = parts[parts.length - 1] + // A guest JWT rides the last segment prefixed `guest.`. The `.` means it can never + // be a valid custom-path segment, so a real path ending in a `guest` segment + // followed by an external JWT (`.../guest/`) is read as before, not hijacked. + if (last.startsWith('guest.') && isJwt(last.slice('guest.'.length))) { return { path: parts.slice(0, -1).join('/'), - jwt: parts[parts.length - 1] - } - } else { - return { - path: customPath, - jwt: undefined + jwt: undefined, + guestJwt: last.slice('guest.'.length) } } + if (parts.length > 1 && isJwt(last)) { + return { path: parts.slice(0, -1).join('/'), jwt: last, guestJwt: undefined } + } + return { path: customPath, jwt: undefined, guestJwt: undefined } } const parsedCustomPath = parseCustomPath(page.params.path ?? '') @@ -102,7 +118,9 @@ // Embedder side: validate access (main session cookie or shared JWT) and mint // a scoped embed token for the opaque iframe (WIN-2006). async function fetchEmbedToken(opts?: { sdkConsent?: boolean }): Promise<{ token?: string }> { - if (parsedCustomPath.jwt) { + if (parsedCustomPath.guestJwt) { + OpenAPI.TOKEN = 'jwt_guest_' + parsedCustomPath.guestJwt + } else if (parsedCustomPath.jwt) { OpenAPI.TOKEN = 'jwt_ext_' + parsedCustomPath.jwt } const headers: Record = {} diff --git a/frontend/src/routes/public/[workspace]/[...secret]/+page.svelte b/frontend/src/routes/public/[workspace]/[...secret]/+page.svelte index de2b4755be..b2a29b6316 100644 --- a/frontend/src/routes/public/[workspace]/[...secret]/+page.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/routes/public/[workspace]/[...secret]/+page.svelte @@ -27,12 +27,25 @@ * offering an ordinary sign-in on a transient fault would provision an account. */ let guestEntry: 'pending' | 'none' | 'guest' | 'error' = $state('pending') - function parseSecret(secret: string): { secret: string; jwt: string | undefined } { + // The share link carries a trailing credential the embedder consumes: an external + // JWT as `/`, or a guest JWT as `/guest.`. The `guest.` + // prefix keeps the two apart with no parsing of the token, which the page cannot + // verify anyway. Either way `viewerUrl` below uses `secret` alone, so no JWT + // reaches the opaque iframe. + function parseSecret(secret: string): { + secret: string + jwt: string | undefined + guestJwt: string | undefined + } { const parts = secret.split('/') - return { - secret: parts[0], - jwt: parts[1] + // The credential rides the segment after the secret: a guest JWT prefixed + // `guest.`, or an external JWT bare. The `guest.` prefix glues the marker to the + // token, so it can never be mistaken for a path or secret segment (which carry no + // `.`), and a bare token keeps the established external-JWT interpretation. + if (parts[1]?.startsWith('guest.')) { + return { secret: parts[0], jwt: undefined, guestJwt: parts[1].slice('guest.'.length) } } + return { secret: parts[0], jwt: parts[1], guestJwt: undefined } } const parsedSecret = parseSecret(page.params.secret ?? '') @@ -52,7 +65,9 @@ // Embedder side: validate access (using the main session cookie or the shared // JWT) and mint a scoped embed token for the opaque iframe (WIN-2006). async function fetchEmbedToken(opts?: { sdkConsent?: boolean }): Promise<{ token?: string }> { - if (parsedSecret.jwt) { + if (parsedSecret.guestJwt) { + OpenAPI.TOKEN = 'jwt_guest_' + parsedSecret.guestJwt + } else if (parsedSecret.jwt) { OpenAPI.TOKEN = 'jwt_ext_' + parsedSecret.jwt } const headers: Record = {} From 130a2f74083ba1bd308beeb86e2cbbaa41fd3345 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: hugocasa Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2026 12:38:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 09/16] feat: instrument sandbox isolation, data tables and in-flow script edits (#10981) * feat: instrument sandbox isolation, data tables and in-flow script edits Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GLnp4v49BozkDd3KeWn5Q3 * fix: address review findings on the new telemetry counters Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GLnp4v49BozkDd3KeWn5Q3 * refactor: inline single-site telemetry helpers and trim what is collected Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GLnp4v49BozkDd3KeWn5Q3 * docs: tighten the telemetry disclosure copy Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GLnp4v49BozkDd3KeWn5Q3 * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 5921c03c8e28642efd1c390f590c0dab9834fa99 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #780 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 548b5e0421a04a2d9a76cce6efc6c91b1d8560ee New ee-repo-ref: 5921c03c8e28642efd1c390f590c0dab9834fa99 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel --- ...23e16b5931c08c1073b09ab01dad205f161ed.json | 26 ++++++++++ ...8f9943111e0bac7d4fb478300f0cd8b799f23.json | 32 ++++++++++++ ...523709f837b7e1969b7364f70cc2a60cdd520.json | 26 ++++++++++ ...da82104a9ee39bfbe5d932340a3c2c209c5d0.json | 26 ++++++++++ ...b6f369eceb079b31ca118cae23c3d15314590.json | 26 ++++++++++ backend/ee-repo-ref.txt | 2 +- .../src/datatable_migrations.rs | 50 +++++++++++++++++++ .../windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs | 17 ++++++- docs/feature-telemetry.md | 7 +-- .../lib/components/DdlMigrationGuard.svelte | 4 ++ .../lib/components/InstanceSettings.svelte | 22 +++++--- .../apps/editor/AppEditorHeaderDeploy.svelte | 7 +++ .../flows/common/FlowCardHeader.svelte | 12 ++++- .../AddDataTableWizard.svelte | 8 +++ .../workspaceSettings/datatableTelemetry.ts | 41 +++++++++++++++ 15 files changed, 292 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-0411a67eb9d88244fa654eda51123e16b5931c08c1073b09ab01dad205f161ed.json create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-209c96d522f9683b39f053707568f9943111e0bac7d4fb478300f0cd8b799f23.json create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-2105d37be923a445933c899bb31523709f837b7e1969b7364f70cc2a60cdd520.json create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-9b727f03e74ea4a35146c9a339cda82104a9ee39bfbe5d932340a3c2c209c5d0.json create mode 100644 backend/.sqlx/query-d3a6a27ece3b5d5071dd8074b8db6f369eceb079b31ca118cae23c3d15314590.json create mode 100644 frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/datatableTelemetry.ts diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-0411a67eb9d88244fa654eda51123e16b5931c08c1073b09ab01dad205f161ed.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-0411a67eb9d88244fa654eda51123e16b5931c08c1073b09ab01dad205f161ed.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..67f2bbbe81 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-0411a67eb9d88244fa654eda51123e16b5931c08c1073b09ab01dad205f161ed.json @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "SELECT\n COALESCE(dt.value->'database'->>'resource_type', 'unknown') AS \"kind!\",\n COUNT(*)::BIGINT AS \"count!\"\n FROM workspace_settings ws,\n LATERAL jsonb_each(ws.datatable->'datatables') dt\n WHERE jsonb_typeof(ws.datatable->'datatables') = 'object'\n GROUP BY 1", + "describe": { + "columns": [ + { + "ordinal": 0, + "name": "kind!", + "type_info": "Text" + }, + { + "ordinal": 1, + "name": "count!", + "type_info": "Int8" + } + ], + "parameters": { + "Left": [] + }, + "nullable": [ + null, + null + ] + }, + "hash": "0411a67eb9d88244fa654eda51123e16b5931c08c1073b09ab01dad205f161ed" +} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-209c96d522f9683b39f053707568f9943111e0bac7d4fb478300f0cd8b799f23.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-209c96d522f9683b39f053707568f9943111e0bac7d4fb478300f0cd8b799f23.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..56128dab99 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-209c96d522f9683b39f053707568f9943111e0bac7d4fb478300f0cd8b799f23.json @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "SELECT\n COUNT(*) FILTER (WHERE dt.value->>'migrations_enabled' = 'true')::BIGINT AS \"enabled!\",\n COUNT(*) FILTER (WHERE dt.value->>'migrations_enabled' = 'false')::BIGINT AS \"disabled!\",\n COUNT(*) FILTER (WHERE dt.value->>'migrations_enabled' IS NULL)::BIGINT AS \"unset!\"\n FROM workspace_settings ws,\n LATERAL jsonb_each(ws.datatable->'datatables') dt\n WHERE jsonb_typeof(ws.datatable->'datatables') = 'object'", + "describe": { + "columns": [ + { + "ordinal": 0, + "name": "enabled!", + "type_info": "Int8" + }, + { + "ordinal": 1, + "name": "disabled!", + "type_info": "Int8" + }, + { + "ordinal": 2, + "name": "unset!", + "type_info": "Int8" + } + ], + "parameters": { + "Left": [] + }, + "nullable": [ + null, + null, + null + ] + }, + "hash": "209c96d522f9683b39f053707568f9943111e0bac7d4fb478300f0cd8b799f23" +} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-2105d37be923a445933c899bb31523709f837b7e1969b7364f70cc2a60cdd520.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-2105d37be923a445933c899bb31523709f837b7e1969b7364f70cc2a60cdd520.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c1ff273bcb --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-2105d37be923a445933c899bb31523709f837b7e1969b7364f70cc2a60cdd520.json @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "SELECT\n COUNT(*)::BIGINT AS \"total!\",\n COUNT(DISTINCT (workspace_id, datatable))::BIGINT AS \"datatables!\"\n FROM datatable_migrations", + "describe": { + "columns": [ + { + "ordinal": 0, + "name": "total!", + "type_info": "Int8" + }, + { + "ordinal": 1, + "name": "datatables!", + "type_info": "Int8" + } + ], + "parameters": { + "Left": [] + }, + "nullable": [ + null, + null + ] + }, + "hash": "2105d37be923a445933c899bb31523709f837b7e1969b7364f70cc2a60cdd520" +} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-9b727f03e74ea4a35146c9a339cda82104a9ee39bfbe5d932340a3c2c209c5d0.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-9b727f03e74ea4a35146c9a339cda82104a9ee39bfbe5d932340a3c2c209c5d0.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..30216f04e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-9b727f03e74ea4a35146c9a339cda82104a9ee39bfbe5d932340a3c2c209c5d0.json @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "SELECT\n COUNT(*) FILTER (WHERE av.raw_app = false)::BIGINT AS \"low_code!\",\n COUNT(*) FILTER (WHERE av.raw_app = true)::BIGINT AS \"raw!\"\n FROM app a\n JOIN app_version av ON av.id = a.versions[array_upper(a.versions, 1)]\n WHERE a.policy->>'sandbox' = 'true'", + "describe": { + "columns": [ + { + "ordinal": 0, + "name": "low_code!", + "type_info": "Int8" + }, + { + "ordinal": 1, + "name": "raw!", + "type_info": "Int8" + } + ], + "parameters": { + "Left": [] + }, + "nullable": [ + null, + null + ] + }, + "hash": "9b727f03e74ea4a35146c9a339cda82104a9ee39bfbe5d932340a3c2c209c5d0" +} diff --git a/backend/.sqlx/query-d3a6a27ece3b5d5071dd8074b8db6f369eceb079b31ca118cae23c3d15314590.json b/backend/.sqlx/query-d3a6a27ece3b5d5071dd8074b8db6f369eceb079b31ca118cae23c3d15314590.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ad5a3c9f56 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/.sqlx/query-d3a6a27ece3b5d5071dd8074b8db6f369eceb079b31ca118cae23c3d15314590.json @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +{ + "db_name": "PostgreSQL", + "query": "SELECT usage_kind::text AS \"kind!\", COUNT(*)::BIGINT AS \"count!\"\n FROM asset WHERE kind = 'datatable' AND usage_kind <> 'job'\n GROUP BY 1\n UNION ALL\n SELECT 'job_recent'::text, COUNT(DISTINCT (workspace_id, path))::BIGINT\n FROM asset\n WHERE kind = 'datatable' AND usage_kind = 'job'\n AND created_at > now() - interval '30 days'", + "describe": { + "columns": [ + { + "ordinal": 0, + "name": "kind!", + "type_info": "Text" + }, + { + "ordinal": 1, + "name": "count!", + "type_info": "Int8" + } + ], + "parameters": { + "Left": [] + }, + "nullable": [ + null, + null + ] + }, + "hash": "d3a6a27ece3b5d5071dd8074b8db6f369eceb079b31ca118cae23c3d15314590" +} diff --git a/backend/ee-repo-ref.txt b/backend/ee-repo-ref.txt index a07d475cb9..11e45db8a7 100644 --- a/backend/ee-repo-ref.txt +++ b/backend/ee-repo-ref.txt @@ -1 +1 @@ -c2270eb5fe2d9f0968253e6b460c33186363f4e7 +5921c03c8e28642efd1c390f590c0dab9834fa99 diff --git a/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/datatable_migrations.rs b/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/datatable_migrations.rs index bb4310d1bc..ef5ea37e1d 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/datatable_migrations.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/datatable_migrations.rs @@ -416,6 +416,16 @@ async fn run_datatable_migrations( let applied_versions = read_applied_versions_on_client(&client, &datatable_name).await?; + // How the user scoped the run, for the counter emitted on the first migration + // that lands below. + let scope = if query.only.is_some() { + "only" + } else if query.up_to.is_some() { + "up_to" + } else { + "all" + }; + let mut applied = Vec::new(); for m in migrations { if let Some(only) = query.only { @@ -453,6 +463,14 @@ async fn run_datatable_migrations( )) })?; applied.push(AppliedMigration { version: m.timestamp, name: m.name }); + // One event per run that moved the data table forward, emitted on the + // first migration that lands rather than after the loop: a later one + // failing returns early, and that run still advanced the data table. A + // run with nothing pending stays uncounted — it is the common outcome of + // opening the list and would drown out the runs that did something. + if applied.len() == 1 { + windmill_common::feature_usage::log_feature_usage("datatable", "migration_run", scope); + } } Ok(Json(RunDatatableMigrationsResult { applied })) @@ -594,6 +612,12 @@ async fn rollback_datatable_migrations( )) })?; + windmill_common::feature_usage::log_feature_usage( + "datatable", + "migration_rollback", + if query.only.is_some() { "only" } else { "last" }, + ); + Ok(Json(RollbackDatatableMigrationsResult { rolled_back: vec![RolledBackMigration { version, name: definition.name }], })) @@ -824,6 +848,8 @@ async fn enable_datatable_migrations( ) .await?; + windmill_common::feature_usage::log_feature_usage("datatable", "migrations_toggled", "on"); + Ok(format!( "Enabled migrations for data table {datatable_name}" )) @@ -892,6 +918,8 @@ async fn disable_datatable_migrations( .await?; } + windmill_common::feature_usage::log_feature_usage("datatable", "migrations_toggled", "off"); + Ok(format!( "Disabled migrations for data table {datatable_name} and deleted its migrations" )) @@ -1134,6 +1162,8 @@ async fn create_datatable_migration( ) .await?; + windmill_common::feature_usage::log_feature_usage("datatable", "migration_created", "manual"); + Ok(Json(DatatableMigration { datatable: datatable_name, timestamp, @@ -1371,6 +1401,20 @@ async fn upsert_datatable_migration( ) .await?; + // An unchanged re-push is not counted: `wmill sync push` sends every migration + // on every sync, so counting those would swamp the definitions people write. + if !unchanged { + windmill_common::feature_usage::log_feature_usage( + "datatable", + "migration_created", + if existing.is_none() { + "synced" + } else { + "edited" + }, + ); + } + Ok(format!( "Upserted migration {} in {}", payload.timestamp, datatable_name @@ -1477,6 +1521,12 @@ async fn generate_initial_datatable_migration( ) .await?; + windmill_common::feature_usage::log_feature_usage( + "datatable", + "migration_created", + "initial_snapshot", + ); + Ok(Json(DatatableMigration { datatable: datatable_name, timestamp, diff --git a/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs b/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs index 620e830a6a..c9343840d2 100644 --- a/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs +++ b/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs @@ -3524,6 +3524,9 @@ async fn edit_datatable_config( // Migrations opt-in is owned by the enable/disable endpoints, not this config // form: preserve each existing data table's flag, and default brand-new data // tables to enabled. + // Counted here rather than after the write because this is where a rename is + // still distinguishable from a creation; emitted once the commit lands. + let mut created_substrates: Vec<&'static str> = Vec::new(); for (name, dt) in new_config.settings.datatables.iter_mut() { let lookup = rename_src .get(name.as_str()) @@ -3531,7 +3534,15 @@ async fn edit_datatable_config( .unwrap_or(name.as_str()); dt.migrations_enabled = match old_datatables.get(lookup) { Some(old) => old.migrations_enabled, - None => Some(true), + None => { + // Keyed by how the substrate is serialized into `workspace_settings`, + // so these line up with the `datatable_configured` adoption counts. + created_substrates.push(match dt.database.resource_type { + DataTableCatalogResourceType::Instance => "instance", + DataTableCatalogResourceType::Postgresql => "postgresql", + }); + Some(true) + } }; } @@ -3589,6 +3600,10 @@ async fn edit_datatable_config( tx.commit().await?; + for substrate in created_substrates { + windmill_common::feature_usage::log_feature_usage("datatable", "created", substrate); + } + crate::datatable_migrations::record_datatable_cascade_deployments( &authed, &db, diff --git a/docs/feature-telemetry.md b/docs/feature-telemetry.md index 5cef3c9364..f5ce2357ca 100644 --- a/docs/feature-telemetry.md +++ b/docs/feature-telemetry.md @@ -4,9 +4,10 @@ anonymous usage-stats payload. It answers "does anyone use this, and which variant do they pick" without any identifying data leaving the instance. -It currently carries 32 registered actions across fifteen features (`ai_session`, `ai_chat`, -`ai_fix`, `ai_agent`, `ai_agent_eval`, `flow_editor`, `flow_run`, `flow_step`, `run_form`, -`debugger`, `trigger`, `command_script`, `hub_script`, `usage_meter`, `sso_groups_claim`). Nearly all of the +It currently carries 42 registered actions across seventeen features (`ai_session`, `ai_chat`, +`ai_fix`, `ai_agent`, `ai_agent_eval`, `app_sandbox`, `datatable`, `flow_editor`, `flow_run`, +`flow_step`, `run_form`, `debugger`, `trigger`, `command_script`, `hub_script`, `usage_meter`, +`sso_groups_claim`). Nearly all of the product is uninstrumented, so new user-facing work is the opportunity to change that. ## When to instrument diff --git a/frontend/src/lib/components/DdlMigrationGuard.svelte b/frontend/src/lib/components/DdlMigrationGuard.svelte index b6833521f8..ae5182f560 100644 --- a/frontend/src/lib/components/DdlMigrationGuard.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/lib/components/DdlMigrationGuard.svelte @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import NewDataTableMigrationModal from './workspaceSettings/NewDataTableMigrationModal.svelte' import DataTableMigrationsButton from './workspaceSettings/DataTableMigrationsButton.svelte' import { splitSqlStatements, isDdlStatement } from './sqlDdl' + import { logDdlGuardChoice } from './workspaceSettings/datatableTelemetry' import { CornerDownLeft } from 'lucide-svelte' let { workspace, datatable }: { workspace: string; datatable: string } = $props() @@ -97,9 +98,11 @@ for (;;) { const choice = await promptDdl(statement) if (choice === 'cancel') { + logDdlGuardChoice('cancelled') return { proceed: false, code, ranMigration: migrationRan } } if (choice === 'run') { + logDdlGuardChoice('run_anyway') kept.push(statement) break } @@ -107,6 +110,7 @@ // created; if the modal was cancelled, loop back to the prompt. const created = await openMigrationModal(statement) if (created) { + logDdlGuardChoice('migrated') break } } diff --git a/frontend/src/lib/components/InstanceSettings.svelte b/frontend/src/lib/components/InstanceSettings.svelte index 19f2477e37..d124569929 100644 --- a/frontend/src/lib/components/InstanceSettings.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/lib/components/InstanceSettings.svelte @@ -1076,12 +1076,15 @@ model identifiers, the names of public hub scripts used, the languages debug sessions are started for, whether AI chat skills are turned on or off and how often one is loaded, whether SSO logins evaluate an IdP groups claim (SAML or OIDC) and change a - membership, and the plan tier and quota shown when the execution meter is opened, last - 30 days)
  • feature adoption (counts of which flow, script, trigger and worker features your - deployed items use)
    • feature adoption (counts of which flow, script, trigger, worker and data table + features your deployed items use, including how many apps run sandboxed, how many data + tables exist per database kind, how many use migrations, and what references them)
  • resource counts (workspaces, scripts per language, flows, workflows as code, low-code @@ -1135,12 +1138,15 @@ model identifiers, the names of public hub scripts used, the languages debug sessions are started for, whether AI chat skills are turned on or off and how often one is loaded, whether SSO logins evaluate an IdP groups claim (SAML or OIDC) and change a - membership, and the plan tier and quota shown when the execution meter is opened, last - 30 days)
  • feature adoption (counts of which flow, script, trigger and worker features your - deployed items use)
    • feature adoption (counts of which flow, script, trigger, worker and data table + features your deployed items use, including how many apps run sandboxed, how many data + tables exist per database kind, how many use migrations, and what references them)
  • resource counts (workspaces, scripts per language, flows, workflows as code, low-code diff --git a/frontend/src/lib/components/apps/editor/AppEditorHeaderDeploy.svelte b/frontend/src/lib/components/apps/editor/AppEditorHeaderDeploy.svelte index c88a20bc99..7b68389d82 100644 --- a/frontend/src/lib/components/apps/editor/AppEditorHeaderDeploy.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/lib/components/apps/editor/AppEditorHeaderDeploy.svelte @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ } from '$lib/components/OnBehalfOfSelector.svelte' import { canUserBypassRuleKind, protectionRulesState } from '$lib/workspaceProtectionRules.svelte' import { FRONTEND_SDK_SCOPES } from '$lib/components/raw_apps/sdkScopes' + import { logFeatureUsage } from '$lib/utils/featureUsage' const WM_DEPLOYERS_GROUP = 'wm_deployers' @@ -352,6 +353,12 @@ checked={policy.sandbox == true} on:change={(e) => { policy.sandbox = e.detail || undefined + // Counted where the toggle is flipped rather than where the policy is + // persisted: a not-yet-deployed app only mutates it locally, and skipping + // those would read as unused in the case where it is picked up front. + logFeatureUsage('app_sandbox', 'toggled', { + key: `${rawApp ? 'raw' : 'low_code'}:${e.detail ? 'on' : 'off'}` + }) // Frontend API access exists only for a sandboxed app, so turning // isolation off drops the declared scopes with it rather than leaving // them set but inert. diff --git a/frontend/src/lib/components/flows/common/FlowCardHeader.svelte b/frontend/src/lib/components/flows/common/FlowCardHeader.svelte index 33b47a9cb5..063367cc85 100644 --- a/frontend/src/lib/components/flows/common/FlowCardHeader.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/lib/components/flows/common/FlowCardHeader.svelte @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import { sendUserToast, type Item } from '$lib/utils' import { twMerge } from 'tailwind-merge' import { getToolNameError } from '$lib/components/flows/agentToolUtils' + import { logFeatureUsage } from '$lib/utils/featureUsage' import autosize from '$lib/autosize' interface Props { @@ -104,7 +105,16 @@ if (flowModuleValue?.type !== 'script') return const hash = flowModuleValue.hash ?? (await getLatestHashForScript(flowModuleValue.path, opWs)) - $scriptEditorDrawer?.openDrawer(hash, () => { + // Same reason the settings item below is gated: the local-dev editors publish + // the context store but never render the drawer, so an unmounted one makes + // this a no-op — and a no-op must not be counted as an editor open. + const drawer = $scriptEditorDrawer + if (!drawer) return + logFeatureUsage('flow_step', 'script_edit', { key: 'opened' }) + // The drawer only runs this callback once a new version is deployed, so it is + // what separates opening the editor from actually editing the script here. + drawer.openDrawer(hash, () => { + logFeatureUsage('flow_step', 'script_edit', { key: 'saved' }) dispatch('reload') sendUserToast('Script has been updated') }) diff --git a/frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/AddDataTableWizard.svelte b/frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/AddDataTableWizard.svelte index 3495bdbee0..0300ddf310 100644 --- a/frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/AddDataTableWizard.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/AddDataTableWizard.svelte @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ import DataTableConnectionReport from './DataTableConnectionReport.svelte' import { useSupabaseOauth } from './supabaseOauth.svelte' import { probeDatatableConnection } from './datatableProbe' + import { logDatatableWizard } from './datatableTelemetry' import { anythingClaimed, claimOf, @@ -526,11 +527,13 @@ await loadTargetUser() reset(parked ?? resume) opened = true + logDatatableWizard({ step: 'opened' }) } function selectProvider(key: Provider) { if (key === wiz.provider) return wiz.provider = key + logDatatableWizard({ step: 'picked', provider: key }) invalidate() if (key === 'instance') wiz.instance.dbName ??= defaultInstanceDbName() } @@ -833,6 +836,11 @@ createdProjects } } + // The setup's own verdict, so a data table that exists counts as done even when the + // caller's appended `onFinishAlso` step failed after it. + if (wiz.provider) { + logDatatableWizard({ step: result?.ok ? 'done' : 'failed', provider: wiz.provider }) + } onDone() } } diff --git a/frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/datatableTelemetry.ts b/frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/datatableTelemetry.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8dab8e71f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/datatableTelemetry.ts @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +import { logFeatureUsage } from '$lib/utils/featureUsage' + +// Anonymous counters for the data table surfaces the backend cannot see: which substrate the +// add-wizard is pointed at and how far a run gets, and what the DDL guard talks people into. +// Same rules as every other `logFeatureUsage` caller: aggregated counts only, and the keys +// below are the whole vocabulary — no data table name, connection string, resource path or SQL +// ever reaches here. + +/** The substrate a wizard run is pointed at. Mirrors the wizard's own `Provider`. */ +export type DatatableWizardProvider = 'supabase' | 'instance' | 'resource' + +export type DatatableWizardEvent = + /** The wizard was opened, including a run resumed from the Supabase redirect. */ + | { step: 'opened' } + /** A substrate was picked. Re-picking a different one counts again, by design: the + * abandoned branch is the interesting half of a funnel. */ + | { step: 'picked'; provider: DatatableWizardProvider } + /** A run finished, with the verdict the checklist reported. */ + | { step: 'done' | 'failed'; provider: DatatableWizardProvider } + +export function logDatatableWizard(event: DatatableWizardEvent): void { + const key = event.step === 'opened' ? 'opened' : `${event.step}_${event.provider}` + logFeatureUsage('datatable', 'wizard', { key }) +} + +export type DdlGuardChoice = + /** The DDL was run ad-hoc, against the guard's advice. */ + | 'run_anyway' + /** The DDL became a migration definition. */ + | 'migrated' + /** The statement was abandoned, so nothing ran. */ + | 'cancelled' + +/** + * Counted once per prompt that reaches a terminal choice. Picking "create a migration" and then + * dismissing the modal loops back to the prompt instead, and is deliberately not counted: it is + * the same statement still undecided, not a fourth outcome. + */ +export function logDdlGuardChoice(choice: DdlGuardChoice): void { + logFeatureUsage('datatable', 'ddl_guard', { key: choice }) +} From 1901d3193bfc6a9e29d0b7c5389fef44ff9d3687 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guilhem Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2026 12:38:44 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 10/16] fix: keep the instance user editor popover inside the viewport (#10979) * fix: keep the instance user editor popover inside the viewport Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A5v4NFqdTaZdkR8Ua1nr13 * fix: drop inert flex and min-h-0 classes from the user editor popover Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A5v4NFqdTaZdkR8Ua1nr13 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) --- .../src/lib/components/InstanceNameEditor.svelte | 13 ++++++------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/frontend/src/lib/components/InstanceNameEditor.svelte b/frontend/src/lib/components/InstanceNameEditor.svelte index 3b5cce4945..9d21da963c 100644 --- a/frontend/src/lib/components/InstanceNameEditor.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/lib/components/InstanceNameEditor.svelte @@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import { createEventDispatcher } from 'svelte' import Button from './common/button/Button.svelte' import Popover from './meltComponents/Popover.svelte' - import { offset, flip, shift } from 'svelte-floating-ui/dom' import ChangeInstanceUsernameInner from './ChangeInstanceUsernameInner.svelte' import ChangeInstanceEmailInner from './ChangeInstanceEmailInner.svelte' import { UserService } from '$lib/gen' @@ -53,11 +52,8 @@ {#snippet trigger()} @@ -66,7 +62,10 @@ > {/snippet} {#snippet content()} -
    + +
    Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2026 12:39:44 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 11/16] fix(frontend): render ordered lists in markdown descriptions (#10973) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit * fix(frontend): render ordered lists in markdown descriptions `GfmMarkdown` defaulted to `prose-xs`, which Tailwind Typography does not define — the class only ever matched four hand-rolled rules in app.css, all scoped to `ul`. Every surface on that default (script and flow descriptions, flow-graph notes, markdown job results) therefore rendered `
      ` with Preflight's `list-style: none` and no typography at all: no numbers, no heading or paragraph rhythm. Route the default through the shared `markdownProse` stacks instead, and cut the app.css list rules down to the dash glyph so ordered and unordered lists share Tailwind Typography's indentation and rhythm. Fixes #10971 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S6G5gDXJnm6uqch4uCPkPE * fix(frontend): address review nits on the markdown prose fix - default `GfmMarkdown` to the `sm` stack rather than `xs`: the AI-agent tool Message pane takes the default and has no ancestor font size, so `xs` left it smaller than its own label. The group note, whose wrapper is `text-2xs`, opts down explicitly. - regenerate `static/tailwind_full.css`, which raw apps are served and which still carried the deleted list rules. - correct the marker-color rationale: the typography config already maps markers to tertiary, so the rule steps them up rather than rescuing them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S6G5gDXJnm6uqch4uCPkPE * fix(frontend): make the note color override an arbitrary value `text-inherit` is not generated: this config replaces the Tailwind color palette outright and defines no `inherit` key, so `[&_*]:!text-inherit` compiled to nothing and notes still rendered in the prose stack's `text-primary`. Verified in the browser: a yellow note's list items now compute to `text-yellow-900`, matching the wrapper and the edit-mode textarea, in both themes. Also drop the `static/tailwind_full.css` regeneration. That file was generated with tailwind 3.4.1 against a config predating the typography theme overrides; rebuilding it today sweeps in 250KB of unrelated churn and would flip every raw app's `.prose` palette from stock gray to Windmill tokens. Its staleness predates this PR and is its own change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S6G5gDXJnm6uqch4uCPkPE --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) --- frontend/src/lib/assets/app.css | 23 ++++++------------- .../src/lib/components/DisplayResult.svelte | 3 ++- .../src/lib/components/GfmMarkdown.svelte | 7 +++--- .../lib/components/graph/GroupNoteArea.svelte | 6 ++--- .../src/lib/components/graph/noteColors.ts | 9 ++++++++ .../graph/renderers/nodes/NoteNode.svelte | 4 +++- frontend/src/lib/components/markdownProse.ts | 4 ++-- 7 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/frontend/src/lib/assets/app.css b/frontend/src/lib/assets/app.css index 760f4c0261..f6dc648234 100644 --- a/frontend/src/lib/assets/app.css +++ b/frontend/src/lib/assets/app.css @@ -209,33 +209,24 @@ U+1fac6, U+1fae0-1fae6, U+1fae8-1faea, U+1faef-1faf8; } - .prose-xs ul { - margin-top: 0.5rem; - list-style-type: '- '; - padding-left: 1.5rem; - } - + /* Bullets read as a dash rather than a disc. Only the glyph is overridden: + indentation and vertical rhythm stay with Tailwind Typography so ordered + and unordered lists line up with each other. */ .prose ul { - margin-top: 1.5rem; list-style-type: '- '; - padding-left: 3rem; } - /* The '- ' list markers, horizontal rules and blockquote bars otherwise - fall through to Tailwind Typography's default bullet/border colors, which - are nearly invisible on dark backgrounds (e.g. the AI chat). Use - theme-aware tokens so they stay readable in both light and dark mode. */ - .prose-xs ul > li::marker, - .prose ul > li::marker { + /* List markers, horizontal rules and blockquote bars take the tertiary/light + tokens the typography config maps them to, which is too faint to read on + the denser markdown surfaces (e.g. the AI chat). Step them up one. */ + .prose :is(ul, ol) > li::marker { color: rgb(var(--color-text-secondary)); } - .prose-xs hr, .prose hr { border-top-color: rgb(var(--color-border-normal)); } - .prose-xs blockquote, .prose blockquote { border-left-color: rgb(var(--color-border-normal)); } diff --git a/frontend/src/lib/components/DisplayResult.svelte b/frontend/src/lib/components/DisplayResult.svelte index 8208fb193e..47bafa4d5a 100644 --- a/frontend/src/lib/components/DisplayResult.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/lib/components/DisplayResult.svelte @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ import Alert from './common/alert/Alert.svelte' import AutoDataTable from './table/AutoDataTable.svelte' import Markdown from 'svelte-exmarkdown' + import { markdownProse } from './markdownProse' import Toggle from './Toggle.svelte' import FileDownload from './common/fileDownload/FileDownload.svelte' @@ -1229,7 +1230,7 @@
    {:else if !forceJson && resultKind === 'markdown'} -
    +
    {:else if largeObject || hasBigInt} diff --git a/frontend/src/lib/components/GfmMarkdown.svelte b/frontend/src/lib/components/GfmMarkdown.svelte index 50fa3cda45..7a30490ba9 100644 --- a/frontend/src/lib/components/GfmMarkdown.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/lib/components/GfmMarkdown.svelte @@ -6,12 +6,11 @@ interface Props { md: string noPadding?: boolean - /** Shared prose stack to render with. Omitted keeps the legacy `prose-xs`, - * which the flow-graph notes are laid out against. */ + /** Shared prose stack to render with. */ prose?: MarkdownProseSize } - let { md, noPadding, prose }: Props = $props() + let { md, noPadding, prose = 'sm' }: Props = $props() // Rendering markdown turns `![](url)` into a real ``, i.e. a request. On the // public replay page the source is a recording from an arbitrary origin and the @@ -21,7 +20,7 @@ let asPlainText = $derived(isOfflineReplay()) -
    +
    {#if asPlainText}

    {md}

    {:else} diff --git a/frontend/src/lib/components/graph/GroupNoteArea.svelte b/frontend/src/lib/components/graph/GroupNoteArea.svelte index 1b4562e8d0..ced0f4deae 100644 --- a/frontend/src/lib/components/graph/GroupNoteArea.svelte +++ b/frontend/src/lib/components/graph/GroupNoteArea.svelte @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@