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datatable-external-instance-2
12
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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448fce93f7 |
fix: make the native trigger disable/enable toggle actually save (#11024)
* feat: let a native trigger be disabled without deleting it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: show and control the native trigger pause outside the flow editor Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: create a native trigger already paused instead of pausing it after Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: correct the native trigger enabled comments for create-time init Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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8aab5034a6 |
feat: guest JWT entry for embedded apps (#10954)
* feat: guest JWT entry for embedded apps (jwt_guest_) A second way in for a guest, alongside the signed-in guest session: a JWT the embedding customer's backend mints and signs, verified per request against a per-workspace key (a PEM public key or a JWKS URL), resolving to the same seatless guest identity confined to the one app its app_path claim names. Bearer prefix jwt_guest_, stateless (no token row). See PR #10954. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: surface guest JWT as the embed method in the app deploy drawer The deploy drawer explained the secret-URL embed but not the guest JWT path, so the primary way to embed an app for a customer's own authenticated users was undiscoverable. For a guest-mode app with guests enabled, show how to mint a `jwt_guest_` token and append `guest.<jwt>` to the app URL, with a copyable iframe template pre-filled with this app's workspace_id and app_path, and a note that new guest emails are refused past the instance's free allowance (the live count is shown just above). Also log a guest JWT allowance refusal at warn, not info: the caller gets a bare 401 (the reason must not leak to an unauthenticated caller), so the log is the admin's signal that the instance hit its guest cap. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: correct the guest JWT minting instructions in the embed block The block said "sign it with the workspace's guest JWT key", but that setting holds the public verification key. Clarify the keypair relationship (configure the public key or a JWKS URL in the workspace; sign with the matching private key), name the accepted algorithms (RS/PS/ES; HS* refused), and keep the required claims, so an embedder knows how to actually mint the token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: fall back to the instance JWT issuer for guest verification (off on cloud) A workspace with no guest key of its own now verifies guest JWTs against the instance issuer (JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL, already used by jwt_ext_), so an operator running one issuer configures it once. Verification and the guest grant are CE; granting a full login from that issuer stays EE (jwt_ext_, unchanged). Disabled under CLOUD_HOSTED, where one instance issuer must not be trusted to mint guests in every tenant's workspace — there the per-workspace key is the only source, which also stays the override everywhere. The workspace settings note (hidden on cloud) explains the fallback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: embed instructions cover both the workspace key and instance issuer The embed block said to set the workspace's guest JWT key; now it says Windmill verifies against the workspace key or, off cloud, the instance issuer (JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL) when no workspace key is set. The instance clause is hidden under isCloudHosted(). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: show the guest JWT embed block only when Embed is toggled It belongs with the iframe snippet, not the plain-URL view, so gate it on embedMode alongside the guest-mode / guests-enabled checks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: trust the instance issuer in the guest fallback; refresh stale docs P1 (CI review): the fallback wrapped JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL as a workspace JwksUrl, so it hit validate_guest_jwks_url and was refused for http/private issuers unless ALLOW_PRIVATE_GUEST_JWKS_URLS was also set — a self-hosted internal issuer that works for jwt_ext_ failed for guests, though the UI says setting the env var is enough. fetch_jwks now fetches the instance issuer without the https/private restriction (matching the jwt_ext_ loader; it stays operator-trusted), while a workspace-admin URL is validated and pinned as before. All the size/key/URL bounds still apply to both. P2 (CI review): refresh the stale docs that said a missing workspace key always refuses a guest JWT — the module, bearer, key-source, and EditGuestJwtKey field docs now describe the workspace key with the off-cloud instance-issuer fallback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: fetch the trusted instance issuer like the jwt_ext_ loader P1 (CI review): the instance-issuer fetch skipped SSRF validation but still disabled redirects and default cert validation, so an instance issuer that works for jwt_ext_ through a redirect or an operator-approved self-signed cert failed the guest fallback. Fetch it with HTTP_CLIENT_PERMISSIVE (follows redirects, honors ACCEPT_INVALID_CERTS) — the same behavior jwt_ext_ has — while a workspace-admin URL stays validated, DNS-pinned and redirect-free. The body size cap still bounds both. P2 (CI review): the WorkspaceSettings field doc still said None/None means no JWT guests; it now names the off-cloud instance-issuer fallback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: schema summary + OpenAPI cover the guest JWT columns and fallback P2 (CI review): summarized_schema.txt was missing guest_activity.jwt_entry and the two workspace_settings guest-JWT key columns (required by docs/validation.md after a schema change). The edit_guest_jwt_key OpenAPI description now notes that clearing the workspace key falls back to the instance issuer (JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL) off cloud rather than necessarily stopping guest JWTs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep JWKS single-flight locks in a self-cleaning map, not a bounded cache P1 (CI review): JWKS_FETCH_LOCKS was a 200-entry quick_cache. Past 200 cold URLs it can evict a lock whose fetch is still in flight; the next request for that URL then mints a fresh lock and starts a second fetch, so cycling configured workspaces defeats single-flight and can storm the issuers. Replace it with a plain map guarded by a JwksFetchLock RAII handle that removes each entry once its last holder drops, so the map only ever holds the fetches in flight and never evicts an in-flight lock. Add a unit test pinning the shared-lock and self-cleaning invariants. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to c2270eb5fe2d9f0968253e6b460c33186363f4e7 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #773 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 5a1d9dee34159512c0823fddcd3d096490edbcce New ee-repo-ref: c2270eb5fe2d9f0968253e6b460c33186363f4e7 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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c2deea13b7 |
fix(security): a WM_TOKEN job token can never be a global superadmin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr) (#10124)
* fix(security): a WM_TOKEN job token can never be a global superadmin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr)
Privilege escalation: an app/flow/schedule/trigger execution policy's `on_behalf_of`
(which a `wm_deployers` member can set) could point at a superadmin email. The
resulting job `WM_TOKEN` then passed the email-based superadmin checks, granting
instance superadmin. `forbid_superadmin_job_token` only guarded ~15 of ~75 routes.
Fix at the token layer: a WM_TOKEN must never satisfy a superadmin gate,
regardless of whose email it runs as (sentinel OR a real superadmin).
- `ApiAuthed` gains a `job_id` field, stamped once in `AuthCache::get_opt_job_authed`
from the resolved token's job_id (correct even on cache hits).
- `require_super_admin(db, email)` -> `require_super_admin(db, &ApiAuthed)`, rejects
`authed.job_id.is_some()`. `require_super_admin_email` kept for the few internal
callers without an ApiAuthed.
- `is_super_admin_authed(db, &ApiAuthed)` for the boolean `is_super_admin_email`
authorization branches on request handlers (workspace deletion, fork drops,
dev-workspace attach/archive, object-storage SSRF exemption, custom dbname, EE GHES
+ connected repositories, ...). Migrate ~75 sites (OSS + EE).
- CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB reads the *authenticated* job_id, not the caller-supplied
`?job_id` query param. Worker-tag check takes a precomputed job-aware `is_super_admin`
on the request path.
Execution-time on-behalf checks (scheduled/flow worker-tag, Cloud enqueue quota,
is_devops_email) are hardened in a follow-up — see
docs/followup-onbehalf-execution-privilege-hardening.md.
Regression tests: a superadmin-email WM_TOKEN is rejected on `require_super_admin`
routes, on `DELETE /workspaces/delete/{w}` (403, workspace preserved), and on the
CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB lookup with no `?job_id` (401); real superadmin tokens still succeed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap devops role at workspace admin and reject reserved on_behalf_of identities
Extends the job-token cap with three pieces:
- `require_devops_role` takes `&ApiAuthed` and rejects job tokens.
`is_devops_email` is true for superadmin emails, so every worker-management,
instance-config and service-log route was reachable by the same superadmin
`WM_TOKEN` that `require_super_admin` already rejects.
- A `job_id` claim that does not parse as a uuid rejects the token rather than
resolving to `None`, which would clear the job provenance and uncap it. Applies
to the internal JWT and the external `jwt_ext_` path.
- Defense in depth at store time: `validate_on_behalf_of` refuses the reserved
internal sentinels as an `on_behalf_of` on apps/flows/scripts/schedules/triggers,
and app execution refuses a policy carrying one — covering already-persisted and
forked-app rows that predate the cap. Deploying on behalf of a real user,
including a real superadmin, stays allowed; the cap handles that at execution.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): preserve job-token provenance when minting the proxy JWT
The MCP endpoint-tool proxy re-mints a JWT from the caller's ApiAuthed to
forward the proxied request, but passed job_id: None. A job's WM_TOKEN is
capped at workspace admin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr); dropping the job_id here
re-minted an uncapped token that satisfies require_super_admin /
require_devops_role on the proxied route (e.g. listWorkers exposing worker
IPs, job/workspace IDs, and sensitive tags).
Carry api_authed.job_id into create_jwt_token. Adds an in-module regression
that decodes the forwarded JWT and asserts the job_id is preserved for a job
caller and absent for a non-job caller.
Reported by Codex CI review (P1) on #10124.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the admin-or-devops gate at workspace admin for job tokens
require_admin_or_devops (the EE critical-alerts endpoints) grants when the
caller is a workspace admin OR an instance devops. is_devops_email is true
for superadmins, so a WM_TOKEN running on-behalf of a superadmin who is not a
member of the target workspace could clear the devops branch and read/ack that
workspace's critical alerts (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr). This gate takes a bare
email, not an ApiAuthed, so the token-layer cap could not see it.
Thread the caller's job-token provenance and reject the devops branch for job
tokens, matching require_devops_role. The workspace-admin branch stays allowed
— that is the cap ceiling. Adds an enterprise-gated regression proving the
bypass is closed and a real superadmin token still clears the gate.
Found while auditing the PR for bare-email gates the choke-point cap misses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap instance-global is_admin gates at workspace admin for job tokens
Three instance-global routes gate on the caller's own `is_admin` claim, which
`ApiAuthed.is_admin` carries into a WM_TOKEN (it is a workspace-admin claim,
true for superadmins too). A job token is capped at workspace admin
(GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr), so its is_admin claim must not authorize instance
actions on a route with no workspace binding:
- `unarchive_workspace` — unarchive an arbitrary workspace by id
- `prune_concurrency_group` — delete a global concurrency group
- `list_worker_groups` — return unobfuscated `env_vars_static` (may hold secrets)
Add job-token-aware `is_instance_admin` / `require_instance_admin` helpers (the
same shape as `require_super_admin` / `require_devops_role`) and use them at
these three sites. Workspace-scoped `require_admin(authed.is_admin, ...)` gates
are intentionally left unchanged — a workspace-admin job token is within the
cap there. Regression added covering all three; verified it lets a WM_TOKEN
unarchive/leak without the fix and is blocked with it.
Reported by Codex CI review (P1) on #10124.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): drop orphaned path_field_renames from EndpointTool test helper
The merge with main adopted main's mcp path-substitution refactor (#10162),
which removed the `path_field_renames` field from `EndpointTool` and its
consumer (`substitute_path_params` no longer takes per-field path renames).
main's `runner.rs` `ep` test helper still constructed the struct with
`path_field_renames: None`, so the workspace test build (cargo test --all,
which compiles windmill-mcp's own #[cfg(test)] module under the `server`
feature) failed with E0560. A plain `cargo check` does not compile that test
module, so it only surfaced in CI's cargo_test.
Remove the orphaned field to match the struct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: describe the sentinel-rejection policy the forged-identity test asserts
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: complete ApiAuthed initializers in feature-gated tests after merge
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: stop job tokens minting credentials that shed their provenance
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the MCP OAuth approval mint at the same elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the self-service password reset at the elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap app embed/SDK mints and scope widening at the elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep job tokens from destroying the account they run on behalf of
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: deny job tokens a foreign-workspace admin claim and workspace ejection
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: keep the follow-up inventory in the PR instead of the repo
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: make the session workspace status gate job-token aware
session_workspace_status derived its superadmin branch from a bare email
check, so a job token carrying a superadmin identity resolved the existence
of workspaces it has no relationship with rather than seeing them as
deleted. Switch to is_super_admin_authed, matching every other instance
gate reached from a request ApiAuthed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* revert: leave the global concurrency-group listing on the plain admin gate
The listing exposes concurrency keys across workspaces, which is metadata
rather than a capability, and it 401s rather than degrading. Keep the guard
on the prune route next to it, which is the destructive one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep the instance-admin gate on the global concurrency listing
The listing spans every workspace's concurrency keys, and the gate rejects
only job tokens: the !is_admin branch is the pre-existing check, so
workspaced tokens and interactive admins are unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to d30af67d38954f9012f7bad08da23e347344b4c6
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #664 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 7870573dbc3360f99bada143f094c67dce0d9e9c
New ee-repo-ref: d30af67d38954f9012f7bad08da23e347344b4c6
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: hugocasa <hugo@casademont.ch>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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4f03aa91a7 |
fix: report why a native trigger service refused instead of a 500 (#10463)
* fix: report why a native trigger service refused instead of a 500 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the cause of an unreachable trigger service in the message Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: degrade a trigger read only for the service's own failures Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: tell a refresh outage apart from a rejected refresh grant Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: treat a rate-limited or timed-out service as an outage, not a refusal Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep a token endpoint's status out of the trigger's Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: read a refused refresh grant off the body, not only the status Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let a throttled 403 read as an outage, not a permission refusal Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: classify a refresh refusal by its OAuth code, and Google quotas by domain Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: recognize GitHub's other wording for a throttled request Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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bd7156682d |
fix: keep native triggers attached when a runnable is renamed (#10432)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszelandwindmill-internal-app[bot]
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dda59767c2 |
feat: stamp webhook trigger_kind on token-driven job runs (#10431)
* feat: stamp ui vs webhook trigger_kind on direct job runs * fix: gate ui trigger kind on min worker version and dedupe display names * docs: state that the ui trigger kind attributes rather than proves * refactor: fold the trigger fallback into one trigger_or_fallback helper * feat: hold trigger_kind as a tolerant label on the worker paths * chore: refresh the sqlx offline cache for the trigger_kind label queries * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7de7daff5eed410e0c815ad6b292d2b4303f02f2 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #700 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 974ab910d9a30c5565e1198ee312acc6d11239f3 New ee-repo-ref: 7de7daff5eed410e0c815ad6b292d2b4303f02f2 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * fix: keep the API job structs tolerant of unknown trigger kinds too * chore: point ee-repo-ref at the merged EE main --------- Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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3716a71fd7 |
fix: credit the token owner instead of the token label in the audit trail (#10423)
* fix: credit the token owner instead of the token label in the audit trail Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review findings on token-owner audit attribution Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: carry token-label provenance explicitly instead of inferring it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: point ee-repo-ref at the companion branch Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: trust only non-forgeable token labels to name the acting entity Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: reject reserved system-token labels at token creation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: narrow the token-label guard to server-minted namespaces Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: add the provenance field to the remaining ApiAuthed literals Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stop trusting the email- label, which no mint produces Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.8
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6156e2372a |
fix: gate native integration pickers behind non-operator check (#9465)
Operators are read-only and cannot create native triggers, yet the google/github/nextcloud integration picker routes had no authorization gate, letting any workspace member drive the admin-configured integration's upstream API and enumerate its data (Drive files, repo names, calendars, events). Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d666e8431c |
feat: read-only flag on API tokens (#9144)
* feat: read-only flag on API tokens, orthogonal to scopes Add a per-token `read_only` boolean set at creation time. When true, the token can only call HTTP methods classified as Read (GET/HEAD/OPTIONS). Mutating methods and job-run actions are rejected with 403, regardless of which scopes are attached. Surfaced as a prominent toggle in the standard token-creation flow and a discreet `2xs` toggle in MCP mode (where users often want write access, so we don't bias them toward enabling it). MCP enforcement: read-only tokens hide all script/flow/hub tools from `list_tools` and only see endpoint tools whose method is GET, and the runner rejects `call_tool` on anything mutating. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: review fixes for read-only token flag - Exempt /api/mcp/* and /mcp/* paths from the read-only middleware check. MCP transport runs over POST (streamable HTTP / SSE), so otherwise the middleware would 403 every MCP request before the runner could enforce read-only at the tool-call level. - Tighten is_endpoint_read_only to GET only, matching the read_only_hint that create_endpoint_annotations actually emits. - Add unit test for check_read_only_for_route covering GET/HEAD/OPTIONS, mutating methods, and run paths. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump ee-repo-ref to read-only-trigger-toggle Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): make read-only toggle discreet in both modes Match the MCP-mode treatment in standard mode: text-tertiary, 2xs, shared "Read-only" label. The tooltip switches per mode so the explanation still fits the context. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): gate read-only toggle behind Limit token permissions The read-only toggle now only shows when the user has limited the token's scopes (standard mode) or in MCP mode (which always picks an MCP scope). Turning the limit off also resets read-only so it doesn't silently stick. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(frontend): hide incompatible MCP tools when read-only is on When the read-only toggle is on in MCP mode: - Endpoint badges and the custom-mode endpoint MultiSelect filter to GET. - Already-selected non-GET endpoints are pruned from the scope. - The scripts/flows preview is replaced with a note explaining they're hidden (the runner already rejects script/flow runs for read-only). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): place read-only toggle at top of limited scope area The previous gate required at least one scope to be picked before the read-only toggle appeared, which made it look missing while the user was still building their scope list. Move the toggle inside ScopesPicker: - Standard mode: sits directly under the "Limit token permissions" toggle whenever Limit is on, before the scope selector. - MCP mode: sits at the top of the MCP scope block. readOnly is now $bindable on ScopesPicker so CreateToken still owns the value. The auto-reset on un-limit moves into ScopesPicker too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): nest read-only toggle inside the scope list card Place the read-only toggle at the top of the scope list (between the Selected Scopes summary and the bordered domain list) via a new optional topSlot snippet on ScopeSelector. Keeps ScopeSelector decoupled from read-only specifics; ScopesPicker fills the slot. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 9bc8160be50b3e57a60daf4e1b71c389a6e02b8a This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #571 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: f53d26e6685dfd60bfa67686fbd7358169cfd130 New ee-repo-ref: 9bc8160be50b3e57a60daf4e1b71c389a6e02b8a Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * fix: address CI review for read-only token flag - P1 (Codex): narrow the MCP middleware exemption from "any /api/mcp/*" to just the streamable HTTP transport endpoints (/api/mcp/gateway, /api/mcp/w/{ws}/{mcp,sse,list_tools}). Without this, a read-only token could POST /api/mcp/gateway/oauth/server/approve and mint a follow-on non-read-only MCP token via the OAuth code/token exchange. - P2 (Claude/cubic): fix test comment/assertion mismatch — the run-path assertion now exercises GET (which is what the RUN_PATH_ACTIONS elevation comment describes) in addition to POST. Add a regression assertion for /api/mcp/gateway/oauth/server/approve. - P2 (cubic): short-circuit script/flow/hub-script/resource fetches in MCP list_tools when read_only is on — they would only be discarded below, so skipping the DB and resource fan-out is pure win. - P2 (cubic): when scopes are pre-supplied via the CreateToken prop, the ScopesPicker isn't rendered, which previously hid the read-only toggle entirely. Render it next to the pre-supplied scopes display. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 4.7
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ad2e855a83 |
fix: mint fresh Google channel IDs on update/renew (#8870)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 4.6
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5089a45881 |
feat: add summary field for native triggers (#8476)
* feat: add summary field for native triggers (nextcloud, google) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: add nullable to NativeTriggerData summary in openapi spec Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: include summary in native trigger search index Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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6f24f1939d |
feat: google native triggers (#7837)
* feat: google native triggers * nit skill * better native trigger abstraction * use resources for workspace integrations * better and better * better tests * update native trigger skill * sqlx * less tx and google update fix * refactor a bit the external logic * nits * fix * fix google native trigger update * fix oauth * review fixes * sqlx fix * nit * chore: update ee-repo-ref to a10eda4251610cceee67fbe05463b8be82ffa9e0 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #416 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: bf3696d5f2a39a3cb84dbbee81e092155f2a8c75 New ee-repo-ref: a10eda4251610cceee67fbe05463b8be82ffa9e0 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |