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8aab5034a6 feat: guest JWT entry for embedded apps (#10954)
* feat: guest JWT entry for embedded apps (jwt_guest_)

A second way in for a guest, alongside the signed-in guest session: a JWT the
embedding customer's backend mints and signs, verified per request against a
per-workspace key (a PEM public key or a JWKS URL), resolving to the same
seatless guest identity confined to the one app its app_path claim names.
Bearer prefix jwt_guest_, stateless (no token row). See PR #10954.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: surface guest JWT as the embed method in the app deploy drawer

The deploy drawer explained the secret-URL embed but not the guest JWT path, so
the primary way to embed an app for a customer's own authenticated users was
undiscoverable. For a guest-mode app with guests enabled, show how to mint a
`jwt_guest_` token and append `guest.<jwt>` to the app URL, with a copyable
iframe template pre-filled with this app's workspace_id and app_path, and a note
that new guest emails are refused past the instance's free allowance (the live
count is shown just above).

Also log a guest JWT allowance refusal at warn, not info: the caller gets a bare
401 (the reason must not leak to an unauthenticated caller), so the log is the
admin's signal that the instance hit its guest cap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: correct the guest JWT minting instructions in the embed block

The block said "sign it with the workspace's guest JWT key", but that setting
holds the public verification key. Clarify the keypair relationship (configure
the public key or a JWKS URL in the workspace; sign with the matching private
key), name the accepted algorithms (RS/PS/ES; HS* refused), and keep the
required claims, so an embedder knows how to actually mint the token.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: fall back to the instance JWT issuer for guest verification (off on cloud)

A workspace with no guest key of its own now verifies guest JWTs against the
instance issuer (JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL, already used by jwt_ext_), so an operator
running one issuer configures it once. Verification and the guest grant are CE;
granting a full login from that issuer stays EE (jwt_ext_, unchanged). Disabled
under CLOUD_HOSTED, where one instance issuer must not be trusted to mint guests
in every tenant's workspace — there the per-workspace key is the only source,
which also stays the override everywhere. The workspace settings note (hidden on
cloud) explains the fallback.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: embed instructions cover both the workspace key and instance issuer

The embed block said to set the workspace's guest JWT key; now it says Windmill
verifies against the workspace key or, off cloud, the instance issuer
(JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL) when no workspace key is set. The instance clause is hidden
under isCloudHosted().

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: show the guest JWT embed block only when Embed is toggled

It belongs with the iframe snippet, not the plain-URL view, so gate it on
embedMode alongside the guest-mode / guests-enabled checks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: trust the instance issuer in the guest fallback; refresh stale docs

P1 (CI review): the fallback wrapped JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL as a workspace JwksUrl, so
it hit validate_guest_jwks_url and was refused for http/private issuers unless
ALLOW_PRIVATE_GUEST_JWKS_URLS was also set — a self-hosted internal issuer that
works for jwt_ext_ failed for guests, though the UI says setting the env var is
enough. fetch_jwks now fetches the instance issuer without the https/private
restriction (matching the jwt_ext_ loader; it stays operator-trusted), while a
workspace-admin URL is validated and pinned as before. All the size/key/URL
bounds still apply to both.

P2 (CI review): refresh the stale docs that said a missing workspace key always
refuses a guest JWT — the module, bearer, key-source, and EditGuestJwtKey field
docs now describe the workspace key with the off-cloud instance-issuer fallback.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: fetch the trusted instance issuer like the jwt_ext_ loader

P1 (CI review): the instance-issuer fetch skipped SSRF validation but still
disabled redirects and default cert validation, so an instance issuer that works
for jwt_ext_ through a redirect or an operator-approved self-signed cert failed
the guest fallback. Fetch it with HTTP_CLIENT_PERMISSIVE (follows redirects,
honors ACCEPT_INVALID_CERTS) — the same behavior jwt_ext_ has — while a
workspace-admin URL stays validated, DNS-pinned and redirect-free. The body size
cap still bounds both.

P2 (CI review): the WorkspaceSettings field doc still said None/None means no JWT
guests; it now names the off-cloud instance-issuer fallback.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: schema summary + OpenAPI cover the guest JWT columns and fallback

P2 (CI review): summarized_schema.txt was missing guest_activity.jwt_entry and
the two workspace_settings guest-JWT key columns (required by docs/validation.md
after a schema change). The edit_guest_jwt_key OpenAPI description now notes that
clearing the workspace key falls back to the instance issuer (JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL)
off cloud rather than necessarily stopping guest JWTs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep JWKS single-flight locks in a self-cleaning map, not a bounded cache

P1 (CI review): JWKS_FETCH_LOCKS was a 200-entry quick_cache. Past 200 cold URLs
it can evict a lock whose fetch is still in flight; the next request for that URL
then mints a fresh lock and starts a second fetch, so cycling configured
workspaces defeats single-flight and can storm the issuers. Replace it with a
plain map guarded by a JwksFetchLock RAII handle that removes each entry once its
last holder drops, so the map only ever holds the fetches in flight and never
evicts an in-flight lock. Add a unit test pinning the shared-lock and
self-cleaning invariants.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to c2270eb5fe2d9f0968253e6b460c33186363f4e7

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #773 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5a1d9dee34159512c0823fddcd3d096490edbcce

New ee-repo-ref: c2270eb5fe2d9f0968253e6b460c33186363f4e7

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-05 10:23:37 +00:00
fce635d3c4 feat: guest app execution mode, a role that takes no seat (#10929)
* feat: guest app execution mode, a fourth role that takes no seat

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: make the guest grant a server-minted label, not a declarable scope

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* chore: pin ee-repo-ref to the guest session companion branch

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: close the relabel hole, guest embed tokens, read-path switch, custom-path entry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: guest tokens are not rescopable and guest embed tokens keep the sentinel

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: guest-derived tokens share one constraint set; gate sign-in on guest discovery

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: the label alone governs a guest; refuse guests with accounts; unserialize discovery

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: guest discovery fails closed; SAML aborts if the guest cookie write fails

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* refactor: enforce the guest switch once at the auth door; sign-in for a guest of another app

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: guest app-mode decided once at the on-behalf resolver; clear a stale guest session before offering another app's sign-in

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: a guest may use anonymous apps; await the stale-session logout; trim comments

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: a guest's path confinement waits for the app's mode, so anonymous apps stay open to it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: guest target survives http (Lax cookie), rides SAML RelayState; tell account holders on arrival

* fix: a guest uses an anonymous app as itself; S3 uploads confined by app mode

* fix: a guest upload needs an app policy; a missing app does not skip the confinement

* fix: guests are gated on the Enterprise plan server-side; pin ee-repo-ref

* fix: the guest plan gate fails closed on non-enterprise builds; settings report the effective switch

* fix: guest controls read the plan, not the key; gate the guest tests on the features they need

* docs: tighten the guest session invariant comments

* feat: 100 free guests per 30 days, then a quarter seat each on Enterprise and a hard cap elsewhere; superadmin guest list; refusals reach the page

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: the cap is exact, an account ends a guest session at the door, popups close, and guest mode survives the CLI round trip

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* feat: a superadmin switch over guests for the whole instance; the pre-existing-user flag keeps its meaning

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: drop the dead guest-access helper, name the instance setting once, guests tab states, CE save order

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: a guest app path is refused at the mint if it could widen the scope; the instance toggle waits for its reload

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: guests stop at the launched-by-me job grant; canonical app paths at the mint and discovery; the toggle ends on the stored value

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: only the scope grammar's own characters bar an app path from guests, refused at deploy as well as at the mint

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: the deploy-time guest path guard checks the destination of a rename and refuses a leading slash

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: a workspace rename keeps the guest switch; the rename guard reads the deployed mode under the row lock

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: guest_activity follows a workspace rename and goes with a workspace delete

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* chore: pin ee-repo-ref to the state-bound guest target

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* chore: pin ee-repo-ref; the guest cookie is never cleared by a callback

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* docs: the workspace-scoped guest_activity delete moves an instance-wide count; assert the mint records the guest

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* test: the seeded allowance is a day old, so only the mint can write today's guest_activity row

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 1a10132e4f3cb442c7d0c2cf6e5d92d150bf6e07

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #769 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 32841072aa396bff91d30bd91854fa348cb3c439

New ee-repo-ref: 1a10132e4f3cb442c7d0c2cf6e5d92d150bf6e07

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-04 22:47:28 +02:00