`sign_s3_objects` minted a long-lived HMAC bearer signature for any S3 key
handed to it, by any authenticated workspace member, with no check that the
caller was allowed to read that key. Since `validate_s3_signature` only
verifies the HMAC and expiry at fetch time, any member (operators included)
could mint a transferable capability to read arbitrary S3 keys, bypassing the
advanced S3 permission rules (`check_lfs_object_path_permissions`).
Authorize the read at mint time: add an `ApiAuthed` extractor and, before
signing each key, require the caller's own `S3Permission::READ` via
`get_workspace_s3_resource_and_check_paths`. A caller can no longer sign a key
they cannot themselves read. The fetch-side validators are left unchanged.
The only legitimate caller is the wmill SDK invoked from an app-author job,
whose token authenticates as the executing (author) identity — which can read
the key — so authorized app display is unaffected.
Adds an integration test proving an authorized caller can sign a readable key
(and the signature validates end-to-end through the presigned fetch route)
while an unauthorized caller is refused.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
Ruben Fiszel