mirror of
https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill.git
synced 2026-10-16 16:03:14 +00:00
datatable-external-instance
4
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
   
|
c2deea13b7 |
fix(security): a WM_TOKEN job token can never be a global superadmin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr) (#10124)
* fix(security): a WM_TOKEN job token can never be a global superadmin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr)
Privilege escalation: an app/flow/schedule/trigger execution policy's `on_behalf_of`
(which a `wm_deployers` member can set) could point at a superadmin email. The
resulting job `WM_TOKEN` then passed the email-based superadmin checks, granting
instance superadmin. `forbid_superadmin_job_token` only guarded ~15 of ~75 routes.
Fix at the token layer: a WM_TOKEN must never satisfy a superadmin gate,
regardless of whose email it runs as (sentinel OR a real superadmin).
- `ApiAuthed` gains a `job_id` field, stamped once in `AuthCache::get_opt_job_authed`
from the resolved token's job_id (correct even on cache hits).
- `require_super_admin(db, email)` -> `require_super_admin(db, &ApiAuthed)`, rejects
`authed.job_id.is_some()`. `require_super_admin_email` kept for the few internal
callers without an ApiAuthed.
- `is_super_admin_authed(db, &ApiAuthed)` for the boolean `is_super_admin_email`
authorization branches on request handlers (workspace deletion, fork drops,
dev-workspace attach/archive, object-storage SSRF exemption, custom dbname, EE GHES
+ connected repositories, ...). Migrate ~75 sites (OSS + EE).
- CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB reads the *authenticated* job_id, not the caller-supplied
`?job_id` query param. Worker-tag check takes a precomputed job-aware `is_super_admin`
on the request path.
Execution-time on-behalf checks (scheduled/flow worker-tag, Cloud enqueue quota,
is_devops_email) are hardened in a follow-up — see
docs/followup-onbehalf-execution-privilege-hardening.md.
Regression tests: a superadmin-email WM_TOKEN is rejected on `require_super_admin`
routes, on `DELETE /workspaces/delete/{w}` (403, workspace preserved), and on the
CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB lookup with no `?job_id` (401); real superadmin tokens still succeed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap devops role at workspace admin and reject reserved on_behalf_of identities
Extends the job-token cap with three pieces:
- `require_devops_role` takes `&ApiAuthed` and rejects job tokens.
`is_devops_email` is true for superadmin emails, so every worker-management,
instance-config and service-log route was reachable by the same superadmin
`WM_TOKEN` that `require_super_admin` already rejects.
- A `job_id` claim that does not parse as a uuid rejects the token rather than
resolving to `None`, which would clear the job provenance and uncap it. Applies
to the internal JWT and the external `jwt_ext_` path.
- Defense in depth at store time: `validate_on_behalf_of` refuses the reserved
internal sentinels as an `on_behalf_of` on apps/flows/scripts/schedules/triggers,
and app execution refuses a policy carrying one — covering already-persisted and
forked-app rows that predate the cap. Deploying on behalf of a real user,
including a real superadmin, stays allowed; the cap handles that at execution.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): preserve job-token provenance when minting the proxy JWT
The MCP endpoint-tool proxy re-mints a JWT from the caller's ApiAuthed to
forward the proxied request, but passed job_id: None. A job's WM_TOKEN is
capped at workspace admin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr); dropping the job_id here
re-minted an uncapped token that satisfies require_super_admin /
require_devops_role on the proxied route (e.g. listWorkers exposing worker
IPs, job/workspace IDs, and sensitive tags).
Carry api_authed.job_id into create_jwt_token. Adds an in-module regression
that decodes the forwarded JWT and asserts the job_id is preserved for a job
caller and absent for a non-job caller.
Reported by Codex CI review (P1) on #10124.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the admin-or-devops gate at workspace admin for job tokens
require_admin_or_devops (the EE critical-alerts endpoints) grants when the
caller is a workspace admin OR an instance devops. is_devops_email is true
for superadmins, so a WM_TOKEN running on-behalf of a superadmin who is not a
member of the target workspace could clear the devops branch and read/ack that
workspace's critical alerts (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr). This gate takes a bare
email, not an ApiAuthed, so the token-layer cap could not see it.
Thread the caller's job-token provenance and reject the devops branch for job
tokens, matching require_devops_role. The workspace-admin branch stays allowed
— that is the cap ceiling. Adds an enterprise-gated regression proving the
bypass is closed and a real superadmin token still clears the gate.
Found while auditing the PR for bare-email gates the choke-point cap misses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap instance-global is_admin gates at workspace admin for job tokens
Three instance-global routes gate on the caller's own `is_admin` claim, which
`ApiAuthed.is_admin` carries into a WM_TOKEN (it is a workspace-admin claim,
true for superadmins too). A job token is capped at workspace admin
(GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr), so its is_admin claim must not authorize instance
actions on a route with no workspace binding:
- `unarchive_workspace` — unarchive an arbitrary workspace by id
- `prune_concurrency_group` — delete a global concurrency group
- `list_worker_groups` — return unobfuscated `env_vars_static` (may hold secrets)
Add job-token-aware `is_instance_admin` / `require_instance_admin` helpers (the
same shape as `require_super_admin` / `require_devops_role`) and use them at
these three sites. Workspace-scoped `require_admin(authed.is_admin, ...)` gates
are intentionally left unchanged — a workspace-admin job token is within the
cap there. Regression added covering all three; verified it lets a WM_TOKEN
unarchive/leak without the fix and is blocked with it.
Reported by Codex CI review (P1) on #10124.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): drop orphaned path_field_renames from EndpointTool test helper
The merge with main adopted main's mcp path-substitution refactor (#10162),
which removed the `path_field_renames` field from `EndpointTool` and its
consumer (`substitute_path_params` no longer takes per-field path renames).
main's `runner.rs` `ep` test helper still constructed the struct with
`path_field_renames: None`, so the workspace test build (cargo test --all,
which compiles windmill-mcp's own #[cfg(test)] module under the `server`
feature) failed with E0560. A plain `cargo check` does not compile that test
module, so it only surfaced in CI's cargo_test.
Remove the orphaned field to match the struct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: describe the sentinel-rejection policy the forged-identity test asserts
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: complete ApiAuthed initializers in feature-gated tests after merge
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: stop job tokens minting credentials that shed their provenance
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the MCP OAuth approval mint at the same elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the self-service password reset at the elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap app embed/SDK mints and scope widening at the elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep job tokens from destroying the account they run on behalf of
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: deny job tokens a foreign-workspace admin claim and workspace ejection
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: keep the follow-up inventory in the PR instead of the repo
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: make the session workspace status gate job-token aware
session_workspace_status derived its superadmin branch from a bare email
check, so a job token carrying a superadmin identity resolved the existence
of workspaces it has no relationship with rather than seeing them as
deleted. Switch to is_super_admin_authed, matching every other instance
gate reached from a request ApiAuthed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* revert: leave the global concurrency-group listing on the plain admin gate
The listing exposes concurrency keys across workspaces, which is metadata
rather than a capability, and it 401s rather than degrading. Keep the guard
on the prune route next to it, which is the destructive one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep the instance-admin gate on the global concurrency listing
The listing spans every workspace's concurrency keys, and the gate rejects
only job tokens: the !is_admin branch is the pre-existing check, so
workspaced tokens and interactive admins are unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to d30af67d38954f9012f7bad08da23e347344b4c6
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #664 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 7870573dbc3360f99bada143f094c67dce0d9e9c
New ee-repo-ref: d30af67d38954f9012f7bad08da23e347344b4c6
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: hugocasa <hugo@casademont.ch>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
|
||
|
|
efb4a27d51 |
fix: replace email with permissioned_as for triggers/schedules (#8439)
* refactor: replace email with permissioned_as for triggers/schedules
Add a new `permissioned_as` column (format: `u/{username}`, `g/{group}`,
or raw email) to all trigger tables and schedule. This value is used
directly for job permission checks, removing the need for email lookups
when creating/updating triggers.
- Migration: add permissioned_as to all 9 trigger tables + schedule,
drop email from trigger tables (schedule keeps it for backwards compat)
- Backend: resolve_email() (async, DB) -> resolve_permissioned_as() (sync)
- Email cache: get_email_from_permissioned_as() with quick_cache for
places that still need email (fetch_api_authed, schedule backwards compat)
- Frontend: rename email/preserve_email -> permissioned_as/preserve_permissioned_as
in deploy data and OpenAPI schemas
- Tests updated for new field names and u/{username} format
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix sqlx/build
* update ee ref
* refactor: simplify resolve_edited_by to always use authed username
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix compile + migration
* update ref
* test: add trigger trait method tests for permissioned_as queries
Add tests that call TriggerCrud and Listener trait methods directly
to verify dynamic SQL correctly references the permissioned_as column.
Covers get_trigger_by_path, list_triggers, set_trigger_mode, and
fetch_enabled_unlistened_triggers for all trigger types.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* update sqlx
* fix: use permissioned_as directly for schedules and fix audit RLS for groups
- Schedule: permissioned_as only set on create, not on edit/set_enabled
- Schedule: stop reading email column, use get_email_from_permissioned_as
- Triggers: use fetch_api_authed_from_permissioned_as instead of edited_by
- Triggers: rename listener fields for clarity (username -> edited_by)
- Fix audit author username for group permissioned_as (g/test -> group-test)
to match session.user, preventing RLS policy violations on audit_partitioned
- OpenAPI: remove permissioned_as/preserve_permissioned_as from EditSchedule
- Add backwards-compat comments for schedule email writes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: regenerate system prompts for permissioned_as field
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix build
* refactor: generalize onBehalfOf naming, add permissioned_as to EditSchedule
- Frontend: rename onBehalfOfPermissionedAs -> onBehalfOf with comments
explaining it carries emails for flows/scripts and permissioned_as for
triggers/schedules
- Frontend: rename getOnBehalfOfEmail -> getOnBehalfOf,
getOnBehalfOfPermissionedAsForDeploy -> getOnBehalfOfForDeploy,
customOnBehalfOfEmails -> customOnBehalfOf
- Backend: add optional permissioned_as/preserve_permissioned_as to
EditSchedule with COALESCE (only updates when provided)
- Backend: add on_behalf_of audit log for schedule edit
- Backend: remove unused resolve_on_behalf_of_permissioned_as
- Tests: remove email assertions from schedule update test (email is
just backwards compat, only permissioned_as matters)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: preserve email column when permissioned_as is preserved on schedule edit
Derive email from the preserved permissioned_as via cache lookup instead
of always writing authed.email. This keeps the email column consistent
with the old behavior for backwards compat with old workers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: update deploy UI labels from "edited by" to "run as" for triggers
Triggers now use permissioned_as (not edited_by) for permissions, so
update the deploy UI wording to reflect this. Also update wm_deployers
group description to mention schedules and permissioned_as.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: use u/username format for custom trigger/schedule deploy selection
When picking a custom user for trigger/schedule deployment, store
u/${username} (permissioned_as format) instead of the email. Flows/scripts
continue to use email format for on_behalf_of_email.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: show u/username format for "me" option in trigger deploy selector
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: simplify OnBehalfOfSelector to return the right format per kind
OnBehalfOfSelector now handles the email vs permissioned_as format
internally based on kind:
- triggers: returns u/username, displays u/username in all options
- flows/scripts/apps: returns email, displays username
The onSelect callback now takes (choice, value?) where value is already
in the correct format. Parent components just store it directly without
needing to know about the format difference.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: always show u/username format in OnBehalfOfSelector for all kinds
Display is now consistent: all kinds show u/username in the selector.
The returned value still differs (email for flows/scripts, u/username
for triggers) since the backend APIs expect different formats.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: replace email with permissioned_as in http_trigger test insert
The email column was dropped from trigger tables in the migration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: review fixes — migration, app policy, capture cleanup, naming
- Migration: remove DEFAULT '', use nullable → populate → SET NOT NULL
- App policy: set both on_behalf_of and on_behalf_of_email for all choices
- OnBehalfOfSelector: return OnBehalfOfDetails {email, permissionedAs} instead of ambiguous value
- Remove unused email field from Capture struct and query
- Rename getSourceEmail/getTargetEmail → getSourceOnBehalfOf/getTargetOnBehalfOf
- Rename test functions from preserve_email to preserve_permissioned_as
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: add permissioned_as to all test schedule INSERTs
Since the migration no longer uses DEFAULT '', all INSERTs must
explicitly provide permissioned_as. Updated test fixtures and
schedule_push tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: strip permissioned_as from exports/sync, fix OpenAPI required field
- Add permissioned_as to workspace export strip list (like edited_by)
- Add permissioned_as to CLI TriggerFile Omit list
- Fix TriggerExtraProperty.required: email → permissioned_as
- Regenerate frontend and CLI types
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: remove accidentally committed generated files
These directories are gitignored and should not be tracked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: regenerate system prompts for permissioned_as schema changes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: remove permissioned_as from CLI TriggerFile Omit list
Already stripped in workspace export, no need to also omit from the type.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: optimize email cache key and revert TriggerFile Omit change
- Use single concatenated string for cache key instead of (String, String) tuple
- Remove permissioned_as from CLI TriggerFile Omit (already stripped in export)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: zero-allocation email cache lookups using Equivalent trait
Use a borrowed EmailCacheKey(&str, &str) for cache lookups via
quick_cache's Equivalent support. Only allocates (String, String)
on cache miss for insert. This is called on every trigger fire
and schedule push.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: add permissioned_as to Schedule required fields in OpenAPI spec
The backend always returns permissioned_as (non-optional String),
so the schema should reflect that.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: handle group- prefix in migration UPDATE statements
edited_by can be 'group-{name}' for group-owned triggers/schedules.
The migration now correctly maps these to 'g/{name}' format instead
of incorrectly producing 'u/group-{name}'.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "fix: handle group- prefix in migration UPDATE statements"
This reverts commit
|
||
  
|
f2be625348 |
feat: store hashed tokens instead of plaintext (#8217)
* feat: store hashed tokens in the token table instead of plaintext
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: address review issues in token hash migration
- Update all base.sql fixtures to include token_hash/token_prefix columns
- Keep plaintext token for webhook tokens (needed for URL reconstruction)
- Restore get_token_by_prefix to query DB for webhook tokens
- Fix down migration to delete NULL-token rows before restoring NOT NULL
- Update parser fixture standalone schema
- Update EE dedicated_worker_ee.rs to use token_hash/token_prefix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: restore sqlx offline cache (only add new query files)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: keep writing plaintext token column for backward compat
Write to token column alongside token_hash until MIN_VERSION_SUPPORTS_TOKEN_HASH
(1.649.0) is reached. This ensures older workers can still authenticate
during rolling upgrades. Remove the separate UPDATE in new_webhook_token
since create_token_internal now writes plaintext directly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: branch on MIN_VERSION to write plaintext token or null
Check MIN_VERSION_SUPPORTS_TOKEN_HASH at runtime: write plaintext to
token column while old workers exist, switch to NULL once all workers
are >= 1.649.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: set MIN_VERSION_SUPPORTS_TOKEN_HASH to 1.650.0
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: use token_hash for email lookup and expiry notifications
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: rotate webhook tokens instead of recovering plaintext from DB
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: use token_hash for native trigger token lookups and deletes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* sqlx
* refactor: drop webhook_token_prefix from native_trigger table
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: backward compat for token rotation and make webhook_token_hash NOT NULL
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: prevent panic on short superadmin secret token prefix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: prevent panic on short superadmin secret token prefix
Replace all `token[0..TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN]` slicing with
`token.get(..TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN).unwrap_or(token)` to prevent
panics when a token shorter than 10 chars is provided (e.g.
malformed Authorization header, short superadmin secret).
Co-authored-by: hugocasa <hugocasa@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: prevent panic on short token prefix slicing
Replace all `token[0..TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN]` with safe
`token.get(..TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN).unwrap_or(token)` to prevent panics
on malformed tokens shorter than 10 characters.
Co-authored-by: hugocasa <hugocasa@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "fix: prevent panic on short superadmin secret token prefix"
This reverts commit
|
||
 wendrul
|
7ac93f6ee3 | feat: option to preserve on_behalf_of and edited_by for admins and users in the new wm_deployers group (#8079) |