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datatable-external-instance
39
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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9320312eac |
feat: cap user token expiration with an instance setting (#11159)
* feat: cap user token expiration with an instance setting Adds `max_token_expiration_days`, an instance-wide ceiling on how far ahead a token created through `POST /users/tokens/create` may expire. With it set, that route refuses a token with no expiration and one that expires past the window; absent or non-positive, nothing changes. Only the user-facing handler enforces it. Server-side mints (native trigger webhook tokens, app embed tokens, sessions) pick a lifetime the caller never chooses and go straight to `create_token_internal`, so they stay uncapped, as does the superadmin `impersonate` route. Service accounts are exempt, in the workspace the token targets or in any workspace for a global token, so unattended automation can keep longer-lived credentials. The token form now surfaces the API error instead of only logging it, and offers "Expires In" in MCP mode as well: that mode always sent no expiration, which the cap refuses, leaving MCP URLs impossible to generate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: shorten over-long token expirations instead of refusing them Refusing a non-compliant request breaks the callers that cannot comply. The CLI authorization page, `wmill user create-token` and the editor's language-server token each pick a lifetime — usually none at all — with no way to read the setting, so a cap made browser login hang and the editor lose its LSP root rather than stopping the long-lived tokens the setting is aimed at. `cap_token_expiration` now returns the expiration to store, shortening a request that asks for too long or for none. The policy still holds absolutely, no caller can break, and there is no clock-skew boundary where an expiration exactly at the ceiling flips to an error. The token form needed no changes at all, so its MCP and error-toast edits are gone with it. Also drops the Enterprise badge on the setting, which nothing enforced, notes the mint paths in docs/auth-surface.md, and pins that `tokens/impersonate` and the second-workspace case stay outside the exemption. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: drop the unintended token-form change and correct the exemption docs The token form needed no change once the ceiling shortens rather than refuses, but the earlier revert restored from the index, which already held the staged edit, so the MCP expiration field and the error toast stayed on the branch with a comment justifying them by a refusal that no longer happens. docs/auth-surface.md claimed a service-account row in any workspace exempts outright; that only holds for a workspace-less token, which has no workspace to match. A ceiling written as a string, which the YAML instance config and config sync can both produce, now has a test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: offer only expirations within the ceiling in the token form The server shortens a token that asks for longer than `max_token_expiration_days` or for no expiration, which the token form could not tell anyone: a user picking "No expiration" got the ceiling silently. The form now reads the setting and, with one set, drops "No expiration" and every choice above it, adds the ceiling itself as "N days (maximum)" and selects it, and says the instance limits tokens to N days. MCP mode hides the expiration field and always sent none, so with a ceiling the field now shows there too and keeps its value across the toggle. Without a ceiling the form is unchanged. Reading it needs no superadmin: the setting joins the keys any logged-in user can read through `GET /settings/global/{key}`. It holds a policy, not a secret. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: make the token form and the server agree on what counts as a ceiling The form parsed `max_token_expiration_days` more loosely than `cap_token_expiration`, so the two could disagree on whether a ceiling exists at all. A `7.0` from the YAML instance config, or a string such as "7.0" or "1e1", made the form hide "No expiration" and announce a 7-day limit while the server capped nothing; a value between chrono's and JavaScript's date limits preselected an expiration the server could not parse. Both now read the same thing as a ceiling: a whole number of days from 1 to 1,000,000, stored as an integer, an integral float or a string of digits. `parseMaxTokenExpirationDays` holds the frontend's copy, and the instance settings validation uses it too, so the settings page no longer accepts a value the server would ignore. The bound replaces the date-range guard on both sides. Also corrects the rationale for shortening rather than refusing: the setting is now readable by any logged-in user, so those callers do not read it rather than cannot, and CLIs already installed never will. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: cap service-account tokens like everyone else's The ticket exempted service accounts from `max_token_expiration_days`, but their tokens are the long-lived ones a rotation policy is meant to bound, and the exemption let any workspace admin get an uncapped token by impersonating one. It also left the token form unable to agree with the server: an admin impersonating a service account was offered only capped choices while the server would have kept any. `cap_token_expiration` now takes just the requested expiration, with no per-caller lookup, and the service-account query and its cache entry are gone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: cap superadmin impersonation tokens and pin the frontend parser `POST /users/tokens/impersonate` wrote its own token row with whatever expiration the superadmin sent, so it was the one route left that could mint a token that never expires with `max_token_expiration_days` set. The ceiling only decides the stored expiration (the auth lookup never reads the setting), so leaving it uncapped meant exactly that. It now goes through `cap_token_expiration` like `create_token`; nothing in Windmill calls it, so no caller changes. Also adds `tokenExpiration.test.ts`, pinning which stored values `parseMaxTokenExpirationDays` reads as a ceiling against the server's reading, and documents that tokens existing when the setting is turned on or lowered keep their expiration. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: reject a max_token_expiration_days the token routes cannot read The settings API and config sync stored any value for the key, and the token routes can only read an unparseable one as no ceiling. A typo such as `7.5` or "7.0" was accepted and silently turned the policy off. `parse_max_token_expiration_days` in windmill-common is now the single server reading of the setting: null or empty clears it, a whole number of days within the bound is the ceiling, anything else is an error. The settings write hook and `sync_global_settings_declarative` reject that error, and `cap_token_expiration` reads through the same function, logging a value written around both. Tests: the parser's accept/clear/reject table (the same table as the frontend parser's), the settings API refusing 7.5, and config sync refusing "7.0". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: reserve the CLI login token label so its expiry does not email the user With a token expiration ceiling, the token the CLI authorization page mints now expires, so every `wmill` login earned an "expiring soon" and an "expired and deleted" email and critical alert. The CLI already signs in again on its own when that token stops working, so those notifications ask the user to do nothing. The page now labels it `cli-login:<username>` (previously `cli-<username>`), reserved in `is_user_token` and its SQL and Svelte mirrors: no expiry notifications, and the label cannot be edited. A colon-terminated namespace like `embed_app:` and `impersonation:` keeps hand-made labels clear of it. Not in `is_server_minted_label`, since the page mints through `/users/tokens/create`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: skip the expiring-soon warning for tokens that were short-lived from the start A token whose whole lifetime fits in the 7-day warning window got its "expiring soon" email (and critical alert, when enabled) minutes after it was created, about a lifetime its creator had just picked. With an expiration ceiling of 7 days or less that is every token created from the form or `wmill token create`. `register_token_expiry_notification` no longer queues a warning for such a token. The window is now `TOKEN_EXPIRY_WARNING_DAYS`, shared with `check_expiring_tokens`, so shortening the warning window can never leave tokens of an intermediate lifetime with no warning at all. The "expired and deleted" notice still goes out for every user token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: exempt service-account tokens from the expiration ceiling again Service accounts are the identity automation that needs a long-lived credential runs as, so their tokens are exempt from `max_token_expiration_days` once more: a service account in the workspace the token names, or in any workspace for a workspace-less token. `tokens/impersonate` checks the impersonated account, so a superadmin minting a token for a service account gets the same exemption. The token form applies the same rule for the account it is running as, when that account is a service account in the current workspace, which is what an admin impersonating one sees; otherwise it would offer only capped choices while the server keeps any. Any workspace admin can create and impersonate a service account to hold an uncapped token, so the ceiling bounds personal tokens; the doc comment and docs/auth-surface.md say so. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: decide the token form's service-account exemption from the token's workspace The form treated the account as a service account only when it was one in the workspace the app was on, while the server checks the workspace the token is for, or any workspace for a workspace-less token. With an email that is a service account in one workspace and an ordinary member of another, picking the other workspace in MCP mode offered "No expiration" and the server silently stored the ceiling; the reverse hid the exemption. `GET /workspaces/users` now returns each membership's `is_service_account` (its query already joins the `usr` row), and the form applies the server's rule to the token's own workspace. The selection becomes a derived value held within the ceiling, so switching to a capped workspace never leaves an unoffered choice selected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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9d348f84c7 |
fix: skip expiry notifications for app embed and SDK tokens (#11169)
* fix: skip expiry notifications for app embed and SDK tokens Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: share app token label prefixes between mint sites and the check Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: skip expiry alerts for impersonation and test-connection tokens Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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 Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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c90d1d95c2 |
refactor: make the app policy's principal the authority for its identity (#10440)
* refactor: make the app policy's principal the authority for its identity * fix: align the app backfill with the sibling migration and audit the uncached address * chore: refresh the sqlx cache after rebasing onto the merged base * fix: resolve the app execution address uncached, it decides the job's authorization * chore: cache the EE queries at the ref this branch pins * chore: cache the EE queries at the ref this branch pins * fix: derive the app draft's on-behalf-of address on read * chore: cache the query the draft derivation test added * fix: derive the app identity on the draft-table and version reads too * docs: state the draft resolver's authorization contract * fix: resolve a draft's principal against workspace membership only * chore: cache the membership lookup the draft resolver added * fix: drop an unresolvable draft's address instead of leaving it stale * perf: evict the address cache on change so app dispatch can read it * fix: evict on superadmin role changes, not only address changes * refactor: make the app policy's address optional instead of derived on read * fix: follow an external superadmin's rename into the apps that name them * docs: state the removal gate once, and correctly * refactor: drop the app-policy version constant that gated nothing * docs: drop the last reference to the removed constant * perf: read the address cache everywhere now that eviction reaches every replica * fix: keep persisted addresses off the cache the poller evicts asynchronously * docs: state where the cached address is accepted and where it is not * docs: keep the cache rule in one place and drop the stale premise * docs: sort the two lookups by how long a wrong answer lives * fix: resolve the schedule address uncached where it is written to the row * docs: name the release this actually ships in * perf: evict a superadmin's key per workspace instead of the whole cache * fix: evict every alias a superadmin principal can be spelled as * docs: describe the trigger as it is * docs: cover the round-tripped read in the cache rule * docs: record why a stale dispatch address cannot escalate * fix: validate a dispatch address against the principal's live binding * fix: carry the validated address through to the job row and token * fix: record the validated address on the job row, not the one handed in * test: run the substep tag check as the non-superadmin it means to test Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * fix: rewrite a stored app address that disagrees with its principal Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * docs: record the accepted staleness window of the cached dispatch address Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * fix: record the validated address on the job's audit row Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * docs: record the accepted rename race of pre-transaction identity resolution Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * docs: separate the app's stored address from the derived one in the resolver doc Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * docs: describe the job identity fast path the push comments skipped Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * fix: backfill a legacy group-prefixed username as the group it names Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * fix: resolve a schedule edit's identity before opening its transaction Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * fix: never resolve a disabled member to a same-named superadmin Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * docs: state what the email-change notify buys, and rewrap two comment lines Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * fix: keep a group's runnables when offboarding a legacy group-prefixed member Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * fix: read the app author from the stored address, as execution does Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * docs: record the rename race's full consequence as a known, accepted limitation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * docs: record the keep-target group address case as a known, accepted limitation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fce635d3c4 |
feat: guest app execution mode, a role that takes no seat (#10929)
* feat: guest app execution mode, a fourth role that takes no seat Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: make the guest grant a server-minted label, not a declarable scope Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * chore: pin ee-repo-ref to the guest session companion branch Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: close the relabel hole, guest embed tokens, read-path switch, custom-path entry Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guest tokens are not rescopable and guest embed tokens keep the sentinel Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guest-derived tokens share one constraint set; gate sign-in on guest discovery Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: the label alone governs a guest; refuse guests with accounts; unserialize discovery Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guest discovery fails closed; SAML aborts if the guest cookie write fails Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * refactor: enforce the guest switch once at the auth door; sign-in for a guest of another app Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guest app-mode decided once at the on-behalf resolver; clear a stale guest session before offering another app's sign-in Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: a guest may use anonymous apps; await the stale-session logout; trim comments Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: a guest's path confinement waits for the app's mode, so anonymous apps stay open to it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guest target survives http (Lax cookie), rides SAML RelayState; tell account holders on arrival * fix: a guest uses an anonymous app as itself; S3 uploads confined by app mode * fix: a guest upload needs an app policy; a missing app does not skip the confinement * fix: guests are gated on the Enterprise plan server-side; pin ee-repo-ref * fix: the guest plan gate fails closed on non-enterprise builds; settings report the effective switch * fix: guest controls read the plan, not the key; gate the guest tests on the features they need * docs: tighten the guest session invariant comments * feat: 100 free guests per 30 days, then a quarter seat each on Enterprise and a hard cap elsewhere; superadmin guest list; refusals reach the page Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: the cap is exact, an account ends a guest session at the door, popups close, and guest mode survives the CLI round trip Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * feat: a superadmin switch over guests for the whole instance; the pre-existing-user flag keeps its meaning Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: drop the dead guest-access helper, name the instance setting once, guests tab states, CE save order Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: a guest app path is refused at the mint if it could widen the scope; the instance toggle waits for its reload Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guests stop at the launched-by-me job grant; canonical app paths at the mint and discovery; the toggle ends on the stored value Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: only the scope grammar's own characters bar an app path from guests, refused at deploy as well as at the mint Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: the deploy-time guest path guard checks the destination of a rename and refuses a leading slash Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: a workspace rename keeps the guest switch; the rename guard reads the deployed mode under the row lock Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guest_activity follows a workspace rename and goes with a workspace delete Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * chore: pin ee-repo-ref to the state-bound guest target Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * chore: pin ee-repo-ref; the guest cookie is never cleared by a callback Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * docs: the workspace-scoped guest_activity delete moves an instance-wide count; assert the mint records the guest Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * test: the seeded allowance is a day old, so only the mint can write today's guest_activity row Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 1a10132e4f3cb442c7d0c2cf6e5d92d150bf6e07 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #769 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 32841072aa396bff91d30bd91854fa348cb3c439 New ee-repo-ref: 1a10132e4f3cb442c7d0c2cf6e5d92d150bf6e07 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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4b406e37c0 |
fix: size the ephemeral job token to the job timeout it must serve (#10804)
* fix: size job token to the premium cloud job timeout Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: give the job token setup headroom and drop dead MAX_TIMEOUT_DURATION Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: cap job token setup slack so self-hosted tokens stay at 7d Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c2deea13b7 |
fix(security): a WM_TOKEN job token can never be a global superadmin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr) (#10124)
* fix(security): a WM_TOKEN job token can never be a global superadmin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr)
Privilege escalation: an app/flow/schedule/trigger execution policy's `on_behalf_of`
(which a `wm_deployers` member can set) could point at a superadmin email. The
resulting job `WM_TOKEN` then passed the email-based superadmin checks, granting
instance superadmin. `forbid_superadmin_job_token` only guarded ~15 of ~75 routes.
Fix at the token layer: a WM_TOKEN must never satisfy a superadmin gate,
regardless of whose email it runs as (sentinel OR a real superadmin).
- `ApiAuthed` gains a `job_id` field, stamped once in `AuthCache::get_opt_job_authed`
from the resolved token's job_id (correct even on cache hits).
- `require_super_admin(db, email)` -> `require_super_admin(db, &ApiAuthed)`, rejects
`authed.job_id.is_some()`. `require_super_admin_email` kept for the few internal
callers without an ApiAuthed.
- `is_super_admin_authed(db, &ApiAuthed)` for the boolean `is_super_admin_email`
authorization branches on request handlers (workspace deletion, fork drops,
dev-workspace attach/archive, object-storage SSRF exemption, custom dbname, EE GHES
+ connected repositories, ...). Migrate ~75 sites (OSS + EE).
- CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB reads the *authenticated* job_id, not the caller-supplied
`?job_id` query param. Worker-tag check takes a precomputed job-aware `is_super_admin`
on the request path.
Execution-time on-behalf checks (scheduled/flow worker-tag, Cloud enqueue quota,
is_devops_email) are hardened in a follow-up — see
docs/followup-onbehalf-execution-privilege-hardening.md.
Regression tests: a superadmin-email WM_TOKEN is rejected on `require_super_admin`
routes, on `DELETE /workspaces/delete/{w}` (403, workspace preserved), and on the
CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB lookup with no `?job_id` (401); real superadmin tokens still succeed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap devops role at workspace admin and reject reserved on_behalf_of identities
Extends the job-token cap with three pieces:
- `require_devops_role` takes `&ApiAuthed` and rejects job tokens.
`is_devops_email` is true for superadmin emails, so every worker-management,
instance-config and service-log route was reachable by the same superadmin
`WM_TOKEN` that `require_super_admin` already rejects.
- A `job_id` claim that does not parse as a uuid rejects the token rather than
resolving to `None`, which would clear the job provenance and uncap it. Applies
to the internal JWT and the external `jwt_ext_` path.
- Defense in depth at store time: `validate_on_behalf_of` refuses the reserved
internal sentinels as an `on_behalf_of` on apps/flows/scripts/schedules/triggers,
and app execution refuses a policy carrying one — covering already-persisted and
forked-app rows that predate the cap. Deploying on behalf of a real user,
including a real superadmin, stays allowed; the cap handles that at execution.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): preserve job-token provenance when minting the proxy JWT
The MCP endpoint-tool proxy re-mints a JWT from the caller's ApiAuthed to
forward the proxied request, but passed job_id: None. A job's WM_TOKEN is
capped at workspace admin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr); dropping the job_id here
re-minted an uncapped token that satisfies require_super_admin /
require_devops_role on the proxied route (e.g. listWorkers exposing worker
IPs, job/workspace IDs, and sensitive tags).
Carry api_authed.job_id into create_jwt_token. Adds an in-module regression
that decodes the forwarded JWT and asserts the job_id is preserved for a job
caller and absent for a non-job caller.
Reported by Codex CI review (P1) on #10124.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the admin-or-devops gate at workspace admin for job tokens
require_admin_or_devops (the EE critical-alerts endpoints) grants when the
caller is a workspace admin OR an instance devops. is_devops_email is true
for superadmins, so a WM_TOKEN running on-behalf of a superadmin who is not a
member of the target workspace could clear the devops branch and read/ack that
workspace's critical alerts (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr). This gate takes a bare
email, not an ApiAuthed, so the token-layer cap could not see it.
Thread the caller's job-token provenance and reject the devops branch for job
tokens, matching require_devops_role. The workspace-admin branch stays allowed
— that is the cap ceiling. Adds an enterprise-gated regression proving the
bypass is closed and a real superadmin token still clears the gate.
Found while auditing the PR for bare-email gates the choke-point cap misses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap instance-global is_admin gates at workspace admin for job tokens
Three instance-global routes gate on the caller's own `is_admin` claim, which
`ApiAuthed.is_admin` carries into a WM_TOKEN (it is a workspace-admin claim,
true for superadmins too). A job token is capped at workspace admin
(GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr), so its is_admin claim must not authorize instance
actions on a route with no workspace binding:
- `unarchive_workspace` — unarchive an arbitrary workspace by id
- `prune_concurrency_group` — delete a global concurrency group
- `list_worker_groups` — return unobfuscated `env_vars_static` (may hold secrets)
Add job-token-aware `is_instance_admin` / `require_instance_admin` helpers (the
same shape as `require_super_admin` / `require_devops_role`) and use them at
these three sites. Workspace-scoped `require_admin(authed.is_admin, ...)` gates
are intentionally left unchanged — a workspace-admin job token is within the
cap there. Regression added covering all three; verified it lets a WM_TOKEN
unarchive/leak without the fix and is blocked with it.
Reported by Codex CI review (P1) on #10124.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): drop orphaned path_field_renames from EndpointTool test helper
The merge with main adopted main's mcp path-substitution refactor (#10162),
which removed the `path_field_renames` field from `EndpointTool` and its
consumer (`substitute_path_params` no longer takes per-field path renames).
main's `runner.rs` `ep` test helper still constructed the struct with
`path_field_renames: None`, so the workspace test build (cargo test --all,
which compiles windmill-mcp's own #[cfg(test)] module under the `server`
feature) failed with E0560. A plain `cargo check` does not compile that test
module, so it only surfaced in CI's cargo_test.
Remove the orphaned field to match the struct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: describe the sentinel-rejection policy the forged-identity test asserts
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: complete ApiAuthed initializers in feature-gated tests after merge
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: stop job tokens minting credentials that shed their provenance
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the MCP OAuth approval mint at the same elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the self-service password reset at the elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap app embed/SDK mints and scope widening at the elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep job tokens from destroying the account they run on behalf of
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: deny job tokens a foreign-workspace admin claim and workspace ejection
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: keep the follow-up inventory in the PR instead of the repo
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: make the session workspace status gate job-token aware
session_workspace_status derived its superadmin branch from a bare email
check, so a job token carrying a superadmin identity resolved the existence
of workspaces it has no relationship with rather than seeing them as
deleted. Switch to is_super_admin_authed, matching every other instance
gate reached from a request ApiAuthed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* revert: leave the global concurrency-group listing on the plain admin gate
The listing exposes concurrency keys across workspaces, which is metadata
rather than a capability, and it 401s rather than degrading. Keep the guard
on the prune route next to it, which is the destructive one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep the instance-admin gate on the global concurrency listing
The listing spans every workspace's concurrency keys, and the gate rejects
only job tokens: the !is_admin branch is the pre-existing check, so
workspaced tokens and interactive admins are unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to d30af67d38954f9012f7bad08da23e347344b4c6
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #664 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 7870573dbc3360f99bada143f094c67dce0d9e9c
New ee-repo-ref: d30af67d38954f9012f7bad08da23e347344b4c6
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: hugocasa <hugo@casademont.ch>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Ruben Fiszelandwindmill-internal-app[bot]
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dda59767c2 |
feat: stamp webhook trigger_kind on token-driven job runs (#10431)
* feat: stamp ui vs webhook trigger_kind on direct job runs * fix: gate ui trigger kind on min worker version and dedupe display names * docs: state that the ui trigger kind attributes rather than proves * refactor: fold the trigger fallback into one trigger_or_fallback helper * feat: hold trigger_kind as a tolerant label on the worker paths * chore: refresh the sqlx offline cache for the trigger_kind label queries * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7de7daff5eed410e0c815ad6b292d2b4303f02f2 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #700 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 974ab910d9a30c5565e1198ee312acc6d11239f3 New ee-repo-ref: 7de7daff5eed410e0c815ad6b292d2b4303f02f2 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * fix: keep the API job structs tolerant of unknown trigger kinds too * chore: point ee-repo-ref at the merged EE main --------- Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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68a52f45a7 | refactor: deprecate username_to_email in favor of WM_END_USER_EMAIL (#10429) | ||
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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3716a71fd7 |
fix: credit the token owner instead of the token label in the audit trail (#10423)
* fix: credit the token owner instead of the token label in the audit trail Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review findings on token-owner audit attribution Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: carry token-label provenance explicitly instead of inferring it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: point ee-repo-ref at the companion branch Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: trust only non-forgeable token labels to name the acting entity Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: reject reserved system-token labels at token creation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: narrow the token-label guard to server-minted namespaces Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: add the provenance field to the remaining ApiAuthed literals Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stop trusting the email- label, which no mint produces Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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 Alexander Petric
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e0d6dc1a19 |
fix: harden flow-orchestration token refresh (mint from job_perms) (#10419)
* fix: harden flow-orchestration token refresh (mint from job_perms) * refactor: address review nits on flow token refresh |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.8
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76a9523009 |
feat: use derived username instead of email for non-member superadmins (#9857)
* feat: use derived username instead of email for non-member superadmins Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review - drop redundant username cache, guard whoami membership by email Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: use explicit non_member boolean instead of role string for superadmin banner Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: resolve email from password table for non-member superadmin permissioned_as Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: resolve non-member superadmin drafts via shared username->email resolver Adds resolve_username_to_email (usr, then super_admin password fallback for both derived-username and email modes) and uses it in get_email_from_permissioned_as and the drafts get/list endpoints, so a non-member superadmin's drafts resolve and no email leaks into the drafts payload. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: superadmin-not-in-workspace schedule uses derived username as permissioned_as Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: resolve non-member superadmin identity in draft owner-circles, username_to_email, and home filter Applies the password-fallback username resolution to the script/flow/app/draft owner-circle subqueries and the username_to_email endpoint (was an admins-workspace 'username == email' hack), and switches the home items-list user-folder filter to the non_member flag instead of the now-broken username-contains-@ heuristic. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: backfill non-member superadmin favorites from email to derived username Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: propagate DB errors in username resolution instead of leaking email (CI review) Addresses cubic-dev-ai P2: get_instance_username_or_fallback_to_email now returns Result and only falls back to the email for a genuine 'no derived username'; a query error propagates so callers fail closed rather than leaking the raw email as the acting username. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: clarify non-member superadmin popover (username used + admin permissions) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep username_to_email endpoint member-only to not disclose non-member superadmin email (CI review) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: forbid disabling automate_username_creation once usernames assigned (CI review) Makes the setting effectively one-way once instance-wide usernames exist, so the global-uniqueness invariant that keeps stored u/<username> identities (schedules/triggers/drafts/superadmin ownership) unambiguous can never be dropped back to workspace-local uniqueness. Re-saving false on an already-disabled instance stays a no-op. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.8
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0dbd9c1231 |
perf: eliminate dual-connection DB pool contention across worker, queue, and api (#9798)
* perf: eliminate dual-connection DB pool contention across worker, queue, and api Reuse the held transaction (or move pool reads before begin()) instead of checking out a second pool connection while a tx is open, extending the fix from #9789/#7861. Targets the per-worker pool (max 5) hot paths plus several server-pool API handlers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: pass owned pool to get_email_from_permissioned_as in http trigger handler The generified signature takes impl PgExecutor; the http trigger handler passed &db where db is already &DB, yielding &&Pool which does not impl PgExecutor (only surfaced under the full feature set in CI). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep RLS-exposed reads on the non-RLS pool and isolate flow-eval reads in a savepoint Addresses review of the dual-connection sweep: - worker_flow: wrap the stop_after_all_iters_if reads in a SAVEPOINT. The caller swallows the error and keeps using tx, so a DB read failure must not leave the outer transaction aborted (it would fail the later commit). Matches the previous pool-read semantics. - Revert reads that were moved onto an RLS (user_db) transaction back to the non-RLS pool, since RLS row-visibility/role context can change results: push_scheduled_job (email/tag/settings lookups; reachable with a user_db tx from api-schedule/api-flows), push_inner native-retry dedicated_worker routing (RLS isolation variants), resources.rs app-namespace folder auto-create (non-admins must not be blocked), and the script archive/delete UPDATEs. Non-RLS db.begin() reuse and move-before-begin are kept. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: failpoint proving the stop_after_all_iters_if savepoint isolates an aborted read Adds a worker-crate failpoints feature and a data-driven hook: when the stop_after_all_iters_if expr is the magic sentinel, the in-evaluation read runs SELECT 1/0 to abort its (savepoint) transaction. The test asserts the flow still completes (iteration marked failed) — which only holds if the savepoint keeps the outer status-update transaction committable. Without the savepoint the abort would poison the outer tx and the job would never complete. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 4.8
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e8e0701a36 |
feat(api): add endpoint to update token label (#9474)
* feat(api): add endpoint to update token label Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): prevent renaming the session token label Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): restrict token-label edits to user tokens, not just session Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): edit token label in the edit modal instead of inline Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): reject relabeling tokens to reserved system-token names Centralize the is_user_token classifier in windmill-common and reuse it to reject labels colliding with system-token namespaces (ephemeral*, debugger-token, mcp-oauth-*), not just session. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): match ephemeral label case-insensitively and cap label length Align the canonical is_user_token, the SQL guard and the frontend mirror on a case-insensitive `ephemeral` match (so a token can't be relabeled to a casing the backend allows but the UI hides), reject labels over the VARCHAR(1000) column limit with a 400, and add unit tests for is_user_token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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efb4a27d51 |
fix: replace email with permissioned_as for triggers/schedules (#8439)
* refactor: replace email with permissioned_as for triggers/schedules
Add a new `permissioned_as` column (format: `u/{username}`, `g/{group}`,
or raw email) to all trigger tables and schedule. This value is used
directly for job permission checks, removing the need for email lookups
when creating/updating triggers.
- Migration: add permissioned_as to all 9 trigger tables + schedule,
drop email from trigger tables (schedule keeps it for backwards compat)
- Backend: resolve_email() (async, DB) -> resolve_permissioned_as() (sync)
- Email cache: get_email_from_permissioned_as() with quick_cache for
places that still need email (fetch_api_authed, schedule backwards compat)
- Frontend: rename email/preserve_email -> permissioned_as/preserve_permissioned_as
in deploy data and OpenAPI schemas
- Tests updated for new field names and u/{username} format
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix sqlx/build
* update ee ref
* refactor: simplify resolve_edited_by to always use authed username
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix compile + migration
* update ref
* test: add trigger trait method tests for permissioned_as queries
Add tests that call TriggerCrud and Listener trait methods directly
to verify dynamic SQL correctly references the permissioned_as column.
Covers get_trigger_by_path, list_triggers, set_trigger_mode, and
fetch_enabled_unlistened_triggers for all trigger types.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* update sqlx
* fix: use permissioned_as directly for schedules and fix audit RLS for groups
- Schedule: permissioned_as only set on create, not on edit/set_enabled
- Schedule: stop reading email column, use get_email_from_permissioned_as
- Triggers: use fetch_api_authed_from_permissioned_as instead of edited_by
- Triggers: rename listener fields for clarity (username -> edited_by)
- Fix audit author username for group permissioned_as (g/test -> group-test)
to match session.user, preventing RLS policy violations on audit_partitioned
- OpenAPI: remove permissioned_as/preserve_permissioned_as from EditSchedule
- Add backwards-compat comments for schedule email writes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: regenerate system prompts for permissioned_as field
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix build
* refactor: generalize onBehalfOf naming, add permissioned_as to EditSchedule
- Frontend: rename onBehalfOfPermissionedAs -> onBehalfOf with comments
explaining it carries emails for flows/scripts and permissioned_as for
triggers/schedules
- Frontend: rename getOnBehalfOfEmail -> getOnBehalfOf,
getOnBehalfOfPermissionedAsForDeploy -> getOnBehalfOfForDeploy,
customOnBehalfOfEmails -> customOnBehalfOf
- Backend: add optional permissioned_as/preserve_permissioned_as to
EditSchedule with COALESCE (only updates when provided)
- Backend: add on_behalf_of audit log for schedule edit
- Backend: remove unused resolve_on_behalf_of_permissioned_as
- Tests: remove email assertions from schedule update test (email is
just backwards compat, only permissioned_as matters)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: preserve email column when permissioned_as is preserved on schedule edit
Derive email from the preserved permissioned_as via cache lookup instead
of always writing authed.email. This keeps the email column consistent
with the old behavior for backwards compat with old workers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: update deploy UI labels from "edited by" to "run as" for triggers
Triggers now use permissioned_as (not edited_by) for permissions, so
update the deploy UI wording to reflect this. Also update wm_deployers
group description to mention schedules and permissioned_as.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: use u/username format for custom trigger/schedule deploy selection
When picking a custom user for trigger/schedule deployment, store
u/${username} (permissioned_as format) instead of the email. Flows/scripts
continue to use email format for on_behalf_of_email.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: show u/username format for "me" option in trigger deploy selector
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: simplify OnBehalfOfSelector to return the right format per kind
OnBehalfOfSelector now handles the email vs permissioned_as format
internally based on kind:
- triggers: returns u/username, displays u/username in all options
- flows/scripts/apps: returns email, displays username
The onSelect callback now takes (choice, value?) where value is already
in the correct format. Parent components just store it directly without
needing to know about the format difference.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: always show u/username format in OnBehalfOfSelector for all kinds
Display is now consistent: all kinds show u/username in the selector.
The returned value still differs (email for flows/scripts, u/username
for triggers) since the backend APIs expect different formats.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: replace email with permissioned_as in http_trigger test insert
The email column was dropped from trigger tables in the migration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: review fixes — migration, app policy, capture cleanup, naming
- Migration: remove DEFAULT '', use nullable → populate → SET NOT NULL
- App policy: set both on_behalf_of and on_behalf_of_email for all choices
- OnBehalfOfSelector: return OnBehalfOfDetails {email, permissionedAs} instead of ambiguous value
- Remove unused email field from Capture struct and query
- Rename getSourceEmail/getTargetEmail → getSourceOnBehalfOf/getTargetOnBehalfOf
- Rename test functions from preserve_email to preserve_permissioned_as
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: add permissioned_as to all test schedule INSERTs
Since the migration no longer uses DEFAULT '', all INSERTs must
explicitly provide permissioned_as. Updated test fixtures and
schedule_push tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: strip permissioned_as from exports/sync, fix OpenAPI required field
- Add permissioned_as to workspace export strip list (like edited_by)
- Add permissioned_as to CLI TriggerFile Omit list
- Fix TriggerExtraProperty.required: email → permissioned_as
- Regenerate frontend and CLI types
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: remove accidentally committed generated files
These directories are gitignored and should not be tracked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: regenerate system prompts for permissioned_as schema changes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: remove permissioned_as from CLI TriggerFile Omit list
Already stripped in workspace export, no need to also omit from the type.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: optimize email cache key and revert TriggerFile Omit change
- Use single concatenated string for cache key instead of (String, String) tuple
- Remove permissioned_as from CLI TriggerFile Omit (already stripped in export)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: zero-allocation email cache lookups using Equivalent trait
Use a borrowed EmailCacheKey(&str, &str) for cache lookups via
quick_cache's Equivalent support. Only allocates (String, String)
on cache miss for insert. This is called on every trigger fire
and schedule push.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: add permissioned_as to Schedule required fields in OpenAPI spec
The backend always returns permissioned_as (non-optional String),
so the schema should reflect that.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: handle group- prefix in migration UPDATE statements
edited_by can be 'group-{name}' for group-owned triggers/schedules.
The migration now correctly maps these to 'g/{name}' format instead
of incorrectly producing 'u/group-{name}'.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "fix: handle group- prefix in migration UPDATE statements"
This reverts commit
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f2be625348 |
feat: store hashed tokens instead of plaintext (#8217)
* feat: store hashed tokens in the token table instead of plaintext
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: address review issues in token hash migration
- Update all base.sql fixtures to include token_hash/token_prefix columns
- Keep plaintext token for webhook tokens (needed for URL reconstruction)
- Restore get_token_by_prefix to query DB for webhook tokens
- Fix down migration to delete NULL-token rows before restoring NOT NULL
- Update parser fixture standalone schema
- Update EE dedicated_worker_ee.rs to use token_hash/token_prefix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: restore sqlx offline cache (only add new query files)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: keep writing plaintext token column for backward compat
Write to token column alongside token_hash until MIN_VERSION_SUPPORTS_TOKEN_HASH
(1.649.0) is reached. This ensures older workers can still authenticate
during rolling upgrades. Remove the separate UPDATE in new_webhook_token
since create_token_internal now writes plaintext directly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: branch on MIN_VERSION to write plaintext token or null
Check MIN_VERSION_SUPPORTS_TOKEN_HASH at runtime: write plaintext to
token column while old workers exist, switch to NULL once all workers
are >= 1.649.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: set MIN_VERSION_SUPPORTS_TOKEN_HASH to 1.650.0
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: use token_hash for email lookup and expiry notifications
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: rotate webhook tokens instead of recovering plaintext from DB
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: use token_hash for native trigger token lookups and deletes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* sqlx
* refactor: drop webhook_token_prefix from native_trigger table
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: backward compat for token rotation and make webhook_token_hash NOT NULL
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: prevent panic on short superadmin secret token prefix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: prevent panic on short superadmin secret token prefix
Replace all `token[0..TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN]` slicing with
`token.get(..TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN).unwrap_or(token)` to prevent
panics when a token shorter than 10 chars is provided (e.g.
malformed Authorization header, short superadmin secret).
Co-authored-by: hugocasa <hugocasa@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: prevent panic on short token prefix slicing
Replace all `token[0..TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN]` with safe
`token.get(..TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN).unwrap_or(token)` to prevent panics
on malformed tokens shorter than 10 characters.
Co-authored-by: hugocasa <hugocasa@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "fix: prevent panic on short superadmin secret token prefix"
This reverts commit
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6
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48bc3e2445 |
fix: prevent zombie jobs from looping forever (#8313)
* fix: always increment zombie job counter to prevent infinite loop at restart limit Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: force-complete zombie jobs when handle_job_error fails Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: revert counter increment change, keep re-detection for robustness Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: disable schedule when permissioned_as user is not found Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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5f0ef936d1 | feat: add sandbox annotations, volume mounts, for AI sandbox starting with claude (#8058) | ||
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6
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894d8a94f8 |
reuse existing transaction in push to reduce pool pressure (#7858)
* fix: reuse existing transaction in push instead of acquiring new connection In push_inner, fetch_authed_from_permissioned_as was acquiring a new connection from the pool to fetch job permissions, even though a transaction was already open. Use fetch_authed_from_permissioned_as_conn with the existing transaction instead, reducing pool pressure when many jobs are pushed concurrently. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * improve contention * improve contention --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6
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e655a06563 |
fix: prevent schedule pool connection exhaustion (#7821)
* fix: prevent schedule pool connection exhaustion Schedules were disabling themselves after upgrading from v1.605.0 to v1.614.0 due to pool connection deadlock. The root cause was fetch_authed_from_permissioned_as acquiring a pool connection inside push() while a transaction already held one, exhausting the pool under pressure. Fix: pre-compute Authed before db.begin() for the normal path, and reuse the transaction connection via fetch_authed_from_permissioned_as_conn for the on_behalf_of_email path. Peak pool usage drops from 2 to 1 for all schedule push paths. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: replace pool exhaustion tests with comprehensive schedule push tests Replace the 16 pool-specific tests with 19 tests covering all schedule push code paths: script/flow scheduling, on_behalf_of_email (script and flow), retry wrapping, duplicate detection, invalid timezone/cron/args, script/flow not found, paused schedules, clock shift detection, disabled schedule, path mismatch, push failure disabling schedule, and trigger metadata. Also simplify the obo_authed pattern in push_scheduled_job to use a single match assignment instead of two bindings with .or() chaining. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasa
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f2dbf6d20d |
count external jwts for telemetry
* feat: count external jwts * nits |
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hugocasaandRuben Fiszel
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526dfd7237 |
feat(backend): allow multiple workspaces in jwt (#6714)
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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0647202a4f |
fix: check perms more tightly for running jobs (#6532)
* all * masterpiece * masterpiece * masterpiece * masterpiece * masterpiece * masterpiece * masterpiece * all * masterpiece * masterpiece * masterpiece * masterpiece * masterpiece * masterpiece * nits |
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hugocasa
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958e8af782 |
feat: ai agent steps (#6393)
* feat: ai agent steps base * better backend and graph * feat: anthropic, log viewer * nit * fix(frontend): hide tool nodes from timeline * move ai agent actions from flow status to flow status module * nits and workspace/hub scripts support * tmp ref * fix merge * feat: display agent tools status in the graph * fix reactivity * fix flow status * nit |
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 centdix
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4d3746335e |
feat(mcp): add api endpoints as tools (#6329)
* working list tools * working call tool * add schema * implement calling the endpoint * use openapi instead * correctly implement call_tool * provide workspace from context * cleaning * add more endpoints * remove resolved hack * add missing properties description * add list scripts and flows * add instructions * remove bacon.toml * cleaning * remove bacon.toml * nit * nit * cleaning * fix openapi file * nit * better error handling |
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 dieribaandRuben Fiszel
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ad441a7ba6 |
improve: add retry logic for sqs oidc fetch credentials (#6275)
* improve * update dependency * push ee ref --------- Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev> |
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835645643e |
feat: Better tracing for audit logs, including a graph to visualize them (#6078)
* Migrate audit log page to svelte 5 * Add email and span cols to audit table * Add token_prefixs to audit logs (into AuditAuthorable trait) * Add audit logs graph (wip) * Add audit span on push and jwt * Unify same job audit into the same audit span * Improve the graph visually * Fix typo * functioning graph with svelte issue * Fix leak * feat: migrate AuditLogsTable from DataTable to VirtualList for performance - Replace DataTable component with VirtualList for handling thousands of rows - Migrate to Svelte 5 runes ($props, $bindable, $derived, $state) - Implement flattenLogs() for virtual scrolling with grouped date headers - Add sticky indices and dynamic height calculation - Update parent component to use callback prop pattern instead of events - Preserve all existing functionality: filtering, selection, pagination - Follows RunsTable.svelte implementation pattern Resolves performance issues when displaying large audit log datasets. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code) Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> * Fix remaining virtual list issues * WIP graph * Fix chart styling * Fix npm check * Fix missing audit_span arguments * Update sqlx * use varchar 255 for email as in other tables * Remove syntax inconsistency * Match struct with ee crate * Update ee-repo-ref.txt * Update worker_flow.rs * Remove redefinition of trait to prevent shadowing * Re add trait on oss but only when no `private` flag --------- Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <209825114+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: GitHub Action <action@github.com> Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev> |
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dieriba
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54b4815df2 |
nits: use generic deserializer for empty data (#5727)
* use generic deserializer for empty data * update repo ref * fix import |
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5b123b01a1 |
feat: handle different aws auth resource type (#5637)
* feat: oidc auth with sqs * rafctor * update: add id token struct * update has_expired function * fix duration * fix typo * Update backend/windmill-common/src/auth.rs Co-authored-by: graphite-app[bot] <96075541+graphite-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * Update backend/windmill-common/src/auth.rs Co-authored-by: ellipsis-dev[bot] <65095814+ellipsis-dev[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * update ref * update sqlx * update resource type * update repo ref * Update settings.json * add new resource type * update repo ref and clear resource path on resource type change * update .sqlx * add missing key --------- Co-authored-by: graphite-app[bot] <96075541+graphite-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: ellipsis-dev[bot] <65095814+ellipsis-dev[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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34b307b2be |
feat: oidc support for sqs trigger (#5614)
* feat: oidc auth with sqs * rafctor * update: add id token struct * update has_expired function * fix duration * fix typo * Update backend/windmill-common/src/auth.rs Co-authored-by: graphite-app[bot] <96075541+graphite-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * Update backend/windmill-common/src/auth.rs Co-authored-by: ellipsis-dev[bot] <65095814+ellipsis-dev[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * update ref * update sqlx * update resource type * update repo ref * Update settings.json --------- Co-authored-by: graphite-app[bot] <96075541+graphite-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: ellipsis-dev[bot] <65095814+ellipsis-dev[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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63fa499015 | feat: agent workers v2 using http (#5588) | ||
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Ruben Fiszel
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3edca4bc91 |
perf: optimize number of queries needed for job run (#5504)
* optPerf * update sqlx * update sqlx |
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HugoCasa
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46c784574a |
feat: app s3 input anonymous delete (#5401)
* feat: app s3 input anonymous delete * tmp ee ref * fix build |
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Ruben Fiszel
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90ba65ae20 | improve error messages for internal err | ||
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HugoCasa
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bc3d93b935 |
fix(backend): better deleted user error (#5060)
* fix(backend): better deleted user error * nit |
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HugoCasa
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04fbda28e8 |
feat: on behalf of (#5058)
* feat: on behalf of * fix * revert mistakke * temp ee ref * renaming + CLI * sqlx * nits + ee ref |
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wendrul
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4facf3ca3e |
feat: Add a devops role to act as a "readonly admin" (#4775)
* Prepare sqlx * Add devops role as bool * Add devops reloe and use it for certain endpoints * Critical alerts: complete devops role visiblity * Update ee repo ref * Prepare sqlx |
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HugoCasa
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1feccd493e |
feat: add tag filtering to external JWT authentication (#4425)
* feat: tag filtering jwt ext auth * move tags to scopes * fix symlink * update ee ref |
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 Ruben Fiszel
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6ddeb07270 | fix: fix OIDC | ||
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HugoCasa
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93f58056a0 |
feat: replace ephemeral tokens by jwt (#3908)
* feat: replace ephemeral tokens by jwt * fix: migration + sqlx * fix: tests, agent, ee ref * fix: sqlx * fix: tests * fix: jwt prefix change + fix tests * fix: nit * fix: handle agent mode |