The /ws_debug debugger WebSocket gated JWT signature verification on inline
`code` being present (`if (code && REQUIRE_SIGNED_REQUESTS)`), so a
`program`-mode launch (naming an arbitrary server-side file path that is read
and executed) skipped verification entirely — even with
REQUIRE_SIGNED_DEBUG_REQUESTS=true. The WS handshake also performed no Origin
check, allowing cross-origin (CSWSH) drive-by from a malicious page.
- Enforce signing on every launch in both handlers (Python + Bun/TS): reject
program-mode outright and require+verify a token for inline code.
- Add opt-in DEBUG_ALLOWED_ORIGINS allowlist enforced at the WS handshake.
- Default docker-compose REQUIRE_SIGNED_DEBUG_REQUESTS to true.
- Update THREAT_MODEL T8/EP15 to reflect the root cause and mitigation.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(sandbox): pull/extract images with crane instead of podman (+ add to image)
The sandboxed container runtime (`# sandbox <image>`) only ever pulls + flattens an
image (nsjail does the run), so a full container engine is overkill — and podman was
never actually in any Dockerfile, so the merged feature couldn't run in the shipped
image. Switch to crane (google/go-containerregistry): a single ~25MB static binary,
no daemon/store/root/privileged.
- docker_v2.rs: crane export -> flattened rootfs tar, crane config -> OCI config,
crane digest -> content-addressed rootfs+config cache (cross-job dedup + automatic
freshness), crane manifest -> pre-download size guard. DOCKER_CONFIG authfile dir.
Cache eviction prunes the rootfs-tar cache by mtime (LRU). Pull policy honored via a
ref->digest cache (missing/never reuse without a registry hit).
- Dockerfile + docker/DockerfileSlim{,Ee}: install the crane binary (Full/FullEe and
the EE image inherit it via FROM the base image).
- docs + UI text + instance-setting descriptions updated (download size is compressed;
cache is the rootfs-tar cache).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): address CI review — digest-pinned fetch, size cap on every job, eviction race
Codex P1s:
- Fetch by the resolved digest (name@digest), not the mutable tag, so content can't
diverge from the digest the cache is keyed under if a tag moves mid-fetch.
- Enforce the size cap on EVERY job via a cached {digest}.size sidecar (no registry call
on cache reuse), so lowering the limit rejects already-cached oversized images.
- Eviction race: hardlink the cache tar into the job dir before tar -xf (pins the inode
against concurrent eviction) and re-fetch if it was evicted first.
Claude P2s: atomic config sidecar (tmp+rename) + tolerate torn parse; soften the LRU
comment (mtime = creation order); sweep orphaned *.tmp.* and .size on eviction.
+digest_key/ref_key unit tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): P1 cross-fs cache staging (EXDEV), Dockerfile arch fail-fast
CI re-review (Claude + Codex P1): the eviction-race hardlink crosses filesystems in the
shipped deployments — the cache is its own volume (/tmp/windmill/cache) while the job dir
is on the container fs — so hard_link returns EXDEV (not NotFound) and every sandbox job
fails. Fall back to tokio::fs::copy on a non-NotFound link error; copy reads through the
source inode so it still survives a concurrent eviction.
Also: Dockerfiles fail fast with a clear error on an unsupported arch instead of building
a 404 crane URL; ref->digest file written via tmp+rename (no torn read under missing/never).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(sandbox): say 'oldest by creation time' not 'LRU' for cache eviction
Codex P2: the code evicts by tar creation time (cache hits don't touch mtime), so the
user-facing docs + instance-setting text shouldn't claim true LRU.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: add sandboxed docker v2 runtime via '# docker <image>'
Run a container image as a subprogram of the job's own nsjail sandbox:
extract the image rootfs with podman (rootless) and run it chrooted inside the
job's nsjail, so the container inherits the job's confinement and is safe under
nsjail / for untrusted code. Selected by '# docker <image>'; a bare '# docker'
keeps the v1 (dind) path untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: default to daemonless docker (drop dind from compose, allow docker on cloud)
docker-compose no longer ships the dind sidecar (v2 is daemonless: podman + nsjail
in the worker); removed the dind service, DOCKER_HOST env, depends_on and volume.
Removed the language-picker guard that blocked Docker scripts on the multi-tenant
platform, now that v2 makes docker safe to run sandboxed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: select sandboxed container via # sandbox <image>; add pull policy + size guards
- Surface moved from '# docker <image>' to '# sandbox <image>' (groups under the
sandbox annotation; '# docker' stays v1-only, '# sandbox' stays nsjail-bash).
- SANDBOX_IMAGE_PULL_POLICY (default 'newer') so moving tags don't go stale.
- SANDBOX_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE_MB rejects oversized images before extraction.
- SANDBOX_IMAGE_CACHE_MAX_MB best-effort LRU eviction of podman's image store.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(sandbox): support # volume, honor nsjail tmp instance settings, v2 docker template
- Thread shared_mount into the sandbox container nsjail config so '# volume' mounts
(and the same-worker /tmp/shared folder) apply inside the container.
- Use resolve_nsjail_tmp_mount_block for the container's /tmp so it honors the same
nsjail_tmp_backing / nsjail_tmpfs_size_mb instance settings as other nsjail jobs.
- docker-compose comment + the editor's Docker template now use '# sandbox <image>'.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(sandbox): make image size/cache/pull-policy UI instance settings
Convert SANDBOX_IMAGE_* from worker env vars to DB-backed instance settings
(sandbox_image_max_size_mb, sandbox_image_cache_max_mb, sandbox_image_pull_policy),
hot-reloaded via the same mechanism as nsjail_tmpfs_size_mb and configurable in
#superadmin-settings. No worker restart needed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(sandbox): windmill-managed registry — default registry + private auth
Two new instance settings:
- sandbox_image_default_registry: prepended to unqualified image refs (alpine ->
<registry>/alpine); fully-qualified refs untouched.
- sandbox_registry_auth: docker/podman auth.json blob written to a per-job authfile
(0600, removed with the job) and passed to podman --authfile for private registries.
Both hot-reloaded and configurable in #superadmin-settings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): protobuf-safe proto_str escaper, atomic 0600 authfile, registry tests
Addresses local-review P2s: proto_str now emits valid protobuf octal escapes for
control/non-ASCII bytes (not Rust \u{..} that nsjail would reject); the registry
authfile is created 0600 atomically (no world-readable window); add a
registry_qualified table test + a non-ASCII proto_str case.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): P0 — deliver image env via nsjail envar:, never the launcher process env
CI review (P0): the image's OCI Env (attacker-controlled keys+values) was applied to
the nsjail launcher process via .envs(), so a hostile image could set LD_PRELOAD/
LD_LIBRARY_PATH/LD_AUDIT on nsjail itself and execute code as the worker outside the
jail. Now the image env is rendered as proto-escaped 'envar:' directives (child-only)
and nsjail's process env carries only windmill-trusted keys (reserved vars + proxy).
Also: warn instead of silently bypassing the size guard on inspect failure; reset the
eviction guard via a Drop guard (no stuck flag on panic/early-return). +render_envars test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): P0 symlink-write escape via rootfs script; P1 redact registry-auth logging
CI review:
- P0 (Codex): the body was written into the image-controlled rootfs as
.windmill_docker_main.sh via write_file (follows symlinks) — a hostile image could
plant that path as a symlink to a host file and capture the worker's write before
nsjail starts. Now the body is passed straight to 'sh -c <body> sh <args>'; no file
is written into the rootfs at all.
- P1 (Codex): sandbox_registry_auth flowed through the generic setting loader which
logs the value (raw auth.json credentials). Replaced with a secret-aware reload that
loads directly and logs only a redacted 'configured=' message.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): redact sandbox_registry_auth in instance-settings write log too
The settings API also logs 'Set global setting <key> to <value>' via format_setting_value;
add sandbox_registry_auth to SENSITIVE_SETTINGS so the credential is redacted there as
well as on reload.
* fix(sandbox): don't silently disable cache eviction on podman images parse error
Re-review (cubic/Claude P2): serde_json::from_slice(...).unwrap_or_default() meant any
parse hiccup (e.g. podman omitting Size/Created via omitempty for a zero value, or
schema drift) silently degraded to an empty Vec and disabled eviction with no log.
Now Size/Created are #[serde(default)] (a missing omitempty key -> 0, not a whole-array
parse failure) and a real parse error warns + breaks instead of being swallowed.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: replace host docker socket with dind sidecar for isolation
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: comment out dind sidecar by default to avoid wasting resources
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: enable dind by default, comment out insecure host socket mount
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Updates the debugger service to use port 3003 instead of 5679 across
all configuration files, documentation, and code references. This aligns
the debugger with the other windmill-extra services which use ports
3001 (LSP) and 3002 (Multiplayer).
Changes:
- docker-compose.yml: Update port exposure and add DEBUGGER_PORT env
- docker/entrypoint-extra.sh: Change default port from 5679 to 3003
- debugger/dap_debug_service.ts: Update default port in code and docs
- debugger/README.md: Update port documentation
- debugger/test_debug_service.ts: Update test URLs
- docker/test_windmill_extra.ts: Update test configuration
- .github/workflows/publish_extra.yml: Update test container ports
- frontend/src/lib/components/debug/*: Update frontend examples and defaults
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* use own folder for memory
* fixes
* better chat interface
* fix export tab
* move in folder
* dont show flow graph if chat mode
* fix
* fix too long title
* fix user message
* fix
* fix
* remove from server
* cleaner
* cleaning
* cleaning
* cleaning
* main docker file
* fix docker image build test tag
* don't remove tag
* make root user default
* chown tmp folder
* create search and logs folder in order to inherite windmill user permissions
* Dockerfile
* lsp non root
* improving lsp image to get rid of critical vulnerabilities
* formatting
* support /root/.cache mount
* make the cache mount backwards compatible
* Add indexer crate and files
* POC searcher
incomplete schema
only indexes at startup
* POC search component frontend
* Demo of the frontend element
* add Results and Args as text
* minimal functionality
* Make jump to scripts by name
also flows and apps
* Add button on sidebar to open search
* Update lock on indexer after merge
* Make arrow key navigation compatible with scrol
* Show empty result screen and log as a coming feat
* Add summary to script searchable items
* Catch `parts is undefined` error (uFuzzy)
* Index refreshing using tokio interval
* Fix JobLoader workspace being wrongly defined
* Fix click outside
* Add debouncing for completed run search
* Binary mode working + job index tracker
* Warning for no license + fix height scrollbars on content search
* Make it compile without EE files
* remove panic to use errors
* Move global search
* Cleanup UI, no more tab switcher but clear placeholders and actions
* Add tantivy feature flag for windmill-api
* Rework indexer mode
* Mac compatibility for shortcut
* Update test for new run_server
* Prepare sqlx
* Mac compatibility
* Fix openapi yaml
* Fix frontend
* Frontend api fix
* Update docker-compose.yml and caddyfile
With the (by default deactivated) container and reverse proxy to use the
windmill indexer
* fix feature flag for tests
* fix feature falg for running tests
* fix feature flag for running tests
* Make content search use search modal instead
* Add tantivy feature to ee build steps
* Remove old Content search
* change volume location for indexer
* Update dependencies
* Prepare sqlx
* Uncomment line on docker compose
* Add line between input and results
* Update ee repo ref
Ruben Fiszel
hugocasa
Alexander Petric
centdix
wendrul
Henri Courdent
Ruben Fiszel
Jacopo Bonomi
Bret Mogilefsky
Guillaume Bouvignies