A move writes old path -> new path (per workspace and kind, per owner for a
draft-only move) in its transaction; a draft save or discard addressed to a
path the caller has no draft at resolves through it and keeps the moved
draft's path keys. Creating an item at a path drops the records leaving it.
Every writer (edit routes, sessions, chat, CLI, the tab-close flush) follows
without passing an id, so the id plumbing is gone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: add per-route CORS origin allowlist for HTTP triggers
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: fail closed on cold router cache and invalid origin input
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: resolve CORS route from the decoded path like the request handler
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: add instance-wide default allowed origins for HTTP routes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: let non-superadmins read the default allowed origins setting
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: badge the advanced section when a route's origins are restricted
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: state inherited origins on the control and use one hint row
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: trim the origins tooltip and relabel the toggle when a default exists
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep the origins format hint visible until an entry is wrong
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: state the at-least-one requirement in the origins hint
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: import the origins validator in the trigger-http tests
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: make an empty allowlist deny rather than fall back to the default
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: address review nits on origin validation and the CORS editor
* fix: derive the origins error from the stored list and tighten host validation
* fix: parse real IPv6 hosts and refuse a newly emptied allowlist
* refactor: make origin validation advisory except for null and non-ascii
* feat: let an empty allowlist be saved as deny every origin
* docs: document the empty allowlist as deny every origin
* fix: bound allowlists, reject commas, and decide cors after the handler
* chore: revert unrelated rustfmt churn in windmill-common tests
* chore: revert unrelated rustfmt churn in windmill-common
* chore: drop the route types the cors restructure replaced
* fix: take the stricter cors decision from before and after the handler
* fix: strip runnable cors headers when the routers are unavailable
* docs: document the allowlist bounds in the openapi schema
* fix: let an unavailable cors read defer to one that resolved
* refactor: carry the resolved cors policy from the handler to the middleware
* docs: describe why an unavailable read fails closed on the paths that reach it
* fix: validate the default origins on the declarative settings path
* test: keep the webhook doc comment with the test it describes
* fix: warn on impossible schemes and ports, and validate the instance setting
* feat: treat an empty allowlist as unset at both levels
* perf: decode the cors path only when the fallback needs it
* docs: document the empty allowlist as unset in the api schema
* docs: describe an empty allowlist as unset in the frontend comments
* docs: say what a null allowlist resolves to, not what it meant before the default existed
* docs: state what the validator refuses and why methods stay broad
* feat: exempt static asset routes from the origin allowlist
* fix: hide the origin control for every static target, not just websites
* fix: exempt only static websites, not single-file static assets
* fix: warn on an unclosed ipv6 host in the origins advisory
* fix: require assets present, not just the static website flag
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: make the app policy's principal the authority for its identity
* fix: align the app backfill with the sibling migration and audit the uncached address
* chore: refresh the sqlx cache after rebasing onto the merged base
* fix: resolve the app execution address uncached, it decides the job's authorization
* chore: cache the EE queries at the ref this branch pins
* chore: cache the EE queries at the ref this branch pins
* fix: derive the app draft's on-behalf-of address on read
* chore: cache the query the draft derivation test added
* fix: derive the app identity on the draft-table and version reads too
* docs: state the draft resolver's authorization contract
* fix: resolve a draft's principal against workspace membership only
* chore: cache the membership lookup the draft resolver added
* fix: drop an unresolvable draft's address instead of leaving it stale
* perf: evict the address cache on change so app dispatch can read it
* fix: evict on superadmin role changes, not only address changes
* refactor: make the app policy's address optional instead of derived on read
* fix: follow an external superadmin's rename into the apps that name them
* docs: state the removal gate once, and correctly
* refactor: drop the app-policy version constant that gated nothing
* docs: drop the last reference to the removed constant
* perf: read the address cache everywhere now that eviction reaches every replica
* fix: keep persisted addresses off the cache the poller evicts asynchronously
* docs: state where the cached address is accepted and where it is not
* docs: keep the cache rule in one place and drop the stale premise
* docs: sort the two lookups by how long a wrong answer lives
* fix: resolve the schedule address uncached where it is written to the row
* docs: name the release this actually ships in
* perf: evict a superadmin's key per workspace instead of the whole cache
* fix: evict every alias a superadmin principal can be spelled as
* docs: describe the trigger as it is
* docs: cover the round-tripped read in the cache rule
* docs: record why a stale dispatch address cannot escalate
* fix: validate a dispatch address against the principal's live binding
* fix: carry the validated address through to the job row and token
* fix: record the validated address on the job row, not the one handed in
* test: run the substep tag check as the non-superadmin it means to test
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc
* fix: rewrite a stored app address that disagrees with its principal
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc
* docs: record the accepted staleness window of the cached dispatch address
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc
* fix: record the validated address on the job's audit row
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc
* docs: record the accepted rename race of pre-transaction identity resolution
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc
* docs: separate the app's stored address from the derived one in the resolver doc
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc
* docs: describe the job identity fast path the push comments skipped
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc
* fix: backfill a legacy group-prefixed username as the group it names
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc
* fix: resolve a schedule edit's identity before opening its transaction
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc
* fix: never resolve a disabled member to a same-named superadmin
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc
* docs: state what the email-change notify buys, and rewrap two comment lines
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc
* fix: keep a group's runnables when offboarding a legacy group-prefixed member
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc
* fix: read the app author from the stored address, as execution does
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc
* docs: record the rename race's full consequence as a known, accepted limitation
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc
* docs: record the keep-target group address case as a known, accepted limitation
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: show when the last git auto-pull status was recorded
* chore: bump ee-repo-ref for the auto-pull status fix
* fix: show the git auto-pull status age with TimeAgo instead of a year-less date
* test: pin that a stale auto-pull recovery cannot overwrite a newer state
* chore: bump ee-repo-ref for the conditional auto-pull recovery
* fix: keep TimeAgo counting past the first hour in noSeconds mode
* chore: bump ee-repo-ref for the clear_auto_pull_failure contract note
* fix: guard TimeAgo's boundary scheduler against invalid dates and pin same-head newer failures
* chore: bump ee-repo-ref for the timestamp-guarded auto-pull recovery
* test: cover a same-second newer failure surviving a stale auto-pull recovery
* chore: bump ee-repo-ref for the whole-failure recovery match
* test: name the recovery helper after its input, not its staleness
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to c6df9fdd9826efb40d3586a9f97d17dee98ac6ef
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #793 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 6aff80b80cae4944a4a78a6b9244019bc37f368b
New ee-repo-ref: c6df9fdd9826efb40d3586a9f97d17dee98ac6ef
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
A rename carries every draft on the item to the new path. An editor left open
across it was still saving by the path it opened on, which the server had to
refuse and answer with where the item went (the "moved" handshake and its
modal). The draft row has an id: the get-by-path overlay now returns it as
draft_id, every later save sends it, and the server writes the row wherever it
is and answers with that path. The editor then follows: it flushes what it holds,
tells the user, and navigates to the item's new path, where the stale prompt
says what changed. The lineage-based move resolvers, the moved status and the
moved modal are gone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A draft occupies its path the way a deployed item does: a never-deployed item,
or a draft left on an archived script. Renaming onto it would either merge two
items or leave the losing row stranded at a path its item has left. The move now
refuses with a BadRequest inside the deploy's transaction, so the rename itself
fails and the source stays deployed. Every draft on the item then moves; there is
no longer a left-behind count to report.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep pinned import versions of imported scripts in bun lockfiles
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: guard pinned imports through an unlocked multi-file bun run
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: let admins and background sync reach private git hosts
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011Hb4vHnVrCMqe8ZtNtzFSs
* chore: point ee-repo-ref at the private git host change
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011Hb4vHnVrCMqe8ZtNtzFSs
* fix: treat any admin token as admin and pin git probe transports
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011Hb4vHnVrCMqe8ZtNtzFSs
* fix: pin git probe transports with a test and say what the caller check skips
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011Hb4vHnVrCMqe8ZtNtzFSs
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to eccad9f68bd7246cc81acb82bdb6c08fc6013f45
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #791 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 45ed1331a82dc15e6bdf15fd63517227f9160e21
New ee-repo-ref: eccad9f68bd7246cc81acb82bdb6c08fc6013f45
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: surface why a private or untrusted git host is unreachable
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YBriXeDGzjBWjSUTgpkCxW
* test: assert the private git host refusal names ALLOW_LOCAL_GIT_REMOTES
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YBriXeDGzjBWjSUTgpkCxW
* test: pin that the url credential stays out of the refused-host error
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YBriXeDGzjBWjSUTgpkCxW
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to fe2418ff4e5630d6ad3fd85cd2c865bf51c87a2a
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #789 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: af0f3ca96f2fbcfa4bf4f8498824c52001d72c55
New ee-repo-ref: fe2418ff4e5630d6ad3fd85cd2c865bf51c87a2a
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(otel): pick up standard OTEL_RESOURCE_ATTRIBUTES on the exported resource
The OTEL resource was built with `Resource::builder_empty()`, which runs no
resource detectors, so attributes injected through the standard
`OTEL_RESOURCE_ATTRIBUTES` env var were silently dropped. Deployments that
inject `k8s.pod.uid`, `k8s.container.name` or `service.namespace` saw none of
them reach their backend.
Use `Resource::builder()`, which seeds from the SDK's env detector. Windmill's
own attributes keep being applied on top, so per the OTel resource spec the env
var is the secondary resource and `service.name`, `service.version`,
`host.name` and `deployment.environment*` stay authoritative.
The EE change lives in windmill-ee-private; this carries the ee-repo-ref bump
and a regression test pinning both halves of the contract.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013yUJaBDHPgjZPodP2u4aqR
* test(otel): clear OTEL_HOST_NAME so the resource test is hermetic
OTEL_HOST_NAME takes precedence over the hostname argument, so an ambient one
failed the host.name assertion with a message pointing at the merge logic.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013yUJaBDHPgjZPodP2u4aqR
* feat(otel): honor OTEL_SERVICE_NAME and OTEL_SERVICE_VERSION
Deployments identify each pod from its own labels, e.g. through the Kubernetes
downward API, so `service.name` and `service.version` must be settable per pod.
Both were ignored: OTEL_SERVICE_NAME was read by the SDK and then overwritten,
and because the two attributes are set in code they also outrank
OTEL_RESOURCE_ATTRIBUTES, leaving no route to set them at all.
The EE change lives in windmill-ee-private; this carries the ee-repo-ref bump
and tests for the dedicated overrides.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013yUJaBDHPgjZPodP2u4aqR
* fix(otel): keep service.version pinned to the build version
OTEL_SERVICE_VERSION is not an OTel env var, and service.version identifies the
build that produced the telemetry, which a deployment cannot state more
precisely than GIT_VERSION already does. A deployment that wants its own release
version in telemetry can carry it under its own key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013yUJaBDHPgjZPodP2u4aqR
* test(otel): pin OTEL_SERVICE_NAME above service.name in OTEL_RESOURCE_ATTRIBUTES
The spec ranks OTEL_SERVICE_NAME above a service.name carried in
OTEL_RESOURCE_ATTRIBUTES; that ordering was only checked by hand. The three
candidate values are distinct, so the assertions fail if either ranking breaks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013yUJaBDHPgjZPodP2u4aqR
* feat(otel): honor OTEL_SERVICE_VERSION
The spec defines no OTEL_SERVICE_VERSION, but deployments set it expecting it to
work because it sits next to OTEL_SERVICE_NAME, and setting service.version in
code blocks the OTEL_RESOURCE_ATTRIBUTES route, so there is otherwise no way to
set it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013yUJaBDHPgjZPodP2u4aqR
* test(otel): guard against unknown_service on a default deployment
Resource::builder seeds SdkProvidedResourceDetector, which sets service.name to
"unknown_service" when neither OTEL_SERVICE_NAME nor a service.name in
OTEL_RESOURCE_ATTRIBUTES is present. Only our own attribute keeps that out of
the exported resource, and no assertion covered the case where nothing is set
at all — which is the default deployment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013yUJaBDHPgjZPodP2u4aqR
* test(otel): pin the empty-means-unset fallback for OTEL_SERVICE_VERSION
The empty case asserted the fallback for service.name and host.name but not
service.version, leaving one branch of the three-variable contract uncovered.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013yUJaBDHPgjZPodP2u4aqR
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to b964f0caaae57dc526c7ac9dc54d753372989f63
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #779 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 62efa909aabdba4cb31ffabe9aae0e4909ca1e07
New ee-repo-ref: b964f0caaae57dc526c7ac9dc54d753372989f63
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Revoking the sequence grant would strip a privilege a healthy instance had
before this migration ran — the grant it adds is indistinguishable in the
catalog from the one ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES gives at creation time — so the
down is a comment, matching the other grant-only migrations.
The mirror rewrite is spread over three sites that have to agree and fails
silently when they don't, so it gets a test: a draft carrying both path keys
has both moved, and one carrying neither mirror does not gain one. It reads
the value back over HTTP rather than with `sqlx::query!`, which would need an
offline cache entry of its own.
Also drops twelve `.sqlx` entries this branch added and then superseded, and
corrects the doc and openapi text that still described only the typed path
being rewritten.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`update_path` is not a symbol in this repo; a script move goes through
`create_script`. The re-assert's comment re-derived the disclosure argument
that already sits on `resolve_moved_to_in`, where a caller would break it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The post-write re-assert names a path and a username, and nothing at any
layer stopped it reading them off a raw pool connection. Swapping the
transaction back to `db.begin()` compiles and passes everything else, so
the guard has to be a test: a non-admin saving at a path whose item moved
into a folder they cannot see gets `saved`, while the admin gets `moved`.
Also drops two doc comments still arguing that clearing the write gate at
the old path removes the need for an RLS envelope. It does not — the gate
resolves the old path and the re-assert asks about the new one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(nativets): bound fetch on a peer that never answers
deno_fetch applies no deadline of any kind. A peer that completes the TCP
handshake, accepts the request and then goes silent leaves `await fetch(...)`
pending indefinitely, holding its worker slot until the *job* timeout -- which
on self-hosted defaults to DEFAULT_SELFHOSTED_TIMEOUT, i.e. 7 days.
Nothing else catches this. Zombie-job detection keys off a stale
v2_job_runtime.ping, and a worker blocked inside a pending fetch keeps pinging
normally throughout: the worker is alive and healthy, only the work is dead.
What this bounds is the wait for a response to begin, and it stops there:
- a peer that never answers -> rejected after N seconds
- a peer slow to answer, but under N -> unaffected
- a body that then streams for an hour,
or is read slowly by the caller -> unaffected, always
That last line rules out the obvious implementation: AbortSignal.timeout(N)
around every fetch would bound the hang and break every streaming response and
long download. This is a hang detector, not a latency budget.
Default 300s via WINDMILL_FETCH_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECS (0 disables), with a
per-script `//fetch_response_timeout <seconds>` annotation alongside the
existing //useragent and //proxy. Both nativets paths inherit it, since
eval_fetch_timeout and the dedicated-worker path in bun_executor both funnel
through create_nativets_runtime.
The ms value is clamped to i32::MAX: deno_web's setTimeout runs its delay
through webidl.converters.long, a 32-bit conversion that *wraps*, so a setting
past ~24.8 days would come out negative and fire immediately -- turning an
over-generous timeout into an instant one on every fetch.
The window covers connect, TLS and request upload as well as server think
time, so a very slow large upload is bounded by it too; the error message says
so rather than claiming the connection went silent.
Not covered: a body that stalls midway. Reaching that needs the response's
InnerBody, which deno_fetch keeps module-private, and every way to wrap it
from outside changes observable Response semantics (locking, bodyUsed,
double-consume errors). Left for a follow-up in deno_fetch itself.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JshNT5XVH78ZsTMvDWfFHb
* test(nativets): cover the instance-wide response-timeout env var
A typo in WINDMILL_FETCH_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECS would compile, pass every
other test, and silently hand every operator the 300s default -- the same
class of silent-default failure the timeout itself exists to prevent. Its
own test binary, since a LazyLock resolves the value once per process.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JshNT5XVH78ZsTMvDWfFHb
* fix(nativets): inherit the caller's RequestInit, and clear the long-poll ceiling
Two problems with the first cut, both found in review.
`{ ...init, signal }` copied only own enumerable properties, but RequestInit is
a WebIDL dictionary whose members deno_fetch reads with plain property gets
that walk the prototype chain. Anything inherited or non-enumerable was
dropped: `fetch(url, Object.create({method: "POST"}))` silently became a GET.
Worse, a non-object init went from a loud TypeError to a silent GET, because
spreading "POST" yields {0:"P",1:"O",...} -- a valid dictionary with ignored
keys. Now the init is inherited from rather than copied, and a non-dictionary
is handed straight back to deno_fetch for its own TypeError.
The 300s default also sat at half of TIMEOUT_WAIT_RESULT (600s), which
run_wait_result long-polls against with no response headers. A script running
another job synchronously for 300-600s would have timed out client-side while
the server was still legitimately holding the request open -- the long-poll
risk class, instantiated inside the product and reachable without writing a
raw fetch. Default raised to 900s, with the constraint recorded where someone
would break it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JshNT5XVH78ZsTMvDWfFHb
* fix(nativets): hand the caller's RequestInit to Request untouched
Carrying a WebIDL dictionary across by hand has no safe form, and both
previous attempts were wrong in opposite directions. Spreading a copy drops
inherited and non-enumerable members, and turns a non-object init from a loud
TypeError into a silent GET. Inheriting from it via Object.create fixes those
but makes the child the receiver, so an accessor on the original runs against
an object that lacks its private-field brand:
Cannot read private member #body from an object whose class did not
declare it
So don't carry it at all. fetch()'s own first act is `new Request(input,
init)`; doing that here hands the init to the same constructor, read exactly
as it would be without this wrapper, and our signal travels in an init we own.
`req.signal` is then deno's own resolution of init.signal over an input
Request's signal, which removes the hand-rolled version of that rule too.
The Request is built twice as a result, once here and once inside fetch. That
is cheap: cloneInnerRequest carries method, headers, redirect mode, clientRid
and blob entry, and a body is proxied rather than buffered -- a static body is
a shallow {body, consumed} copy sharing its bytes, a stream gets a one-chunk
pass-through.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JshNT5XVH78ZsTMvDWfFHb
* fix(nativets): keep an aborted fetch settling in the same tick
deno_fetch keeps its outer fetch non-async on purpose: "WPT has a test that
aborted fetch is settled in the same tick. This means we cannot wrap the
promise if it is already settled" (26_fetch.js). An `async` wrapper adopts
that promise through another one, so a rejection that used to land before any
microtask queued after the call now lands after it.
Made the wrapper non-async, with an early return that hands deno's settled
rejection straight back for an already-aborted signal, and no timer armed
there since there is no response to wait for. Construction still has to reject
rather than throw, so it is caught and returned as a rejection, which is what
the `async` was buying.
The comment claiming this matched deno_fetch's own `async function fetch` was
wrong on two counts -- that function is not async, and the wrapper was not
matching it. Replaced with the constraint that actually holds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JshNT5XVH78ZsTMvDWfFHb
* fix(nativets): keep fetch's observable shape and reach intrinsics safely
Three ways the wrapper was distinguishable from the fetch it replaces, all
observable from a script sharing the isolate.
`.then` was an ordinary property lookup, so `Promise.prototype.then =
undefined` broke fetch after the request had already gone out. deno's own
modules reach intrinsics through primordials, and this file already captured
setTimeout, clearTimeout and Promise.reject for exactly that reason, so the
lookup was the odd one out. Now captured alongside them.
Declaring `init` without a default made `fetch.length` 2 where the standard
says 1. And the empty-call branch forwarded two explicit `undefined`s, so
deno's required-argument check saw two arguments and raised "Invalid URL:
'undefined'" instead of "1 argument required". Forwarding through
ReflectApply preserves the count.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JshNT5XVH78ZsTMvDWfFHb
* docs: clarify fetch timeout restart requirements
* fix: capture native fetch abort helpers
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: guest JWT entry for embedded apps (jwt_guest_)
A second way in for a guest, alongside the signed-in guest session: a JWT the
embedding customer's backend mints and signs, verified per request against a
per-workspace key (a PEM public key or a JWKS URL), resolving to the same
seatless guest identity confined to the one app its app_path claim names.
Bearer prefix jwt_guest_, stateless (no token row). See PR #10954.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: surface guest JWT as the embed method in the app deploy drawer
The deploy drawer explained the secret-URL embed but not the guest JWT path, so
the primary way to embed an app for a customer's own authenticated users was
undiscoverable. For a guest-mode app with guests enabled, show how to mint a
`jwt_guest_` token and append `guest.<jwt>` to the app URL, with a copyable
iframe template pre-filled with this app's workspace_id and app_path, and a note
that new guest emails are refused past the instance's free allowance (the live
count is shown just above).
Also log a guest JWT allowance refusal at warn, not info: the caller gets a bare
401 (the reason must not leak to an unauthenticated caller), so the log is the
admin's signal that the instance hit its guest cap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: correct the guest JWT minting instructions in the embed block
The block said "sign it with the workspace's guest JWT key", but that setting
holds the public verification key. Clarify the keypair relationship (configure
the public key or a JWKS URL in the workspace; sign with the matching private
key), name the accepted algorithms (RS/PS/ES; HS* refused), and keep the
required claims, so an embedder knows how to actually mint the token.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: fall back to the instance JWT issuer for guest verification (off on cloud)
A workspace with no guest key of its own now verifies guest JWTs against the
instance issuer (JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL, already used by jwt_ext_), so an operator
running one issuer configures it once. Verification and the guest grant are CE;
granting a full login from that issuer stays EE (jwt_ext_, unchanged). Disabled
under CLOUD_HOSTED, where one instance issuer must not be trusted to mint guests
in every tenant's workspace — there the per-workspace key is the only source,
which also stays the override everywhere. The workspace settings note (hidden on
cloud) explains the fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: embed instructions cover both the workspace key and instance issuer
The embed block said to set the workspace's guest JWT key; now it says Windmill
verifies against the workspace key or, off cloud, the instance issuer
(JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL) when no workspace key is set. The instance clause is hidden
under isCloudHosted().
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: show the guest JWT embed block only when Embed is toggled
It belongs with the iframe snippet, not the plain-URL view, so gate it on
embedMode alongside the guest-mode / guests-enabled checks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: trust the instance issuer in the guest fallback; refresh stale docs
P1 (CI review): the fallback wrapped JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL as a workspace JwksUrl, so
it hit validate_guest_jwks_url and was refused for http/private issuers unless
ALLOW_PRIVATE_GUEST_JWKS_URLS was also set — a self-hosted internal issuer that
works for jwt_ext_ failed for guests, though the UI says setting the env var is
enough. fetch_jwks now fetches the instance issuer without the https/private
restriction (matching the jwt_ext_ loader; it stays operator-trusted), while a
workspace-admin URL is validated and pinned as before. All the size/key/URL
bounds still apply to both.
P2 (CI review): refresh the stale docs that said a missing workspace key always
refuses a guest JWT — the module, bearer, key-source, and EditGuestJwtKey field
docs now describe the workspace key with the off-cloud instance-issuer fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: fetch the trusted instance issuer like the jwt_ext_ loader
P1 (CI review): the instance-issuer fetch skipped SSRF validation but still
disabled redirects and default cert validation, so an instance issuer that works
for jwt_ext_ through a redirect or an operator-approved self-signed cert failed
the guest fallback. Fetch it with HTTP_CLIENT_PERMISSIVE (follows redirects,
honors ACCEPT_INVALID_CERTS) — the same behavior jwt_ext_ has — while a
workspace-admin URL stays validated, DNS-pinned and redirect-free. The body size
cap still bounds both.
P2 (CI review): the WorkspaceSettings field doc still said None/None means no JWT
guests; it now names the off-cloud instance-issuer fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: schema summary + OpenAPI cover the guest JWT columns and fallback
P2 (CI review): summarized_schema.txt was missing guest_activity.jwt_entry and
the two workspace_settings guest-JWT key columns (required by docs/validation.md
after a schema change). The edit_guest_jwt_key OpenAPI description now notes that
clearing the workspace key falls back to the instance issuer (JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL)
off cloud rather than necessarily stopping guest JWTs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep JWKS single-flight locks in a self-cleaning map, not a bounded cache
P1 (CI review): JWKS_FETCH_LOCKS was a 200-entry quick_cache. Past 200 cold URLs
it can evict a lock whose fetch is still in flight; the next request for that URL
then mints a fresh lock and starts a second fetch, so cycling configured
workspaces defeats single-flight and can storm the issuers. Replace it with a
plain map guarded by a JwksFetchLock RAII handle that removes each entry once its
last holder drops, so the map only ever holds the fetches in flight and never
evicts an in-flight lock. Add a unit test pinning the shared-lock and
self-cleaning invariants.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to c2270eb5fe2d9f0968253e6b460c33186363f4e7
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #773 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 5a1d9dee34159512c0823fddcd3d096490edbcce
New ee-repo-ref: c2270eb5fe2d9f0968253e6b460c33186363f4e7
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: let operators use wmill.datatable() from within running jobs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RHR4fytgt6m4q37WCXs2Rp
* fix: refuse content-driven redirects and deferral in the operator datatable exemption
* fix: check the datatable exemption against the expanded query, not the raw content
* fix: fail closed on a language-overriding expansion and state the exemption's real scope
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
Guilhem LemouelandClaude Fable 5.1