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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Diego Imbert
|
3c66ebf4fa |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into datatable-roles-redesign-part-4
# Conflicts: # backend/ee-repo-ref.txt # backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/datatable_permissions_oss.rs # frontend/src/lib/components/DBManager.svelte # frontend/src/lib/components/DBManagerContent.svelte # frontend/src/lib/components/common/confirmationModal/ConfirmationModal.svelte # frontend/src/lib/components/datatableAcl/PgAclEditor.svelte # frontend/src/lib/components/raw_apps/DefaultDatabaseSelector.svelte # frontend/src/lib/components/raw_apps/RawAppDataTableDrawer.svelte # frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/DataTableMigrationsButton.svelte # frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/DataTablePermissionsButton.svelte # frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/DataTableSettings.svelte # frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/InstanceRolesButton.svelte |
||
  Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
|
974b0265f8 |
fix(cli): read wmill.yaml from the branch a git-sync deploy writes to (#11236)
* fix(cli): read wmill.yaml from the branch a git-sync deploy writes to Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(cli): create the stateful dir once the deploy branch's config is read Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
 Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel
|
01b38320ea |
chore(main): release 1.815.0 (#11212)
* chore(main): release 1.815.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
 Alexander PetricandClaude Fable 5.1
|
de4818d905 |
chore(security): resolve Dependabot alerts in frontend, windmill-yaml-validator, typescript-client and cli lockfiles (#11181)
Targeted dependency bumps only; no behavior change intended. Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
 
|
df61dea5fa |
fix: keep instance groups when editing auto-invite (#11217)
* fix: keep instance groups when editing auto-invite and push them from sync Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: compare settings.yaml without undeclared instance groups on push Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: read a missing auto_invite as empty when diffing settings.yaml on push Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to f2fced19fcae81de7f6dac545010ce404c052e1b This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #813 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: cf4258c1232720ca3b82db2b22ea1fb4bca9533e New ee-repo-ref: f2fced19fcae81de7f6dac545010ce404c052e1b Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev> |
||
|
Diego Imbert
|
89bee36774 |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/datatable-roles-redesign-part-2' into datatable-roles-redesign-part-4
# Conflicts: # backend/ee-repo-ref.txt # backend/windmill-api-integration-tests/tests/datatable_roles.rs # backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/datatable_permissions_oss.rs # backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs # backend/windmill-common/src/datatable_roles_oss.rs # backend/windmill-common/src/workspaces.rs # frontend/src/lib/components/datatableAcl/PgAclEditor.svelte # frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/DataTablePermissionsButton.svelte # frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/DataTableRolesSection.svelte # frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/DataTableSettings.svelte # frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/InstanceRolesButton.svelte |
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|
0e807fb1dd |
feat: put a data table's connection under Postgres roles (#11020)
* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles
A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.
A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.
Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.
A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.
Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin
Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.
All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping
A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.
Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.
Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded
Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.
Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.
Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.
`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.
Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code
The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.
`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract
The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.
Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.
The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.
Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.
Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery
Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.
`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.
Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.
Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.
Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced
The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".
The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing
The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.
Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:
A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.
Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.
Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.
Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings
Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.
The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.
One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.
Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks
Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.
A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.
Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.
The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.
Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically
The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".
The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.
Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles
pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.
Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data
A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.
Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* nit worker error msg
* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it
`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.
A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.
Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it
`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.
The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry
The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".
Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands
Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.
The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test
Two review findings, both real.
`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.
`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy
Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.
Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.
Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist
The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.
Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created
A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.
That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.
Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database
A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.
`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"
This reverts commit
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Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel
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d440ebb520 |
chore(main): release 1.814.0 (#11171)
* chore(main): release 1.814.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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c297ed0052 |
feat: managed memory with an inherited or custom memory id per step (#11118)
* feat: split ai agent memory into agent policy, run memory id and step history * fix: scope string memory ids to workspace and flow, keep nested tool history inputs * chore: update sqlx cache for the flow context query * docs: describe memory id scoping as collision-free rather than isolated * chore: regenerate openflow json after merging main * fix: offer no memory id for legacy manual memory, document linked history inputs * fix: seed provided messages from legacy manual memory and hide its note once set * fix: bypass memory when a provided messages expression evaluates to null * fix: require a user message when provided messages are empty * chore: keep the empty messages comment within the line width * docs: name the history inputs wherever linked steps list their flow-local inputs * docs: keep the memory storage path on one line * feat: managed memory with an inherited or custom memory id per step Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: list a custom memory id in the test run form and name where an inherited one comes from Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep memory id out of the add-field menu and drop the memory id telemetry Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep legacy auto memory without an id working after an untouched redeploy Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: rename step messages to previous_messages and address review Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: rewrap comments and docs lines lengthened by the previous_messages rename Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: read agent memory as either a legacy shape or the current one Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: name the memory setting in ignored-input notes and keep conversions honest Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep a legacy memory count unset on open and read a cleared count as off Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review on cleared test history and zero-count memory Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: drop flow-local keys from a linked agent resource before interpolating it Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep a linked resource's own inputs as fallbacks and note ignored history on image runs Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: restore the linked agent draft tests and log ignored history on every image run Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: resolve the one-of variant from the value when the selected one leaves the list Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: treat zero-count managed memory as off when enabling chat mode and shorten comments Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stop requiring user_message in the openflow agent contract when previous messages are the prompt Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Diego Imbert
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92e51f19aa |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/datatable-roles-redesign-part-2' into datatable-roles-redesign-part-4
# Conflicts: # backend/ee-repo-ref.txt # backend/windmill-api-integration-tests/tests/datatable_roles.rs # backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/datatable_permissions_oss.rs # backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs # backend/windmill-common/src/datatable_roles_oss.rs # backend/windmill-common/src/workspaces.rs # frontend/src/lib/components/datatableAcl/PgAclEditor.svelte # frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/DataTablePermissionsButton.svelte # frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/DataTableRolesSection.svelte # frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/DataTableSettings.svelte # frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/InstanceRolesButton.svelte |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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1dbc1e7759 |
fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers
A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends. The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns. Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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a74f73ccb1 |
fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery
Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways. The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either. Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every login it described. `custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret, written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape: `datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist. No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to take it out. Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And `set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings row across validation and write. Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish: `read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and `converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's. Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but `extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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34ed0c4230 |
feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles
A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection, `custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table. A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares `-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch — grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`. A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before. Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint, `get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could `RESET ROLE` its way out of. A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not where an access decision should be made. Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR |
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 GuilhemandClaude Fable 5.1
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189793c2e4 |
feat: flow chat model picker on a shared model-settings component (#11187)
* refactor: render the session chat model menu from a shared ChatModelSettings config Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: pick the flow chat's model and thinking from the provider fields the flow exposes Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: name only the thinking level the flow run will send on the model button Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let the flow chat take a typed model id and keep a shared thinking input editable Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: promote a flow input to the model button only where its control can edit it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: drop any reasoning token the chosen model rejects before a flow chat run Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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GuilhemandClaude Fable 5.1
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68f2248018 |
feat: keep flow inputs and seed the agent when chat mode is enabled (#11177)
* feat: keep flow inputs and seed the agent when chat mode is enabled Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: leave a linked agent's memory and streaming to the agent when enabling chat mode Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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f36aa69fc3 |
feat(datatables): data table roles in the DB manager and raw apps
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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46dfcc5c49 |
fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers
A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends. The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns. Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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715d8a0e6d |
fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery
Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways. The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either. Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every login it described. `custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret, written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape: `datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist. No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to take it out. Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And `set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings row across validation and write. Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish: `read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and `converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's. Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but `extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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22b3e69c07 |
feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles
A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection, `custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table. A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares `-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch — grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`. A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before. Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint, `get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could `RESET ROLE` its way out of. A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not where an access decision should be made. Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR |
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Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel
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c3e11bd223 |
chore(main): release 1.813.0 (#11141)
* chore(main): release 1.813.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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54553b2add |
fix(cli): resolve lockgen imports through modules a push leaves alone (#11160)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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e8078f2a96 |
fix: dispatch workflow-as-code tasks from a deployed flow's inline step (#11146)
* fix: dispatch workflow-as-code tasks from a deployed flow's inline step * fix: give a workflow-as-code task its own result-cache key * fix: key a cached workflow-as-code task on its name and arguments * fix: hash a cached workflow-as-code task's arguments like any job's * chore: regenerate system prompts for the task cache_ttl docs * fix: key a cached workflow-as-code task on its step key, not its name * fix: key a cached workflow-as-code task on a fingerprint of its code * fix: keep the task() doc attached to task() * fix: key a cached inline task on its step key and the workflow input * docs: cache_ttl has no effect on a taskFlow target |
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 AlexRV12andClaude Opus 5
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d0d5b295b9 |
docs: terminate datatable write examples with .execute() (#11148)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Fable 5.1
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129c045595 |
fix(cli): keep the workspace color when settings are synced from git (#11144)
* fix(cli): keep the workspace color when settings are synced from git Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(cli): name the sync direction consistently in the identity-field comments Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(cli): apply the workspace color from settings.yaml only when the file sets one Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel
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9fe493311d |
chore(main): release 1.812.0 (#11111)
* chore(main): release 1.812.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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a78beff743 |
feat: dynamic AI agent toolsets (#11050)
* feat: dynamic ai agent toolsets, and memory as a step input Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review round 1 on dynamic ai agent toolsets Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: tag enabled_tools and drop the memory step input Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let an mcp server entry be named by the path the roster shows Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep $res: out of the tool names the enabled tools picker offers Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: name an mcp server by its bare path on the one side that can hold it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: count the enabled tool names that matched nothing instead of logging them Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: narrow an agent's roster in one pass, by whole entries Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: pin that an mcp summary is rejected against a name that is not Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: regenerate the copilot flow schema after the merge Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: shorten the enabled tools list hint Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: take enabled_tools back to a plain list of tool names Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: keep the enabled tools add-menu hint describing the unset field Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: name a websearch tool that carries no summary of its own Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: reserve the name web search is enabled by so no tool can share it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: spell the reserved web search name with a hyphen Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: reserve __wm_web_search as the name web search is enabled by Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: advance ee-repo-ref past the git sync ci check work Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: shorten the enabled tools description the run form shows Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to e4c1b794d6c5e6e390987341b2840587bbb40348 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #785 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: af668462f0f06b02a5f4e0c22e6156858487a518 New ee-repo-ref: e4c1b794d6c5e6e390987341b2840587bbb40348 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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42f489685b |
feat: store resource type display names and label hub integrations (#11113)
* feat: label resource types and integrations with hub display names Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: load hub integration names in the app and flow pickers Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: load hub resource type names where drawers title a type Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: store resource type display names and drop the hardcoded list Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: leave display_name out of the fork comparison Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: ignore over-long synced display names, move name loaders Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: share the hub integration list cache, backfill admins only Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep a name over a nameless duplicate, retry failed hub reads Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Fable 5.1
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75ee497011 |
fix(cli): stage a rewritten shared lockfile on git-sync deploy push (#11126)
* fix(cli): stage a rewritten shared lockfile on git-sync deploy push Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GGciSSE5EFMiDf1dFWQq5M * test(cli): pin that a swept shared lockfile is committed as a deletion Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GGciSSE5EFMiDf1dFWQq5M * chore: bump the git sync hub script to 28969 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GGciSSE5EFMiDf1dFWQq5M --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Fable 5.1
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e8c02c04cd |
feat: windmill-chat sdk for chat-mode flows in external frontends and raw apps (#11117)
* feat: windmill-chat sdk for chat-mode flows in external frontends and raw apps Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018aQiZNAU8g17kWkyTryS5J * fix: keep streamed answers until persisted, finish turns after history fallback Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018aQiZNAU8g17kWkyTryS5J * feat: ai sdk transport and assistant-ui runtime for windmill-chat Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: finish a turn from the flow result until its answer row lands, hash chat ids without crypto.subtle Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: judge a turn answered by a persisted assistant row, wherever it was fetched Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: attribute a turn's answer to its own jobs, keep a local turn when switching conversations Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: mirror local history on every change, attribute failure-handler answers to the turn Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: new chat per token string in the React hook, idle after destroy, no reorder on view Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: recreate the hook's chat on any credential change, namespace local history per user Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: send the latest inputs from the React hook Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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a95e950529 |
feat(cli): list, get and restore trashed items with wmill trash (#11125)
* feat(cli): list, get and restore trashed items from the CLI * docs(cli): tell agents a sync push deletion is restorable with wmill trash * refactor(cli): share the ApiError formatting and type trash flags as integers |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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d54a66f15c |
fix(cli): say where a sync push deleted variable or resource went (#10851)
* fix(cli): keep variables and resources a sync push repo never tracked `wmill sync push` archives a script it no longer finds locally, but hard-deletes a variable or a resource: the credentials go for good. A remote-only one is equally a deletion being deployed and one the repository never had, provisioned on the instance or written by a script at runtime, and reading the second as a deletion is unrecoverable. Committed history tells them apart. A push whose changeset deletes a variable or resource now asks what this branch has ever tracked at `*.variable.*` / `*.resource.*`; anything it has never recorded is kept on the remote (prompted for on a TTY), and a real deletion, recorded before the commit that removed it, still applies. Where the history cannot be read (shallow clone, sparse checkout, no repository) there is no evidence either way, so the deletion stands as before with a warning naming the remedy — the git-sync "Pull from repo" job runs in a depth-1 clone and must keep deploying the deletions it always has. `--delete-untracked-secrets` / `deleteUntrackedSecrets` opts a mirror-semantics pipeline back into deleting them unattended. Fixes GIT-980 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(cli): classify secret-bearing deletions the way the push itself does Three ways the suffix match missed: - A fileset child can be any file, `inner.resource.yaml` included, and its deletion re-pushes the parent rather than deleting anything. Classifying with the push's own `getTypeStrFromPath`, behind the same fileset exclusion the apply loop uses, keeps the two in step. - Deleting `f/x.resource.file.ini` deletes the resource `f/x` outright, so without that file in the pathspecs every file resource walked past the check. Its two files now count as the one resource they delete. - A `specificItems` item is committed as `y.<workspace>.variable.yaml` while `elementsToMap` collapses it to the base path the changeset carries, so a deletion the user did commit read as never tracked. The history is searched under both names. `gitRecordedPaths` also reads its history with `core.quotePath=false`: a path with a non-ASCII byte came back C-quoted and matched nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(cli): judge held-back deletions per object, not per file `DELETE /variables/delete` takes the resource at the same path down with it, and `DELETE /resources/delete` does the same to the variables its value references, so a tracked deletion could destroy an untracked object the push had just reported it was keeping. A file resource had the same shape from the other end: two files for one resource, either survivor deleting it. The unit is the server-side object. One file left unaccounted for by history now holds the whole object back, so nothing in a group reported as kept is deleted. The residual is a resource whose value references a variable at another path, which stays possible and is called out in the PR. Also corrects what the messages claim. Deleting a variable or resource is not irrecoverable: both move to the workspace trash, which keeps them for three days (migrations/20260326000000_trashbin.up.sql, CE since v1.665.0). The asymmetry with a script is real but narrower, and the prompt defaults to No, so it should say what it actually costs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(cli): warn when sync push deletes variables the repo never tracked `sync push` deletes a remote variable or resource that has no local file. An object the repository has never tracked was provisioned outside it, by hand or by a script at runtime, rather than deleted from it, and the change list said nothing to tell the two apart. The push still deploys every deletion — that is what the repo-is-the-mirror contract means, and a shallow clone (the git-sync "Pull from repo" job, a default actions/checkout) could not tell them apart anyway. What changes is that the preview names the ones this branch's history has no record of, before the prompt that confirms them, and points at the excludes that stop them recurring. Deleting is also not final, which the CLI was alone in not saying: both handlers move the item to the workspace trash first, restorable for three days (migrations/20260326000000_trashbin.up.sql, CE since v1.665.0). A push that deleted any now says so. This replaces the earlier hold-back design. Keeping objects back changed what a push deploys, needed a flag and a wmill.yaml key to opt out of, and could claim to keep an object that a linked deletion then cascaded onto. Reporting cannot. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(cli): name the paths the untracked-deletion warning is about A push can delete a tracked and a never-tracked resource together, where "1 resource" identified neither. The warning lists the paths instead of counting them, so the reader knows which one to exclude. Outside a git checkout it no longer opens "This branch's history", which contradicted the reason it went on to give, and it drops the pronouns that disagreed with a plural count. The history walk is skipped under --json-output, where both notices are silenced and its result had no reader. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(cli): vouch for an object with any file in history, not just deleted ones The tracked set was built from the deletions being judged, so a companion file the push was not deleting could not vouch for its object: a file resource whose `.resource.yaml` stays while its content file goes was reported as never tracked, though the repository plainly owned it. It is built from the whole history now, which also turns the workspace-specific lookup around — history is normalized to base paths, the form the changeset already carries, instead of each candidate being searched for under two names. The warning also prints one line per server-side object rather than per file, so a file resource is the one deletion it is rather than two. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(cli): name both kinds at a shared path, gate the history path conversion Three from review: A variable and a resource at one path are judged together, since deleting either takes both, but they are two objects to name — keying the printed lines by path alone dropped one of them. `fromWorkspaceSpecificPath` strips a `.<workspace>` segment wherever it finds one, so a history entry that merely looks workspace-suffixed was re-keyed onto a different object, whose history then vouched for it. Only a path `specificItems` claims is converted now. Not reachable from a server object (the backend rejects `.` in paths), but history holds whatever was committed. `secretBearingKey` lost its last caller when the tracked set moved to object paths; removed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(cli): identify a secret-bearing object by kind as well as path A variable and a resource can share a path and are still two backend objects: `DELETE /variables/delete` drops the same-path resource unconditionally, while `DELETE /resources/delete` drops only the variables its value references. Keying tracked history by path alone let a committed variable vouch for a resource the repository never had, which then went unmentioned. The cascade is a reason to report both, not to treat them as one. A file resource's two files keep one id. `git log HEAD` also fails on a repository with no commits, which was reported as "its history could not be read. Check that git runs correctly in this directory" — true of neither. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(cli): tighten the comments on the untracked-deletion warning Halves the prose without dropping a constraint: the trashbin retention is stated where the message says it rather than twice more in doc comments, and the two stacked comments at the print site had come to contradict each other, one still describing a same-path variable and resource as judged together. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(cli): say where a deleted variable or resource went `sync push` deletes a remote variable or resource that has no local file, and said nothing more. Both handlers move the item to the workspace trash first, restorable for three days (migrations/20260326000000_trashbin.up.sql, CE since v1.665.0), and the CLI was the one surface never to mention it — the report behind this concluded the deletion was final and there was nothing to restore. A push that deleted any now ends with where they went and how long they have. Drops the untracked-deletion warning this branch carried: distinguishing a deletion the repo deployed from an object it never owned needs the branch's git history, and roughly 130 lines to read it and be right about the answer, for a claim the trash already softens. Two fixes it turned up in the data-table migration guard, which reads history the same way, are kept: a path with a non-ASCII byte came back C-quoted and matched nothing, and a repository with no commits was reported as one where git does not run. Fixes GIT-980 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(cli): name the trashbin correctly and say who can restore The tab is labelled Trashbin, not Trash, and `restore_trash_item` requires admin, so a non-admin reading the old line would go looking for a control they do not have. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(cli): move the migration-guard git fixes to their own PR They fix `gitRecordedDatatableMigrationPaths`, which this PR no longer touches. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(cli): don't count a .lock deletion the push skips The apply loop `continue`s past a non-raw-app, non-dbt `.lock` deletion before reaching the delete switch, so nothing happens on the server. The classifier did not mirror that, and `f/x.resource.file.lock` reaches it as a resource through `isFileResource` — a resource type whose format_extension is literally `lock` would have the notice announce a deletion the push never performed. A raw-app or dbt `.lock`, the two that loop does not skip, classifies as its bundle's own kind well before the file-resource check, so a suffix test is enough. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(cli): state what the classification tests protect The header described the change rather than the invariant. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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d8d7332eb6 |
feat: add per-route CORS origin allowlist for HTTP triggers (#10833)
* feat: add per-route CORS origin allowlist for HTTP triggers Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: fail closed on cold router cache and invalid origin input Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: resolve CORS route from the decoded path like the request handler Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add instance-wide default allowed origins for HTTP routes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let non-superadmins read the default allowed origins setting Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: badge the advanced section when a route's origins are restricted Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: state inherited origins on the control and use one hint row Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: trim the origins tooltip and relabel the toggle when a default exists Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the origins format hint visible until an entry is wrong Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: state the at-least-one requirement in the origins hint Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: import the origins validator in the trigger-http tests Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: make an empty allowlist deny rather than fall back to the default Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review nits on origin validation and the CORS editor * fix: derive the origins error from the stored list and tighten host validation * fix: parse real IPv6 hosts and refuse a newly emptied allowlist * refactor: make origin validation advisory except for null and non-ascii * feat: let an empty allowlist be saved as deny every origin * docs: document the empty allowlist as deny every origin * fix: bound allowlists, reject commas, and decide cors after the handler * chore: revert unrelated rustfmt churn in windmill-common tests * chore: revert unrelated rustfmt churn in windmill-common * chore: drop the route types the cors restructure replaced * fix: take the stricter cors decision from before and after the handler * fix: strip runnable cors headers when the routers are unavailable * docs: document the allowlist bounds in the openapi schema * fix: let an unavailable cors read defer to one that resolved * refactor: carry the resolved cors policy from the handler to the middleware * docs: describe why an unavailable read fails closed on the paths that reach it * fix: validate the default origins on the declarative settings path * test: keep the webhook doc comment with the test it describes * fix: warn on impossible schemes and ports, and validate the instance setting * feat: treat an empty allowlist as unset at both levels * perf: decode the cors path only when the fallback needs it * docs: document the empty allowlist as unset in the api schema * docs: describe an empty allowlist as unset in the frontend comments * docs: say what a null allowlist resolves to, not what it meant before the default existed * docs: state what the validator refuses and why methods stay broad * feat: exempt static asset routes from the origin allowlist * fix: hide the origin control for every static target, not just websites * fix: exempt only static websites, not single-file static assets * fix: warn on an unclosed ipv6 host in the origins advisory * fix: require assets present, not just the static website flag --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel
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7b89e37322 |
chore(main): release 1.811.1 (#11107)
* chore(main): release 1.811.1 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel
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62d4632fad |
chore(main): release 1.811.0 (#11098)
* chore(main): release 1.811.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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c90d1d95c2 |
refactor: make the app policy's principal the authority for its identity (#10440)
* refactor: make the app policy's principal the authority for its identity * fix: align the app backfill with the sibling migration and audit the uncached address * chore: refresh the sqlx cache after rebasing onto the merged base * fix: resolve the app execution address uncached, it decides the job's authorization * chore: cache the EE queries at the ref this branch pins * chore: cache the EE queries at the ref this branch pins * fix: derive the app draft's on-behalf-of address on read * chore: cache the query the draft derivation test added * fix: derive the app identity on the draft-table and version reads too * docs: state the draft resolver's authorization contract * fix: resolve a draft's principal against workspace membership only * chore: cache the membership lookup the draft resolver added * fix: drop an unresolvable draft's address instead of leaving it stale * perf: evict the address cache on change so app dispatch can read it * fix: evict on superadmin role changes, not only address changes * refactor: make the app policy's address optional instead of derived on read * fix: follow an external superadmin's rename into the apps that name them * docs: state the removal gate once, and correctly * refactor: drop the app-policy version constant that gated nothing * docs: drop the last reference to the removed constant * perf: read the address cache everywhere now that eviction reaches every replica * fix: keep persisted addresses off the cache the poller evicts asynchronously * docs: state where the cached address is accepted and where it is not * docs: keep the cache rule in one place and drop the stale premise * docs: sort the two lookups by how long a wrong answer lives * fix: resolve the schedule address uncached where it is written to the row * docs: name the release this actually ships in * perf: evict a superadmin's key per workspace instead of the whole cache * fix: evict every alias a superadmin principal can be spelled as * docs: describe the trigger as it is * docs: cover the round-tripped read in the cache rule * docs: record why a stale dispatch address cannot escalate * fix: validate a dispatch address against the principal's live binding * fix: carry the validated address through to the job row and token * fix: record the validated address on the job row, not the one handed in * test: run the substep tag check as the non-superadmin it means to test Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * fix: rewrite a stored app address that disagrees with its principal Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * docs: record the accepted staleness window of the cached dispatch address Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * fix: record the validated address on the job's audit row Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * docs: record the accepted rename race of pre-transaction identity resolution Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * docs: separate the app's stored address from the derived one in the resolver doc Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * docs: describe the job identity fast path the push comments skipped Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * fix: backfill a legacy group-prefixed username as the group it names Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * fix: resolve a schedule edit's identity before opening its transaction Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * fix: never resolve a disabled member to a same-named superadmin Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * docs: state what the email-change notify buys, and rewrap two comment lines Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * fix: keep a group's runnables when offboarding a legacy group-prefixed member Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * fix: read the app author from the stored address, as execution does Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * docs: record the rename race's full consequence as a known, accepted limitation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc * docs: record the keep-target group address case as a known, accepted limitation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JY4bBCR1q2c5XB8s2r7Ysc --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel
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4a293cf77a |
chore(main): release 1.810.0 (#11079)
* chore(main): release 1.810.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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30ffdbecc1 |
fix: unpin only the specifiers in the bundle a bun modules run executes (#11083)
* fix: keep version pins from imported scripts in bun lockfiles Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WCq4nkUjiZBnPPMuGYCo6w * fix: strip version pins from the bundle a bun modules run executes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WCq4nkUjiZBnPPMuGYCo6w * fix: unpin only module specifiers, not matching text elsewhere in the script Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WCq4nkUjiZBnPPMuGYCo6w * docs: name the raw endpoint lock generation fetches imports through Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WCq4nkUjiZBnPPMuGYCo6w * fix: leave require calls alone and skip spans not on a quote pair when unpinning Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WCq4nkUjiZBnPPMuGYCo6w * test: create the bun bundle cache dir a dependency job saves into Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WCq4nkUjiZBnPPMuGYCo6w * test: drop the lock test #11082's module test already covers Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WCq4nkUjiZBnPPMuGYCo6w * fix: narrow the change to a fail-open strip of the modules-run bundle Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WCq4nkUjiZBnPPMuGYCo6w * fix: unpin only the specifiers in the modules-run bundle, and log a parse fallback Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WCq4nkUjiZBnPPMuGYCo6w --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel
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7915540f66 |
chore(main): release 1.809.0 (#11045)
* chore(main): release 1.809.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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63cb46d7bb |
feat: add a minimal skin for the approval page and slack/teams (#11061)
* feat: add an approval skin to the approval page and slack/teams messages Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9 * chore: point ee-repo-ref at the teams approval skin commit Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9 * fix: resolve the approval skin from the step awaiting approval Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9 * fix: shorten the slack approval message to fit the button value limit Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9 * fix: rename skins to detailed/minimal and keep long slack messages Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9 * feat: title the minimal approval page from the step and flow summaries Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9 * feat: let wait_for_approval set the description approvers see Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9 * fix: keep a finished workflow's approval description, still gated Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9 * fix: keep a login-required approval locked after the run moves on Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9 * feat: hide the windmill version on the approval page Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9 * chore: update ee-repo-ref to e92abc9d1fba3ba898640df0cfeb0af8a50849b4 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #786 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: bf1766ff49458f62d3f11746f1a06893ae3c2325 New ee-repo-ref: e92abc9d1fba3ba898640df0cfeb0af8a50849b4 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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0af7675588 |
fix: keep an app's deployed policy on wmill push (#11049)
* fix: keep an app's deployed policy on wmill push Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X47gNFqf1SsA67zTm71f8c * fix: keep a first push's file-stated app policy Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X47gNFqf1SsA67zTm71f8c * fix: deploy a file-stated viewer app as viewer, not publisher Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X47gNFqf1SsA67zTm71f8c * fix: never put a repo-stated run identity on the wire Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X47gNFqf1SsA67zTm71f8c * fix: send the deployed run identity only when the push may claim it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X47gNFqf1SsA67zTm71f8c * fix: let a file-stated execution mode win in both directions Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X47gNFqf1SsA67zTm71f8c * refactor: drop the app-file execution mode helper with no caller Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X47gNFqf1SsA67zTm71f8c * feat: warn before a raw-app push takes over the run-as user Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X47gNFqf1SsA67zTm71f8c * fix: keep an app's run-as user when a push only deletes one of its files Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X47gNFqf1SsA67zTm71f8c * refactor: settle an app's ownership check before any content parsing Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X47gNFqf1SsA67zTm71f8c * fix: share one rule for which raw-app files a push sends Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X47gNFqf1SsA67zTm71f8c * fix: stop tracking raw-app files no push ever sends Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X47gNFqf1SsA67zTm71f8c * test: bundle for real instead of stubbing the module for every suite Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X47gNFqf1SsA67zTm71f8c * docs: record why a module mock cannot be undone by afterAll Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X47gNFqf1SsA67zTm71f8c * fix: keep tracking a runnable whose file shares a bundle-excluded name Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X47gNFqf1SsA67zTm71f8c * test: pin both halves of the backend runnable rule Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X47gNFqf1SsA67zTm71f8c --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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8820b9fc64 |
feat: report script metadata with no content file in wmill lint (#11053)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PENfHNJceAbrcUsgfFCjXN Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel
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133e21080a |
chore(main): release 1.808.0 (#11043)
* chore(main): release 1.808.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel
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22c1a106cf |
chore(main): release 1.807.0 (#11034)
* chore(main): release 1.807.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel
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63c40f046b |
chore(main): release 1.806.0 (#11012)
* chore(main): release 1.806.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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d23da87c16 |
chore(cli): restore module mocks so they stop leaking into later test files
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SoXmLSb53SU8jfCMANugoY |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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0b37226078 |
fix: chain redeploys onto a retired path's version history (#11029)
* fix: chain auto_parent onto the archived lineage tip at a path Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GoTAmRTjG2KAH4g4mco6T5 * fix: check descendants unscoped and drop the hash-guard move Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GoTAmRTjG2KAH4g4mco6T5 * fix: widen retired-path adoption, lock it, drop inherited grants Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KMhCSFeWSezY61g6woQiz2 * fix: check lineage linearity unscoped, under the parent lock Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GoTAmRTjG2KAH4g4mco6T5 * fix: do not name a lineage conflict the caller cannot read Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GoTAmRTjG2KAH4g4mco6T5 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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448fce93f7 |
fix: make the native trigger disable/enable toggle actually save (#11024)
* feat: let a native trigger be disabled without deleting it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: show and control the native trigger pause outside the flow editor Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: create a native trigger already paused instead of pausing it after Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: correct the native trigger enabled comments for create-time init Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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f081fb1070 |
feat: recognize // volume: mounts in PHP scripts (#11018)
* feat: recognize `// volume:` mounts in PHP scripts Volume annotations were parsed for every language but PHP, so a PHP script could not mount a workspace volume. Two things stood in the way: PHP had no entry in the comment-prefix maps, and a PHP script opens with `<?php`, which ends the leading comment block the parsers scan before any annotation is read. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T3FR7iS9nRhpFt615cnuQ7 * fix: tolerate a PHP opener that carries code, drop the inert CLI hunk The open-tag skip matched `<?php` exactly, so `<?php declare(strict_types=1);` still ended the leading comment block and every annotation below it was silently ignored. Match the tag as a case-insensitive prefix and skip the whole line. The CLI local-graph hunk could never fire: PHP has no wasm asset parser, so `fallbackParse` handles it, and its own header scan stops at `<?php` — the script is dropped as a non-pipeline-member before any volume asset is read. Making only the CLI PHP-aware would also put the local graph out of parity with the deployed one, whose `parse_pipeline_annotations` stops there too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T3FR7iS9nRhpFt615cnuQ7 * docs: correct the CLI mirror comment, state the own-line annotation rule Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T3FR7iS9nRhpFt615cnuQ7 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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d3f305db98 |
feat: retry a workflow-as-code task from its task options (#11013)
* feat: retry a workflow-as-code task from its task options Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WvjgKMRNtRNPnAkg6MkiTA * fix: claim every retry attempt key up front, so a step cannot alias one Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WvjgKMRNtRNPnAkg6MkiTA * fix: bound retry attempts, which now claim their keys up front Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WvjgKMRNtRNPnAkg6MkiTA * fix: honour an explicit zero retry multiplier in the python client Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WvjgKMRNtRNPnAkg6MkiTA * docs: state the retry validation rules once in the task docstring Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WvjgKMRNtRNPnAkg6MkiTA --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel
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a9d42b489f |
chore(main): release 1.805.0 (#10995)
* chore(main): release 1.805.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |