Commit Graph
152 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
8dbdfa1949 feat: workspace roles settings UI and capability-based gating (#11824)
* feat: configurable workspace roles with per-workspace overrides

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: close role review gaps in pickers, declarative sync and removal

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: keep resolve_role_name doc on its function

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: validate overrides on instance role changes and bill admins fully

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: allow pipeline drafts and keep role checks on one connection

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: list data pipelines in operator_can_draft

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: expect a 403 role refusal when an operator resolves jobs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: require a valid license for custom workspace roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: freeze workspace roles when the license lapses

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: pin the ee companion for workspace roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: broadcast role override changes from the write path, not a trigger

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to b5294d38db082bdd104d5358a47695390694c05d

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #891 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 688e00c5982865b14098f530d54280e2311994c0

New ee-repo-ref: b5294d38db082bdd104d5358a47695390694c05d

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* feat: add workspace roles settings UI and role pickers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: show the server's reason when a settings save fails

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: default role pickers to a defined role and confirm resets of unknown capabilities

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: treat null role capabilities as unset and key role drafts by map

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: gate the frontend on workspace role capabilities

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: gate deploys, bulk actions and chat composition per role kind

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: treat a superadmin as full in deploy permission checks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: leave page visibility out of isRestricted, as the server does

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: let a member discard their own draft without the authoring right

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: show custom roles as inactive without a valid license

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the user store import on the agent page

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: show custom roles as frozen without a valid license

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: reorder instance roles with a drag handle

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: let an admin row that kept the operator flag hold full rights everywhere

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: treat superadmin members as admins and return role names from get user

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: move the instance role label into the expanded panel

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-21 16:31:04 +02:00
be23abb360 feat: let agent workers authenticate with a workload identity token (#11858)
* feat: let agent workers authenticate with a workload identity token

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: throttle failed workload identity key fetches per issuer

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep stale workload identity keys through an issuer outage

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: refuse workload identity rules with an empty claim value

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: validate workload identity issuers in declarative sync and share the JWKS cache

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: say workload identity issuers are optional in agent worker settings

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 96e8e2aa15bdc5968a1dae10f4e81d47d7ea49e0

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #897 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 0e98880edb8db269d53120ca606025c81f320f5c

New ee-repo-ref: 96e8e2aa15bdc5968a1dae10f4e81d47d7ea49e0

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-18 10:44:50 +02:00
e7088e7f47 feat: one Entra app for the Teams bot and ms_teams Graph connect (#11718)
* feat: one Entra app for the Teams bot and ms_teams Graph connect

Adds the ms_teams registry provider (Microsoft Graph) and moves the Teams OAuth setting
from key teams to ms_teams: a migration copies the entry and keeps teams for rolling
upgrades, and readers fall back to teams. The Graph connect URLs come from the setting's
tenant. The settings tile is no longer EE-locked; the bot stays enterprise-only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read the Teams setting from ms_teams in the workspace and alert views

Only drop the legacy teams key when the Teams tile was switched off.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to c8e450396ff4210c3bc253b1fa83b913c1a24c45

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #881 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 618749ff7884f7202b75b091bd4de4790fef202d

New ee-repo-ref: c8e450396ff4210c3bc253b1fa83b913c1a24c45

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
2026-10-16 19:00:52 +00:00
157183ae9c feat: external signer for OIDC tokens and a log line per mint (#11614)
* feat: sign OIDC tokens with an external signer and log every mint

* fix: init the signer in sqs_trigger builds and show signer reachability from results

* fix: key the OIDC key rows by source and kid

* chore: bump ee ref and list the oidc-signer subcommand only where it exists

* fix: advertise the actual signing algorithm in OIDC discovery

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: harden the external signer startup, agent workers and failed mints

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump ee ref for the stored key listing fix

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: list the oidc signing settings page only with an external signer

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 1e538620a9b2f08b044997d032e71d8720ecbd5c

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #859 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 84fa325737df98407c7b9f79c09d6e9378c46147

New ee-repo-ref: 1e538620a9b2f08b044997d032e71d8720ecbd5c

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-12 16:01:41 +00:00
8741843d2e feat: external instance cluster for data tables and Ducklake catalogs (#11197)
* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it

`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it

`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry

The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands

Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test

Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy

Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist

The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created

A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database

A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"

This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation

A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted

Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal

Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart

A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved

Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it

Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting

Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`

Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers

A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename

A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles

The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition

Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition

The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition

The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it

Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license

Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition

The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): data table roles in the DB manager and raw apps

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: never add a role to the reference of a data table whose name contains '?'

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read the roles of a data table whose name contains '?'

The generated client leaves a '?' in a path param unencoded, so the lookup
404'd and the raw-app picker blocked Start on such a data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): refuse a reference naming both a legacy data table and a role

When a workspace stores both `sales` and a legacy `sales?role=analytics`, the
reference resolved to the legacy entry without a role, so browsing `sales` as
`analytics` reached another data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: declare the default role in migrations written for a data table whose name contains '?'

Such a data table connects as its default role without naming it, so the
migrations the manager wrote for it declared no role and ran as admin.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* feat(datatables): set up an external instance cluster for data tables

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): send external cluster passwords as SCRAM verifiers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): scope external cluster credential readers to the crate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* [ee] feat(datatables): external_instance data tables on the external cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): compare the external cluster settings under a row lock before storing setup

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): only drop external databases Windmill marked, and check use under the lock

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles

A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.

A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.

Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.

A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.

Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin

Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.

All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping

A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.

Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.

Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded

Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.

Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.

Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.

`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.

Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code

The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.

`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract

The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.

Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.

The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.

Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.

Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery

Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.

`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.

Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.

Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.

Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced

The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".

The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing

The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.

Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:

A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.

Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.

Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.

Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings

Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.

The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.

One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.

Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks

Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.

A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.

Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.

The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.

Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically

The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".

The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.

Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles

pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.

Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data

A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.

Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* nit worker error msg

* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it

`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it

`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry

The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands

Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test

Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy

Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist

The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created

A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database

A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"

This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation

A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted

Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal

Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart

A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved

Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it

Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting

Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`

Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers

A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename

A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles

The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition

Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition

The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition

The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it

Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license

Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition

The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* feat(datatables): Ducklake catalogs on the external instance cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): never grant CREATEROLE to custom_instance_user on the external cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): state the authorization contract of external database usage lookups

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): drop a DuckDB data table secret once its ATTACH has used it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf(datatables): resolve a workspace's data tables per pointer hop, not per entry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): hold the parent's settings while a fork points at its data tables

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse repointing the external cluster while it is in use, and keep verify-ca working for pg_dump

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): protect external databases pending fork cleanup, and describe Ducklake usage in the API

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): per-cluster data table role catalogs, with roles on the external instance cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): write the external cluster setting under the lifecycle lock, and check fork targets are registered

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): register external fork catalogs under the lifecycle lock, and keep certificate verification in DuckDB attaches

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep certificate verification when DuckDB attaches an external data table

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep certificate verification when DuckDB attaches an external data table

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse fork cleanup of an external database another workspace uses

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse rolling back while external data tables are under roles, and type external_instance in the CLI

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): stop counting storage-only fork cleanup rows as uses of an external database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bind fork database copies to their workspace, and count every use before dropping one

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): authenticate instance database setup before writing its status, and keep a fork reservation across it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): create external databases only on a cluster setup succeeded on, and document the registry reader

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep only the most recently used DuckDB root certificate files

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): migrate fork reservations on workspace rename, and lock the parent's data tables for the whole fork

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): take the fork data table lock once, before the external cluster's

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): describe the external instance cluster and how to run one locally

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep fork reservations private, drop a cleaned-up entry with its database, and serialize cleanup with settings saves

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): hold the fork lock across a fork import, and carry the reservation inside the setup write

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): check the external cluster setting on its own transaction, and gate the registry probe

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #787 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 0edd40979cf36bfba59323f3f6a0811ae1369cf5

New ee-repo-ref: 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): keep DuckDB root certificate files in the job directory

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: drop the unused json import from the settings crate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): drop the serde_json::json import left unused by the fork setup write

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): accept external_instance data tables in the settings form type

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize fork database reservations, cleanup, setup and Ducklake saves on the database

- A fork copy is created and registered under its workspace's fork lock, and refused once the
  workspace is archived; a rename re-migrates reservations under that lock after archiving.
- Ducklake saves lock every instance database they newly name, as data table saves do.
- Instance database setup holds the database's lock until its entry is written.
- Fork import also holds the database's lock across the restore.
- Cleanup re-reads the entry under its locks before dropping anything.
- Non-superadmins no longer see fork copies reserved for workspaces they are not in.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): state the authorization contract of the external cluster status and write check

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): lock the fork copy at finalization, and order cleanup's registry write after its settings row

- Fork finalization holds the copy's database lock from its availability check to the commit.
- Cleanup removes the registry entry in its own transaction, in a task of its own, instead of on a
  second connection; a rename migrates reservations after its settings rewrites, so both take the
  settings rows before the registry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): hold the fork lock across a rename's settings copy

Fork cleanup of the old id could otherwise drop a copy the renamed workspace goes on using. Also
states the authorization contract of the instance database drop helpers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse moving the external cluster to another host or port while it holds databases

Every settings writer goes through the same check as removal: the login, TLS and maintenance
database may still change, the cluster may not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): clone a data table under roles with its owners and grants (#11120)

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UbrtwiYNfayrmqouBJHwGV

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: open the raw app data table drawer when the workspace has none

Selecting the first data table of an empty list passed undefined to the name
check, which threw instead of opening the drawer on no data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): offer cloning a data table under roles where its grants can be replayed

The server clones such a data table and replays the source's owners and grants,
which only the Enterprise Edition does, so the fork wizard hid both clone
options everywhere instead of on a build that cannot replay them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: name the placeholder the empty raw app data drawer renders

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): replace a job directory file at the DuckDB root certificate path instead of trusting it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the enterprise refusal the role pickers read as 'not under roles'

The server's sentence and the frontend's copy of it were coupled by nothing,
so rewording either one turned every role picker on a community build into a
failed lookup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): type Ducklake catalogs on the external instance cluster in the settings form

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): read a roles answer only for the workspace it was asked in

A fork and its parent each have their own roles on a data table of the same
name, so an answer stamped with the name alone settled the role from the
workspace the editor was acting on before.

Also derive the AI table creation flag from the data replaced into the editor:
data naming no data table left the flag on from before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep an instance database a settings save is waiting to name

Cleanup for a database whose setup failed took the lock first, read no user,
and dropped it while a save blocked on that same lock was about to commit a
reference to it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): check the workspace stamp in the default database selector too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): read what a save racing instance-database cleanup committed

A transaction blocked on the lock may still roll back, so keeping the database
for it stranded one whose name then blocks every retry: it is let through and
its outcome read instead. The waiter query also matches this database's locks
only, since pg_locks spans the cluster.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): tell a waiting request apart from the workspaces using a database

Both callers render what cleanup returns as the workspaces that keep the
database, so a waiting request's pid read as one of them. Each now words that
case itself, and the give-up comment names where the kept name actually goes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): take the cleanup lock on a connection the pool cannot reclaim

A session lock outlives the future holding it, so a cancellation between
taking it and releasing it handed a locked session back to the pool, where
every later settings save waits on it. Detached, the connection closes when it
is dropped and the server releases the lock with the session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): close the cleanup connection on drop instead of detaching it

Detaching released the pool permit while the session stayed alive, so
concurrent cleanups waiting on their locks could open as many connections as
they liked. Closing on drop covers the same cancellation and keeps them
counted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 179d2454a063ee818a9387a1eafdd354a217a16c

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #802 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: c2e43f5b5ff753d339b70e232fd17b6ffecb054d

New ee-repo-ref: 179d2454a063ee818a9387a1eafdd354a217a16c

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #798 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 3145e422d61d580f0a82804f075285c112879da0

New ee-repo-ref: fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): classify a fork import's target from the resolution that built its connection

A second read could see the entry flipped to a resource and skip the reservation check while the
connection already built still reached the instance cluster.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): run external database lifecycle on the caller's transaction, one lock order for fork cleanup

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): check a fork copy's reservation on the locked transaction's connection

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): make and drop fork copies of external data tables on the external cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a fork whose external copy something already names

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): check an external fork copy's uses before removing its entry, so child fork pointers still count

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): migrate external cluster fork reservations on workspace rename

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): configure the external instance cluster and pick its databases from the UI

Instance settings gets an External Postgres tab: the cluster's connection, the setup run
with its report, and the databases Windmill created there. Data table and Ducklake settings
offer the external_instance kind, with a picker over those databases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the external cluster form out of the instance settings the page bulk-saves

The form seeded its key into the settings store after the page snapshotted them, so merely
opening the tab made the page send a setting the validator refuses, failing an admin's
unrelated save. The form is local state now, and only the setup writes the key.

The database picker also treats a superadmin-only listing as authoritative: a workspace
admin, who cannot list, no longer sees a saved database as missing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(tests): app paths are validated, so a guest app cannot be renamed to one with a space

Path validation on apps landed after this test, which still expected a space to be accepted
and created its fixture on a ':' path. The scopable-path guard it exists for is kept by
planting that path on the row, which is now the only way an app can hold one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): one Managed Postgres tab, and a switch for Windmill's own database

The instance settings tab covers both substrates Windmill administers: the external cluster,
which can now be disabled once nothing sits on it, and Windmill's own database, which an
operator can turn off so the cluster is the only one a workspace may newly name. A save that
names it then refuses, as the create endpoint does.

Workspace settings name them the way an admin meets them: Postgres Resource, and Managed
instance, qualified as Internal or External only while both are on offer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): offer the external cluster in the add-data-table wizard, and give Ducklake its room back

The wizard gets the external cluster as a fourth substrate: pick a database it already holds
or name a new one, which the run creates before writing the entry, so Try again does not trip
on a database the last attempt made.

Ducklake's maintenance column moves into the settings popover next to the extra args, which
the wider catalog select had squeezed the name box out of.

A setting a component saves itself now also moves the page's baseline, or Discard would
restore what it replaced and a later save would send that stale value back.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): only a database this wizard run made makes its retry idempotent

A retry skipped the create whenever the name was registered, which let a run adopt a database
another superadmin had made and share their data without the warning the existing-database
branch shows. The run tracks what it created instead, and reports it so Discard can say the
database is still there. Creating one now refreshes the registry the next run's default name
and its validation read, and that default counts the external cluster's databases rather than
the instance's.

Row ownership carries the substrate: "instance" and "external_instance" can hold the same name,
and a row repointed between them while a run probes must not read as that run's own.

Also fixes the merge leftovers in the DuckDB executor's tests, which cargo check never compiles:
the new PgDatabase field and the attach helper's job directory.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): shorten the picked managed kind, and say what an empty database list means

The closed select has room for the qualifier, not the whole name, so a picked managed kind
reads "Managed (Internal)". An external entry gets the tooltip its internal counterpart has,
and a database picker with nothing in it says to type a name rather than "No items found".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the wizard's external-database bookkeeping optional and parked

The run deps gained a required field, which every existing caller of runSetup -- the sibling
test suite included -- does not pass. It defaults to empty instead, the parked payload carries
it across a Supabase redirect as it claims to, and a resumed run counts it as something left
behind. Two regressions pin the create: made on a first attempt, skipped only for a database
this run made.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): review an external-cluster database as one, not as a Postgres resource

The review step fell through to the resource branch for the new provider, so it announced a
connection already in the workspace for a database that does not exist yet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): show the server's refusal instead of an object in the toast

Saving data table settings passed the whole error to the toast, which rendered the request
and response as JSON, and the instance-database wizard replaced it with "check console".
Both surface the message the API sent, through the helper that exists for it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: point at the EE commit dropping the unused import

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): define a role on the cluster its data table sits on

The permissions drawer created and listed roles without naming a cluster, so a role defined
from an external data table became a login on Windmill's own, and the refresh then replaced
the correct catalog with the internal one. The drawer passes the data table's cluster to both.

The wizard also read a database it had just created as a name collision, which blocked
returning to the failed attempt and finishing under the same name.

And the merge had left the CONNECT-grant pass and its log in both the caller and the callee.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): manage the external cluster's role catalog, and name the cluster in the copy

The roles drawer offered one catalog, so the external cluster's roles could only be reached
through a data table sitting on it — and became unreachable once the last one was gone, while
the cluster could not be unset until they were dropped. Opened from the page it now offers the
clusters the instance has; a data table's own drawer still pins its cluster, and its copy names
that cluster rather than "the instance".

A DuckDB attach also decides whether to verify certificates the way every other Postgres
connection does, so a resource carrying a root certificate is no longer downgraded to require
here alone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bind the roles list to the cluster it was read for

Switching catalogs left the previous cluster's rows on screen and applied whichever response
landed last, so a slower read could seat one cluster's logins under the other's heading while
every control acted on the wrong id — invisible where a name exists on both. The switch clears
the rows, a token discards a response the selection has moved past, and the controls stay inert
while a catalog is being read.

The drop confirmation also names the cluster whose databases it reaches.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to dfe7b8b9204d21e0264fbea1c6f6eedf9e738d56

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #810 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 30db1b33bda0446f5fc5dfe353fbb226d57a26d4

New ee-repo-ref: dfe7b8b9204d21e0264fbea1c6f6eedf9e738d56

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
2026-09-29 14:45:47 +02:00
17448c97d3 count trigger suspend, resume and discard (#11405)
* feat(telemetry): count trigger suspend, resume and discard

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: shorten the telemetry disclosure to one line per category

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: correct the resume branch comments and note the pre-commit fire count

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: name feature adoption in the telemetry disclosure

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 9855e1b7a43a0a33e04f8accf1c497af3fd9b139

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #834 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 1d5b128ec956c156fe549cf099ba0dbc1b6467bf

New ee-repo-ref: 9855e1b7a43a0a33e04f8accf1c497af3fd9b139

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-29 12:26:11 +02:00
7dec3d9771 feat(db-manager): add a schema diagram view (#11030)
* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles

A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.

A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.

Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.

A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.

Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin

Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.

All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping

A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.

Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.

Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded

Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.

Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.

Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.

`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.

Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code

The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.

`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract

The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.

Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.

The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.

Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.

Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery

Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.

`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.

Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.

Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.

Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced

The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".

The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing

The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.

Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:

A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.

Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.

Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.

Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings

Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.

The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.

One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.

Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks

Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.

A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.

Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.

The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.

Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically

The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".

The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.

Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles

pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.

Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data

A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.

Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* nit worker error msg

* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it

`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it

`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry

The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands

Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test

Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy

Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist

The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created

A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database

A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"

This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation

A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted

Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal

Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart

A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved

Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it

Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting

Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`

Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers

A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename

A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles

The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition

Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition

The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition

The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it

Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license

Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition

The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): data table roles in the DB manager and raw apps

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: never add a role to the reference of a data table whose name contains '?'

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read the roles of a data table whose name contains '?'

The generated client leaves a '?' in a path param unencoded, so the lookup
404'd and the raw-app picker blocked Start on such a data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): refuse a reference naming both a legacy data table and a role

When a workspace stores both `sales` and a legacy `sales?role=analytics`, the
reference resolved to the legacy entry without a role, so browsing `sales` as
`analytics` reached another data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: declare the default role in migrations written for a data table whose name contains '?'

Such a data table connects as its default role without naming it, so the
migrations the manager wrote for it declared no role and ran as admin.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles

A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.

A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.

Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.

A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.

Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin

Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.

All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping

A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.

Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.

Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded

Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.

Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.

Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.

`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.

Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code

The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.

`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract

The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.

Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.

The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.

Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.

Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery

Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.

`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.

Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.

Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.

Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced

The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".

The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing

The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.

Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:

A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.

Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.

Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.

Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings

Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.

The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.

One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.

Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks

Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.

A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.

Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.

The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.

Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically

The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".

The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.

Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles

pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.

Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data

A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.

Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* nit worker error msg

* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it

`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it

`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry

The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands

Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test

Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy

Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist

The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created

A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database

A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"

This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation

A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted

Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal

Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart

A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved

Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it

Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting

Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`

Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers

A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename

A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles

The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition

Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition

The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition

The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it

Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license

Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition

The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): drop a DuckDB data table secret once its ATTACH has used it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf(datatables): resolve a workspace's data tables per pointer hop, not per entry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): hold the parent's settings while a fork points at its data tables

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(db-manager): add a schema diagram view

The database manager could only show one table at a time, so nothing in it
answered "how do these tables relate". This adds a Diagram mode beside the
data view, for PostgreSQL: the tree's checkboxes pick the tables, and the
canvas draws them as cards on a pan/zoom surface.

There are deliberately no edges. A schema of any size turns an edge-drawn ERD
into a hairball, so the relationships surface on hover instead: hovering a
table lights every table it is linked to and the columns tying them together,
hovering a column lights only the column it is actually paired with.

Only the connected database can be drawn, so another data table's rows in the
tree get no checkbox in this mode, and a row of the connected one toggles what
is drawn rather than selecting it for a data pane that is not shown.

Foreign keys come from a new ALL_FOREIGN_KEYS marker that reads the whole
database in one query. The existing FOREIGN_KEYS marker is per table, which
would be one job per card. It reads pg_constraint rather than
information_schema, whose constraint_column_usage loses which column of a
composite key pairs with which.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MXECAKye6KgN13wznsuRzP

* fix(db-manager): discard a superseded relations read

The manager is not remounted on every database change and a queued job
cannot be recalled, so a slow read could resolve after the next database's
and decorate its tables with the previous one's relations: runed stores
whatever the fetcher returns, and this one ignored its abort signal.

It now throws on a superseded run, the way the per-table foreign-key
resource beside it already does, and the result carries the database it was
read from so it is only ever shown alongside that one. The database is
identified by a key string passed in rather than by the objects read from
it: those are replaced whenever the manager re-reads, which says nothing
about the database having changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MXECAKye6KgN13wznsuRzP

* fix(db-manager): retry a failed relations read on re-entry

A failed read was cached like a successful one, so a transient worker or
connection failure left the diagram without relations until the schema was
reloaded or the manager remounted. The cache now only answers for a read
that succeeded, and leaving the diagram and coming back retries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MXECAKye6KgN13wznsuRzP

* fix(db-manager): scope the diagram's selection to its database

The manager is not remounted on every database change, so the tables
checked for one database's diagram carried into the next: same-named tables
were drawn from a database they were never chosen in, and differing names
left an empty canvas that the first draw no longer filled, having already
run. Both the selection and that first draw are now scoped to the database
they belong to.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MXECAKye6KgN13wznsuRzP

* refactor(db-manager): hold the diagram's state against its database

Three separate pieces of diagram state each had to work out on their own
which database they were about, and each got it wrong in a different way:
the selection carried across a switch, the first-draw latch counted itself
done before the schema it needed had arrived, and the relations read could
land under the wrong database.

They are now one record carrying the database it describes, read through a
single derived where a key that no longer matches reads as a fresh diagram.
The first draw waits for the schema rather than marking itself done without
one, and any table the user checks counts as that draw, so an emptied canvas
is never refilled behind them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MXECAKye6KgN13wznsuRzP

* fix(db-manager): draw a schema the database actually has

`selected.schemaKey` follows the tree and is only replaced once it is empty,
so it can still name a schema of the database browsed before this one. The
diagram's first draw took it on trust, found no tables under it and stood
down for good, leaving that database on a blank canvas.

It is now taken only when this database has that schema, and otherwise falls
back to the same default the tree starts from.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MXECAKye6KgN13wznsuRzP

* feat(db-manager): move the view toggle into the drawer header

The Data/Diagram toggle sat above the tree's search box, where it read as a
filter over the tree rather than a choice about the pane beside it. It now
sits with the manager's other header controls, left of the worker tag.

The mode moves with it: the drawer holds it and the manager is told which
view to show, clamping it for a database that has no diagram. Holding it
outside the key that remounts the manager also means picking another data
table or role no longer drops the user back into the data view.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MXECAKye6KgN13wznsuRzP

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #787 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 0edd40979cf36bfba59323f3f6a0811ae1369cf5

New ee-repo-ref: 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* feat(datatables): clone a data table under roles with its owners and grants (#11120)

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UbrtwiYNfayrmqouBJHwGV

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: open the raw app data table drawer when the workspace has none

Selecting the first data table of an empty list passed undefined to the name
check, which threw instead of opening the drawer on no data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(db-manager): wait for table metadata before reading relations

Returning to a cached database with the diagram selected remounts the
manager with its schema ready but its metadata not yet loaded. The
relations read started anyway, then ran again once the metadata landed, and
the first queued job cannot be recalled by an abort, so both full-database
queries took a worker and hit PostgreSQL. The read now waits for the
metadata, whose arrival already re-runs it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MXECAKye6KgN13wznsuRzP

* fix(db-manager): keep the relations read across a switch to the data view

The relations came from a runed `resource`, which abandons a run whenever
any of its inputs changes. A queued job cannot be recalled, so switching to
the data view while relations loaded threw away a read that still ran to
completion, and coming back queued a second full-database job.

A plain read replaces it: at most one per database and metadata, started
when the diagram needs it, kept across mode changes, and replaced only by
another database, reloaded metadata, or a retry after failing. An answer
arriving after its read was replaced is ignored, so it can never decorate
another database's tables.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MXECAKye6KgN13wznsuRzP

* fix(db-manager): hand down metadata only for the database it was read from

A resource keeps its previous value while it refetches, so after a switch
of database the manager was handed the previous database's metadata as the
new one's. The diagram started its relations read beside it, then again once
the right metadata arrived: two full-database jobs, the first unrecallable.
It also drew the previous database's columns meanwhile.

The metadata now carries the database it was read for, and nothing is
handed down while it belongs to another.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MXECAKye6KgN13wznsuRzP

* fix(db-manager): address the schema diagram's review nits

- Clear a pinned highlight once its table is unchecked or its column is
  folded away by collapsing the card; it otherwise left the canvas dimmed
  around nothing on screen.
- Use the design-system button for a card's expand control.
- Describe the view-mode counter as what it records — switches between the
  data and diagram views, not how the manager was opened.
- Give the relation index loop its real reason: hovering either table of a
  pair lights both of its columns.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MXECAKye6KgN13wznsuRzP

* fix(db-manager): keep schema diagram cards in place and open tables from the header

- Cards were draggable, but the canvas is laid out from scratch on every
  change, so a moved card snapped back at the next one. Dragging is off.
- Double-clicking a card anywhere opened its table. Expanding a card moves
  its rows under the pointer, so a double-click on the expand control landed
  its second click on a row and left the diagram. Only the header opens the
  table now; the rows keep hovering and pinning columns.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MXECAKye6KgN13wznsuRzP

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 39f8896379295728a509c4d642574bb8173368e8

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #784 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 720f334ee1843878749e9520567a7b657fc2deda

New ee-repo-ref: 39f8896379295728a509c4d642574bb8173368e8

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-22 15:15:05 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5 2a40f25bda fix: add missing credential fields to settings redaction lists (#11272)
* fix: redact Azure and AWS credential fields in instance settings

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: redact the GitHub App private key in the settings change log

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 23:36:24 +02:00
e1e3692fbc feat: data table roles in the DB manager and raw apps (#11139)
* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles

A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.

A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.

Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.

A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.

Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin

Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.

All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping

A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.

Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.

Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded

Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.

Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.

Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.

`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.

Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code

The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.

`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract

The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.

Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.

The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.

Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.

Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery

Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.

`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.

Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.

Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.

Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced

The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".

The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing

The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.

Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:

A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.

Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.

Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.

Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings

Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.

The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.

One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.

Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks

Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.

A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.

Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.

The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.

Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically

The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".

The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.

Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles

pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.

Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data

A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.

Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* nit worker error msg

* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it

`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it

`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry

The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands

Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test

Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy

Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist

The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created

A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database

A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"

This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation

A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted

Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal

Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart

A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved

Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it

Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting

Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`

Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers

A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename

A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles

The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition

Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition

The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition

The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it

Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license

Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition

The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): data table roles in the DB manager and raw apps

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: never add a role to the reference of a data table whose name contains '?'

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read the roles of a data table whose name contains '?'

The generated client leaves a '?' in a path param unencoded, so the lookup
404'd and the raw-app picker blocked Start on such a data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): refuse a reference naming both a legacy data table and a role

When a workspace stores both `sales` and a legacy `sales?role=analytics`, the
reference resolved to the legacy entry without a role, so browsing `sales` as
`analytics` reached another data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: declare the default role in migrations written for a data table whose name contains '?'

Such a data table connects as its default role without naming it, so the
migrations the manager wrote for it declared no role and ran as admin.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles

A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.

A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.

Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.

A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.

Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin

Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.

All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping

A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.

Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.

Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded

Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.

Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.

Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.

`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.

Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code

The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.

`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract

The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.

Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.

The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.

Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.

Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery

Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.

`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.

Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.

Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.

Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced

The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".

The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing

The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.

Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:

A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.

Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.

Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.

Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings

Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.

The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.

One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.

Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks

Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.

A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.

Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.

The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.

Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically

The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".

The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.

Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles

pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.

Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data

A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.

Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* nit worker error msg

* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it

`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it

`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry

The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands

Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test

Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy

Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist

The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created

A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database

A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"

This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation

A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted

Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal

Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart

A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved

Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it

Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting

Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`

Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers

A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename

A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles

The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition

Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition

The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition

The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it

Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license

Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition

The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): drop a DuckDB data table secret once its ATTACH has used it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf(datatables): resolve a workspace's data tables per pointer hop, not per entry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): hold the parent's settings while a fork points at its data tables

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #787 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 0edd40979cf36bfba59323f3f6a0811ae1369cf5

New ee-repo-ref: 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* feat(datatables): clone a data table under roles with its owners and grants (#11120)

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UbrtwiYNfayrmqouBJHwGV

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: open the raw app data table drawer when the workspace has none

Selecting the first data table of an empty list passed undefined to the name
check, which threw instead of opening the drawer on no data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): offer cloning a data table under roles where its grants can be replayed

The server clones such a data table and replays the source's owners and grants,
which only the Enterprise Edition does, so the fork wizard hid both clone
options everywhere instead of on a build that cannot replay them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: name the placeholder the empty raw app data drawer renders

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the enterprise refusal the role pickers read as 'not under roles'

The server's sentence and the frontend's copy of it were coupled by nothing,
so rewording either one turned every role picker on a community build into a
failed lookup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): read a roles answer only for the workspace it was asked in

A fork and its parent each have their own roles on a data table of the same
name, so an answer stamped with the name alone settled the role from the
workspace the editor was acting on before.

Also derive the AI table creation flag from the data replaced into the editor:
data naming no data table left the flag on from before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep an instance database a settings save is waiting to name

Cleanup for a database whose setup failed took the lock first, read no user,
and dropped it while a save blocked on that same lock was about to commit a
reference to it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): check the workspace stamp in the default database selector too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): read what a save racing instance-database cleanup committed

A transaction blocked on the lock may still roll back, so keeping the database
for it stranded one whose name then blocks every retry: it is let through and
its outcome read instead. The waiter query also matches this database's locks
only, since pg_locks spans the cluster.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): tell a waiting request apart from the workspaces using a database

Both callers render what cleanup returns as the workspaces that keep the
database, so a waiting request's pid read as one of them. Each now words that
case itself, and the give-up comment names where the kept name actually goes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): take the cleanup lock on a connection the pool cannot reclaim

A session lock outlives the future holding it, so a cancellation between
taking it and releasing it handed a locked session back to the pool, where
every later settings save waits on it. Detached, the connection closes when it
is dropped and the server releases the lock with the session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): close the cleanup connection on drop instead of detaching it

Detaching released the pool permit while the session stayed alive, so
concurrent cleanups waiting on their locks could open as many connections as
they liked. Closing on drop covers the same cancellation and keeps them
counted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #798 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 3145e422d61d580f0a82804f075285c112879da0

New ee-repo-ref: fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-21 12:03:01 +00:00
9994e03bc7 feat: add an ACL editor for data table roles (#11063)
* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #787 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 0edd40979cf36bfba59323f3f6a0811ae1369cf5

New ee-repo-ref: 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-19 23:23:50 +02:00
0e807fb1dd feat: put a data table's connection under Postgres roles (#11020)
* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles

A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.

A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.

Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.

A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.

Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin

Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.

All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping

A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.

Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.

Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded

Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.

Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.

Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.

`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.

Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code

The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.

`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract

The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.

Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.

The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.

Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.

Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery

Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.

`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.

Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.

Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.

Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced

The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".

The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing

The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.

Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:

A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.

Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.

Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.

Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings

Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.

The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.

One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.

Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks

Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.

A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.

Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.

The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.

Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically

The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".

The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.

Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles

pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.

Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data

A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.

Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* nit worker error msg

* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it

`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it

`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry

The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands

Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test

Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy

Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist

The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created

A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database

A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"

This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation

A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted

Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal

Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart

A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved

Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it

Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting

Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`

Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers

A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename

A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles

The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition

Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition

The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition

The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it

Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license

Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition

The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): drop a DuckDB data table secret once its ATTACH has used it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf(datatables): resolve a workspace's data tables per pointer hop, not per entry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): hold the parent's settings while a fork points at its data tables

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #787 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 38d6fcf2aeb39cfdac21814bbdbbcc02911e566a

New ee-repo-ref: 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-18 13:56:41 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Fable 5.1 f082fddf41 [ee] feat: fall back to instance storage for AI session backups (#11153)
* feat: instance object store as fallback for AI session backups

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: fence the instance store sweep by generation, name it by location

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin that an instance store location tells endpoints apart

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: show the instance storage fallback setting on while it is unset

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: check the generation fence queries at compile time

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: stop the instance storage fallback once the plan is Pro

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-15 23:09:45 +02:00
796b6e5297 feat: back AI sessions up to the workspace object storage (#11116)
* feat: back AI sessions up to the workspace object storage

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SG5qEPM6Fmf7VerXS5nnWp

* fix: bind the backup key to the user and pack pushes within the server caps

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SG5qEPM6Fmf7VerXS5nnWp

* fix: keep refused and unavailable marks, one mark per key, stream the flush

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SG5qEPM6Fmf7VerXS5nnWp

* fix: settle only fully sent sessions, keep removals while backups are off, cap pull bodies

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SG5qEPM6Fmf7VerXS5nnWp

* fix: bound removal marks while backups are off and stale the sync rows instead of dropping them

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: retry a lost lock, cap nested push lists and oversized pieces, drop a stale copy of a chat that outgrew the backup

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: cap pieces per push, size requests in UTF-8, keep a move's removal for an off workspace, disclose the restore counter

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: file a move's removal only once the new copy landed, retire marks through the sync row

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep a session marked while deletes are carried over, drop only gone sessions' marks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: record what a refused flush already stored, stop early when every mark is retired

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: restore past another workspace's removal mark, file a move's removal before its row, bound the first pulled session

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: re-key the backups on workspace key rotation, accept only base64 images, carry a delete on the sync row when its mark cannot be written

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: durable conditional re-key of session backups, re-push on a storage switch

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: fail a push the key rotated under, settle no session split across storages, narrow the re-key module

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep a delete filed during a push, bound the pull and re-key listings

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: bound the session listing, mark the store's own user on a write that lands after a user switch

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: list sessions through per-session index markers, hold a session's parts back after a failed one

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: record a rotation on every build, list a session only on the part that completes its push

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: leave an object larger than any push writes unread

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read each object against its listed size, carry a dirty mark that cannot be written on the sync row

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: note the storages the re-key walk completed on, reach another user's rows on a failed mark, read a head at its cap

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read the replaced key under its row lock, carry a refused dirty bump on the sync row

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: pull a session that outgrew one answer in pages, imported only whole

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: build a pull page from the smallest keys of the whole listing, stage each page as it lands

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: re-record a key rotated back to, admit earlier-page images, restage over a cut-short restore

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: delete the backups on key rotation instead of re-keying them

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: end a pull page before an object that grew since the listing, prune what a cut-short restore staged

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: delete the backups before the key commits, skip a planted object whatever its listing says, lock a restore across tabs, prune stale artifact versions

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the backups under a prefix named by the key, delete the previous key's prefix after the commit

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: name the backup prefix by a generation the rotation bumps, never write an older record over a newer one on restore

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: retire a removal only against the storage holding the backup, restart a paged pull whose listing moved

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: fingerprint a pull page before reading it, answer the backup generation apart from the storage identity

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: answer needs_head for a headless session push, prune restaged pieces by id

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: serialize a session's push and removal, open whole pushes with the head, prune only own restores

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: require a head on a whole push, prune before the record lands, restore only under Web Locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: incremental pushes ride on a listed session, removals wait for every storage holding a copy

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a whole push replaces the backup under a per-push token, a pull page is checked after its reads

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: fingerprint a pull page by entity tag and version too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a moved session's removal mark names the storages holding the old copy

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: restore a workspace family together, the newest copy of a moved session winning

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: name the marker by the session's move count, abort a family restore a listing failed in

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: list the family again before a restored record lands, require the pull fingerprint

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: list the whole family once per restored workspace, off members included

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a push split over parts, incremental too, unlists the session until its last part

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: refuse a partial push part that names no push

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep a refused bump for a session with no row yet, probe an off workspace again

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: backfill row-carried bumps after a reload, ask an off workspace again on a timer

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: backfill a row for its bumps only when it carries some

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a backfilled mark that cannot be written counts from the page's counter

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: say an off workspace is asked again, in the mirror's comments

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 1c1dab33563c4907aff8b0da825fb66db60af82a

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #796 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 289b477ca3fc993da06ec09b11c8f55d5e4e39c1

New ee-repo-ref: 1c1dab33563c4907aff8b0da825fb66db60af82a

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix: unlist a session while an incremental push changes more than one object

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-15 15:48:33 +00:00
a78beff743 feat: dynamic AI agent toolsets (#11050)
* feat: dynamic ai agent toolsets, and memory as a step input

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address review round 1 on dynamic ai agent toolsets

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: tag enabled_tools and drop the memory step input

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: let an mcp server entry be named by the path the roster shows

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep $res: out of the tool names the enabled tools picker offers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: name an mcp server by its bare path on the one side that can hold it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: count the enabled tool names that matched nothing instead of logging them

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: narrow an agent's roster in one pass, by whole entries

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin that an mcp summary is rejected against a name that is not

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: regenerate the copilot flow schema after the merge

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: shorten the enabled tools list hint

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: take enabled_tools back to a plain list of tool names

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: keep the enabled tools add-menu hint describing the unset field

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: name a websearch tool that carries no summary of its own

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: reserve the name web search is enabled by so no tool can share it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: spell the reserved web search name with a hyphen

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: reserve __wm_web_search as the name web search is enabled by

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: advance ee-repo-ref past the git sync ci check work

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: shorten the enabled tools description the run form shows

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to e4c1b794d6c5e6e390987341b2840587bbb40348

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #785 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: af668462f0f06b02a5f4e0c22e6156858487a518

New ee-repo-ref: e4c1b794d6c5e6e390987341b2840587bbb40348

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-15 11:34:30 +02:00
91e6dc39ce feat: pre-approved cloud accounts: login links, OAuth adoption, setup, and the trial bridge (#10875)
* feat: single-use login links and oauth-claimable pending accounts

* docs: capture the auth surface facts behind login links

* fix: accept stringified email_verified from oauth userinfo

* docs: describe the oauth claim rule in the auth surface notes

* fix: harden login-link redirects and sweep expired links

* chore: bump ee-repo-ref

* fix: keep expired login links a day so an open still reads as expired

* fix: refuse login links for superadmin and devops accounts

* fix: re-check the account's roles when a login link is opened

* feat: pre-approved cloud accounts finish their setup and start their trial from Windmill

* feat: dev-only localStorage opt-in to the cloud UI on localhost

* feat: finish-setup entry in the desktop settings menu

* style: pulse the settings row while account setup is pending; shorter, blue finish-setup entry

* fix: list the configured providers in the finish-setup modal

* fix: open the finish-setup modal after the menu has closed

* feat: finish-setup provider sign-in keeps the session when the provider asserts another address

* chore: pin the EE companion commit

* fix: plain toast for the finish-setup refusal

* style: format the dev cloud override

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* feat: onboarding skips the source question an invite already answered

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* fix: type the finish-setup icons and login_type as the frontend uses them

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* feat: invited accounts get a workspace name, hub picks and starter prompts from their invite

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* fix: the workspace form reads the invite's name itself, so the picker prefills it too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* feat: an empty workspace offers the projects its invite picked, one click from importing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* style: picked projects get identical import buttons

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* feat: a pinned sidebar banner until an invited account has credentials of its own

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* style: the account-setup row speaks the rail's language, tinted not filled

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* chore: pin ee-repo-ref to the import fix

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* refactor: picked projects live in the template picker only; account-setup row moves to the rail footer

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* fix: review round — no portal login for job tokens, finish-setup failures keep the session, prompt labels deduped

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* fix: CI round — trial start is a POST, profile cache follows the session, setup row on MenuButton

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* fix: CI round — no password road where password login is off, cache note on the login form, trial refusal surfaced

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* fix: CI round — set_password guarded on its read, refusal stays on the page, docs and formatting

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* fix: CI round — popup OAuth clears the profile cache, portal helper crate-private, refusal toast stays

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* fix: a refused trial is recorded inline in the rail, not in a day-long toast

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* fix: the refusal notice uses the rail's button and has a collapsed form

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* fix: CI round — SSO can finish account setup, with the same mismatch refusal as OAuth

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* fix: SSO finish-setup rides in RelayState and the refusal notice is a status region

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* fix: keep the finish-setup cookie beside RelayState, hoist the status region, pin session-keyed profile cache

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* fix: empty live region for the trial refusal, drop the setup cookie once adopted, telemetry inventory

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* fix: the trial refusal survives the responsive sidebar swap

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* fix: the trial refusal is shown to the account it answers, modal open prop is required

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* feat: an invited account skips the whole onboarding survey

Its source is the invite and its use case was researched before the invite went
out, so neither question is asked: the known source is recorded and onboarding
opens on naming the workspace. Accounts without an invite profile see the survey
exactly as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* fix: an invited account with a workspace leaves onboarding before anything paints

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* fix: account-setup state resets on sign-out, onboarding shows a loading state while it settles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* style: keep the refresh doc comment on refresh

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* fix: profile lists are distinct, and the offer table notes what a users-import does to it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011HMniEf5hapoKEB6TEBcGy

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 1ba6fe83451f0a1f8fafe04b7187087d51e0f769

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #750 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: be42722d09832ffff709a1f710f3e97e34d513b2

New ee-repo-ref: 1ba6fe83451f0a1f8fafe04b7187087d51e0f769

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-14 20:04:58 +00:00
63cb46d7bb feat: add a minimal skin for the approval page and slack/teams (#11061)
* feat: add an approval skin to the approval page and slack/teams messages

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9

* chore: point ee-repo-ref at the teams approval skin commit

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9

* fix: resolve the approval skin from the step awaiting approval

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9

* fix: shorten the slack approval message to fit the button value limit

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9

* fix: rename skins to detailed/minimal and keep long slack messages

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9

* feat: title the minimal approval page from the step and flow summaries

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9

* feat: let wait_for_approval set the description approvers see

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9

* fix: keep a finished workflow's approval description, still gated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9

* fix: keep a login-required approval locked after the run moves on

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9

* feat: hide the windmill version on the approval page

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KK2Ye4PizykReZVuMEm3m9

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to e92abc9d1fba3ba898640df0cfeb0af8a50849b4

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #786 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: bf1766ff49458f62d3f11746f1a06893ae3c2325

New ee-repo-ref: e92abc9d1fba3ba898640df0cfeb0af8a50849b4

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-10 18:50:09 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5 abf4c6c234 feat: add a dismissible instance-wide announcement banner (#11037)
* feat: add a dismissible instance-wide announcement banner

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExBp57hUoB8hQm36bJuUEs

* fix: harden instance banner validation and mandatory-banner visibility

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExBp57hUoB8hQm36bJuUEs

* fix: sequence instance banner loads and match the backend character cap

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExBp57hUoB8hQm36bJuUEs

* fix: gate the settings save on a valid instance banner link

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExBp57hUoB8hQm36bJuUEs

* feat: restrict the announcement banner to the managed cloud

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExBp57hUoB8hQm36bJuUEs

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 11:20:25 +02:00
fd35b47658 feat: create the cloud workspace in onboarding, and teach the empty home (#10959)
* [ee] feat: create a personal workspace on cloud signup instead of the demo invite

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* feat(frontend): land cloud users in their workspace after onboarding

Cloud signup creates exactly one workspace for the new user, so the picker
that followed onboarding was a page with a single choice on it. Switch to
that workspace and go to the home page instead, falling back to the picker
whenever there is a real choice: an invite to accept, several workspaces,
or none.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* chore(frontend): remove the tutorial system

Deletes the guided-tour feature: the tutorials directory, the per-editor
wrappers, the home banner and button, the /tutorials route, and the
driver.js dependency they were built on. Also removes what only existed to
serve them — the `tutorialsToDo` / `skippedAll` / `isCurrentlyInTutorial`
stores, the `disableTutorials` prop chain through the flow editor, the
`?tutorial=` deep links, PopupV2's clickOutside exemption for the driver
popover, and the selector-anchor class on the flow editor tabs.

The backend `tutorial_progress` endpoints and table stay: nothing calls
them now, and removing them is a public-API break plus a migration that
would drop existing progress.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* feat(frontend): suggest Hub projects on an empty workspace home

A workspace with nothing in it showed only "Welcome to Windmill". Replace
that with a grid of ready-made Hub projects to import, and hide the search
box, kind toggles and the sort/filter row while the workspace is empty —
they would act on an empty list. A search that matches nothing still keeps
its controls and shows the no-match message.

The project list is seeded locally for now; the Hub endpoint that ranks
them is not there yet, and Import is still a placeholder.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* feat(frontend): make a new cloud workspace the thing onboarding produces

Signup already makes a personal workspace; nothing let its owner name it, and a
user who ended up without one landed on a workspace picker whose only action was
a button. Onboarding now ends on the workspace itself, and the empty home that
follows says what a workspace is for rather than "Welcome to Windmill".

Onboarding gains a third step that names the workspace signup created, prefilled
from the login provider's name or the email local part — `ruben@…` gives "Ruben's
workspace". Skipping the survey reaches it too: the questions are ours, the
workspace is theirs. Advanced settings swaps in the real creation form for
someone setting up for a team.

The workspace picker stands down when it has nothing to offer: no workspace to
enter and no invite to accept leaves one action on the page, so the page is that
action — one field, prefilled, "Create workspace". Both hand-overs hold a loading
state for 900ms and the app fades in behind them, so creating a workspace reads
as something that happened.

The empty home draws three static placeholder rows in the shape of real ones,
under a caption offering a template or the New menu. "Start from a template"
opens a popover listing the hub's projects, most-starred first, preloaded when
the empty state renders and paged as you scroll. Picking one opens the import
wizard in a dialog: its two destination steps are already answered by being in a
workspace, so it starts at the import itself and pages to the credentials step
with the animation the paged-modal pattern provides.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): gate the empty state and repair the derived workspace id

Review findings from the first round.

The empty state offers a template import and the New menu, and neither checks a
permission — so an operator, or a workspace whose direct-deploy protection
cleared `showEditButtons`, was offered both. It now sits behind the same gate as
the create menu thirty lines above it.

`validateWorkspaceId` answers with the *reason* an id is unusable, so
`if (validateWorkspaceId(next)) break` stopped on the first invalid candidate and
returned it: someone named Global got the reserved `global`, and a 50-char seed
got a taken one. Invalid candidates are skipped instead, and when none works the
caller opens advanced settings rather than posting a name the server refuses.

Also: `rd` may be absolute (the CLI login sends one) and `goto` refuses those,
which would strand the caller on the "Creating …" screen with the workspace
already made; the hub host is parsed defensively, since the instance setting is
whatever an admin typed and `new URL` was throwing in render; `insert_workspace`
says which authorization its callers still own; and the two arrival animations'
comments now describe when they actually play.

Tests for the two pure helpers the review named: `defaultWorkspaceName` and
`hubProjectDescription`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): use unifiedSize on the new onboarding step's buttons

`size` and `color` are deprecated on Button; the new step copied them from the
survey steps above it. AGENTS.md: deprecated props survive at old call sites,
copying one forward is still a bug.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): let Skip wait for the workspace onboarding names

`loadWorkspaceStep()` was fired and dropped, while Skip and the use-case Continue
branch on `ownWorkspace` in their `finally`. Skip awaits one POST that starts
after those two GETs and can finish before them, so a first-frame Skip fell
through to `leaveOnboarding()` and landed in the workspace with the backend's
name — the step this flow exists for, silently gone. Both exits await the load;
`isSubmitting` already covers the wait.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* refactor: create the workspace in onboarding rather than at signup

Signup no longer makes a personal workspace, so the last onboarding step creates
one instead of renaming it — the same one-field `SimpleCreateWorkspace` the
workspace picker falls back to, so a user who leaves onboarding early meets the
form again rather than something new. The id now comes from the name they type
rather than from their email, and there is one creation path instead of two.

`insert_workspace` goes back to being private: the extraction existed only so the
EE signup path could call it, and nothing outside `create_workspace` does now.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): count a pending invite as somewhere to go

Onboarding read `listUserWorkspaces`, which returns membership. An invite is a
`workspace_invite` row until `accept_invite` runs, so an invited teammate reached
the last step owning nothing and was walked into creating a personal workspace,
with the invite nowhere on the page. Invites are fetched alongside the
workspaces, the way the picker already gates the same decision.

A failed load now reads as placed rather than not: the picker can work the
decision out, while the create step's only way forward is creating.

The create form reports when it is handing over, so the Previous button beside
it stands down for the ~900ms rather than offering a way back out of a workspace
that now exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): open the template picker downward and size it from the popover

The popover's default positioning caps its height to the viewport, and the list
inside it carried a fixed one, so a capped box overflowed its own frame — visible
with the AI composer hidden, where the caption sits high and `placement: top`
left almost no room above it. It opens downward now, with flip fallbacks, at a
definite `min(72vh, 520px)`; the list fills what the header leaves, which is
still the definite height it needs to page.

`creating` on the create form becomes `onCreatingChange`: `$bindable(default)` on
an optional prop is banned, and this is something the form reports rather than
state it shares.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* refactor(frontend): drop the InfiniteList containerClass prop

Added for the template picker, which turns out not to need it: DataTable's own
container is already `h-full`, so `containerClass="h-full"` merged to nothing and
the height the list pages against comes from the flex chain above it. A prop with
no effect at its only call site is public surface for free. InfiniteList is back
to what it was.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): stop a dismissed project import from running on

Modal reports dismissal only through its bindable `open` — the X, Escape
and the backdrop dispatch neither `confirmed` nor `canceled`. Bind it, so
clearing `pick` follows the dialog closing: re-picking the same project
opens it again, and a run still in flight is abandoned with a toast
instead of writing to the workspace with no UI in front of it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): stop a dismissed project import from running on

Modal reports dismissal only through its bindable `open` — the X, Escape
and the backdrop dispatch neither `confirmed` nor `canceled`. Bind it, so
clearing `pick` follows the dialog closing: re-picking the same project
opens it again, and a run still in flight is abandoned with a toast
instead of writing to the workspace with no UI in front of it.

Also mark the inline-link buttons as sanctioned rather than oversights,
and give Log out `text-accent` instead of `text-blue-500`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): keep the stopped-import toast off the Finish path

`done` survives a retry, so Finish is clickable while the run is going
again, and its own closing reaches the same falling edge the X does.
Abandon the run either way; say it was stopped only when that is what
the click asked for.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* feat(frontend): reach the hub importer from the create menu, and count the funnel

The picker only existed inside the empty state, which disappears as soon
as a workspace holds one item — nothing else in the product linked to
`/projects/import`. New → Import now offers a hub project, opening the
catalogue in a dialog: a popover anchored to an item inside an open
dropdown leaves two melt layers arguing over focus. The list and the
import dialog move up to ItemsList, so one dialog serves both doors.

`template_setup` records how the credentials step ended — `filled` only
when nothing was outstanding, `skipped` carrying how many rows were left
— and `template_abandon` records where a dismissed import was given up.
`template_picker_open` gains a key naming the entry point.

Also on the workspace picker: logging out is a text link on the line
that says who you are and an item in the settings menu, rather than the
page's accent action, and onboarding's Previous joins the row it belongs
to instead of hanging under the button that finishes the form.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): make the import counters answer what they claim to

`template_abandon` folded a landed import closed with the X into `idle`,
the bucket read as "opened this and bounced" — three outcomes in one
number. It gets its own `done` stage.

`template_setup` counted skipped rows through `value`, which is an
increment: `skipped` accumulated rows while `filled` and `none` counted
imports, two units in one counter with no way to recover one from the
other. The row count becomes a bucket in the key, so every event is one
import and the buckets compare.

The import dialog also asked for the hub URL settings at init, and the
home list now mounts it for everyone on every arrival — two GETs for a
string only the project card renders. Deferred to the first pick.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix: sanitize the inferred username, and stop counting an unread setup step as clean

`loadUsernamePolicy` derived a username by stripping dots, so `O'Connor`
and `alice+demo` both produced values the `proper_username` constraint
refuses — posted invisibly by the simple form, which then failed with
nothing on screen explaining why. `usernameFromName` keeps only `[\w-]`
and answers undefined when nothing usable is left, which is already the
form's cue to open the full one.

The credentials step offers Finish when the export could not be read,
since it cannot tell what is outstanding — and that landed in
`template_setup` as `filled`, the bucket meaning the step came out
clean. It reports whether it checked anything, and an unread step counts
as `unchecked`.

Also drops an orphaned `.sqlx` entry left by the create-at-signup query
this branch abandoned, and rewrites the stepper's first-frame comment,
which argued from a meaning of `resourceCount` that main has narrowed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): cap the inferred username at what the column holds

`usr.username` is VARCHAR(50) while the provider name and email it is
derived from run to 255, and `create_workspace` inserts the value
untruncated — so a long first name failed the same way the invalid
characters did: posted invisibly, refused on insert, with nothing on
screen naming the field. Undefined instead, which the form already
routes to the full one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): show the import note where it applies, and drop onCreated's unused id

The note is about landing on top of what a workspace already holds, so
it belongs wherever the destination is an existing workspace. The route
already read it that way; the dialog, which always imports into the
current workspace, was hiding it. It costs one collapsed row.

`onCreated` was typed as taking the new workspace id, and the advanced
branch passed `''` because `CreateWorkspaceInner` does not report one.
No caller reads it — the form has already switched to the workspace by
then — so the argument goes rather than the lie staying.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): keep the empty-state toolbar reachable, and name the view counters

"Empty" here means the default listing found nothing, and a workspace
whose items are all archived looks exactly the same. The searchbar
carries "Only archived", so taking it off the pointer left those items
unreachable without hand-writing a query URL. Dimmed still, never
`inert`.

The disclosure named the counters that fire on a creation or an import
and not the three that fire on merely seeing the empty home or opening
either picker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): respect disable_hub in both hub-project entry points

An instance with the hub turned off still got the catalogue preloaded on
every empty home and an "Import a hub project" entry in the create menu
— an outbound request the operator has said not to make, and a door to
somewhere unreachable. Both now observe `disableHubStore`, the store the
script and flow hub pickers already read. With the hub off the caption
reads "Create a new one." rather than continuing a sentence whose first
half is gone.

The telemetry disclosure also scoped the create menu and picker counters
to the empty home, when both fire from the toolbar in a populated one,
and said a creation was recorded when what is recorded is the menu
opening.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* refactor(frontend): drop the catalogue preload rather than gate it twice

Warming the hub catalogue when the empty state rendered bought the time
between the caption appearing and someone clicking it, and cost two
defects: the request fired on instances with the hub turned off, and the
gate added for that raced `disable_hub`'s own load, which starts false
and stays false if the settings request fails.

The picker fetches on open instead. Measured: nothing before the click,
one request after it, 411ms to a filled list. `disableHubStore` still
hides the link and the menu entry, which cost no request and correct
themselves if the setting lands late.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* docs: count the home actions, and state the lazy-fetch constraint without its history

The telemetry doc's tally is maintained by hand and main had just moved
it; this PR adds a feature, so it reads 48 across eighteen with `home`
in the list — verified against the pinned EE ref rather than counted by
eye.

The empty state's comment narrated a preload that no longer exists and
the defects it caused. What a future reader needs is the constraint:
`disable_hub` loads asynchronously, so a fetch from here goes out before
the setting forbidding it is known.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): stop the prefill overwriting a typed name, and gate submit on the policy

`load()` assigned the suggested name unconditionally, so a name typed
while its two requests were in flight was replaced a moment later. It
now yields to anything already typed.

Nothing may be submitted before the username policy lands either:
`automateUsername` starts at the common case, and posting that guess to
an instance that derives no usernames sends none where one is required.
`policyLoaded` gates both the button and `create()`, and is set in a
`finally` so a failed load leaves the form usable rather than wedged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): settle the username policy on failure instead of guessing it

`policyLoaded` was set in a `finally`, so a failed policy load unblocked
the form with `automateUsername` still at its default — the exact submit
the flag exists to prevent. The failure now hands over to the full form,
which asks for a username outright rather than inferring one, so the
flag is never true while the answer is still a guess.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): answer the username policy instead of rejecting it

Three rounds of this bug moved between call sites because the shared
loader rejects when it cannot read `automate_username_creation`, leaving
each caller to guess — and both guessed "automated", which hides the
username field and posts none to an instance that derives none.

`loadUsernamePolicy` now answers "ask for one" in that case, so
`SimpleCreateWorkspace` and `CreateWorkspaceInner` both render a field
someone can type into rather than submitting a guess. An instance that
does automate ignores a username it was sent, so asking is safe either
way.

The prefill and the policy are settled apart now too: a failed
`globalWhoami` costs the suggested name and nothing else.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): block creation when the username policy is unknown

There is no safe default. `create_workspace` refuses a username on an
instance that automates them and requires one on an instance that does
not (`workspaces.rs:5820`), so a client that cannot read the setting has
two request shapes available and the server rejects both. Last round's
"ask for one" was as wrong as the "automated" guess it replaced.

So the loader reports the failure instead of inventing an answer, and
the form says so: Create stays disabled, with a line explaining why and
a link to try again. Verified in the browser both ways — unreadable
policy disables Create and shows the message, a healthy load prefills
the name and enables it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): close the advanced-settings bypass while the policy is unknown

Create was gated on knowing whether the instance derives usernames, and
the link beside it went to a form with no such gate — so the way around
the block sat next to it. It is disabled until the policy is known, with
a title saying why.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): reload the list on dismissal, and never re-offer a workspace that exists

Closing a landed import with the X left the home list stale: only
`finish()` reloaded it, so a workspace that now holds a project kept
showing its placeholder rows. A run that started wrote items whether it
finished, was abandoned or failed partway, so any dismissal after one
reloads.

Creation reported failure for a failed *list refresh* too, and handed
the form back — where a retry picks the next free id and creates a
second workspace. Once `createWorkspace` returns, nothing may report
failure: the refresh is logged if it fails, and the hand-over proceeds,
since the workspace is real either way.

The disabled-link tooltip also claimed the settings could not be read
during the ordinary load, before anything had failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): reload after the abandoned run stops, not when it is asked to

`abandon()` stops the run at the next phase boundary; the request already
sent still lands. Reloading the list at that moment could read it before
that write committed, leaving the caller stale again — the thing the
reload was added to fix. It now waits for `running` to clear, which is
immediate for the common case of dismissing a finished import, with a
cap so a run that never settles still ends in a reload.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): give the list reload one owner, taken by both exits

Finish reloaded immediately while dismissal waited for the run to stop,
so Finish pressed during a retry — `done` survives one, which is what
makes the button clickable then — read the list mid-write, and its
`finishing` flag stopped the deferred reload from correcting it.

Both exits now go through the same wait. One reload per closing, always
after the writing stops, whichever way the dialog was left.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* feat(frontend): give ImportExecution a whenIdle(), and await it instead of polling

The reload waited on a 250ms poll of `running` with a 15s cap, because
the modal receives the execution after `run()` was already called and so
holds no promise to await. The cap was its own hole: a write slower than
15s reloaded early, and nothing followed.

`run()` now keeps the in-flight promise and `whenIdle()` hands it out —
resolved when nothing is being written, immediate when no run is in
flight. The modal awaits that: no poll, no cap, no window.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): back the settlement reload with a bound, and keep reporting run failures

`installProject` writes serially and takes no signal, so a request left
pending after earlier items committed leaves those invisible until the
next page load — `whenIdle()` alone never resolves for it. A bound now
reloads once in that case, *without* replacing the settlement reload:
replacing it was the flaw in the timeout this grew out of, so a hung run
reloads on the bound and again if it ever finishes.

`whenIdle()`'s rejection handler also swallowed the only report an
unexpected throw had — `#runInternal` has no catch of its own, and a
throw outside its inner ones leaves a stalled run with nothing on
screen. It logs now instead of discarding.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* feat(frontend): say when a workspace holds only archived items

A workspace whose items are all archived read as empty, because the
placeholder is decided by the default listing. Reaching those items then
depended on the toolbar, which is why it had been left interactive while
dimmed — and that let a kind toggle replace the invitation with "no
items found" on a workspace that really was empty.

The state is named instead. When the default listing comes back empty,
one request asks whether anything archived exists, and the placeholder
says which of the two it is: "Everything in this workspace is archived"
with a link to show them, or the ordinary invitation. Held until that
answer lands rather than drawn and swapped, since the wrong one claims
the workspace is empty when it is not.

The toolbar is dimmed and `inert` again, its original design: the
archived case now carries its own way in.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix(frontend): make the archived route independent of write permissions

Three ways the archived-only placeholder failed to deliver what it
promised:

Reading archived items is not a write, but the notice offering them sat
behind the create-permission gate — so an operator, or a workspace whose
direct-deploy protection cleared `showEditButtons`, got "no items found"
over items it could see and a toolbar now inert. The gate governs the
create actions alone; the notice is shown to whoever the probe found
something for.

The probe answered once per workspace and was never invalidated, so
archiving the last item left a cached "nothing archived" claiming the
workspace was empty until a page load. `reloadItemsAndCounts` clears it.

And it omitted `includeWithoutMain`, which the backend reads as
excluding library scripts — a workspace holding only archived ones
answered "empty". Always true here: hiding library scripts puts a filter
in `activeFilters`, which `workspaceEmpty` requires to be empty.

`whenIdle()` gains the two tests its contract deserves, since the reload
correctness three rounds argued over rests on it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix: harden the hub proxy, the workspace picker's gating and the rd hand-off

Findings from four local review passes over the branch:

- `list_projects` refuses when `disable_hub` is set, and `is_public_hub` now
  compares the parsed host, so no spelling of the public hub (mixed-case scheme
  or host, port, trailing dot, userinfo) forwards a member's bearer token there.
  Covered by a unit test table.
- The workspace picker waits on `usersWorkspaceStore` as well as `workspaces`,
  which derives to `[]` while the store is unloaded; with the create-form latch,
  one such frame swapped a member's picker for the create form until reload.
- `refreshSuperadmin` takes `force`, and the picker uses it: a `false` left over
  from a logged-out load decides whether the page is a picker or a create form.
  A cancelled call no longer publishes `false` over the live request's answer,
  and only its own request's handle is cleared.
- `rd` is sanitized once where it is derived rather than at each of the four
  hand-offs, so an absolute target keeps the OAuth callback's allowance and
  `https://evil.example/` is dropped.
- The archived-items probe answers "unknown" on failure, which keeps the
  ordinary caption and leaves the toolbar reachable.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* fix: answer the round-33 nits on the hub route and the empty state

- `empty_state_view` is no longer logged for an archived-only workspace, which
  is not the state the counter measures.
- `detail`'s fetcher keeps its last answer in a local instead of reading
  `detail.current`, a self-reference that typed the resource `any`.
- `list_projects`' comment, including its authorization contract, is back on the
  handler rather than on the predicate inserted above it.
- `listHubProjects` documents the 400 an instance with the hub disabled returns.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012fRjnaHLwjpHN84gNNxah9

* feat(frontend): keep the operator onboarding tour

Operators cannot create anything, so the home page is the whole product to
them and its three tabs are worth naming. The tour that did that is the one
piece of the removed tutorial system that still has an audience.

Restored trimmed: driver.js, the driver wrapper and its controls, the
`.driver-popover` styling, and a module for the progress bit. The catalogue
machinery it used to sit in — the config, the role gating, the router, the
banner and the tutorials page — stays deleted, so the five steps are reached
directly instead of through a registry of one.

It runs on an operator's first home page visit and is recorded as seen
however it ends, including navigating away; afterwards it is in the sidebar
menu under Take the tour, which is where the last step points. Progress uses
the surviving `tutorial_progress` route, slot 6, read-modify-written so the
slots of the removed tutorials keep their state.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JirHCYVR6qg7Xqe4PcZ1KG

* fix(frontend): dim the home toolbar only where the placeholder replaces it

Standing the toolbar down depends on something else offering a way onwards.
An operator in a workspace that is simply empty gets no placeholder — they
cannot create, and there is nothing archived to reach — so the search and the
kind toggles were the only controls on the page, dimmed to 40% and `inert`.

They now follow the placeholder rather than emptiness, which also stops the
operator tour spending three of its five steps highlighting controls this
page had greyed out.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JirHCYVR6qg7Xqe4PcZ1KG

* docs(frontend): put the inline-link rationale on the first link, not the third

The caption's three links share one reason for being bare `<button>`s, and it
was written on the last of them. A reader — or a reviewer — meets the archived
one first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JirHCYVR6qg7Xqe4PcZ1KG

* fix(frontend): keep private hub project names out of telemetry

An instance pointed at its own hub imports its own projects, and the slug
naming one is the customer's content — `template_import` was recording it
verbatim, which the disclosure ("the name of any public hub project") does
not cover and `hub_script` already avoids by collapsing a private script to
`private`.

`hubProjectUsageKey` gives projects the same treatment, deciding by the
configured hub's host so a port, a scheme's case or a trailing slash cannot
turn a private hub into a public one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JirHCYVR6qg7Xqe4PcZ1KG

* fix(frontend): treat an unread hub setting as private, not as the public hub

`hubBaseUrlStore` is seeded with the public hub and written in one place, by a
loader with no catch and no retry. A settings read that threw therefore left
the store naming hub.windmill.dev for the rest of the session, and the import
counter read that as permission to report a private instance's project slug —
the leak the previous commit closed, narrowed to "after one failed read".

The fact has three states and the store held two, so `hubBaseUrlKnown` carries
the third: the loader sets it only once the value is the instance's own, and
the telemetry key requires it. Links keep rendering the default meanwhile,
which is what they always did.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JirHCYVR6qg7Xqe4PcZ1KG

* fix(frontend): tag each hub detail with the slug that asked for it

`resource()` assigns whatever its fetcher returns, with no guard for a run that
has been superseded, so handing back the previously fetched project on a stale
response published that project. With two slow requests in flight — pick A,
leave B loading, pick C — B's answer put A's name, author and counts on the
card while the plan underneath still said C, and Import wrote C.

Each answer now carries its own slug and is read only while that slug is the
chosen one, which also drops the local the previous shape needed to keep the
resource's type from going circular.

The hub-telemetry tests reset their shared fixture per case; the private-hub
one had been passing on what the case above it left behind.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JirHCYVR6qg7Xqe4PcZ1KG

* fix(frontend): stop the template picker spinning on a hub with no projects

Opening the picker against a reachable hub that has published nothing pinned
the renderer at full CPU and froze the tab. The effect arming the list called
`setLoader` and `loadData`, which read `InfiniteList`'s reactive state as well
as writing it, so the effect depended on what its own load changed and re-ran
itself; a list that stays empty never settles that cycle. It now arms the
loader once per workspace, untracked, and leaves the load to `setLoader`.

The same empty list also claimed the hub was unreachable, since one `empty`
snippet serves both. The loader records which happened, so a hub with nothing
on it says so.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JirHCYVR6qg7Xqe4PcZ1KG

* fix(frontend): keep a superseded hub answer from erasing the chosen project

`resource()` publishes whatever its fetcher returns, superseded or not, and
`fetchHubProject` takes no abort signal — so an answer for a project the user
had moved on from replaced the published value, the slug guard rejected it,
and the chosen project's item counts went off the card for good with nothing
left to ask for them again.

The fetch now records its own answer, tagged with its slug and only while that
slug is still the chosen one, and the card reads that. Nothing reads the
resource, so it is a `watch` — the same machinery without the value that was
the problem.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JirHCYVR6qg7Xqe4PcZ1KG

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 81edd1382d951265ab3e9b67fc7ca7967676fd56

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #775 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 21ace847ec1c1406bafc50153004e1874642bf6c

New ee-repo-ref: 81edd1382d951265ab3e9b67fc7ca7967676fd56

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-09 10:22:06 +02:00
130a2f7408 feat: instrument sandbox isolation, data tables and in-flow script edits (#10981)
* feat: instrument sandbox isolation, data tables and in-flow script edits

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GLnp4v49BozkDd3KeWn5Q3

* fix: address review findings on the new telemetry counters

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GLnp4v49BozkDd3KeWn5Q3

* refactor: inline single-site telemetry helpers and trim what is collected

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GLnp4v49BozkDd3KeWn5Q3

* docs: tighten the telemetry disclosure copy

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GLnp4v49BozkDd3KeWn5Q3

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 5921c03c8e28642efd1c390f590c0dab9834fa99

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #780 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 548b5e0421a04a2d9a76cce6efc6c91b1d8560ee

New ee-repo-ref: 5921c03c8e28642efd1c390f590c0dab9834fa99

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
2026-09-05 10:38:20 +00:00
fce635d3c4 feat: guest app execution mode, a role that takes no seat (#10929)
* feat: guest app execution mode, a fourth role that takes no seat

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: make the guest grant a server-minted label, not a declarable scope

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* chore: pin ee-repo-ref to the guest session companion branch

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: close the relabel hole, guest embed tokens, read-path switch, custom-path entry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: guest tokens are not rescopable and guest embed tokens keep the sentinel

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: guest-derived tokens share one constraint set; gate sign-in on guest discovery

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: the label alone governs a guest; refuse guests with accounts; unserialize discovery

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: guest discovery fails closed; SAML aborts if the guest cookie write fails

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* refactor: enforce the guest switch once at the auth door; sign-in for a guest of another app

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: guest app-mode decided once at the on-behalf resolver; clear a stale guest session before offering another app's sign-in

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: a guest may use anonymous apps; await the stale-session logout; trim comments

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: a guest's path confinement waits for the app's mode, so anonymous apps stay open to it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: guest target survives http (Lax cookie), rides SAML RelayState; tell account holders on arrival

* fix: a guest uses an anonymous app as itself; S3 uploads confined by app mode

* fix: a guest upload needs an app policy; a missing app does not skip the confinement

* fix: guests are gated on the Enterprise plan server-side; pin ee-repo-ref

* fix: the guest plan gate fails closed on non-enterprise builds; settings report the effective switch

* fix: guest controls read the plan, not the key; gate the guest tests on the features they need

* docs: tighten the guest session invariant comments

* feat: 100 free guests per 30 days, then a quarter seat each on Enterprise and a hard cap elsewhere; superadmin guest list; refusals reach the page

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: the cap is exact, an account ends a guest session at the door, popups close, and guest mode survives the CLI round trip

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* feat: a superadmin switch over guests for the whole instance; the pre-existing-user flag keeps its meaning

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: drop the dead guest-access helper, name the instance setting once, guests tab states, CE save order

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: a guest app path is refused at the mint if it could widen the scope; the instance toggle waits for its reload

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: guests stop at the launched-by-me job grant; canonical app paths at the mint and discovery; the toggle ends on the stored value

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: only the scope grammar's own characters bar an app path from guests, refused at deploy as well as at the mint

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: the deploy-time guest path guard checks the destination of a rename and refuses a leading slash

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: a workspace rename keeps the guest switch; the rename guard reads the deployed mode under the row lock

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* fix: guest_activity follows a workspace rename and goes with a workspace delete

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* chore: pin ee-repo-ref to the state-bound guest target

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* chore: pin ee-repo-ref; the guest cookie is never cleared by a callback

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* docs: the workspace-scoped guest_activity delete moves an instance-wide count; assert the mint records the guest

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* test: the seeded allowance is a day old, so only the mint can write today's guest_activity row

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 1a10132e4f3cb442c7d0c2cf6e5d92d150bf6e07

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #769 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 32841072aa396bff91d30bd91854fa348cb3c439

New ee-repo-ref: 1a10132e4f3cb442c7d0c2cf6e5d92d150bf6e07

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-04 22:47:28 +02:00
79426a1a68 feat: reconcile IdP instance groups from the SSO groups claim (#10957)
* feat: add sso_groups_claim setting for login-time instance group sync

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YESxWqzt959S6TY6vbc4eG

* chore: bump ee-repo-ref for the SSO groups claim reconcile

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YESxWqzt959S6TY6vbc4eG

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 3b89bfc11314a326a191101cfe3ef65f6f7f82a8

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #774 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: e388527f9adbbe466fe050ca8d1d236ce3342bc3

New ee-repo-ref: 3b89bfc11314a326a191101cfe3ef65f6f7f82a8

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-03 22:23:43 +02:00
Ruben Fiszelandwindmill-internal-app[bot] cfcfe298dd feat(ai-chat): make reusable skills ai_skill resources you select per workspace (#10914)
* feat(ai-chat): make reusable skills ai_skill resources you select per workspace

* chore: pin the ee ref to the skill telemetry counters

* fix: address review findings on skill authoring, import and migration

* fix: enforce skill selection in read_skill and stop imports clobbering resources

* feat: carry format_extension from the hub into synced resource types

* fix: let an edit set or clear a resource type's format_extension

* fix: regenerate the sqlx cache and close the review round findings

* fix: close the round-2 findings on folder ACLs, cached sync and truncation

* refactor: make the skills migration non-destructive and use design-system inputs

* fix: close the round-4 findings on folder owners, startup sync and truncation

* fix: clear obsolete extensions, guard folder owners, and report skipped skills

* fix: honor explicit-null extensions and report same-type migration conflicts

* fix: scope skill actions to the committed workspace and paginate the listing

* fix: keep the drawer scoped to the live workspace and surface truncation

* fix: discard a skills refresh for a workspace the chat has left

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 6efe7a73c745c2e1377a34498523c00d89010a3d

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #764 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 55998c142bc72edd08532748af1974b16035658d

New ee-repo-ref: 6efe7a73c745c2e1377a34498523c00d89010a3d

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-01 12:51:27 +00:00
815de49e23 feat: make the service log retention period an instance setting (#10889)
* feat: make the service log retention period an instance setting

Service log retention was a hardcoded 14 days with no override, unlike job retention. It
becomes the `service_log_retention_secs` global setting (env `SERVICE_LOG_RETENTION_SECS`,
default unchanged at 14 days), reloaded on change like the other retention settings.

The constant becomes `DEFAULT_SERVICE_LOG_RETENTION_SECS` and every reader goes through
`service_log_retention_secs()`, so the `log_file` sweep, the object-storage orphan scan, the
columnar store's compaction and pruning, the retrieval clamp and the search index's trim
window all follow the configured value.

Loaded outside `initial_load`'s `server_mode` guard: a dedicated indexer trims the search
index to a window derived from this value and is not a server.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN

* fix: never let a non-positive service log retention expire every log

Every service log cutoff is `now - retention`, so a `0` or negative window puts the cutoff
at or after `now` and the next sweep reads the whole history as expired — deleting the
`log_file` rows and their object-storage files irreversibly.

`0` is reachable two ways now that the window is configurable: it is what an operator types
by analogy with the job retention period sitting directly above it, where `0` does mean keep
forever; and `SecondsInput` writes a `0` into a field that was merely focused, so saving the
Jobs panel is enough. Service logs always have a window, so clamp an unusable value back to
the default in the accessor every reader already goes through. The upper bound is where
`chrono::Duration::seconds` panics, which would abort the sweep that reads it.

The settings field rejects a non-positive value rather than silently correcting it, and its
description now names the database rows too — they are swept on every instance, including
one with no object storage configured.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN

* fix: address review findings on the service log retention setting

- Bound the monitor's `log_file` sweep. Every process rotates a log file a minute, so lowering
  the retention can make one ordinary setting change expire millions of rows; the unbounded
  `DELETE ... RETURNING` materialized all of them, and their deletion futures, in a single
  tick. Batched like the settings-page cleanup on the same table.
- Make the retention atomic private and give it one writer, so a value that would expire every
  service log cannot reach a cutoff by any path, and say so in the log when one is rejected
  rather than falling back silently.
- Cap the retention at a century. The previous ceiling only bounded `TimeDelta` construction,
  while consumers compute `now - retention`, which panics past year 262143, and build a
  Postgres interval that overflows well before the old cap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN

* fix: cap an oversized service log retention instead of shortening it

The two unusable directions were landing on the same fallback, so configuring a retention
above the ceiling silently produced 14 days — deleting logs the operator had asked to keep
for longer. Too large now caps at the maximum, which preserves that intent; only a
non-positive value, which would expire everything and has no upward reading, falls back to
the default.

Also bound the `log_file` drain to ten batches per pass: `monitor_db` runs under a 600s
timeout that cancels every maintenance future in the same `join!` and reports a critical
error, so a backlog large enough to need batching has to drain across ticks, the way the
neighbouring sweeps already do. The settings field carries the upper bound too, and the
superseded query's offline entry is dropped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN

* fix: route the new log-file registration cutoff through the retention accessor

`send_log_files_to_object_store` arrived on main while this branch was open and reads the
retention directly. The atomic behind it is private now, so it goes through the accessor like
every other consumer — which also means the cutoff it uses to skip registering already-expired
files follows the configured retention rather than a fixed two weeks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN

* fix: say why every mode loads the service log retention setting

A worker registers its rotated log files against the retention cutoff, so the comment naming
only the indexer no longer covers why the setting sits outside the `server_mode` guard.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN

* fix: file service log retention under Monitoring, not Jobs

Service logs are the Windmill processes' own logs — every process rotates and registers its
own, no job involved — so the Jobs panel was grouping by the shape of the widget rather than
by the subject. It sits under Monitoring now, beside the Indexer panel that holds the other
service-log window.

Its own section rather than inside that panel: the panel is badged EE, while this governs the
database sweep that runs on every instance.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a6e3533b26195918a17fea58646f71d2bbcde288

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #752 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 1d93da24bd166b9a5a5cc204034a1d35ffc88474

New ee-repo-ref: a6e3533b26195918a17fea58646f71d2bbcde288

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* feat: say on the service logs page where the logs actually are

The retention number alone does not tell an operator what it governs, and the answer differs
by instance. Two states are worth calling out because they are the ones where retention does
not mean what it looks like:

Without instance object storage, each process keeps its files on its own disk. The page lists
what every host wrote, since the rows are in the shared database, but can only open the files
of the replica serving the request, and a host's files go with it when it is replaced.

With object storage but "Delete logs from s3 periodically" off — the backend default, since
uploads are gated on a store existing while deletions are gated on that toggle — expiring a
log removes the row and the local file and leaves the uploaded copy behind for good.

The retention field itself now names every copy it covers and says that full-text search
reaches back at most that far, and less when the indexer's own window is shorter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN

* fix: describe raw log files as the transient copy they became

Retiring the raw files landed while this was being written: the indexer now deletes each one
as soon as it is ingested, and the log viewer rebuilds a file from the columnar store once the
raw copy is gone. So the durable copy is the store, and warning that an uploaded file is kept
forever when periodic s3 deletion is off only holds where no indexer runs to ingest it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN

* chore: point ee-repo-ref at the EE compile fix

EE main does not build on its own: extracting the index-window expression and adding a fourth
copy of it landed in separate PRs that never conflicted textually. windmill-ee-private#756 is
the one-line fix; this pins it so CI has a tree that compiles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-29 19:39:14 +02:00
0bbd559ac8 feat: instrument AI fill/fix, evals, agents and the debugger (#10853)
* feat: track AI fill, AI fix, evals, reusable agents and debugger usage

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: pin ee ref to the feature_usage registry commit

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to c3b6f62ea579a3583d4b474e9885c77104cfc87e

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #745 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 77992910929188a854eadc06ee45971877b6f954

New ee-repo-ref: c3b6f62ea579a3583d4b474e9885c77104cfc87e

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
2026-08-28 16:31:13 +02:00
e866b68cdf feat: surface execution usage in the sidebar and explain what an execution is (#10760)
* feat: surface execution usage in the sidebar and explain what an execution is

Users read "executions" as a job count and are surprised by the real number,
which meters a second of compute. Every place the UI prints an execution count
now says so, and the sidebar carries a usage meter for the quota that will bind
first.

Adds SidebarUsage at the bottom of both sidebar surfaces: a ring in the
collapsed rail, a labelled bar when expanded, and a modal breaking down every
quota. On the free tier it meters the per-user and per-workspace 1000-execution
caps; on a paid plan it meters workspace usage against the executions the
workspace's seats already include.

Item.tooltip was inert on disabled dropdown rows: DropdownSubmenuItem rendered
the info icon inside the disabled button, which swallows hover, and the row's
own title attribute shadowed any wrapper title. Both renderers now fall back to
a wrapper title the way DropdownV2Inner already intended.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the usage meter tied to the workspace it describes

isPremiumStore held the previous workspace's tier across a switch, which no
consumer noticed while it only gated affordances — the usage meter is the first
surface to render a number from it, and would have shown a paid seat quota for a
free workspace. It is now undefined until the active workspace's tier is known,
and a superseded response no longer writes.

The seat fetch had the same shape: a slow response for the workspace we left
overwrote the current count and stayed wrong until the next switch.

The usage wrapper also carried the padding the brand-mark row used to own, which
shifted the sidebar bottom by 4px on every instance where the meter renders
nothing. The component owns its own padding instead.

Names the collapsed ring for assistive tech, which otherwise saw an unlabelled
button whose only signal was the arc's color.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: scope the usage meter to the billing workspace and a known tier

A fork's usage, tier and bill all resolve to its billing root, but its member
list is deliberately a subset of the root's, so counting fork members metered
root usage against a fork-sized cap and invented billed-seat overages. Seats now
come from the billing root, and the paid meter stays hidden when that root is
not visible from the fork.

The tier was cleared only after the user-store round-trip, so the meter rendered
the previous workspace's tier for the length of it — a free→paid switch showed
the 1000-execution hard cap on a paid workspace, not a race but every time. The
clear now happens before the first await.

Workspace usage had neither guard: a superseded response overwrote the store
permanently, and the meter is the first surface to print that number as its
headline rather than bury it in a dropdown.

The free-tier counters keyed off `!$isPremiumStore`, which reads an unknown tier
as free and flashed the free-tier blocks during a paid-to-paid switch. They wait
for a known tier instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: never render an unresolved execution count as zero

The workspace-usage clear wrote 0, which is a real usage value: an in-flight or
failed fetch rendered as a green "0/1,000" bar, and a rejection left it there for
the session because loadUsage had no failure path. Usage is now undefined until
it resolves, each endpoint is assigned on its own so one failing leaves the
other's number intact, and a quota is listed only once its own usage, tier and
cap are known. The legacy counters show an em dash rather than a fabricated 0.

The fork gates read an unknown tier as not-premium, so clearing the tier on
switch made the fork entry point disappear for the length of the fetch on a
paid-to-paid switch. They hold while the tier is unknown.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read the usage endpoints as numbers, and fall back to the free tier

Both usage endpoints serve text/plain, so the client hands back a string despite
the generated `number` type. Interpolation and arithmetic coerced it, which is
why nothing noticed before, but `toLocaleString` on a string returns it
unchanged — a five-figure count rendered without its thousands separator against
a formatted cap.

A failed tier fetch left the tier unknown for the session, and consumers hold
premium-only affordances through the unknown window so a free workspace kept
offering them. It falls back to the free tier instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep an unknown tier unknown, and refresh the seat cap on demand

Falling back to the free tier on a failed tier fetch fixed the affordance gates
by lying to the meter: a paid workspace's real five-figure usage rendered
against the 1000 hard cap, red, under "jobs stop running for the rest of the
month". The tier stays unknown instead, and the two consumers get what each
needs — the meter hides, while affordances read `maybePremium`, which holds
through the pending window but fails closed once the fetch has failed.

Membership changes elsewhere don't reach this component, so the seat cap could
show an overage against a cap that had since grown. It re-resolves when the
modal opens, which is when the number is read rather than glanced at.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: let anything showing executions re-read them

The counters were written in one place, the root layout, on a workspace change
only — so a tab left open all day showed the count from whenever the workspace
was opened, and the modal-open refresh could only reach the seat cap, leaving a
freshly computed denominator over a stale numerator.

Moves the fetch to lib/usage.ts, next to the stores it writes, so the meter can
refresh both numbers when its modal opens. Seats follow a membership signal that
WorkspaceUserSettings bumps where it already refetches after every mutation, so
the cap stops lagging a role change without either side owning the other.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: order concurrent usage and seat refreshes

The workspace id doesn't order two requests for the same workspace, and both
refreshes can now have two in flight: usage through A→B→A or a modal-open
refresh landing on one already running, seats through a membership bump
arriving mid-request. An older response could win and restore the count it
replaced. Each refresh takes a generation and only writes if it is still the
newest.

The membership signal also fired on a plain read, so opening the users tab made
every consumer re-fetch a list identical to the one it held. It bumps on an
observed change to the member set instead, never on the first read.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: count only billable seats, and order the tier requests

The cap counted every member row, while the backend bills
`NOT disabled AND NOT is_service_account` — a workspace with service accounts
got an inflated included quota, which hides a real overage rather than inventing
one. The seat basis matches `count_paid_seats` now, and the membership signature
carries both fields so enabling or disabling a member re-resolves the cap.

The tier fetch was the one refresh still ordered by workspace id alone, so a
late failure for a workspace could raise the failure flag over a tier a newer
request had already resolved. It takes a generation like the other two.

The membership signature is keyed by workspace: this page survives a workspace
switch, and comparing one workspace's members against another's reported a
membership change where only the workspace had changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: compare the member set only against the same workspace's

Qualifying the signature with the workspace put the workspace inside the value
being compared, so a switch made every comparison unequal and bumped the version
unconditionally — the opposite of the intent, and worse than before the key. The
workspace is the key now, not part of the payload: a different one has nothing
to compare against and re-baselines silently.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: hold the usage and tier fetches in resources

Every one of these values belongs to a workspace but lived in a bare store, so
each writer and reader re-derived "does this still describe what I'm rendering?"
by hand. Nine sites did, and the ones that forgot were most of this branch's
review findings: three stale-workspace overwrites, three A→B→A races, and two
placeholders (`0` executions, `false` tier) that read as real data because an
in-band value was standing in for "not known".

`resource` from runed — which frontend/AGENTS.md prescribes for async data, and
which ~80 files here already use — supplies all three properties as behaviour
rather than convention: a superseded fetch is discarded, the value resets when
its key changes, and loading and error are states instead of magic values. The
seat count keys on the billing root and the membership version, so both a
workspace switch and an added member re-resolve it.

That removes three generation counters, two workspace trackers, and the manual
clear-and-compare around each fetch. What remains is one publish site that
asserts the value still carries the active workspace before it reaches a store.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: order the resource responses that runed does not

The refactor claimed `resource` discards a superseded fetch. It does not: its
only ordering is an AbortController whose signal the generated client cannot
consume, and `current = result` runs unconditionally once a fetch resolves. So a
late answer for a workspace we had left still landed in `current`, and the
publish site — which trusted `current` — cleared the value on screen for the
workspace we were on. That reinstated the races the generation counters had
covered.

`loading` was standing in for the missing ordering, and it cannot: it is also
true during a `refetch()`, when `current` is still the right value. Gating on it
meant every re-read blanked the meter, and clicking it unmounted the modal that
same click had opened, since both sit behind the quota it had just cleared.

Values now carry the scope they describe and `scopedValue` keeps the newest one
matching the active scope, so a superseded answer neither publishes nor erases,
and a re-read leaves the display alone. The account-wide user counter keys on
the account, so a workspace switch no longer clears it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: order responses within a scope, not just across scopes

The tag carried what a value described but not when it was asked for, so two
fetches for one scope — a refetch landing on an in-flight load, or a second
membership invalidation — were indistinguishable and the older won if it landed
last. That left the seat cap reading the pre-change number until the next bump
or switch, which is the stale cap the generation counters had covered.

Widening the tag to the resource key would have fixed it by blanking the bar on
every membership change, so the issue order travels alongside the scope instead:
`tagged` stamps each request as it is issued, and only a strictly newer answer
for the current scope replaces the held one.

The unit tests now cover the same-key case they missed; both new ones fail
against the key-only guard.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: ignore a user list a newer read has overtaken

`lastSeen` was written unconditionally after the await, so a response for a
workspace already left overwrote the baseline for the workspace on screen. The
next real membership change there then compared against a baseline that was
never taken for it, re-baselined silently, and never bumped
`workspaceMembershipVersion` — leaving the sidebar on the old seat cap. The
`users` assignment had the same hole: an overtaken list could paint over a
newer one.

Both now go through a single check: a read whose issue order is behind the last
applied one is dropped before it touches either.

Also trims the two `scopedValue` docstrings and the membership rationale to the
four lines AGENTS.md allows, and records there that a failed refresh keeps the
last successful value rather than blanking.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: do not claim a plan before the tier resolves

Widening `isPremiumStore` to `boolean | undefined` left `UserMenu`'s `{:else}`
catching the unresolved state: with the tier still in flight, or after the
request failed, a free workspace was told it was on the "Premium plan". Both
branches under that block assert a plan, so the block now renders only once the
tier is known — which also keeps the bordered divider from appearing empty
while it resolves.

Verified against the running instance with the tier stubbed slow: unresolved
shows neither branch, `false` shows the free counters, `true` shows "Premium
plan". Reverting the guard reproduces the wrong label at 300ms.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin how a late answer orders against the read that replaced it

Returning to a scope whose earlier read is still in flight is the one case the
guard resolves by scope rather than by sequence, and the suite only covered it
with nothing outstanding. It now covers the late answer itself: it stands while
it is the only value describing the scope, the read issued on returning
supersedes it, and it cannot come back afterwards.

Also gives the meter the explicit `type="button"` the sibling sidebar rows use.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: size the modal's plan button with unifiedSize

`size` is deprecated on `Button`. `unifiedSize="sm"` renders the plan button at
the same height and weight as the modal's own Close button.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: match the plan button to the modal's own action button

`unifiedSize="sm"` is `h-7`, and the Cancel button `Modal` renders beside it is
`px-3 py-[7px]`, i.e. 32px — so the two sat 4px apart. `md` is the unified size
that lands on 32px, which pairs them without putting a deprecated prop back.

Measured both boxes rather than the new one alone: 32px and 32px, same top.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: instrument the execution meter, and bill-align PremiumInfo's seats

The meter's only interaction is opening the modal, so that is what it counts:
`usage_meter/opened`, keyed by the plan tier and the quota that was tightest —
`free:user`, `free:workspace`, `paid:workspace`. The full set is a type next to
the call site so the vocabulary stays readable in one place.

The pair is registered in `FEATURE_USAGE_KINDS` (windmill-ee-private), without
which the post is dropped with a 204 and records nothing. Verified both halves:
the browser posts
`{"feature":"usage_meter","kind":"opened","key":"free:user","value":1}`, the
running EE image drops it because its registry predates the entry, and
`is_recordable_event` accepts it once the entry is there.

`PremiumInfo` computed its seats from an unfiltered user list, so the billing
page counted disabled members and service accounts that `count_paid_seats` does
not bill. Same filter as the sidebar's cap now.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: point ee-repo-ref at the usage_meter registration

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read the member list before the seat rows that depend on it

`loadPremiumInfo` reads `users` after its own await and nothing recomputes the
seat rows when the list lands, so whenever `premium_info` won the race the page
rendered zero developers, zero operators and zero seats and kept them. The list
is now fetched first, and a failure to read it no longer costs the rest of the
page.

Also refreshes the registered-action inventory in `docs/feature-telemetry.md`,
which the new pair makes 21 across nine features.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: scope the seat comment to the counter it matches

The comment claimed parity with the seats actually charged, which nothing in
this repo computes: `count_paid_seats` documents itself as counting provisioned
members rather than billing's active-user population, and the Stripe quantity
is not derived here. What the filter buys is agreement with that counter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to c6902ec2c51dc0ce30962afbfab3e456c5d9b831

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #735 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: bbc48fae6b73b6d72fe2e125e6003794a4ece167

New ee-repo-ref: c6902ec2c51dc0ce30962afbfab3e456c5d9b831

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
2026-08-20 22:17:15 +02:00
53eb94659b feat(telemetry): extend feature-usage tracking beyond AI features (#10681)
* feat(telemetry): extend feature-usage tracking to long-tail features

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: describe telemetry as product feature usage rather than AI usage

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(telemetry): trim disclosure copy and drop unused pick origin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(telemetry): count trigger fires per run and key hub picks from hub data

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(telemetry): slugify hub keys and order both writers' upserts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(telemetry): key native trigger adoption by service so it matches fires

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref for native trigger adoption fix

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(telemetry): move feature-usage collection into the ee crate

* docs: point feature-telemetry at the moved registry and rust writer

* docs: correct the trigger-fire gate comment to match measured step counts

* docs: put the private-build caveat on the verification step

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to f079db9e7962a413b349c4ff8036080894f30771

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #725 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 055adb80416f9339c9a28ae7fbaeadad30d74959

New ee-repo-ref: f079db9e7962a413b349c4ff8036080894f30771

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-14 18:50:38 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5 ef99a739dd fix(github-app): complete the self-managed setup instructions, render the page header (#10683)
* docs(github-app): state the pull-direction permissions and the App owner field

The in-product "How to create a GitHub App" panel only listed Contents and
Metadata, which covers the push direction of git sync. Webhooks, pull requests
and checks are what the git to Windmill direction needs, and a GHE Cloud
(*.ghe.com) app also needs App owner, whose field hint was the only place
saying so.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(instance-settings): render the GitHub App page header

The branch tested the pre-rename category name, so the page rendered with no
header at all. Naming the header after the category duplicates the card
below it, so the card that holds the app credentials is now labelled for what
it is, next to the webhook base url card.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 11:03:42 +00:00
318c9f0073 feat(git-sync): dedicated base url for GitHub webhook delivery (#10411)
* feat(git-sync): let GitHub webhooks register a dedicated base url

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(git-sync): validate the webhook base url and apply it on change

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: pin ee ref for the git-sync webhook base url change

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(git-sync): validate and reconcile the webhook base url on every write path

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(git-sync): route every declarative settings writer through the same rules

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(git-sync): let the reconciler own the webhook field write-back

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(git-sync): make the webhook base url validators agree across UI and server

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(git-sync): lock the workspace row across git_sync read-modify-writes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the webhook base url validator to its server counterpart

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(git-sync): retry a failed webhook move on every re-apply of the setting

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(git-sync): retry pending webhook moves on every declarative re-apply

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(git-sync): reject non-string webhook base urls and bound the sweep

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(git-sync): reject credential-bearing webhook base urls

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(git-sync): keep credentials out of webhook base url validation errors

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(git-sync): redact through the last authority @ when reporting a bad url

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(git-sync): stop echoing unparsed webhook base urls instead of scrubbing them

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(git-sync): never echo a submitted webhook base url in validation errors

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(git-sync): keep the submitted scheme out of validation errors

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(git-sync): drop the webhook sweep, surface stale receivers in settings

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(git-sync): refresh the stale webhook list when settings are saved

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(git-sync): mark registered_url nullable and drop the duplicated field error

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: pin ee ref after dropping the reconcile lock and CAS

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(git-sync): refresh the stale webhook list on category saves too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to aa05ca8e97fc8265cd724753a80db37f83243254

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #695 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 3e6cd9226b68707233ae2434511fe5131dce808b

New ee-repo-ref: aa05ca8e97fc8265cd724753a80db37f83243254

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-30 23:27:12 +02:00
11fda89b52 feat(telemetry): generic feature-usage telemetry with AI session metrics (#10200)
* feat(telemetry): add generic feature_usage table and batched logging endpoint

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(telemetry): log AI session usage events and document them in telemetry settings

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(telemetry): use escape sequence instead of literal NUL bytes in buffer key

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(telemetry): validate dimensions, decouple retention, keepalive flush

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(telemetry): allowlist feature-usage dimensions and index retention scans

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(telemetry): pin tool-name allowlist and deploy session attribution

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(telemetry): route AI chat usage through feature_usage and drop ai_chat_usage

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(telemetry): slim dimension validation to registered kinds plus key shape

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(telemetry): backfill ai_chat_usage into feature_usage before dropping it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(telemetry): disclose provider and model identifiers in telemetry settings text

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(telemetry): issue all flush chunks before awaiting so pagehide keeps them

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 6306c072a50937ea9af44a5bcf42345543207486

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #672 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 964f242a0eb44db7f7d26636cc8d76aeabea2b73

New ee-repo-ref: 6306c072a50937ea9af44a5bcf42345543207486

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
2026-07-20 20:56:57 +02:00
9793d01575 feat: add resource and infrastructure telemetry (#9737)
* feat(telemetry): disclose resource and infra usage stats

When minimal telemetry is disabled, the stats payload now includes resource
counts (workspaces, scripts per language, flows, workflows as code, low-code
and raw apps) and, on EE only, infrastructure info (container runtime,
database size, max connections, RDS detection).

Update the telemetry disclosure in instance settings accordingly: resource
counts are listed for both CE and EE; infra info is shown only on EE since it
is collected only there. Bump the EE ref and add the sqlx cache for the new
queries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(telemetry): expand EE infra disclosure and add sysinfo dep

Disclose the expanded EE infrastructure telemetry (deployment mode, host
OS/arch/CPU/memory, filesystem space, Postgres version and connection counts,
object storage backend, sandboxing and retention settings) in instance
settings. Add sysinfo as a windmill-common dependency for host memory and
filesystem stats, bump the EE ref, and add the sqlx cache for the new queries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(telemetry): focus EE infra disclosure on wrapping platform

Drop the single-server host details (OS, arch, CPU, memory, filesystem) and
tuning config from the EE infra disclosure, and revert the sysinfo dependency
they required. Reflect managed-database-provider detection in place of the RDS
flag. Bump the EE ref and update the sqlx cache for the revised queries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(telemetry): drop deployment mode and worker count from disclosure

Remove deployment mode and worker count from the EE infra disclosure to match
the backend, and bump the EE ref. They reflect only the node sending telemetry,
not the deployment topology.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 6d3301507db50818f1683dac3941d3e0cf1152a7

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #627 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: d30e7d18d14992598a97356d0ed13f7d5d585115

New ee-repo-ref: 6d3301507db50818f1683dac3941d3e0cf1152a7

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
2026-06-23 20:53:12 +00:00
hugocasaandClaude Fable 5 d7e139b191 oauth: add netsuite provider + icon (#9538)
NetSuite is a per-instance OAuth provider (account-specific authorize/token
URLs), registered via connect_config_template. Its authorize endpoint
requires scope=rest_webservices, so the template mechanism gains an
optional scopes field copied into the built connect_config.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18 17:51:35 +02:00
e26a9239a6 feat: zero-setup oauth client credentials for registry providers (#9559)
* feat: zero-setup oauth client credentials for registry-declared providers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: support client-credentials-only custom oauth providers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add coupa client credentials provider to oauth registry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: clarify oauth resource connect auth-method selection

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: support shared instance-level oauth client credentials

Admins can designate an instance OAuth entry's credentials as client
credentials; the connect dialog then runs the exchange server-side with
them instead of asking each user for their own. Replaces the per-provider
"Support Client Credentials Flow" toggle with a grant-type selector.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to be9f23b2c06b8b6ee0cd3e4d9f16bcd9e90129fb

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #613 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 05643cbbc8c1bebf3509c691c5811b4057d96485

New ee-repo-ref: be9f23b2c06b8b6ee0cd3e4d9f16bcd9e90129fb

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* feat: allow both grant types on an instance oauth entry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: bring-your-own oauth credentials from the others section

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: segmented oauth grant-type selector, always show grant

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: enable client credentials for 5 more oauth providers

Verified against official docs: bitbucket, linkedin, spotify, xero and
zoho support the standard client_credentials grant with a plain
client_id + client_secret, compatible with Windmill's token exchange.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: hide create-manually link on the managed oauth connect path

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: enable client credentials for salesforce and servicenow

Salesforce CC requires the org's My Domain token endpoint (login.salesforce.com
is unsupported for that grant), so add an optional cc_token_url registry field
that the connect form prefills for the client-credentials path instead of the
shared token_url. ServiceNow uses the same instance host for both grants, so it
only needs its token URL and req_body_auth surfaced at the top level.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add instance-level client-credentials token url override

Some providers use a per-org/instance-specific token endpoint for the
client-credentials grant that differs from the authorization-code URL.
Add an optional cc_token_url on the instance OAuth entry, surfaced in
instance settings (prefilled from the registry template) when client
credentials is selected, and used for the CC exchange and refresh while
auth-code keeps its own token URL.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* style: remove redundant grant-type tags from oauth auth cards

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: extract reusable RadioCard component for the oauth auth chooser

A token-based selectable card (label, description, selected, onSelect,
optional icon) replacing the inline cards in the connect dialog.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: hide sign-in option on the bring-your-own oauth path

Picking a provider from "Others" means bring your own credentials, so
the auth-code "Sign in" card (which uses the instance client) no longer
shows there — it goes straight to the client-credentials form. The
two-flow chooser stays on the instance-configured path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: restrict client-credentials token url to caller-supplied creds

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: resolve client-credentials id and secret all-or-nothing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: host-pin client-credentials token url via instance-name input

For registry providers whose CC token URL is instance-templated (Coupa,
Salesforce My Domain, ServiceNow), the connect dialog and instance settings
collect an instance name and the backend substitutes it into the fixed-host
template, validating it as a hostname label. A free-form token URL is no longer
accepted for these providers, so the exchange host cannot be redirected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: client-credentials token url always comes from the registry

Bring-your-own CC is registry-only: the token URL is resolved server-side from
the built-in registry (host-pinned via an instance name for templated providers,
the fixed registry URL otherwise) and rejected for custom resource types. The
caller-supplied token URL field is removed from the connect dialog and the API.
Adds unit tests for the resolver.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address CC review - sandbox CC config and instance-templated providers

Resolve `_sandbox` provider keys to the parent registry entry in the instance
settings and connect-dialog helpers, so salesforce_sandbox (and future sandbox
entries) can enable client credentials. Use the effective CC token URL template
(cc_token_url or token_url) so the instance-name field works for Coupa/ServiceNow,
and hide that field when a connect_config_template already owns the instance input
(ServiceNow). Document the authorization contract on resolve_instance_cc_credentials.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: unify instance-templated oauth onto connect_config_template

Remove the separate cc_token_url and cc_instance config fields. An instance-
templated provider now declares one connect_config_template (auth_url optional
for client-credentials-only providers like Coupa); the CC flow reads its token
URL, label and strip_suffix to host-pin the exchange. Coupa and ServiceNow move
to connect_config_template; Coupa stays drawer-only (no auth_url -> excluded from
instance settings). Salesforce CC is removed for now (its auth-code/CC host split
needs the endpoint-profiles model).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: cc_scopes defaults and instance config for client credentials

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: store empty auth_url for cc-only templated oauth providers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address review nits - sandbox key lookup, template doc, deref specs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: default shared client-credentials connect to cc_scopes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: support bring-your-own client credentials for instance-configured providers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: move oauth grant-type help into per-option tooltips

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep instance-configured oauth providers selectable from Others

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: preserve admin-configured scopes for custom client-credentials providers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: use cc scopes on cc refresh and enforce cc grant for bring-your-own

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: require {instance} in leftmost host label for cc token url templates

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: drop token_url from unauthenticated get_connect response

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: fill byo templated resource args from the entered instance

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 136f4634aca61e74ccb045372358a1e3f6b23e75

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #616 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: b5083e266492e908456e39401778a9cdcea46e94

New ee-repo-ref: 136f4634aca61e74ccb045372358a1e3f6b23e75

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-17 16:32:01 +00:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 4.8 93a74f229a oauth: add ServiceNow + make per-instance OAuth providers registry-driven (#9449)
* oauth: add ServiceNow provider; make per-instance OAuth registry-driven

ServiceNow's OAuth endpoints are per-instance
(https://<instance>.service-now.com/oauth_auth.do + /oauth_token.do), like
Snowflake's. Rather than add another bespoke special-case, generalize:
a registry entry may carry a `connect_config_template` (label/placeholder/
help_url + {instance}-templated auth_url/token_url + req_body_auth +
optional extra_params_key/strip_suffix). The instance-settings UI renders
one generic instance-name input for any such provider and substitutes
{instance} to build the per-client connect_config — a new per-instance
provider needs only a JSON entry, no frontend code.

- oauth_connect.json: servicenow + snowflake_oauth now carry a
  connect_config_template (snowflake keeps its account_identifier
  extra_params key for backward compatibility).
- windmill-oauth: add the ConnectConfigTemplate struct (frontend-only
  metadata; the backend's existing connect_config override resolves the
  concrete URLs generically — no other backend change).
- AuthSettings/InstanceSettings: replace the Snowflake + ServiceNow
  special-cases with one registry-driven path (instanceInputs map,
  setupTemplatedOauthUrls, loadInstanceInputs); per-instance providers are
  derived from the registry for the builtins list + dropdown.

Pairs with windmill-integrations#139 (ServiceNow hub integration).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: point ee-repo-ref at servicenow-oauth EE branch (revert at merge)

Temporary CI pointer so check_ee_full / cargo_test build against the EE
slack-literal fix (windmill-ee-private#602). Revert to a pinned SHA once
that EE PR is merged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-04 18:58:47 +00:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 4.7 3c3c03455d fix: OAuth popup login reliability + auto-login Safari edge cases (#8971)
- Login.svelte: poll whoami after popup opens as a safety net for Safari
  ITP — when the popup is opened without a fresh user gesture, cookies
  and localStorage can be partitioned, leaving the existing postMessage
  / storage signaling unable to reach the parent. Polling is independent
  of partitioning since it runs in the parent's own session. An
  oauthFlowDone flag guards the three terminal paths (postMessage,
  storage, poll) so onLoginSuccess fires exactly once. Adds compact
  "oauth: signaled via {postMessage|storage|poll}" diagnostic logs.
- routes/user/login_callback/[client_name]/+page.svelte: replace `??`
  with `||` on the cookie/localStorage fallback. The cookie check
  returns a boolean, so `??` never fell through and the localStorage
  branch was dead code.
- InstanceSettings.svelte: per-category save/discard for the
  Auth/OAuth/SAML tab now sees auto_login_provider and
  disable_password_login. getSettingsForCategory was returning only
  scimSamlSetting for that tab, leaving the dirty check and per-category
  save unable to detect changes to those fields.
- vite.config.js: drop a stale personal dev hostname from allowedHosts.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-30 12:20:12 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.7 e8f7589d7a fix: delete instance settings cleared via bulk endpoint (#8949)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-27 12:55:12 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6 4fff89f98c fix: hide legacy global_settings.worker_configs ghost row (#8790)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-10 06:00:03 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6 506b7f55e1 fix: zero-downtime coordinated restarts for OTEL and other setting changes (#8768)
* fix: zero-downtime coordinated restarts for OTEL and other setting changes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: use background_task_state for server heartbeats and fix stale heartbeat detection

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: show restart propagation toast when saving settings that trigger server restarts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-08 20:35:27 +00:00
Ruben Fiszel 02d0ee9198 feat: add object storage usage view and manual log cleanup (#8724) 2026-04-05 13:10:48 +00:00
9ceab730d7 feat: add DB health diagnostic dashboard for superadmins (#8574)
* feat: add DB health diagnostic dashboard for superadmins

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Update SQLx metadata

* fix: improve db health query performance

Bound large_results scan to last N jobs (configurable via scan_limit
query param, default 10K) instead of full-table pg_column_size sort.
Replace N+1 datatable size queries with single batched pg_class lookup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Update SQLx metadata

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* sqlx

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
2026-03-28 09:32:10 +00:00
8c769aebbf improve analytics (#8418)
* [ee] improve analytics: add git sync & AI chat telemetry, HMAC-signed download

- Add ai_chat_usage table to track chat sessions (session_id, provider, model, mode, message_count)
- Add POST /w/{workspace}/workspaces/log_chat endpoint with upsert on session_id
- Frontend fires logAiChat on every sendRequest, using HistoryManager's existing chat ID
- EE stats: add git_sync_usage (sync vs promotion repo count) and ai_chat_usage (30-day aggregates)
- Replace RSA+AES-GCM encrypted telemetry download with plaintext JSON + HMAC-SHA256 signature
- Signature (12 hex chars) included in download filename for verification
- Update instance settings telemetry descriptions for both EE and CE

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: make StatsDownload struct pub to fix private-interfaces error

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 878cc2044717e0177228529a50433fe2768e70b5

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #464 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 33eb863b6b881bd54ed69a540e0c65d5fe125024

New ee-repo-ref: 878cc2044717e0177228529a50433fe2768e70b5

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-17 20:14:02 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6 73fe45b6cb feat: workspace-specific registry overrides (#8406)
* feat: add workspace-specific registry overrides

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: move workspace registries to end of registries tab

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: workspace overrides use field selector instead of showing all fields

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* style: polish workspace registries UI to match design guidelines

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: show field selector directly and fix addField initialization logic

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: namespace pip_resolution_cache by workspace when registry overrides exist

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: namespace binary/bundle caches by workspace when registry overrides exist

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: zero-cost cache suffix when no workspace overrides exist

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: reload workspace_registries via notify events on setting change

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address PR review findings

- Fix discardCategory not reverting workspace_registries changes
- Fix get_no_default: convert to async fn with owned Uuid param
- Fix append_logs: use windmill_queue import already available
- Fix ruby URL parsing: support both comma and whitespace delimiters
- Add WorkspaceRegistryMap type alias to reduce inline type noise

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* all

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-17 12:49:25 +00:00
2e430c4c0b feat: add GitHub Enterprise Server (GHES) support for GitHub App git sync (#8344)
* feat: add GitHub Enterprise Server (GHES) support for GitHub App git sync

Add a self-managed GitHub App mode alongside the existing managed
(stats.windmill.dev) mode, enabling git sync for GitHub Enterprise Server
and custom GitHub App installations.

Backend:
- Parameterize GitHub API URLs (no more hardcoded github.com)
- Add GITHUB_ENTERPRISE_APP_SETTING global setting
- Add OpenAPI specs for ghes_installation_callback and ghes_config endpoints

Frontend:
- Add instance settings UI for configuring self-managed GitHub Apps
  with setup instructions and validation
- GHES installation flow in gh_success page
- Dynamic installation URL based on GHES config
- Increase git sync test connection timeout to 10s
- Block "Review changes" save when settings are invalid

EE companion PR: windmill-labs/windmill-ee-private#<PR_NUMBER>

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to c74c86b78a66b976fd9968b21f77903723e668ec

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #459 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 45e4550110799525b5502cf072c8af8132492638

New ee-repo-ref: c74c86b78a66b976fd9968b21f77903723e668ec

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* sqlx

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
2026-03-13 08:21:15 +00:00
fe1519f128 feat: support minimal telemetry mode (#8243)
* feat: support minimal telemetry mode for EE

When EE customers disable telemetry, send a reduced payload with only
license-compliance data instead of ignoring the setting. Job usage data
is excluded in minimal mode. The telemetry settings UI now shows in EE
with context-appropriate descriptions for both CE and EE.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref for telemetry-minimal

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: make telemetry toggle label and description license-aware

Show "Minimal telemetry" with EE-specific description on EE, and
"Disable telemetry" with CE-specific description on CE.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Update commit hash in ee-repo-ref.txt

* Update reference hash in ee-repo-ref.txt

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 2f52c015bc6c81391234fa87b27ee1d4cd3a48a3

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #440 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 3628ed51426d8d29b3d5c62864ba256b7f9eab17

New ee-repo-ref: 2f52c015bc6c81391234fa87b27ee1d4cd3a48a3

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-11 19:12:47 +01:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6 f67b8159ad warn about missing <clear /> in nuget config and make description optional (#8281)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-09 13:11:16 +00:00
Henri Courdent f331e1f0ad Error frontend links (#8210) 2026-03-03 16:11:54 +00:00
Ruben Fiszel dbec70aedd internal: instant npm run check 2026-02-19 09:33:33 +00:00
GuilhemandClaude Opus 4.6 57ca7dbca0 improve instance settings drawer UX (#8002)
* fix(frontend): prevent false dirty state in instance settings on load

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(frontend): handle undefined python version in select binding

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(frontend): extract SaveButton component and improve drawer header UX

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(frontend): replace inline diff with diff drawer and simplify save flow

Save now saves immediately instead of requiring a two-step confirm flow.
Diff view opens in a separate drawer with split/unified toggle instead of
replacing the form content inline.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(frontend): preserve dirty state when toggling YAML mode in instance settings

syncFormToYaml() was setting yamlCodeInitial to the current modified YAML,
causing hasUnsavedChanges to become false when entering YAML mode with
pending form changes. Build yamlCodeInitial from initialValues instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(frontend): clear dirty state after saving in YAML mode

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* reduce save button timeout

* feat(frontend): add review changes button to unsaved changes confirmation modal

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(frontend): address code review issues from PR #8002

Remove unnecessary IIFE wrappers in handleSave/handleSaveAndCloseDiff,
fix stale on:close reference on diff drawer, clip SaveButton overlay with
overflow-hidden, make DiffEditor respond reactively to inlineDiff prop
instead of using {#key} destroy/recreate, and revert normalizeValue
object check to original simpler behavior.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(frontend): remove tab-switch confirmation modal in full settings mode

In full mode, the save button saves all settings across all categories,
so switching tabs cannot lose unsaved changes. Remove the per-category
dirty check, confirmation modal, and unused ConfirmationModal import.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(frontend): prevent SMTP toggles from creating false dirty state

Use getter/setter bind:checked so Toggle reads undefined as false
without writing it back to the store. This prevents visiting the SMTP
tab from mutating smtp_settings and triggering a false unsaved diff.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(frontend): prevent OTEL toggles from creating false dirty state

Same fix as SMTP toggles: use getter/setter bind:checked so Toggle
reads undefined as false without writing it back to the store.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(frontend): use recursive normalizeValue for dirty state instead of per-component fixes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(frontend): replace save button with always-visible review changes button

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(frontend): address PR review comments on DiffEditor and SaveButton

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-18 21:12:20 +00:00
17f9536a76 promote license key to second field in setup wizard and warn on EE (#8001)
* feat: promote license key to second field in setup wizard and warn on EE without key

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: remove screenshots from PR branch

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: use positive EE check with startsWith instead of negative CE check

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: claude-agent <claude-agent@noreply>
2026-02-18 17:10:15 +00:00
Ruben Fiszel 71608bf669 fix: yaml settings UI mask rsa_keys and jwt_secret 2026-02-17 08:54:58 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6 b3eeee4131 feat: show all settings in YAML UI and protect from empty overwrites (#7976)
- Show custom_instance_pg_databases, ducklake_settings, ducklake_user_pg_pwd
  and rsa_keys in frontend YAML editor (remove from excludedKeys)
- Redact sensitive values: add ducklake_user_pg_pwd and rsa_keys to
  sensitiveKeys, add custom_instance_pg_databases.user_pwd to
  nestedSensitiveFields
- Remove rsa_keys from HIDDEN_SETTINGS so it appears in YAML export
- Hide automate_username_creation from export (add to HIDDEN_SETTINGS)
- Add ducklake_user_pg_pwd and rsa_keys to SENSITIVE_SETTINGS for log
  redaction
- Generalize empty/null protection for all PROTECTED_SETTINGS: operator
  diff skips empty values when DB has existing data, direct API rejects
  delete/empty for protected settings

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-17 08:52:31 +01:00