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6782 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Ruben Fiszel
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0e547adf23 |
fix(migrations): grant zombie_job_counter to windmill roles (#10159)
The zombie_job_counter table (20250205131522) was never granted explicitly to windmill_user / windmill_admin. The generic GRANT ALL ON ALL TABLES in 20250205131523 swallows failures via EXCEPTION WHEN OTHERS, and the ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES it sets only covers objects created by that same role, so external-database deployments whose migration runner differs from the init-script runner leave the table ungranted. This stayed invisible while the table was only reached through ON DELETE CASCADE, which bypasses caller permissions. 20260625092813 replaced those cascades with explicit DELETEs in delete_jobs(), which run as the invoking role and fail with "permission denied for table zombie_job_counter". Same fix already applied to notify_event (20260619091631), script_trigger (20260619112847) and dispatch_event (20260701080313). Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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 hugocasa
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51d8db6602 |
feat: automatic git-to-windmill sync (polling, webhooks, in-app PRs + checks) (#9552)
* docs: add design doc for automatic git-to-windmill pull sync
* docs: add migration plan and implementation phases to git-sync pull design
* feat(git-sync): add auto_pull settings schema and pull enqueue primitive
Adds AutoPullSettings/AutoPullMode/AutoPullStatus on GitRepositorySettings
(workspace_settings.git_sync JSONB), the GIT_SYNC_PULL_SCRIPT_PATH constant,
and should_pull/effective_poll_interval_s helpers with unit tests. Exports the
EE enqueue_git_pull_job primitive. Foundation for repo→Windmill auto-pull.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(git-sync): poll repos and auto-pull new commits into the workspace
Phase 1 of automatic repo → Windmill sync. A monitor task (EE-licensed,
single-replica via advisory lock) git ls-remotes each auto-pull-enabled
repository ~every minute and enqueues a pull when the tracked branch moves,
reusing the {workspace_id}:git_sync concurrency key so pulls serialize with
in-flight push commits.
- windmill-store: background (no-authed) resolver get_git_repo_head_for_autopull
that resolves the repo resource (incl. $var: refs) and ls-remotes; GitHub-App
repos are skipped here and will sync via webhooks (phase 2).
- monitor.rs: poll/reconcile/persist with optimistic sha advance and failure
status; targeted jsonb update so concurrent settings edits aren't clobbered.
- edit_git_sync_repository: preserve server-owned auto_pull state on UI save.
- openapi: AutoPullSettings/AutoPullMode/AutoPullStatus + auto_pull field.
- frontend: per-repo "Automatically deploy changes from Git" toggle with last
sync status; demote the GitHub Actions link to an advanced CI option.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(git-sync): wire webhook lifecycle + receiver; share reconcile logic
OSS side of phase 2 auto-pull webhooks:
- edit_git_sync_repository creates/removes the repo webhook on save (EE-gated,
best-effort → falls back to polling).
- monitor poller now delegates to the shared windmill_git_sync reconcile/persist
helpers (also used by the webhook receiver), removing duplicated logic.
- export the shared reconcile/persist/failure helpers; bump EE ref.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(git-sync): bump EE ref for phase 3 in-app PR creation
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(git-sync): show webhook vs polling status on the auto-pull toggle
When a repo has an active webhook (auto_pull.webhook_id set), the status line
reads "instant via webhook"; otherwise it reads the ~1-minute polling cadence.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(git-sync): post PR diff check on dry-run completion (phase 4)
Worker completion hook in process_completed_job: when a DeploymentCallback job
carrying the __git_sync_pr_check marker finishes, parse the dry-run SyncResponse
and patch the GitHub check run with the diff summary (success/neutral/failure).
Export enqueue_git_pull_dry_run; bump EE ref.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(git-sync): bump EE ref (drop unused GHES webhook_secret)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* revert(git-sync): defer phase 4 PR diff checks (OSS side)
Remove the worker completion hook that posted the PR check run, drop the
enqueue_git_pull_dry_run re-export and the orphaned sqlx cache, bump EE ref.
Phases 1-3 (polling, webhooks, in-app PR creation) are unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "revert(git-sync): defer phase 4 PR diff checks (OSS side)"
This reverts commit
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 Diego Imbert
|
7d5009e392 |
fix: heartbeat job ping during s3object materialization in SQL executors (#10152)
* fix: heartbeat job ping during s3object materialization in SQL executors Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KrFtZjXc8GB6VtSMVJFXjE * chore: update ee-repo-ref.txt Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KrFtZjXc8GB6VtSMVJFXjE * chore: update ee-repo-ref to e19948fa2974a7d89bec12957fc6d9fa0a421da8 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #668 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: a3828dcd67f026c0e983a1a5dc5c5b33af3c3120 New ee-repo-ref: e19948fa2974a7d89bec12957fc6d9fa0a421da8 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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3bd9f05938 |
fix(alerts): identify server replica in low-disk alert + per-host dedup tag (#10143)
* fix(alerts): identify server replica in low-disk alert + per-host dedup tag The server-mode low-disk alert keyed its dedup tag on the mountpoint alone, so `simple_alert_helper` mapped every server replica onto a single alert row per mountpoint. With more than one replica that row flaps every monitor pass: a replica seeing low disk raises the alert while a replica seeing healthy disk recovers it. The alert text also could not say which replica tripped. The fix lives in windmill-ee-private (`low_disk_alerts` in windmill-common/src/ee.rs) and appends the hostname to both the message and the dedup tag, mirroring the worker branch. Also add a regression test pinning the server tag as per-host, and correct the monitor cadence comments: iterations are LISTEN_NEW_EVENTS_INTERVAL_SEC (10s by default), not 30s, so "~60s (2 iterations * 30s)" was wrong on both factors. * fix(alerts): widen healthchecks.check_type so per-host disk tags fit Alert tags embed a mountpoint and a hostname, both unbounded, but check_type was varchar(50). create_alert only logs the insert error while the notification still fires, so an overflowing tag re-alerts every monitor pass and never records recovery state. The server tag overflows for ordinary pod-length hostnames, and the existing worker tag already overflows for every tracked mount except "/". Widening the column fixes both; bounding the hostname would not, since the mountpoint alone can consume the budget. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to b3d01f2c0d2c0714ae95b8a348af22b0fcc30ee4 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #666 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: ccd1e42cf6b2d051ca17074fbdf5b80a46cffe0f New ee-repo-ref: b3d01f2c0d2c0714ae95b8a348af22b0fcc30ee4 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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4e0fd4db55 |
feat(alerts): include disk total and top consumers in low-disk alert (#10144)
* feat(alerts): include disk total and top consumers in low-disk alert Point ee-repo-ref at the companion windmill-ee-private commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(alerts): pass alert message lazily from the min-version check simple_alert_helper now takes the error message as a future so callers can put diagnostic work behind it. Update this call site and point ee-repo-ref at the companion windmill-ee-private commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: point ee-repo-ref at rebased EE branch Rebase onto EE main so the pin keeps the SAML metadata fixes (394ad23) that the previous ref carried, and pick up the mount-scoped consumer walk. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump ee-repo-ref for bind-mounted file exclusion Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 4d7aafdba33a879b3c60d390c960e57679da9e87 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #667 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 08d3aa4c5bf630d15a28289cca62a0f1da7b7386 New ee-repo-ref: 4d7aafdba33a879b3c60d390c960e57679da9e87 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * chore: point ee-repo-ref at the merged EE work plus the test fix ee#667 squash-merged, so the previous pin was a branch commit no longer reachable from EE main. Point at ee#669, which branches from EE main and carries the /proc test-portability fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to d8a7ac6ae97642a7f4928e6be6846a32dabf4e26 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #669 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 5526aedd73654b9aa4086dae0441b9687ff6415d New ee-repo-ref: d8a7ac6ae97642a7f4928e6be6846a32dabf4e26 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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a935d06c8e |
chore(main): release 1.760.1 (#10142)
* chore(main): release 1.760.1 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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8c725d9e44 |
fix(apps): honor presigned S3 signature on app display/preview routes (#10141)
The app provenance gate short-circuits on a valid presigned signature, but only the raw download_s3_file route parsed it. The parquet/csv/table-count/file-preview/metadata routes discarded sig/exp and always fell through to the provenance gate, so a presigned S3 object rendered as a table showed "File restricted" for any viewer who did not produce it. Thread sig/exp through every apps_u S3 display route and forward the presigned bearer from ParqetCsvTableRenderer/DisplayResult. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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2092155191 |
chore(main): release 1.760.0 (#10128)
* chore(main): release 1.760.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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hugocasa
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8bfe5c9340 |
fix(ai): stop sending the AI agent system prompt twice for OpenAI (#10126)
* fix(ai): stop sending the AI agent system prompt twice for OpenAI Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ai): document collect_system_prompt precedence and trim duplicate comments Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ai): hoist only the leading system prompt for OpenAI Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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17872018cc |
feat(nsjail): make python/ansible rlimit_as configurable per worker (GIT-921) (#10138)
nsjail caps a jailed job's virtual address space at rlimit_as (4096 MiB for python3 and ansible). JIT runtimes (Bun/JavaScriptCore, the JVM) reserve large virtual ranges up front, so a subprocess spawned from a jailed Python/Ansible job can crash against this cap even when its physical memory use is modest (e.g. the Bun-compiled claude CLI hitting JSC/pthread allocation failures). Most other language protos already run with disable_rl: true (unlimited); python3 and ansible are the outliers with an explicit rlimit_as. This exposes that cap via a per-language env var (NSJAIL_PY_RLIMIT_AS_MB, NSJAIL_ANSIBLE_RLIMIT_AS_MB) so operators can raise or lift it on a dedicated worker pool without a source patch/rebuild and without weakening the mount/PID/user-namespace isolation that provides the real security boundary. Only the address-space limit changes; cpu/fsize/nofile rlimits are untouched. Value is in MiB, or unlimited/none/inf/0 to uncap (rlimit_as_type: INF). Unset keeps the historical 4096 default. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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f7eb5c460d |
fix(apps): invalidate cached app policy on change or deletion (GHSA-r5v4-cxh9-7qhq) (#10121)
* fix(apps): invalidate cached app policy on change or deletion (GHSA-r5v4-cxh9-7qhq) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(agents): keep PR tests and comments minimal and non-ephemeral Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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188647a942 |
fix(security): enforce variables:write scope on resource-delete var cascade (GHSA-xmr2-98m6-cjf7) (#10123)
A token scoped only to resources:write:<path> could delete linked secret variables it had no variables:write scope for, by embedding $var:<victim> in an attacker-controlled resource value and triggering the resource-delete cascade. #9712 re-enforced scoped-token boundaries broadly but missed this path. Add check_linked_var_delete_scopes, called before the cascade in both delete_resource and delete_resources_bulk: require variables:write for every linked variable, failing (and rolling back) the delete otherwise. No-op for unscoped tokens, so full-token cascade cleanup is unchanged. No co-located-path exemption: a resource and a variable may share a path, and a resource-write token can create a resource over an existing standalone variable and self-reference it, so "same path as the deleted resource" is attacker- forgeable and cannot stand in for variable scope. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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6407d9ff5c |
fix(bash): normalize CRLF line endings before running scripts (#10131)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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27ead8d084 |
fix(ai): disable redirects on worker AI provider client (GHSA-5q4v) (#10122)
* fix(ai): disable redirects on worker AI provider client (GHSA-5q4v) The worker AI request path issued provider requests with the shared HTTP_CLIENT, which follows up to 10 redirects without revalidating each hop. SSRF validation on the provider base_url is single-shot, so a public base_url could 3xx the worker into a private/internal host (e.g. cloud metadata), bypassing the private-endpoint protection. The API proxy was already hardened in #9370; the worker path was missed. Add a dedicated AI_HTTP_CLIENT with redirects disabled and use it for the user-controlled provider endpoint, mirroring the API proxy client. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ai): add ALLOW_AI_BASE_URL_REDIRECTS debug escape hatch Off by default (redirects stay disabled). When set, restores redirect following on the AI HTTP client for debugging non-standard/self-hosted gateways, with a startup warning that it weakens SSRF protection. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(ai): correct redirect comment for the escape hatch override Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(ai): condense redirect invariant comments per review Anchor the SSRF rationale to ALLOW_AI_BASE_URL_REDIRECTS (the knob that would break it) and shorten the AI_HTTP_CLIENT and call-site comments to avoid restating it at multiple sites (AGENTS.md). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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73c8d7f08a |
fix: reject git URL fragment/query SSRF bypass (GHSA-p5cj-8cfh-mjv6) (#10120)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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360e783b1d |
chore(main): release 1.759.0 (#10108)
* chore(main): release 1.759.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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6d1e12d5e9 |
feat(nativets): expose the standard web-platform globals deno_web provides (#10112)
* feat(nativets): expose standard web-platform globals for bun parity Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(nativets): wire bun-present Event subclasses and add construction smoke test Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(nativets): seed performance.timeOrigin per isolate, drop broken reportError Addresses CI Codex review on #10112: - performance.timeOrigin was undefined (setTimeOrigin never called); seed it per isolate via __wmInitPerIsolate executed from create_nativets_runtime. - reportError needs a global EventTarget this runtime never installs; drop it. - reword the namespace-import comment to not describe drafting history. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(nativets): wire DOMException global + broad edge-case smoke sweep DOMException is present in bun and, more importantly, deno_web references it as a global: AbortController.abort() with no reason constructs a DOMException("...", "AbortError"), so the already-wired AbortController/ AbortSignal threw "DOMException is not defined" on abort. Surfaced by a new functional edge-case sweep (smoke_web_globals_edge_cases) that exercises every wired global for real (not just presence) — DOMException/abort, AbortSignal.timeout, EventTarget dispatch, stream tee/reader/writer, all 3 compression formats, structuredClone Map/Set/Date/circular/reject-function, performance mark/measure, MessagePort delivery — plus a check that the merged Web Crypto globals still work. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(nativets): restore arg-default smoke tests dropped in merge, drop history comments Addresses CI Codex/Pi review on the merge commit: - Merge conflict resolution (checkout --ours) dropped smoke_missing_optional_arg_uses_default and smoke_explicit_null_arg_is_preserved (added on main by #10111); restore them. - Reword edge-case-sweep comments to state the constraint, not how the gaps were found. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(nativets): give reportException a global dispatch target; wire stream reader/controller globals Addresses CI Codex review on #10112: - P1: a throwing EventTarget listener (and reportError) is routed through deno_web's reportException, which dispatches on a saved global reference. With none set, dispatchEvent threw a masking error that hid the original. Wire a dedicated EventTarget as that target so the ORIGINAL error is reported (async unhandled, matching bun). Does NOT make globalThis an EventTarget (bun's isn't either). Re-adds reportError, now functional. Regression test asserts the original error is surfaced, not a masking one. - P2: wire the stream reader/controller globals bun also exposes (ReadableStreamDefaultReader/BYOBReader, ReadableStreamDefault/ByteStreamController, ReadableStreamBYOBRequest, WritableStreamDefaultWriter/Controller, TransformStreamDefaultController) for instanceof parity; sweep verifies via real reader/writer/controller instances. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(nativets): make globalThis an EventTarget so globalThis.reportError() works Addresses follow-up CI Codex review on #10112: - P1: the prior fix saved a *separate* EventTarget as the global reference, so globalThis.reportError() still failed its receiver check (this === globalThis_) with 'Illegal invocation'. Make globalThis itself the saved reference by turning it into a functional EventTarget (setPrototypeOf to DedicatedWorkerGlobalScope + setEventTargetData + webidl brand + saveGlobalThisReference), per isolate in __wmInitPerIsolate. Both reportError(e) and globalThis.reportError(e) now surface the original error (async, matching bun) instead of throwing. New test smoke_report_error_both_call_forms covers both call forms. - P2: reword the regression-test comment to state the invariant, not the patch history. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(nativets): wire performance constructor globals for bun parity Addresses the P2 nit in the CI Codex review: bun exposes Performance, PerformanceEntry, PerformanceMark, and PerformanceMeasure as globals (deno_web exports all four), so wire them alongside the performance singleton. The edge-case sweep verifies instanceof against real mark/measure entries. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(nativets): state global-wiring comment as a constraint, not patch history Addresses the P2 in the CI Codex review: reword the block comment to describe the current bun-parity constraint and the deliberate EventSource/ImageData exclusions, without narrating what was or wasn't wired before (per AGENTS.md). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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95d9ff02ee |
fix(jseval): raise QuickJS eval memory cap to 128MB with clear OOM error (#10116)
* fix(jseval): raise QuickJS eval memory cap to 128MB with clear OOM error Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(jseval): note bare null/undefined throws are absorbed into OOM bucket Addresses CI review P2 nit on map_quickjs_error. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(jseval): keep batch-rerun eval on a conservative 32MB cap; tighten OOM match Addresses CI review: eval_simple_js runs in the API process with unbounded request concurrency, so it must not inherit the raised flow-transform cap. Tighten the Exception OOM match to exact string. Reword drafting-history comments per AGENTS.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(jseval): gate OOM on InternalError kind; path-specific remediation hint Require the OOM InternalError name (not just the message) so a user throw new Error('out of memory') is not misclassified, and only suggest QUICKJS_MEMORY_LIMIT_MB on the env-tunable flow path (not the fixed-cap eval_simple_js path). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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a6191e2a85 |
fix(mcp): advertise flow input variables in MCP tools (#10117)
Flow input schemas omit `required` (they carry an `order` key instead), which made `serde_json::from_str::<SchemaType>` fail in `convert_schema_to_schema_type`. The error was swallowed and callers fell back to an empty `SchemaType::default()`, so MCP flow tools advertised no inputs. Add `#[serde(default)]` to `type`, `properties`, and `required` on `SchemaType` so these schemas deserialize correctly. Scripts always include `required` and were unaffected. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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e9fd4e7554 |
perf(rls): wrap session GUC reads in RLS policies for per-statement InitPlan (GIT-919) (#10110)
* perf(rls): wrap session GUC reads in RLS policies for per-statement InitPlan
RLS policies read current_setting('session.user' / 'session.groups' /
'session.pgroups' / 'session.folders_read' / 'session.folders_write')
directly inside their USING / WITH CHECK predicates. Postgres treats those
unwrapped calls as potentially row-varying and re-evaluates them once per
scanned row, on the read path of every workspace-scoped table.
The GUCs are set with SET LOCAL (set_config(..., true)) in
set_session_context(), so they are constant for the duration of a statement.
Wrapping each session-derived subexpression in a scalar sub-select lets the
planner hoist it to a one-time InitPlan (evaluated once per statement, reused
for every row) — same rows in, same rows out, N per-row GUC lookups collapse
to 1. Array-producing subexpressions keep an explicit ::text[] cast on the
sub-select so `= ANY (...)` / `?|` stay in their array-operand form rather
than being reparsed as a row-returning subquery.
The consolidating migration recreates every existing policy (across ~30 prior
migrations) whose predicate reads a session GUC, by deparsing the current
predicate and substituting the wrapped forms; the down migration is the exact
inverse (byte-identical round-trip). The adding-a-trigger skill documents the
wrapped form so new trigger tables inherit it.
Surfaced by pgrls (PERF001).
Fixes GIT-919
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(adding-a-trigger): fix RLS example cast placement for = any context
The `= any(...)` example put the ::text[] cast inside the sub-select, which
Postgres parses as a row-returning subquery and rejects at CREATE POLICY with
`operator does not exist: text = text[]`. Move the cast outside the sub-select
(matching the migration's canonical form) so the operand stays in array form,
and note why.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Ruben Fiszel
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ba232544e7 |
feat(nativets): add Web Crypto support via deno_crypto (#10109)
The nativets in-process runtime (deno_core) exposed no Web Crypto API:
`crypto` was undefined, so scripts could not use `crypto.getRandomValues`,
`crypto.randomUUID`, or `crypto.subtle`, even though the bun runner provides
them. This closes that parity gap by registering the `deno_crypto` extension
and wiring the crypto globals onto `globalThis`.
- Pin `deno_crypto = "0.223.0"`, the sibling release of the already-pinned
deno_core 0.352 / deno_web 0.240 stack (deps: deno_core ^0.352,
deno_web ^0.240, deno_error =0.6.1), so the rest of the deno stack is
untouched.
- Register `deno_crypto::init(None)` after `deno_web` in both the snapshot
(build.rs) and the runtime (lib.rs) extension lists, keeping the snapshot a
prefix of the runtime list. deno_crypto declares deps = [deno_webidl,
deno_web], which the position satisfies.
- Import `ext:deno_crypto/00_crypto.js` in runtime.js and assign
`crypto` / `Crypto` / `CryptoKey` / `SubtleCrypto` to `globalThis`.
- Add the `smoke_web_crypto` opt-in smoke test asserting the UUIDv4 shape of
`randomUUID`, a non-zero `getRandomValues` fill, and the known
SHA-256("abc") vector via `subtle.digest`.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Ruben Fiszel
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4917f79935 |
fix(mcp): let MCP tokens call preview run tools (jobs:run scope) — Fixes GIT-920 (#10107)
* fix(mcp): let MCP tokens call preview run tools (jobs:run scope) The MCP proxy mints an internal JWT scoped to exactly `scope_for_route` for the endpoint it forwards to. For preview run routes (`run/preview`, `run/preview_bundle`, `run/preview_flow`, `run_wait_result/preview`, `run_wait_result/preview_flow`), `determine_kind_from_route` matched the `SCRIPT_JOBS` prefix `jobs/run_wait_result/p` (because "preview" starts with "p") and derived `jobs:run:scripts`. But the preview handlers run arbitrary request-supplied code with no deployed path and require the broad `jobs:run` scope, so `jobs:run:scripts` was rejected with 403 "Required scope: jobs:run". Preview/bundle routes now carry no runnable kind, so the derived scope is the broad `jobs:run` the handlers expect. This also aligns the route-level access check with the handler check for these routes. Fixes GIT-920 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): anchor preview-route match to endpoint segment Address CI review: `route_path.contains("preview")` also matched by-path runs of a deployed runnable whose path contains "preview" (e.g. `jobs/run_wait_result/p/f/team/preview_report`). Since determine_kind_from_route also feeds check_route_access, such a route would derive the broad `jobs:run` and reject a legitimately kind-scoped `jobs:run:scripts:*`/`jobs:run:flows:*` token with 403. Anchor the exception to the actual preview endpoints (`jobs/run/preview*`, `jobs/run_wait_result/preview*`) so by-path runs keep their kind. Add regression tests for preview-named by-path paths, and trim the comments per AGENTS.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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ba7f9c065f |
fix(nativets): apply parameter defaults for missing args instead of null (#10111)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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65d6f477ab |
chore(main): release 1.758.0 (#10084)
* chore(main): release 1.758.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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hugocasa
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7ebfad382a |
feat(ai-agent): give tools a real description instead of the tool name (#10083)
* feat(ai-agent): use a real tool description instead of the tool name Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ai-agent): render tool-name error full width and hoist it above the description Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ai-agent): make tool description field hug its content so a single line is vertically centered Add an optional minHeight param to the autosize action (default unchanged at 30px) and pass minHeight 0 for the tool description so an empty/one-line field no longer reserves the 30px floor and leaves dead space below the text. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(ai-agent): regenerate OpenFlow-derived prompts, CLI guidance, and copilot zod schema for tool description Fixes the check-freshness CI failure (system_prompts + skills.gen.ts) and makes the flow copilot's openFlow.json / openFlowZod.gen.ts aware of the new AgentTool.description field so AI-authored tools can set it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasa
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4edffeb84b |
fix(mcp): align script auto_kind filter with scripts list API (#10098)
The MCP `get_items` script filter used `auto_kind IS NULL`, which excluded every script with a non-null `auto_kind` (pipeline, test, WAC, ...). These are valid runnable scripts and should surface as MCP tools. Switch to the deny-list `(auto_kind IS NULL OR auto_kind <> 'lib')`, matching the scripts list API (windmill-api-scripts). Only library scripts (no main function) are excluded; pipeline/test/WAC and any future auto_kind values are included. Fixes WIN-2190 Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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1ffe5a1075 |
chore(main): release 1.757.0 (#10080)
* chore(main): release 1.757.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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hugocasa
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851e30914e |
feat(saml): add ALLOW_PRIVATE_SAML_METADATA_URLS SSRF bypass (#10077)
* feat(saml): add ALLOW_PRIVATE_SAML_METADATA_URLS SSRF bypass Introduce the ALLOW_PRIVATE_SAML_METADATA_URLS env var and its allow_private_saml_metadata_urls() helper, mirroring the existing ALLOW_PRIVATE_MCP_SERVER_URLS opt-out. This lets self-hosted deployments with internal SAML IdPs (private IPs, no public DNS) skip the metadata-URL SSRF check that otherwise blocks server startup. The companion EE change (saml_ee.rs) consumes the helper to gate the validate_url_for_ssrf() call and additionally treats a cleared (empty/whitespace-only) SAML_METADATA setting as no SAML configured. Fixes WIN-2169 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(saml): surface opt-in hint and record SSRF control in threat model Add saml_ssrf_error_message() so private-IdP metadata URL rejections point to ALLOW_PRIVATE_SAML_METADATA_URLS (mirroring the MCP helper), with a unit test. Record the new SSRF opt-in under T2 in THREAT_MODEL.md, and bump the EE ref for the companion saml_ee.rs change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(saml): add validate_saml_metadata_url with opt-in unit tests Factor the SAML metadata SSRF gating into validate_saml_metadata_url() (mirroring validate_mcp_server_url) so the private-URL opt-in branch is unit-tested at the ssrf layer: blocks private by default, allows on true/1, and keeps scheme/host syntax guards when the opt-in is on. Bump the EE ref for the companion saml_ee.rs change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 394ad23242de429aef4074cc1dc28867dac95870 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #659 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 86da208c5aef2570568e18c7ab98f4d58adeec18 New ee-repo-ref: 394ad23242de429aef4074cc1dc28867dac95870 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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4f65187f9e |
chore(main): release 1.756.1 (#10072)
* chore(main): release 1.756.1 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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710a13a59d |
fix(apps): cover script/flow component outputs in deployed-app S3 provenance gate (#10070)
* fix(apps): cover script/flow component outputs in deployed-app S3 provenance gate Deployed apps read S3 files on-behalf of the app author for logged-in viewers (#10048). A confused-deputy guard confines those reads to files the app "produced", but the recent-production check only matched inline `appscript`/ `preview` jobs nested under the app path. Files produced by the deployed script/flow components an app is wired to run (e.g. a SQL query persisted to S3) were therefore denied "File restricted" for every viewer, admins included. Expand the provenance check to also match completed `script`/`flow`/`flowscript`/ `flownode` jobs whose `runnable_path` is one of the app's declared triggerables, and accept the author identity via `permissioned_as = on_behalf_of` (not only `created_by = caller`) so files produced on-behalf of the author are covered. Reads outside the app's declared triggerables stay denied. Adds a regression test seeding a script-kind produced file that reproduces the "File restricted" denial before the fix and passes after. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(apps): key S3 provenance on on-behalf identity + cover flow steps (review) Addresses the CI review on the S3 provenance gate: - P1 (confused deputy): the recent-production check keyed on `created_by = caller`, so a viewer who can run a declared script/flow directly (outside the app, with un-pinned inputs) could craft a result naming an author-only key and read it back through the app as the author. Key provenance instead on the producing job's `permissioned_as` matching the on-behalf identity the download reads as (the author in author-mode); a viewer's direct run has `permissioned_as = viewer` and no longer clears the gate. Drops `created_by` from both the appscript/preview and script/flow branches, closing the same latent hole in the pre-existing inline-script branch. - P2 (dead flow-step branch): `flowscript`/`flownode` jobs have `runnable_path = <flow_path>/<step_id>`, which exact `= ANY(...)` never matched. Split script vs flow triggerable paths; flow kinds now match the flow's own job (bare path) and its step jobs via a `<flow_path>/%` prefix, bounded to declared flows. - P2 (test realism): the regression test now uses the production component-prefixed triggerable key format (`<id>:script/...`), exercises a flow-step-produced key, and asserts a viewer's own direct run of a declared script stays denied (the P1 case). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(apps): tie deployed-app S3 provenance to an app-origination marker (review) Second CI-review round flagged that `permissioned_as` still does not prove a job was app-launched: a runnable configured with its own `on_behalf_of` makes a direct `/jobs/run` resolve `permissioned_as` to that identity (the app author), so a viewer with run access could execute a declared runnable directly, craft an S3 result, and read it back through the app. The flow-path `LIKE fp || '/%'` match also let `_`/`%` in a declared path admit unrelated flows. Introduce a real app-origination marker instead of inferring provenance: - Add `JobTriggerKind::App`; `execute_component` stamps every app-launched job with `trigger_kind = 'app'` + `trigger = <app path>`. A direct `/jobs/run` cannot set this, so it is the authoritative signal that a file was produced *by the app*. - The provenance gate's recent-production check collapses to `trigger_kind = 'app' AND trigger = <this app path>` (+ the 3h window and result containment). This drops the forgeable `created_by`/`permissioned_as`/ `runnable_path`/kind logic entirely and removes the `LIKE` wildcard issue. - Provenance is scoped to THIS app's path, so another app's jobs (even same author) do not authorize this app's reads. Regression test rewritten to the marker model: an app-produced key clears for viewer and admin; a direct run whose `permissioned_as` resolves to the author stays denied (the forgery); another app's output stays denied. Adds `app` to the OpenAPI JobTriggerKind enum. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(apps): assert execute_component stamps trigger_kind='app' at runtime Adds an end-to-end test that runs a real script component through the app runtime (`apps_u/execute_component`) and asserts the enqueued job carries the app-origination marker `trigger_kind = 'app'` + `trigger = <app path>` (not the runnable path). The provenance-gate tests seed the marker directly; this proves the runtime actually produces the exact marker the gate depends on. execute_component commits the job row and returns its id, so the assertion reads the row directly — no worker needed to run the job. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(triggers): reject trigger_kind=app for suspended-job reassignment (review) `JobTriggerKind::App` (added for the app-origination S3 marker) became a valid value for the resume/cancel suspended-trigger routes, whose handler derives the table name `<kind>_trigger`. There is no `app_trigger` table, so both endpoints would fail with a missing-relation database error (500). Reject `App` in `get_suspended_trigger` alongside webhook/schedule so it returns a clean 400. Adds a regression test asserting the reassignment route returns 400 (not 500) for trigger_kind=app. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(apps): don't stamp app-origination marker on preview runs (review) The app-origination marker (trigger_kind='app') was stamped unconditionally, including preview mode. A preview lets a `jobs:run` caller supply arbitrary `raw_code` against ANY app path without that app's deployed policy (raw_code with no path/id skips all app authorization), so a preview returning `{"s3":"<author-only-key>"}` would forge the exact marker the S3 provenance gate trusts and read the victim app author's file. Gate the marker on `!is_preview`: only deployed, policy-checked executions are app-provenanced. Preview/editor S3 display does not rely on this marker (the editor routes reads through the force_viewer allowlist), so nothing legitimate regresses. Adds a regression test asserting a preview run's job is not stamped trigger_kind='app'. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(apps): editor-authorize preview marker + per-viewer S3 provenance isolation (review) Closes the codex P1 (preview forgery) without breaking editor preview downloads, and adds cross-viewer isolation to the provenance gate. - Preview marker now requires app write: `execute_component` stamps the app-origination marker on a preview only when the caller can EDIT that app (`require_is_writer`), instead of never stamping previews. An app editor already wields the app's author identity (they can deploy a component that reads the same file), so marking their own preview is no escalation and keeps preview-produced S3 results downloadable in the editor; a `jobs:run`-only caller who cannot edit the app still cannot forge the marker. Deployed runs are unchanged (always marked). - Per-viewer isolation: the provenance gate now also requires `j.created_by = <this caller>`. The security boundary stays the un-forgeable `trigger_kind='app'` marker; `created_by` is an additional filter ANDed under it, so it only narrows — a viewer can only download keys their OWN app runs produced, not another viewer's result. Restores the per-caller scoping #10048 had, now safe on top of the marker. Tests: preview marked iff caller can edit the app; cross-viewer isolation (another viewer's app-marked key denied, no admin bypass); direct-run and other-app keys still denied; deployed run still stamped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(apps): require apps:write scope (not just writer ACL) to mark preview provenance (review) require_is_writer checks the user's underlying ACL but ignores token scopes, so a writer's token deliberately scoped to apps:run/apps:read/jobs:run but WITHOUT apps:write could still mark a preview and forge provenance — even though that token cannot deploy the app (update_app requires apps:write), breaking the "any marked caller can deploy equivalent code" rationale. Require BOTH apps:write:<path> scope (check_scopes) AND the writer ACL (require_is_writer) before stamping a preview's app-origination marker. Deployed runs unchanged. Adds a scope-restricted-writer token to the test (apps:run/read + jobs:run, no apps:write) and asserts its preview stays unmarked; retains the full-editor positive case and the non-editor negative case. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(apps): never app-provenance preview runs; read editor S3 as the caller (review) Simplifies the preview handling: a preview executes as the *caller* (Viewer mode), never as the author, so its results must be read back as the caller — never author-mode — and must never carry the app-origination marker. This removes the whole `require_is_writer` / `apps:write` / `can_preserve_on_behalf_of` reasoning (which was also unsound: a writer's token or session may not be able to deploy a component running as the app's on-behalf identity, so marking their preview could still escalate). - Backend: mark the app-origination marker for deployed runs only (`!is_preview`). - Frontend: `getS3File` (AppImage/AppPdf/AppDownload) now routes editor/preview reads through the viewer-scoped `job_helpers/download_s3_file` endpoint (reads as the caller), matching what DisplayResult/ParqetCsvTableRenderer already do; only a deployed app view uses the provenance-gated `apps_u` endpoint. This is the path that previously relied on marking previews, so nothing regresses. Test: a preview is never app-provenanced (owner's own preview and a non-editor's both stay unmarked). Cross-viewer isolation, deployed marking, and the reassignment guard are unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(apps): app components run on-behalf of the app, not the referenced runnable (review) Root-causes codex's on-behalf-preview finding: `execute_component` was overriding the app's resolved on-behalf identity with the referenced script/flow's OWN `on_behalf_of` (its `on_behalf_of_email`). That is wrong in the app context — the app's execution mode should govern: - A Viewer-mode app could execute a component AS the referenced runnable's on_behalf identity (privilege confusion / escalation), instead of as the viewer. - A preview would run as that identity rather than as the caller, so its S3 output could not be read back as the caller — the download-identity mismatch codex flagged. Always use the app-resolved identity (author in author-mode, caller in viewer/preview); a referenced runnable's own `on_behalf_of` no longer leaks into app execution. Direct `/jobs/run` still honors a runnable's `on_behalf_of` (unchanged). With this, previews always run as the caller, so reading editor/preview S3 as the caller (viewer-scoped `job_helpers`) is unconditionally correct. - Test: the deployed-component e2e now seeds the script with a distinct on_behalf and asserts the component job's `permissioned_as` is the app identity, not the script's. - Also reword the getS3File `configuration` param comment to describe current state only (AGENTS.md comment rule). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(apps): surface 'app' trigger kind in Runs UI; condense provenance comments (review) Addresses codex review nits: - Add `app` to `jobTriggerKinds`, `triggerIconMap` (LayoutDashboard), and `triggerDisplayNamesMap` so app-component jobs (which now carry `trigger_kind = 'app'`) are filterable in Runs and render their trigger info. - Condense the app-origination marker, on-behalf-identity, and provenance-gate comments to state each invariant once in <=4 lines at its relevant site (AGENTS.md comment rule). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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22b47c8823 |
chore(main): release 1.756.0 (#10062)
* chore(main): release 1.756.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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 lucsoft
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29f4cd4b6f |
feat(triggers): serve binary HTTP-route responses via base64 transfer encoding (#10058)
Add an opt-in `wm_content_transfer_encoding: "base64"` field to the composite result. When set (together with `wm_content_type`), result_to_response decodes the string result into raw bytes before sending it, so sync HTTP routes/webhooks can return arbitrary binary payloads (PDFs, images, ...) with any content type — not just as base64 text or via object storage. Explicit and safe: the encoding is never guessed, invalid base64 is a hard error (no silent fallback to the encoded text), an unsupported encoding is rejected, and a transfer encoding without a content type is rejected. Existing string responses are unchanged. Closes #5986 |
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Ruben Fiszel
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92b7f375a9 |
fix: replicate all secrets on fork when external backend is configured (#10060)
* fix: replicate all secrets on fork with external backend (WIN-2161) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add Azure KV fork secret-replication reproduction (WIN-2161) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: condense clone_variables invariant comment (WIN-2161) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: drive real create_fork handler in Azure KV repro (WIN-2161) Replace the windmill-common test that mirrored clone_variables' loop with an end-to-end test in windmill-api-integration-tests that exercises the real migration, create_fork and variable-read endpoints against a local Azure KV emulator. Verified it fails (404 "not found in Azure Key Vault") without the fix and passes with it; unique per-run ids keep it robust to the emulator's persistent state. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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1ed7fc066b |
chore(main): release 1.755.0 (#10041)
* chore(main): release 1.755.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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ff774c46bf |
feat: add per-workspace job-retention override (#10050)
* feat: add per-workspace job-retention override (EE) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 2ba6a2a75b6fc97858b306b2c98ada481e363c10 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #658 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: e7fb36acd813cd717bcf05f5aafbf81de271d618 New ee-repo-ref: 2ba6a2a75b6fc97858b306b2c98ada481e363c10 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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04eb7ddd39 |
fix: clearer errors on auto-draft save failure (WIN-2157) (#10053)
* fix: clearer errors on auto-draft save failure (WIN-2157) When an autosave draft save fails, the cloud indicator now surfaces the backend reason on hover (native title tooltip) in addition to the existing click popover, so the cause is discoverable without a click. Backend now returns a clearer, actionable message: - `require_can_write_path` distinguishes a malformed path (unrecognized namespace prefix -> BadRequest) from a genuine permission denial, and the deny message spells out where the user *can* write. - `require_owner_of_path` no longer panics with an out-of-bounds index on a malformed single-segment path (e.g. a bare `u`/`f`); it returns a clear BadRequest instead. Covered by a regression test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: trim narrative comment to invariant in drafts.rs (WIN-2157) Address CI review (AGENTS.md: comments record constraints, not narration, ≤4 lines): keep the malformed-path invariant, drop the motivation tail. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: don't let a malformed stored draft 400 the draft listing (WIN-2157) Address CI review (P1): require_can_write_path can now return BadRequest for a malformed path, and list_drafts propagated it — so a single malformed stored draft row (the draft table has no path constraint; legacy/admin-authored rows may be malformed) would make GET /drafts/list return 400. Treat BadRequest like NotAuthorized there: the row is simply not writable. Verified e2e on EE — listing returns 200 with can_write false for the malformed rows. Also trim "unchanged"/"still" drafting-history narration from the regression test comments (P2, AGENTS.md). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: compress list_drafts comment to 4 lines (WIN-2157) Address CI review P2: keep the constraint (draft table has no path constraint) and the invariant (one malformed row must not 400 the listing) within the AGENTS.md ≤4-line limit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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1e192f2d86 |
feat(apps): authorize deployed-app S3 reads on-behalf of the author for logged-in viewers (#10048)
* feat(apps): authorize deployed-app S3 reads on-behalf of the author for logged-in viewers A logged-in user viewing a deployed app now reads S3 files (rich result, table/image/PDF preview, CSV export, download, metadata) the same way an anonymous viewer already does: on-behalf of the app author per the app policy's execution_mode, gated by an app-provenance check — instead of against the viewer's own S3 permissions. This aligns S3 with every other thing an app does (scripts, flows, resources all already run on-behalf of the author) and lets an operator who lacks folder S3 permission still see data rendered inside the app. The raw job_helpers/* S3 API stays viewer-scoped: a viewer who lacks folder permission is still denied there. Only which endpoint the app frontend uses for logged-in deployed viewers changes. Backend: - Add app-scoped, provenance-gated apps_u/* variants for all S3 display ops (download_s3_file already existed; add download_s3_parquet_file_as_csv, load_file_metadata, load_file_preview, load_parquet_preview, load_csv_preview, load_table_count). Each routes through one shared helper (app_s3_on_behalf_and_provenance) that scope-confines an app embed token, resolves the on-behalf identity, and runs the provenance gate ONCE before dispatching to the EE *_internal S3 helpers. - Close the confused-deputy hole in check_if_allowed_to_access_s3_file_from_app: the unconditional Ok() bypass for a logged-in, non-embed session now only applies in viewer execution mode (where the on-behalf identity IS the viewer, so the viewer's own permissions still bound the read downstream). Author-mode reads (anonymous/publisher) always enforce provenance, for anonymous and logged-in viewers alike, so a viewer cannot launder the author's S3 permissions with an arbitrary file_key. Frontend: - Route the deployed-app view through apps_u/* using the app-viewer isEditor signal instead of login state (the old $userStore proxy wrongly sent logged-in deployed viewers to the viewer-scoped job_helpers API). Editor and preview keep viewer identity via job_helpers. execution_mode: viewer remains the escape hatch for per-viewer S3 enforcement. Fixes provenance-gated S3 display for logged-in operators on deployed apps. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(backend): document cargo features, restarting the dev backend, and filesystem object storage The dev backend runs `cargo watch --features quickjs` by default, which omits S3, EE, MCP, and non-JS runtimes — feature-gated routes then 404 or return a "requires <feature>" stub at runtime. Add a backend/CLAUDE.md section that: - explains that you must restart the backend with the appropriate features to exercise gated functionality, with the pid/cwd-scoped restart recipe (never pkill target/debug/windmill) and the PORT=$BACKEND_PORT gotcha; - documents what each commonly-toggled feature gate does (private, enterprise, license, parquet, duckdb, language runtimes, mcp, trigger kinds, no_auth) plus common combinations; - documents using the built-in FilesystemStorage large-file storage for dev workspace object storage (hidden from the UI dropdown; set via edit_large_file_storage_config), including the advanced_permissions shape. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(apps): don't flatten inner query in app-scoped S3 preview routes axum's `Query` uses `serde_urlencoded`, which cannot deserialize the typed (numeric/bool) fields of a `#[serde(flatten)]`-ed struct and 400s on `limit` / `offset` ("invalid type: string, expected u32"). The app-scoped load_csv_preview / load_parquet_preview / load_table_count routes flattened LoadPreviewQuery / LoadCountQuery, so their previews were broken. Restate the fields directly on the outer query structs (with an into_inner() to rebuild the inner query) and extend the CE OSS stub to match. Also bumps ee-repo-ref.txt for the companion EE csv-separator panic fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address CI review — nested DisplayResult routing, byte-range contract, docs, tests - [P1] Thread `appPath` into the nested `DisplayResult`s (render_all children and the expanded-result drawer) so logged-in deployed viewers route nested/expanded S3 tables, images, PDFs, and downloads through `apps_u/*` too, not job_helpers. - [P2] Mark `read_bytes_from`/`read_bytes_length` required on the `apps_u/load_file_preview` route (they are non-optional in LoadFilePreviewQuery), and mirror the full query shape in the CE OSS stub so the byte-range contract is enforced identically on CE and EE. - [P2] Fix the backend retrigger command in backend/CLAUDE.md: cargo watch runs from `backend/`, so `touch README.md` (not `backend/README.md`). - [P2] Trim app_s3_onbehalf.rs comments per AGENTS.md (state the invariant once, no drafting-history narration). - Extend the integration test to cover the table-count, csv-preview (numeric limit/offset deserialization), and file-preview (byte-range required) routes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(apps): tighten S3 provenance-gate comments per AGENTS.md Consolidate the viewer-mode / author-mode rationale to ≤4 lines at each branch of the gate, and drop the repeated explanation from the shared app_s3_on_behalf_and_provenance doc comment (which now just states what the helper does). No behavior change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to f292a1040da6a667ce7c22abf63ec0debfdd480f This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #657 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: a582389084eb363997cb5e8053f29220e0d3eaec New ee-repo-ref: f292a1040da6a667ce7c22abf63ec0debfdd480f Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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5844c32ac5 |
fix: enforce read authorization when signing S3 objects (#10049)
`sign_s3_objects` minted a long-lived HMAC bearer signature for any S3 key handed to it, by any authenticated workspace member, with no check that the caller was allowed to read that key. Since `validate_s3_signature` only verifies the HMAC and expiry at fetch time, any member (operators included) could mint a transferable capability to read arbitrary S3 keys, bypassing the advanced S3 permission rules (`check_lfs_object_path_permissions`). Authorize the read at mint time: add an `ApiAuthed` extractor and, before signing each key, require the caller's own `S3Permission::READ` via `get_workspace_s3_resource_and_check_paths`. A caller can no longer sign a key they cannot themselves read. The fetch-side validators are left unchanged. The only legitimate caller is the wmill SDK invoked from an app-author job, whose token authenticates as the executing (author) identity — which can read the key — so authorized app display is unaffected. Adds an integration test proving an authorized caller can sign a readable key (and the signature validates end-to-end through the presigned fetch route) while an unauthorized caller is refused. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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ab38e1418e |
fix: keep agent-worker server job-completed processor alive & self-healing (#10033)
* fix: keep agent-worker server job-completed processor alive on init-script failure The agent-worker API server's background job-completed processors relay completions on behalf of many remote agent workers. The processor loop exited (dropping its receiver) on an init-script failure, but on the server that failed init script belongs to a remote worker, not the server. Once enough processors exited, the shared completion channel disconnected and every /send_result POST returned 500, stranding completions and creating zombie-job restart loops. Add an is_agent_server flag so server relay processors don't self-terminate on init-script failure. Pins the EE companion change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump EE ref for send_result wait-for-processor change Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: agent-worker server survives a failed init script End-to-end regression for the agent-worker-server processor bug: an agent worker runs a failing init script, POSTs the failed init-script completion to /send_result, and the test asserts the server's background job-completed processor stays alive (a subsequent job completes and no bg-processor critical alert is raised). Fails if the is_agent_server guard is removed (the processor breaks, the supervisor raises a critical alert). Requires --features enterprise,license,private,agent_worker_server. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: replace heavyweight init-script e2e with focused unit tests The panic/respawn/alert and 503 timeout paths are now covered by fast, deterministic unit tests in windmill-api-agent-workers (supervise_processor, classify_send). Drop the enterprise-only, global-config-mutating e2e in favor of those. Bump EE ref. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to bc45d9275d4307132927dc8ad3e82049b1aed463 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #653 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 2aca03f28bb37e938ae548b81f1620b2e00dc0f7 New ee-repo-ref: bc45d9275d4307132927dc8ad3e82049b1aed463 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * chore: bump EE ref for bg-processor alert rate-limiting Picks up windmill-ee-private#654: exponential backoff + rate-limited critical alerts in supervise_processor, addressing the code-review nit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to d48c0e01e8601a372353c032dd237ddb6fa3bbad This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #654 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: f89eeb6e333614850ef650e7df78e3c2335f107c New ee-repo-ref: d48c0e01e8601a372353c032dd237ddb6fa3bbad Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * chore: bump EE ref for graceful-shutdown-during-backoff fix Picks up windmill-ee-private#655: supervise_processor re-checks shutdown before respawn and selects on the shutdown broadcast during backoff, so a crash-loop backoff can't hang graceful shutdown. Addresses the Codex P1. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 9bc5dfb9ce73a2d9b981a1de86eea6aa26688b79 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #655 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 8dc3b3d9ec8f9c28b227d36c2a1327b4b2017665 New ee-repo-ref: 9bc5dfb9ce73a2d9b981a1de86eea6aa26688b79 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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8343203ec2 |
feat(mcp): add multi-workspace MCP tokens via the gateway endpoint (#10043)
* feat(mcp): add multi-workspace MCP tokens via the gateway endpoint A single MCP token with no bound workspace (workspace_id NULL + mcp scope) now works across every workspace the token owner can access, served through the existing /api/mcp/gateway endpoint. This avoids having to register one MCP server entry per workspace in clients like Claude/Cursor. In multi-workspace mode the runner exposes a synthetic `list_workspaces` tool plus the generic API endpoint tools, each workspace-scoped one gaining a required `workspace_id` argument (mirroring the proxy pattern users built externally). Per-workspace scripts/flows are not enumerated to avoid flooding the tool list — they are run via runScriptByPath/runFlowByPath with an explicit workspace_id. Auth is resolved per tool call: the gateway middleware detects a workspace-less mcp token and marks the request MultiWorkspaceMcp, and the runner resolves a per-workspace ApiAuthed from the raw token via the AuthCache (validating membership; superadmins may act in any workspace). Single-workspace tokens are unchanged. Frontend: the MCP token creation flow gains an "All workspaces" option that produces a workspace-less token and the gateway URL. Fixes WIN-2153 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(mcp): cover multi-workspace endpoint tool transformation Unit tests for endpoint_tool_to_mcp_tool_multi and list_workspaces_tool: workspace-scoped tools gain a required workspace_id arg, global tools are left unchanged, workspace_id is not duplicated, and list_workspaces takes no arguments. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): forward script/flow args for runScriptByPath/runFlowByPath These endpoints have an additionalProperties body (no declared properties), so build_request_body previously returned an empty body and dropped every script/flow argument. This was latent for the per-path run endpoints and became load-bearing in multi-workspace mode, where scripts/flows can only be run via runScriptByPath/runFlowByPath — parameterized runs silently lost their arguments. build_request_body now forwards all arguments not consumed by a path/query parameter for pass-through (additionalProperties) bodies, keeping the strict declared-only behavior for endpoints with explicit properties. The runner strips the synthetic workspace_id argument before dispatch so it can't leak into the forwarded body. Reported by Codex review on #10043. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(mcp): note workspace_id requirement in multi-workspace tool descriptions Workspace-scoped tools already gain a required workspace_id parameter (with its own schema description) in multi-workspace mode, but the tool's prose description was unchanged. Append a note so models/clients that read the description text know to pass workspace_id (and to call list_workspaces first). Global tool descriptions are left untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(mcp): trim multi-workspace tool/arg descriptions The workspace_id note repeats across every workspace-scoped tool in each tools/list, so keep it terse: description suffix "Requires `workspace_id`." and arg description "Target workspace id (from list_workspaces)." to avoid spending tokens on repeated boilerplate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): enforce script/flow path scopes for multi-workspace run-by-path In multi-workspace mode runScriptByPath/runFlowByPath are the only way to run scripts/flows, but they were authorized against the endpoint scope only — never the caller's mcp:scripts:/mcp:flows: path scopes. A granular token could run items outside its allowed paths (e.g. mcp:scripts:f/team/* + mcp:endpoints:* running f/other/secret), and a mcp:endpoints:* token could run arbitrary scripts. Now these two endpoints are authorized by the script/flow scope of the requested path (matching single-workspace mode's per-item tools): exposed in list_tools only when the token grants some script/flow (McpScopeConfig::has_any), and at call time the path is checked via is_allowed("script"/"flow", path). Verified e2e: mcp:scripts:f/team/* runs f/team/* but is denied f/other/*; mcp:endpoints:* alone no longer exposes or runs run-by-path. Reported by Codex + Pi review on #10043. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): deny run-by-path for mcp:favorites multi-workspace tokens mcp:favorites sets granular=false, so the previous run-by-path scope check (gated on `granular`) was skipped entirely — a default "Favorites only" all-workspaces token could run any script/flow by naming its path, bypassing the favorites restriction. Favorites are an enumerated set reachable only through per-item tools, not by arbitrary path, so they grant nothing for run-by-path. has_any() now returns true only for mcp:all (not favorites), and the call-time check drops the `granular` gate and relies on is_allowed() directly (already false for favorites, true for mcp:all, pattern-matched for granular). Verified e2e: mcp:favorites no longer exposes or runs run-by-path; mcp:all still runs; granular script scopes still path-enforced. Reported by Codex review on #10043. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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38a190b53a |
chore(main): release 1.754.0 (#10017)
* chore(main): release 1.754.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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hugocasa
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6c521e9d87 |
fix(backend): propagate script timeout when restarting perpetual scripts (#10029)
Perpetual scripts (restart_unless_cancelled) re-pushed their restart job with custom_timeout = None, so every rerun ignored the script's configured timeout and fell back to the instance-level job_default_timeout. Only the first run honored the script timeout. Fetch the script timeout alongside restart_unless_cancelled (both cached by the immutable script hash) and pass it as custom_timeout when re-pushing the perpetual job. Fixes WIN-2149 Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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c029d6dcde |
fix(security): drop --allow-run from Deno sandbox (GHSA-gj6h-vw66-mr8f) (#10039)
The `// sandbox` annotation (and global nsjail sandboxing) restricted Deno to `--allow-run=git,/usr/bin/chromium`. Both binaries can be coerced into spawning `/bin/sh`, escaping Deno's permission model: - git via hook configs, e.g. `git -c core.fsmonitor='/bin/sh -c <cmd>' status` - chromium via subprocess-launcher flags, e.g. `--renderer-cmd-prefix` / `--gpu-launcher`, pointed at a launcher the script writes into `./` Because the subprocess is spawned by git/chromium — not Deno — it is invisible to Deno's permission checks, giving any user with script-execution permission arbitrary OS command execution (root, in the default worker container). Critically, the Deno runtime is the ONE language never wrapped in nsjail (there is no run.deno.config.proto; every other language has one). So for deno the Deno permission model is the *entire* sandbox — there is no OS-level containment to fall back on, and handing it any subprocess-spawning binary is an unconditional escape regardless of the nsjail setting. Fix: emit no `--allow-run` in the restricted path, denying all subprocess execution. The advisory's alternative (inject `-c core.fsmonitor=false ...`) doesn't apply — the user controls the git/chromium argv, so any injected hardening is overridden. Admins who accept the risk (e.g. puppeteer) can still re-add specific binaries via `DENO_FLAGS`. Verified with both PoCs on a running worker: git and chromium invocations now return `Requires run access to "<bin>"`; the sandbox escapes are closed. Fixes WIN-2151 Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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689b20a470 |
fix(security): remove git from Deno sandbox allow-run (GHSA-gj6h-vw66-mr8f) (#10038)
The `// sandbox` annotation restricts Deno to `--allow-run=git,/usr/bin/chromium`. git can be coerced into spawning `/bin/sh` via hook configs such as `git -c core.fsmonitor=<cmd> status`, and that subprocess is spawned by git — not Deno — so it is invisible to Deno's permission model. This let any user with script-execution permission run arbitrary OS commands as root inside the worker, fully defeating the sandbox. The advisory's alternative (injecting `-c core.fsmonitor=false -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null`) does not apply here: the user's own script invokes git directly via `Deno.Command`, so Windmill cannot inject hardening flags into that call. Removing git from the allowlist is the only complete fix. git was originally allowed for git-sync-adjacent use, which no longer needs it. Verified with the advisory PoC: git invocation now returns `Requires run access to "git"` and the sandbox escape is closed. chromium (puppeteer) support is preserved. Fixes WIN-2151 Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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9feda57c15 |
perf: index v2_job(parent_job) to speed up run child-job listing (#10034)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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9ad6927231 |
chore(main): release 1.753.0 (#9997)
* chore(main): release 1.753.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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f28ea9cb99 |
feat(db-health): add connection sizing guidance (#10014)
* feat(db-health): add connection sizing guidance The Database Connections panel showed current/max connections but gave no guidance on how to size max_connections for the deployment. Derive an estimate from the live worker fleet: each worker instance shares a pool sized DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS_WORKER + (workers - 1), and each server opens up to DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS_SERVER (both overridable via DATABASE_CONNECTIONS). The endpoint now returns live worker/instance counts, the default per-server and per-worker pool sizes, the estimated peak worker connections, the reserved superuser connections, and a recommended max_connections floor (workers + one server + 25% headroom). Servers do not ping worker_ping, so the recommendation assumes one server and exposes the per-server increment. The panel renders this as a sizing breakdown and warns when max_connections is below the recommended floor. Fixes WIN-2147 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(db-health): single source for pool-size constants + sizing tests Address review: db_connect.rs kept its own copies of DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS_* that duplicate the windmill_common constants the sizing guidance reads, so tuning the runtime pool size would silently leave the guidance stale. Re-export the windmill_common constants from db_connect.rs so there is one source of truth. Add unit tests for compute_connection_sizing covering the zero-fleet, single worker, multi-instance, and reserved-clamp cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(db-health): 20% headroom and 200-connection minimum floor Lower the sizing headroom from 25% to 20% and never recommend below 200 connections (postgres defaults to 100; cheap headroom for growth/bursts/psql). Update the guidance message and unit tests accordingly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(db-health): honor DATABASE_CONNECTIONS in sizing recommendation Address Codex P1: the runtime caps every process's pool at DATABASE_CONNECTIONS when set (db_connect.rs), but the sizing guidance always used the default 50/5 pools. For a tuned deployment this under-estimated worker demand and could hide a genuine under-provisioning (e.g. DATABASE_CONNECTIONS=100 with 5 instances is 500 worker connections, not 25). compute_connection_sizing now takes the effective DATABASE_CONNECTIONS override (read the same way db_connect.rs reads it): when set, each worker instance and server pool is that value and the worker estimate is override * instances. The response exposes server_pool_size / worker_pool_size (effective) and database_connections_override; the panel renders both pool rows and labels them (default) vs (DATABASE_CONNECTIONS), and the message states which source is used. Adds a unit test for the override path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(db-health): exclude agent workers from connection sizing Agent workers reach the API over HTTP (MODE=agent, Connection::Http) and hold no postgres pool, but their pings still land in worker_ping (written server-side by /api/agent_workers/update_ping). Counting them inflated the connection estimate. Filter the fleet query by the worker-name prefixes: DB-connected workers use "wk-" (WORKER_NAME_PREFIX), agent workers use "ag-" (AGENT_WORKER_NAME_PREFIX). Only wk- workers/instances feed the estimate; ag- workers are counted separately and surfaced as context ("N agent workers excluded — they use HTTP, not postgres connections"). Adds a unit test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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99d0047515 |
fix: name the offending item when a fork fails on a NUL escape (#10013)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasa
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f65fe7bf58 |
fix: replicate external secret backend secrets when forking a workspace (#10007)
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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223e1569ce |
chore(main): release 1.752.0 (#9974)
* chore(main): release 1.752.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com> |