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Commits
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8aab5034a6 |
feat: guest JWT entry for embedded apps (#10954)
* feat: guest JWT entry for embedded apps (jwt_guest_) A second way in for a guest, alongside the signed-in guest session: a JWT the embedding customer's backend mints and signs, verified per request against a per-workspace key (a PEM public key or a JWKS URL), resolving to the same seatless guest identity confined to the one app its app_path claim names. Bearer prefix jwt_guest_, stateless (no token row). See PR #10954. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: surface guest JWT as the embed method in the app deploy drawer The deploy drawer explained the secret-URL embed but not the guest JWT path, so the primary way to embed an app for a customer's own authenticated users was undiscoverable. For a guest-mode app with guests enabled, show how to mint a `jwt_guest_` token and append `guest.<jwt>` to the app URL, with a copyable iframe template pre-filled with this app's workspace_id and app_path, and a note that new guest emails are refused past the instance's free allowance (the live count is shown just above). Also log a guest JWT allowance refusal at warn, not info: the caller gets a bare 401 (the reason must not leak to an unauthenticated caller), so the log is the admin's signal that the instance hit its guest cap. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: correct the guest JWT minting instructions in the embed block The block said "sign it with the workspace's guest JWT key", but that setting holds the public verification key. Clarify the keypair relationship (configure the public key or a JWKS URL in the workspace; sign with the matching private key), name the accepted algorithms (RS/PS/ES; HS* refused), and keep the required claims, so an embedder knows how to actually mint the token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: fall back to the instance JWT issuer for guest verification (off on cloud) A workspace with no guest key of its own now verifies guest JWTs against the instance issuer (JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL, already used by jwt_ext_), so an operator running one issuer configures it once. Verification and the guest grant are CE; granting a full login from that issuer stays EE (jwt_ext_, unchanged). Disabled under CLOUD_HOSTED, where one instance issuer must not be trusted to mint guests in every tenant's workspace — there the per-workspace key is the only source, which also stays the override everywhere. The workspace settings note (hidden on cloud) explains the fallback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: embed instructions cover both the workspace key and instance issuer The embed block said to set the workspace's guest JWT key; now it says Windmill verifies against the workspace key or, off cloud, the instance issuer (JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL) when no workspace key is set. The instance clause is hidden under isCloudHosted(). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: show the guest JWT embed block only when Embed is toggled It belongs with the iframe snippet, not the plain-URL view, so gate it on embedMode alongside the guest-mode / guests-enabled checks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: trust the instance issuer in the guest fallback; refresh stale docs P1 (CI review): the fallback wrapped JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL as a workspace JwksUrl, so it hit validate_guest_jwks_url and was refused for http/private issuers unless ALLOW_PRIVATE_GUEST_JWKS_URLS was also set — a self-hosted internal issuer that works for jwt_ext_ failed for guests, though the UI says setting the env var is enough. fetch_jwks now fetches the instance issuer without the https/private restriction (matching the jwt_ext_ loader; it stays operator-trusted), while a workspace-admin URL is validated and pinned as before. All the size/key/URL bounds still apply to both. P2 (CI review): refresh the stale docs that said a missing workspace key always refuses a guest JWT — the module, bearer, key-source, and EditGuestJwtKey field docs now describe the workspace key with the off-cloud instance-issuer fallback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: fetch the trusted instance issuer like the jwt_ext_ loader P1 (CI review): the instance-issuer fetch skipped SSRF validation but still disabled redirects and default cert validation, so an instance issuer that works for jwt_ext_ through a redirect or an operator-approved self-signed cert failed the guest fallback. Fetch it with HTTP_CLIENT_PERMISSIVE (follows redirects, honors ACCEPT_INVALID_CERTS) — the same behavior jwt_ext_ has — while a workspace-admin URL stays validated, DNS-pinned and redirect-free. The body size cap still bounds both. P2 (CI review): the WorkspaceSettings field doc still said None/None means no JWT guests; it now names the off-cloud instance-issuer fallback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: schema summary + OpenAPI cover the guest JWT columns and fallback P2 (CI review): summarized_schema.txt was missing guest_activity.jwt_entry and the two workspace_settings guest-JWT key columns (required by docs/validation.md after a schema change). The edit_guest_jwt_key OpenAPI description now notes that clearing the workspace key falls back to the instance issuer (JWT_EXT_JWKS_URL) off cloud rather than necessarily stopping guest JWTs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep JWKS single-flight locks in a self-cleaning map, not a bounded cache P1 (CI review): JWKS_FETCH_LOCKS was a 200-entry quick_cache. Past 200 cold URLs it can evict a lock whose fetch is still in flight; the next request for that URL then mints a fresh lock and starts a second fetch, so cycling configured workspaces defeats single-flight and can storm the issuers. Replace it with a plain map guarded by a JwksFetchLock RAII handle that removes each entry once its last holder drops, so the map only ever holds the fetches in flight and never evicts an in-flight lock. Add a unit test pinning the shared-lock and self-cleaning invariants. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to c2270eb5fe2d9f0968253e6b460c33186363f4e7 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #773 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 5a1d9dee34159512c0823fddcd3d096490edbcce New ee-repo-ref: c2270eb5fe2d9f0968253e6b460c33186363f4e7 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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f977f5bf8b |
fix: stand the WAC park down for a cancel that beat it to the row (#10990)
* fix: stand the WAC park down for a cancel that beat it to the row Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GHfNFFJh3ozZYgyyoaEepu * refactor: share the cancel result payload with canceled_job_to_result Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GHfNFFJh3ozZYgyyoaEepu --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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54287102b2 |
fix: meter WAC compute per segment, not the whole sleep (#10985)
* fix: clear started_at when a WAC parent suspends Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AzS5d5Dc3GL49kWZPQAQCg * fix: restore started_at on the WAC dispatch rollback, fail loudly on a no-op suspend Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AzS5d5Dc3GL49kWZPQAQCg * fix: restore the pulled segment start on the WAC dispatch rollback Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AzS5d5Dc3GL49kWZPQAQCg * feat: meter WAC execution per segment instead of only the last one Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AzS5d5Dc3GL49kWZPQAQCg * fix: make the cloud feature self-sufficient per crate Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AzS5d5Dc3GL49kWZPQAQCg * chore: name windmill-common/cloud directly in the worker cloud feature Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AzS5d5Dc3GL49kWZPQAQCg --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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1e31ab3a1e |
test: fit the relock no-op tests inside the 60s worker cap (#10984)
* test: fit the relock no-op tests inside the worker timeout Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwxTTC4GsAANBjEZki2cft * test: share one wait budget in the relock no-op tests Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwxTTC4GsAANBjEZki2cft * test: bound a whole relock wait on one deadline and idle the drain Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwxTTC4GsAANBjEZki2cft * test: drop the redundant drain sleep in the relock no-op tests Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwxTTC4GsAANBjEZki2cft --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fce635d3c4 |
feat: guest app execution mode, a role that takes no seat (#10929)
* feat: guest app execution mode, a fourth role that takes no seat Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: make the guest grant a server-minted label, not a declarable scope Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * chore: pin ee-repo-ref to the guest session companion branch Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: close the relabel hole, guest embed tokens, read-path switch, custom-path entry Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guest tokens are not rescopable and guest embed tokens keep the sentinel Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guest-derived tokens share one constraint set; gate sign-in on guest discovery Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: the label alone governs a guest; refuse guests with accounts; unserialize discovery Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guest discovery fails closed; SAML aborts if the guest cookie write fails Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * refactor: enforce the guest switch once at the auth door; sign-in for a guest of another app Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guest app-mode decided once at the on-behalf resolver; clear a stale guest session before offering another app's sign-in Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: a guest may use anonymous apps; await the stale-session logout; trim comments Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: a guest's path confinement waits for the app's mode, so anonymous apps stay open to it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guest target survives http (Lax cookie), rides SAML RelayState; tell account holders on arrival * fix: a guest uses an anonymous app as itself; S3 uploads confined by app mode * fix: a guest upload needs an app policy; a missing app does not skip the confinement * fix: guests are gated on the Enterprise plan server-side; pin ee-repo-ref * fix: the guest plan gate fails closed on non-enterprise builds; settings report the effective switch * fix: guest controls read the plan, not the key; gate the guest tests on the features they need * docs: tighten the guest session invariant comments * feat: 100 free guests per 30 days, then a quarter seat each on Enterprise and a hard cap elsewhere; superadmin guest list; refusals reach the page Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: the cap is exact, an account ends a guest session at the door, popups close, and guest mode survives the CLI round trip Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * feat: a superadmin switch over guests for the whole instance; the pre-existing-user flag keeps its meaning Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: drop the dead guest-access helper, name the instance setting once, guests tab states, CE save order Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: a guest app path is refused at the mint if it could widen the scope; the instance toggle waits for its reload Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guests stop at the launched-by-me job grant; canonical app paths at the mint and discovery; the toggle ends on the stored value Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: only the scope grammar's own characters bar an app path from guests, refused at deploy as well as at the mint Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: the deploy-time guest path guard checks the destination of a rename and refuses a leading slash Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: a workspace rename keeps the guest switch; the rename guard reads the deployed mode under the row lock Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * fix: guest_activity follows a workspace rename and goes with a workspace delete Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * chore: pin ee-repo-ref to the state-bound guest target Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * chore: pin ee-repo-ref; the guest cookie is never cleared by a callback Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * docs: the workspace-scoped guest_activity delete moves an instance-wide count; assert the mint records the guest Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * test: the seeded allowance is a day old, so only the mint can write today's guest_activity row Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 1a10132e4f3cb442c7d0c2cf6e5d92d150bf6e07 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #769 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 32841072aa396bff91d30bd91854fa348cb3c439 New ee-repo-ref: 1a10132e4f3cb442c7d0c2cf6e5d92d150bf6e07 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Fable 5.1
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11138284ac |
fix: deploy a relocked script version only when its lock changed (#10966)
* fix: deploy a relocked script version only when its lock changed Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GdEb6gzCZ2qXmAQJAeMf9W * fix: write the unchanged relock hash under the row lock and skip the phantom tally Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GdEb6gzCZ2qXmAQJAeMf9W * fix: requeue a superseded relock and read the live head past the script cache Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GdEb6gzCZ2qXmAQJAeMf9W * fix: re-read the relock head after waiting on its lock and keep module locks Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GdEb6gzCZ2qXmAQJAeMf9W * fix: bound the relock head re-read instead of reading once Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GdEb6gzCZ2qXmAQJAeMf9W * chore: refresh the sqlx cache entry for the re-indented lock write Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GdEb6gzCZ2qXmAQJAeMf9W * test: pin the waiting-relock requeue and the multi-file importer no-op Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GdEb6gzCZ2qXmAQJAeMf9W --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Fable 5.1
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9b64a89cd4 |
fix: let operators use wmill.datatable() from within running jobs (#10931)
* fix: let operators use wmill.datatable() from within running jobs Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RHR4fytgt6m4q37WCXs2Rp * fix: refuse content-driven redirects and deferral in the operator datatable exemption * fix: check the datatable exemption against the expanded query, not the raw content * fix: fail closed on a language-overriding expansion and state the exemption's real scope --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Fable 5.1
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4fef1195ad |
fix: apply object-storage test SSRF validation to all non-super-admins (#10933)
* fix: apply object-storage test SSRF validation to all non-super-admins Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FJLqsE5br9r5e7qy8ULwUg * fix: name the job-token case in object-storage test rejections Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FJLqsE5br9r5e7qy8ULwUg * fix: run object-storage connection tests with a short-lived user token Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FJLqsE5br9r5e7qy8ULwUg * fix: test object-storage resources from the browser, mint a token only for the worker test Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FJLqsE5br9r5e7qy8ULwUg * fix: resolve variable and resource references before the browser-side object-storage test Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FJLqsE5br9r5e7qy8ULwUg * fix: bound the browser-side object-storage test to 15s Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FJLqsE5br9r5e7qy8ULwUg * fix: explain object-storage test rejections and name the way out Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FJLqsE5br9r5e7qy8ULwUg * fix: keep the server-resolved address out of the object-storage test rejection Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FJLqsE5br9r5e7qy8ULwUg --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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 hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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c2279db8a9 |
fix: allow job tokens to read the automate_username_creation setting (#10869)
* fix: let a job token read the automate_username_creation setting Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: use an ungated global setting as the confinement control Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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69320b28f6 |
perf: index the suspended-job resume test instead of filtering it (#10863)
* perf: index the suspended-job resume test instead of filtering it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SEUq14Wz4cC2NzcRyo6CNj * fix: keep the legacy suspended index until the replacement is recorded Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SEUq14Wz4cC2NzcRyo6CNj * perf: drop the redundant suspend_until column from the suspended index Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SEUq14Wz4cC2NzcRyo6CNj --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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46c363ffa4 |
fix: require admin on workspace tarball settings export (#10817)
* fix: require admin on workspace tarball settings export Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: name the refused flag in the settings export error Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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 Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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8a6dc27236 |
feat: configurable expiry for presigned s3 public url signatures (#10835)
* feat: configurable expiry for presigned s3 public url signatures Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015JdZFeMXLGfeFNiQgx9QvA * fix: describe expiry_secs clamping in the spec and pin the bounds in a test Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015JdZFeMXLGfeFNiQgx9QvA * fix: omit null expiry_secs from the python sdk sign request Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015JdZFeMXLGfeFNiQgx9QvA --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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3b2a6d7604 |
feat(datatables): add a down migration from the migration viewer (#10812)
* feat(datatables): add a down migration from the migration viewer Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ha889ogajX9jbqmwTaF8kD * fix(datatables): refuse an empty down migration and keep the saved one visible Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ha889ogajX9jbqmwTaF8kD * refactor(datatables): use unifiedSize on the new buttons and fix the lock comment Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ha889ogajX9jbqmwTaF8kD * fix(datatables): make the add-down exemption atomic against concurrent additions Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ha889ogajX9jbqmwTaF8kD * fix(datatables): re-test the whole observed row when an upsert skips the lock Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ha889ogajX9jbqmwTaF8kD * fix(datatables): re-test the observed row even when none was read, and sync the down draft on the leading change Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ha889ogajX9jbqmwTaF8kD --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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dc27db68de |
fix: require item read scope on workspace tarball export (#10797)
* fix: require item read scope on workspace tarball export Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: accept a wildcard path grant for whole-domain scope checks Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let a wildcard path grant delegate the unqualified scope Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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40f0cab2ad |
fix: scope capture deletion to the workspace in the request path (#10795)
* fix: scope capture deletion to the workspace in the request path Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: layer the capture fixture on base instead of duplicating it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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25d9a20630 |
fix: require an unscoped token to reach the workspace encryption key (#10798)
* fix: require an unscoped token to read the workspace encryption key Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: hold the encryption key's write path to the same token bar Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: audit a workspace export only once nothing can still reject it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: carry the new audit operation into the served openapi spec Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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01fc4f1568 |
fix: name the requested storage when a workspace storage lookup finds nothing (#10803)
* fix: name the requested storage when a workspace storage lookup finds nothing * chore: point ee-repo-ref at the merged ee commit |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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9022dc9d44 |
fix: confine job tokens to workspace-scoped API routes (#10631)
* fix: confine job tokens to workspace-scoped API routes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the object-storage connection test reachable from a job token Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the workspace-exists check the CLI makes reachable from a job Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: reconcile the job-token caps after #10124 The workspace-confinement middleware answers a workspace-less route before the privilege gate behind it runs, so the cases #10124 added on those routes now see 403 rather than 401. Rejection is what they assert, but two of them needed more than a status change: - `list_worker_groups` asserted only that the response body omits the static env value, which an error body satisfies for the wrong reason. It now asserts the status, keeping the secret check as a second assertion. - `require_super_admin` lost its only unshadowed route. `GET /api/w/{workspace}/users/list_addable` is gated solely by that call and names a workspace, so it reaches the gate and pins it at 401. The module doc states the two-layer rule once; the file covers both caps, so it is no longer named for either one alone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: correct the workspaces/exists rationale and the parquet gate note `workspace` carries no row-level security, so `exists_workspace` running through `user_db` does not filter by membership as the comment claimed. State what the route actually discloses — whether a workspace id is taken. The object-storage case explained why a 404 would satisfy the assertion for the wrong reason, which described the earlier `assert_ne!(403)`; against the 422 it now asserts, a 404 fails. Say instead why the case is gated on the feature. * fix: let a job token keep the workspace-less routes that carry no workspace Confinement refused every route outside the allowlist, including ones that answer purely from the caller's own account or from the request body. Those cross no workspace boundary, so refusing them buys nothing: - `users/email` returns a value already inside the token, and `workspaces/allowed_domain_auto_invite` tests the caller's own address against a static list. Neither opens a transaction. - `users/usage` reads the caller's own row; `users/tutorial_progress` reads and upserts a UI bitfield keyed on the same email. - `schedules/preview` takes no `ApiAuthed` at all — it computes the occurrences of the cron expression in the body and returns nothing the caller did not send. The rule, not the list, is what the doc comment states: answers from the caller's own account, the request body, or content identical for every workspace; never naming another workspace, never instance configuration. The candidates it excludes are written down with their reasons, since `users/list_invites` reads as caller-scoped until you notice the response carries a workspace id per invite. Regression covers both directions — the new entries answer, and the rejected caller-scoped reads stay refused. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: reach the privilege gates confinement hides `require_devops_role` and `require_instance_admin` gate only workspace-less routes, so confinement answers every request that would reach them: no HTTP case can tell whether they still cap job tokens, and both could lose that check with this suite green. `require_super_admin` has a workspace-scoped route to reach it; these two have none, so call them directly instead. The identity used is the fixture's real superadmin, so the passing half proves the rejection keys off `job_id` rather than off the user. Also separate two claims the write-allowlist doc had merged into one sentence: no entry writes outside the caller's own account, but what each may read differs, and the workspace-existence check answers for any id. * docs: say that the object-storage probe writes The write-allowlist lead claimed no entry writes state outside the caller's own account. `test_s3_bucket` puts an object into the store the body names and deletes it again, so it does write; a failure between the two leaves the object behind. The invariant that holds is about Windmill state. Say so in the lead, and describe the put/delete in the entry itself rather than leaving "acts only on the store the request body describes" to imply a read. * test: cover the last two job-token gates confinement hides Seven guards key on `ApiAuthed::job_id`. Three keep a workspace-scoped route and are exercised over HTTP; the other four are reachable only through workspace-less routes, which confinement now answers first, so nothing observed whether they still cap job tokens. `require_devops_role` and `require_instance_admin` were already called directly. Add the two that were not: `forbid_superadmin_job_token`, and `forbid_elevated_job_token`, whose call sites are `create_token`, `update_token_scopes` and `set_password` — all workspace-less. Both key on two conditions rather than one, so all three combinations are pinned: neither fires without job provenance, and neither fires for an unelevated identity. The second matters — collapsing either into a blanket job-token refusal would stop ordinary users creating tokens, and no other case would catch it. The doc comment records which of the seven each route covers. * docs: correct which job-token gates have no observable route The previous commit put `forbid_elevated_job_token` among the guards reachable only through workspace-less routes, and its message named three call sites. It has six, and two are workspaced: `mint_app_embed_token` and `mint_raw_app_sdk_token`. Its superadmin branch is therefore already exercised over HTTP — the 401 the embed-token case asserts is this gate. So three of the seven lack an observable route, not four. Its direct assertions stay: the embed-token case only ever reaches it with an elevated identity, and the unelevated-negative case is what would catch the gate being collapsed into a blanket job-token refusal. * test: pin is_instance_admin, and stop enumerating gates in prose `is_instance_admin` is `authed.is_admin && authed.job_id.is_none()`, so a census built by searching for `job_id.is_some()` could not see it. Both its call sites are workspace-less, and it returns a bool that selects obfuscation rather than refusing — a job token reading `true` leaks `env_vars_static` instead of being turned away. Pin both directions. The doc comment tried to account for every job-token guard and which route exercised it. It was wrong three times running: the count, the call sites of `forbid_elevated_job_token`, and the claim that the CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB case covers `is_super_admin_authed` when that path tests `job_id` inline. A table that has to be rederived from six crates to stay true does not belong in a comment, so it now states only why these calls are direct. * docs: name the right is_instance_admin caller The comment credited "the concurrency-group listing" with obfuscating rows. The second caller is `prune_concurrency_group`, which returns PermissionDenied; the obfuscating one is `list_worker_groups`. Keep the claim to that single caller, which is what makes this guard fail by leaking `env_vars_static` rather than by admitting a request. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c2deea13b7 |
fix(security): a WM_TOKEN job token can never be a global superadmin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr) (#10124)
* fix(security): a WM_TOKEN job token can never be a global superadmin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr)
Privilege escalation: an app/flow/schedule/trigger execution policy's `on_behalf_of`
(which a `wm_deployers` member can set) could point at a superadmin email. The
resulting job `WM_TOKEN` then passed the email-based superadmin checks, granting
instance superadmin. `forbid_superadmin_job_token` only guarded ~15 of ~75 routes.
Fix at the token layer: a WM_TOKEN must never satisfy a superadmin gate,
regardless of whose email it runs as (sentinel OR a real superadmin).
- `ApiAuthed` gains a `job_id` field, stamped once in `AuthCache::get_opt_job_authed`
from the resolved token's job_id (correct even on cache hits).
- `require_super_admin(db, email)` -> `require_super_admin(db, &ApiAuthed)`, rejects
`authed.job_id.is_some()`. `require_super_admin_email` kept for the few internal
callers without an ApiAuthed.
- `is_super_admin_authed(db, &ApiAuthed)` for the boolean `is_super_admin_email`
authorization branches on request handlers (workspace deletion, fork drops,
dev-workspace attach/archive, object-storage SSRF exemption, custom dbname, EE GHES
+ connected repositories, ...). Migrate ~75 sites (OSS + EE).
- CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB reads the *authenticated* job_id, not the caller-supplied
`?job_id` query param. Worker-tag check takes a precomputed job-aware `is_super_admin`
on the request path.
Execution-time on-behalf checks (scheduled/flow worker-tag, Cloud enqueue quota,
is_devops_email) are hardened in a follow-up — see
docs/followup-onbehalf-execution-privilege-hardening.md.
Regression tests: a superadmin-email WM_TOKEN is rejected on `require_super_admin`
routes, on `DELETE /workspaces/delete/{w}` (403, workspace preserved), and on the
CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB lookup with no `?job_id` (401); real superadmin tokens still succeed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap devops role at workspace admin and reject reserved on_behalf_of identities
Extends the job-token cap with three pieces:
- `require_devops_role` takes `&ApiAuthed` and rejects job tokens.
`is_devops_email` is true for superadmin emails, so every worker-management,
instance-config and service-log route was reachable by the same superadmin
`WM_TOKEN` that `require_super_admin` already rejects.
- A `job_id` claim that does not parse as a uuid rejects the token rather than
resolving to `None`, which would clear the job provenance and uncap it. Applies
to the internal JWT and the external `jwt_ext_` path.
- Defense in depth at store time: `validate_on_behalf_of` refuses the reserved
internal sentinels as an `on_behalf_of` on apps/flows/scripts/schedules/triggers,
and app execution refuses a policy carrying one — covering already-persisted and
forked-app rows that predate the cap. Deploying on behalf of a real user,
including a real superadmin, stays allowed; the cap handles that at execution.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): preserve job-token provenance when minting the proxy JWT
The MCP endpoint-tool proxy re-mints a JWT from the caller's ApiAuthed to
forward the proxied request, but passed job_id: None. A job's WM_TOKEN is
capped at workspace admin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr); dropping the job_id here
re-minted an uncapped token that satisfies require_super_admin /
require_devops_role on the proxied route (e.g. listWorkers exposing worker
IPs, job/workspace IDs, and sensitive tags).
Carry api_authed.job_id into create_jwt_token. Adds an in-module regression
that decodes the forwarded JWT and asserts the job_id is preserved for a job
caller and absent for a non-job caller.
Reported by Codex CI review (P1) on #10124.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the admin-or-devops gate at workspace admin for job tokens
require_admin_or_devops (the EE critical-alerts endpoints) grants when the
caller is a workspace admin OR an instance devops. is_devops_email is true
for superadmins, so a WM_TOKEN running on-behalf of a superadmin who is not a
member of the target workspace could clear the devops branch and read/ack that
workspace's critical alerts (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr). This gate takes a bare
email, not an ApiAuthed, so the token-layer cap could not see it.
Thread the caller's job-token provenance and reject the devops branch for job
tokens, matching require_devops_role. The workspace-admin branch stays allowed
— that is the cap ceiling. Adds an enterprise-gated regression proving the
bypass is closed and a real superadmin token still clears the gate.
Found while auditing the PR for bare-email gates the choke-point cap misses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap instance-global is_admin gates at workspace admin for job tokens
Three instance-global routes gate on the caller's own `is_admin` claim, which
`ApiAuthed.is_admin` carries into a WM_TOKEN (it is a workspace-admin claim,
true for superadmins too). A job token is capped at workspace admin
(GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr), so its is_admin claim must not authorize instance
actions on a route with no workspace binding:
- `unarchive_workspace` — unarchive an arbitrary workspace by id
- `prune_concurrency_group` — delete a global concurrency group
- `list_worker_groups` — return unobfuscated `env_vars_static` (may hold secrets)
Add job-token-aware `is_instance_admin` / `require_instance_admin` helpers (the
same shape as `require_super_admin` / `require_devops_role`) and use them at
these three sites. Workspace-scoped `require_admin(authed.is_admin, ...)` gates
are intentionally left unchanged — a workspace-admin job token is within the
cap there. Regression added covering all three; verified it lets a WM_TOKEN
unarchive/leak without the fix and is blocked with it.
Reported by Codex CI review (P1) on #10124.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): drop orphaned path_field_renames from EndpointTool test helper
The merge with main adopted main's mcp path-substitution refactor (#10162),
which removed the `path_field_renames` field from `EndpointTool` and its
consumer (`substitute_path_params` no longer takes per-field path renames).
main's `runner.rs` `ep` test helper still constructed the struct with
`path_field_renames: None`, so the workspace test build (cargo test --all,
which compiles windmill-mcp's own #[cfg(test)] module under the `server`
feature) failed with E0560. A plain `cargo check` does not compile that test
module, so it only surfaced in CI's cargo_test.
Remove the orphaned field to match the struct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: describe the sentinel-rejection policy the forged-identity test asserts
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: complete ApiAuthed initializers in feature-gated tests after merge
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: stop job tokens minting credentials that shed their provenance
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the MCP OAuth approval mint at the same elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the self-service password reset at the elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap app embed/SDK mints and scope widening at the elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep job tokens from destroying the account they run on behalf of
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: deny job tokens a foreign-workspace admin claim and workspace ejection
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: keep the follow-up inventory in the PR instead of the repo
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: make the session workspace status gate job-token aware
session_workspace_status derived its superadmin branch from a bare email
check, so a job token carrying a superadmin identity resolved the existence
of workspaces it has no relationship with rather than seeing them as
deleted. Switch to is_super_admin_authed, matching every other instance
gate reached from a request ApiAuthed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* revert: leave the global concurrency-group listing on the plain admin gate
The listing exposes concurrency keys across workspaces, which is metadata
rather than a capability, and it 401s rather than degrading. Keep the guard
on the prune route next to it, which is the destructive one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep the instance-admin gate on the global concurrency listing
The listing spans every workspace's concurrency keys, and the gate rejects
only job tokens: the !is_admin branch is the pre-existing check, so
workspaced tokens and interactive admins are unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to d30af67d38954f9012f7bad08da23e347344b4c6
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #664 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 7870573dbc3360f99bada143f094c67dce0d9e9c
New ee-repo-ref: d30af67d38954f9012f7bad08da23e347344b4c6
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: hugocasa <hugo@casademont.ch>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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f34b7fbcfa |
fix: make the listScripts parent_hash filter valid SQL (#10752)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ab3c0206d7 |
fix: support @typechecked decorator in Python relative imports (#8495)
WindmillFinder's ModuleSpec lacked origin, so __file__ was never set on loaded modules. inspect.getfile() then raised "is a built-in module", breaking typeguard's @typechecked and anything else that introspects module source. Use spec_from_file_location() which sets origin correctly. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: hugocasa <hugo@casademont.ch> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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d97f380c87 | test: stop stranding sqlx pool permits in run_in_isolated_thread (#10707) | ||
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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ee533273dd |
fix: confine jobs:run tokens to the jobs of the runnables they may start (#10635)
* fix: confine path-scoped jobs:run tokens to their runnable's jobs Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: project singlestepflow onto its runnable and confine kind-only run scopes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep every by-id job read reachable by a jobs:run token Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: whitelist the dbt and wac-approval by-id job reads for run tokens Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let an apps:run scope satisfy job-read confinement for that app's runs Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: apply run-scope confinement on top of the approval-token read bypass Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: confine the resume-secret job reads to the run scope as well Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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3f07a1a803 |
feat: let the global AI chat call connected MCP servers as the user (#10656)
* feat: let the global AI chat call connected MCP servers as the user Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review findings on the chat MCP tools Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: connect MCP servers from a predefined list in chat and agent steps Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: show the OAuth redirect URL in the instance connect settings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: clarify the OAuth redirect URL copy in instance settings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: match the instance settings warning style and drop the redirect tooltip Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: use the standard warning alert for the redirect url mismatch Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: correct the GitHub token guidance in the MCP registry Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: warn when an OAuth connect lacks the scopes an MCP server needs Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: request the connect's scopes when the oauth popup is opened directly Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: connect an oauth-app MCP server without leaving the panel Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: seed connect scopes from the instance config only Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: make the chat use only the MCP servers you turn on Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: align the MCP connect UI with the design system * feat: make a pasted url the default way to connect an mcp server * feat: show provider icons on the suggested mcp servers * fix: make both mcp sign-in paths behave the same and stop reloading on toggle * fix: clarify the mcp tool step's server field and drop its info alert * fix: name the mcp resource in the tool step and move the transport note into the connect box * fix: drop the redundant description on the mcp resource field * fix: make the mcp connections trigger icon-only * fix: scope enabled mcp servers to the account and address review nits * fix: wait for connect scopes and create session connections in the operating workspace * feat: move mcp connections into the chat's plus menu and fix review findings * fix: show mcp servers as checkboxes so off reads as a state * feat: give menu rows an on/off switch and use it for mcp servers * fix: lead the mcp menu rows with the switch * feat: keep the menu open while toggling and simplify the connect card * fix: ask for the server before the credential in the connect card * fix: show one credential path at a time in the connect card * fix: label the path field and move token guidance into its tooltip * fix: open straight into connect and keep the server menu scannable * feat: warn when an mcp connection lands outside your own space * refactor: require the workspace on the mcp connect components and rename the oauth child * fix: replace the oauth variable on reconnect and bound every mcp result * feat: show a connected server's provider icon in the connections list * feat: resolve mcp provider icons from the url and clarify the path field * style: align the mcp connect card with the design system surfaces * style: drop the redundant oauth support line and name the scopes oauth scopes * feat: keep the mcp connect card open in the connections drawer * feat: preopen the mcp connect card under the agent step resource picker * feat: resolve a typed mcp url to its registry entry and describe the token field * style: name both mcp connect actions connect * style: name the mcp oauth actions connect with the provider * style: say in the path description what the connect action will save * style: name the resource type in the mcp connect path description * feat: cache mcp provider icons and confirm disconnect in a modal * fix: keep the mcp menu switches live and the disconnect modal above the drawer * style: fall back to the plug icon in the mcp menu rows * fix: never destroy a foreign variable or resource when connecting an mcp server * fix: prove a token variable is ours before writing it and bound mcp search failures * fix: pin an mcp oauth popup to the target it was opened for * fix: bind an mcp credential to the server and popup it was requested for * fix: bound mcp tool calls with a deadline and drop stale server listings * fix: keep the disconnect confirmation handler returning void * fix: tie the mcp tool cache to the resource revision and the grant to its scopes * fix: verify mcp read-only server-side, keep oauth connector mounted Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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22eadab67d |
perf: resolve the worker external IP in the background (#10697)
* perf: resolve the worker external IP in the background `run_workers` awaited `external_ip::get_ip()` — an HTTPS GET to hub.windmill.dev — before spawning any worker, so every worker process paid that round trip before its first job pull. Measured on a CE debug build it was 120-450 ms of a ~200-500 ms startup, and behind a firewall the call does not fail fast: it burns its whole 5 s connect timeout, on every process start. That cost is per-job under EXIT_AFTER_N_JOBS. The value is informational (it is only written to `worker_ping.ip`, which the workers list displays so users can whitelist the address), so nothing needs to wait on it. It now resolves into a process-wide cache off the startup path, and `WORKER_EXTERNAL_IP` supplies it explicitly for deployments that know their egress address or have no egress at all. Until it resolves the ping carries no IP, which `insert_ping_query` now COALESCEs so a reclaimed row keeps the address the previous process wrote instead of being blanked. The main loop reports the IP as soon as it lands rather than on the next periodic tick, so a short-lived process still records it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep unknown worker IPs out of the whitelist alert Review follow-ups: - `WhitelistIp` filtered only the `'unretrievable IP'` sentinel, so the `'NO IP'` one a pending or failed lookup now leaves in the row would be offered as an address to whitelist. It filters both. - Register `WORKER_EXTERNAL_IP` in `ENV_SETTINGS` so operators can confirm from the instance settings view that it took effect. - The worker tracked whether it had reported the IP by re-reading the cache after each ping rather than remembering what the ping carried, so a lookup landing mid-ping marked it reported without it reaching the row. The value is read once and threaded through `insert_ping` / `update_worker_ping_full`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: report a sentinel IP once the lookup has definitively failed Keeping the previous process's address on a reclaimed `worker_ping` row is right while the lookup is still in flight, but not once it has failed: the row would advertise an address nothing has confirmed, and the whitelist alert would offer it. A failed lookup now reports `UNKNOWN_IP`, leaving NULL to mean "in flight". `WORKER_EXTERNAL_IP` is rejected when longer than the `varchar(50)` column rather than panicking the worker on its initial ping, which is a hard failure. Adds the regression guard for the `ON CONFLICT` semantics: reverting to `ip = EXCLUDED.ip` would compile and blank every reclaimed row. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the agent initial ping acceptable to older servers An agent worker routinely runs against a server of a different version, and one predating the background lookup rejects an initial ping carrying no IP — which `run_worker` turns into a panic, so a newly upgraded agent would crash-loop against it. The not-resolved-yet case goes over the wire as the sentinel instead, and the server maps it back so a reclaimed row still keeps its address while resolution is pending. Also documents `ip` as the one conditional exception to `insert_ping_query`'s "only `started_at` and `jobs_executed` survive a restart", and adds `WORKER_EXTERNAL_IP` to the README env-var table. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: deliver the resolved IP to servers that only take it at registration A server predating the background lookup applies `ip` from the initial ping only, and ignores it on the periodic ones. An agent registering before its lookup resolves would therefore keep the sentinel forever on such a server, where it used to report its real address. It registers a second time once the address is known, skipping that when the address is still unknown, when the server is reached over SQL and needs no second registration, or once a job has run, since registering clears the row's current job. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: re-register the resolved IP even after a job has run Gating the second registration on "this process has not run a job yet" meant an agent that pulled queued work before its lookup resolved never delivered the address to a server that only takes one at registration. No job of the worker is in flight where that runs, so the gate bought nothing beyond the last job's id, which the next job refills. Documents the two cases where WORKER_EXTERNAL_IP stops being an optimisation and becomes the only way to report an address: an agent against such a server, and a process shorter-lived than the lookup. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * revert: drop the WORKER_EXTERNAL_IP escape hatch Supplying the address by hand skips the hub lookup, which is not something to make easy. Resolving it in the background is what keeps it off the startup path; opting out of it is a separate decision this does not need to take. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: distinguish an IP never established from one that could not be retrieved `NO IP` was doing double duty: the column default for a row whose lookup has not resolved, and the marker for one that failed. An operator reading the workers list could not tell "not resolved yet" from "this instance cannot reach the hub", and the latter is the actionable one. A failed lookup now reports `unretrievable IP`, which is also what it reported before the lookup moved off the startup path. That leaves `NO IP` meaning only "no address established", which is what an agent sends while its lookup is in flight and what the server maps back to "unresolved" — so the wire sentinel no longer collides with the failure marker, and an agent delivers the failure to a server that only reads an IP at registration. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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2714210d7c |
fix: expand AZURE_DEVOPS_TOKEN placeholder in backend git probes (#10677)
* fix: expand AZURE_DEVOPS_TOKEN placeholder in backend git probes * fix: require azure token placeholder to be http userinfo * fix: scrub probe credentials from git stderr and harden token mint * fix: confine azure token placeholder to azure devops hosts * fix: require https and authorize azure reference at write time * fix: require workspace admin to configure an azure token reference * fix: name the azure reference in the admin-required error |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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71b9989daa |
feat: auto-build binaries to object storage on deployment (#10673)
* feat: auto-build binaries to object storage on deployment Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: queue the auto-build from pre-locked deploys and off the lock slot Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: materialize companion modules before a deploy-time build Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep a build job from stamping lock_error_logs on a healthy script Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: de-flake test_flow_lock_all and surface the lock error it hides Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: trim drafting history from the flow-lock fixture comments Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stop a binary build from restarting dedicated workers Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the build-job marker off the agent wire and out of user args Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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 Guilhem
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603b2012a7 |
fix: home search matches each term instead of the whole query verbatim (#10663)
* fix: home search matches each term instead of the whole query verbatim * docs: state the search term cap and drop unreachable test cases * fix: treat a term-less search as no filter and trim the comment * fix: a term-less search matches nothing instead of the whole page * feat: match the homepage fuzzy search exactly in the runnables endpoint * docs: say apostrophes stay in terms; test summary-less and draft rows * docs: separate an empty search from one holding no terms * docs: state that terms split on ASCII alphanumerics only |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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c09de594b6 |
feat: version resource values with history, diff and restore (#10596)
* feat: version resource values with history, diff and restore Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: record resource versions in a trigger so direct writes are covered Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: show the selected version's value and tighten history write access Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf: gate resource version recording in trigger WHEN clauses Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: clear a resource's past versions, and address review nits Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: restore the displayed version and keep author attribution on pooled writes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: scope history to the selected workspace and gate clearing on ownership Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: gate restore on write access and clearing on the signed-in workspace Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(frontend): share the version-history row between script and resource drawers Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf: trim resource version history in the monitor sweep, not on write Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): match the script versions drawer shell for resource history Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf(frontend): highlight version values instead of mounting monaco Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): match the script drawer's code preview presentation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: rank version trim in one windowed pass instead of a correlated delete Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(frontend): treat the newest version as current by position Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf: gate the resource version trim to an hourly sweep Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: unnest the version row action and correct the trim cadence docs * perf: cap the history listing and use sets for reference lookup * feat: warn when a resource is written more than 60 times a minute * fix: lower the resource write advisory to 20 per minute * fix: discard stale history loads and never diff against an unread value * fix: correct the write advisory boundary and document the eviction lock * fix: read history and the live value from one snapshot * refactor: read the drawer's diff baseline from versions, not the live resource * fix: open the history drawer with no version selected * fix: disarm the clear confirmation and clear the pane when the selection moves * fix: explain the missing diff and drop a guard that can no longer fire --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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5ce29b3436 |
feat: add public sharing option for job pages (#10573)
* feat: add public sharing option for job pages Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: gate public run sharing and address review findings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review nits on public run sharing Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: key public run view on workspace, job and token Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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 AlexRV12andClaude Opus 5
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8bab579665 |
stop destroying AI sessions in workspaces reached without a usr row (#10567)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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c59b60c729 |
fix: keep the same_worker pin when a suspend ends without approval (#10552)
* fix: keep the same_worker pin when a suspend ends without approval A disapproved or timed-out approval gate hands the flow back through the UpdateFlow channel with unrecoverable = true. That flag means "the previous step's worker died", and it is read by six sites. Five of them happen to want what it does here, but continue_on_same_worker and continue_with_runners do not: the worker that ran the approval step is alive, so unpinning the error handler and routing it by tag breaks the ./shared contract of a same_worker flow and can land it on a worker group that cannot run it — the same defect #10551 fixed for the three producers that hand back a live flow. Replace the boolean with StepFailureKind so the suspend producer can say "worker alive, but this failure is not the module's to handle" instead of overstating a worker death. The failed module's error policy is deliberately still bypassed: the failure is recorded against the step the gate was holding back, which never ran, so its retry would re-open the gate and its continue_on_error would skip it outright (verified: the gated step is marked Failure with a nil job id and the flow jumps past it). suspend. continue_on_disapprove_timeout remains the way to continue past a gate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(flow-editor): flag that continue on error does not cover the approval gate A resolved approval is recorded against the step the gate holds back, not the step carrying the suspend, so continue_on_error never sees it: the flow still stops on a disapproval or timeout. Point users at suspend.continue_on_disapprove_timeout, which is what actually continues past a gate, whenever both settings are on and that one is not. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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1aee22296e |
fix: keep the same_worker pin across a flow module that spawns no job (#10551)
When a module completes without spawning a job — an empty branch, an empty for-loop, or a module already marked Success — the flow hands itself back through the UpdateFlow channel, and the result processor resumed it with unrecoverable = true regardless of what sent it. That flag means "the previous step's worker died", which holds for none of the three producers except a suspend that ended without approval. The stale argument was inert until continue_on_same_worker and continue_with_runners started reading it, since when the step after such a module is pushed as an ordinary queued job. It is then routed by tag and can land on any worker in the pool, breaking both the ./shared directory contract and the guarantee that a same_worker flow stays on a worker able to run it — a step whose tag resolves to a worker group that cannot execute its language fails instantly, taking the flow with it. Carry the flag on the UpdateFlow message so each producer states its own case, rather than having the shared receiver assume the worst. The three that hand back a live flow forward whatever their caller reported, so a genuinely unrecoverable failure still crosses the hop unchanged. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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ecae9320d0 |
fix: let admins edit the dev workspace lock ruleset (#10512)
* fix: let admins edit the dev workspace lock ruleset Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: route the empty protections panel through the owning workspace Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: make protection rule rename actually apply Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: cache the renamed protection rule query for sqlx offline Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep verbatim rule names and scope parent-admin lookup to its workspace Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: store renamed protection rule names verbatim Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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d9dd036edc |
fix: stop app updates from silently converting an app between raw and low-code (#10495)
* fix: stop app updates from silently converting an app between raw and low-code * fix: lock the app row for the kind guard and route MCP away from raw apps * style: condense the restore kind-change comment |
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fb82748296 |
fix: make on_behalf_of control permissions for scripts and flows (#10438)
* fix: make on_behalf_of control permissions for scripts and flows Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: inherit the recorded on-behalf-of identity when a preserving deploy omits it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep an omitted permissioned_as from re-versioning an unchanged script Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: derive the on-behalf-of principal from the email and reject mismatched pairs Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stop workspace deploys from carrying a source-workspace principal Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: correct the onBehalfOfPermissionedAs param doc Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: pin that workspace deploys never carry a source-workspace principal Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: correct the omitted-principal contract and refresh generated prompts Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep external-superadmin principals on email-only redeploys Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: scope the recorded principal to its workspace and prefer real accounts Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: carry the recorded principal correctly through drafts and set-permissioned-as Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: sweep draft identity pairs on email change and offboarding Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: leave group identities alone when sweeping a user's email Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: treat only g/ without an email as a group, and match the offboard preview Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stop the group guard from skipping rows with no recorded principal Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: state the group guard once instead of restating it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: make the permissioned_as the only stored on-behalf-of identity Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf: skip resolving the on-behalf-of address for sync clients that discard it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address the local review of the identity refactor Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: resolve the on-behalf-of identity coherently across clones, offboarding and no-op deploys * test: pin that a fork keeps only the on-behalf-of identities that resolve in it * fix: decide a principal prefix-first everywhere and canonicalize bare addresses * fix: prefix a slash-containing address so a reader cannot take it for a group * fix: read an address as a username before the group- convention * fix: rewrite the canonical principal when an account's address moves * fix: keep the address form of a principal to accounts without a usr row * fix: reject an identity a job row cannot carry and read it uncached at dispatch * fix: count characters against the job identity width and cap the backfill * refactor: name the script/flow principal on_behalf_of, as apps do * docs: state the caller-must-authorize contract on the identity resolvers * fix: keep writing on_behalf_of_email until every worker reads the principal * fix: err high on the compatibility version and document the last resolver * fix: keep the compatibility address current through identity mutations * fix: carry the compatibility address with the principal on every copy path * chore: re-pin the EE ref to the companion branch merged with EE main * fix: key the dbt retry lookup on the stored principal * fix: keep a mixed-version address recoverable through a fork * fix: read a round-tripped address uncached so a redeploy is not rejected * fix: refuse an email change that would make a principal unenqueueable * chore: update ee-repo-ref to ac3d7d015296f041ae44ab6bc4953485f44d36e4 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #704 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 219b0b03905a1a0028054b3a4985724e77d09036 New ee-repo-ref: ac3d7d015296f041ae44ab6bc4953485f44d36e4 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszelandwindmill-internal-app[bot]
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dda59767c2 |
feat: stamp webhook trigger_kind on token-driven job runs (#10431)
* feat: stamp ui vs webhook trigger_kind on direct job runs * fix: gate ui trigger kind on min worker version and dedupe display names * docs: state that the ui trigger kind attributes rather than proves * refactor: fold the trigger fallback into one trigger_or_fallback helper * feat: hold trigger_kind as a tolerant label on the worker paths * chore: refresh the sqlx offline cache for the trigger_kind label queries * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7de7daff5eed410e0c815ad6b292d2b4303f02f2 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #700 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 974ab910d9a30c5565e1198ee312acc6d11239f3 New ee-repo-ref: 7de7daff5eed410e0c815ad6b292d2b4303f02f2 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * fix: keep the API job structs tolerant of unknown trigger kinds too * chore: point ee-repo-ref at the merged EE main --------- Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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02c4a9e515 |
fix: carry the token label into job-run audit rows (#10433)
* fix: carry the token label into job-run audit rows * docs: state the audit end-user precedence at the push signature * chore: point ee-repo-ref at the companion branch * docs: state the username/end_user split at the push signature * feat: keep the audit caller searchable when a token label takes end_user * fix: skip the caller parameter when it repeats the end user |
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Ruben Fiszel
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68a52f45a7 | refactor: deprecate username_to_email in favor of WM_END_USER_EMAIL (#10429) | ||
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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c69f08073a |
fix: add apps:run to the token scope picker and confine path-scoped app tokens (#10428)
* fix: expose apps:run in the token scope picker and let apps:write grant it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: confine path-scoped app run/write tokens to the app they name Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let apps:run read back its own app's S3 files, condense scope comments Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let apps:write mint apps:run and extend run read-back to app S3 display routes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: drop stale embed-token wording from the app S3 helper summary Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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3716a71fd7 |
fix: credit the token owner instead of the token label in the audit trail (#10423)
* fix: credit the token owner instead of the token label in the audit trail Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review findings on token-owner audit attribution Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: carry token-label provenance explicitly instead of inferring it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: point ee-repo-ref at the companion branch Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: trust only non-forgeable token labels to name the acting entity Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: reject reserved system-token labels at token creation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: narrow the token-label guard to server-minted namespaces Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: add the provenance field to the remaining ApiAuthed literals Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stop trusting the email- label, which no mint produces Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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318c9f0073 |
feat(git-sync): dedicated base url for GitHub webhook delivery (#10411)
* feat(git-sync): let GitHub webhooks register a dedicated base url Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): validate the webhook base url and apply it on change Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: pin ee ref for the git-sync webhook base url change Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): validate and reconcile the webhook base url on every write path Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): route every declarative settings writer through the same rules Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): let the reconciler own the webhook field write-back Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): make the webhook base url validators agree across UI and server Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): lock the workspace row across git_sync read-modify-writes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: pin the webhook base url validator to its server counterpart Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): retry a failed webhook move on every re-apply of the setting Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): retry pending webhook moves on every declarative re-apply Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): reject non-string webhook base urls and bound the sweep Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): reject credential-bearing webhook base urls Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): keep credentials out of webhook base url validation errors Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): redact through the last authority @ when reporting a bad url Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): stop echoing unparsed webhook base urls instead of scrubbing them Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): never echo a submitted webhook base url in validation errors Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): keep the submitted scheme out of validation errors Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(git-sync): drop the webhook sweep, surface stale receivers in settings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): refresh the stale webhook list when settings are saved Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): mark registered_url nullable and drop the duplicated field error Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: pin ee ref after dropping the reconcile lock and CAS Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): refresh the stale webhook list on category saves too Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to aa05ca8e97fc8265cd724753a80db37f83243254 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #695 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 3e6cd9226b68707233ae2434511fe5131dce808b New ee-repo-ref: aa05ca8e97fc8265cd724753a80db37f83243254 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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fbf9f04e10 |
fix: surface the real postgres error when data table migrations fail (#10371)
* fix: surface the real postgres error when data table migrations fail Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review nits on the data table migration error fix Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: name the exact grant a data table migration needs Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: quote both identifiers in the data table grant hint Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add a data table connection and privilege check to workspace settings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: report data table privileges from the capability fields, not the grant list Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: read grant targets from the server and drop the public schema guess Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: render the search_path suggestion server-side and pin the granted database Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: key the connection check on request identity, not the data table name Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: declare the data table check schema field nullable and required Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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GuilhemandClaude Opus 5
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8a96e3a4ec |
fix: raw apps with no stylesheet were permanently un-deployable (#10364)
* fix: raw apps with no stylesheet were permanently un-deployable Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep js strict when defaulting the raw app bundle css Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: drop ephemeral narration from raw app bundle regression test Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: pin the extension each raw app bundle half is fetched under Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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50da65c886 |
feat: show per-owner runnable counts in the homepage tree (WIN-2253) (#10351)
* feat: show per-owner runnable counts in the homepage tree Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: exclude pipeline members from runnable owner counts Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review findings on runnable owner counts Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: avoid tree reflow while counts load and label pipeline rows Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: drop collapsed owners' cached rows when the tree scope changes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: untrack tree owners whose node is removed Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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4b7ab64a48 |
fix: enforce per-job authorization on cancel and force_cancel endpoints (#10341)
* fix: enforce per-job authorization on cancel and force_cancel Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: authorize force_cancel on the ancestor it actually kills Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: fail closed when the force_cancel ancestor walk is truncated Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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dc5182f86c | fix: operators cannot see flows and apps on the homepage (#10340) | ||
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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9cef724ff2 |
feat: bind WAC approval urls to a named wait_for_approval step (#10317)
* feat: bind WAC approval urls to a named wait_for_approval step Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: reject duplicate WAC approval step keys instead of renaming them Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: reject WAC approval links minted for a step that is not awaiting approval Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: bind WAC approval links to the awaiting step and stop step key aliasing Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: reject empty approval keys and scope minted-key writes to the workspace Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: enforce WAC approval binding at consumption and reject colliding keys Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: make WAC approval binding and collision checks atomic, harden TS step keys Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: decrement WAC suspend atomically instead of from a pre-lock snapshot Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: add sqlx cache entry for the atomic WAC suspend decrement Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: omit empty approver param from python get_approval_urls Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: pin the suspend-snapshot decrement and the colliding-mint race Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: drop the suspend-snapshot interleave test, it cannot both be stable and discriminate Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: reject step keys that cannot be minted as a URL path segment Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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71b7135cf2 |
feat: multiple homepage sort orders via an efficient merged runnables endpoint (#10297)
Adds recently-updated / oldest / name A-Z / name Z-A sort orders to the homepage (WIN-2236), produced server-side by a new merged, index-backed, keyset-paginated GET /w/{workspace}/runnables/list so a chosen order is globally correct across scripts + flows + apps and stays efficient on large workspaces.
- Backend: UNION ALL of script/flow/app ordered by index (Merge Append + LIMIT); keyset (sort_key, path, kind, tiebreak) cursor; per-branch LIMIT bounds correlated projections; starred-first pinning; RLS + scope-token filters in SQL. Archived view returns the latest row per path. Migration adds time + lowered-name indexes (built CONCURRENTLY).
- Frontend: server-side sort/kind/owner filters + hybrid search (instant client + on-demand server pagination); file-explorer tree with every folder and your user namespace as lazy-loaded top-level nodes (per-owner "Load more", nested subfolders, bounded "expand all", in-place re-sort without collapse or flicker); the client sorts by the server fetch ordinal to reproduce the endpoint's exact order; empty state distinguishes an empty workspace from too-narrow filters.
Reviewed clean by Claude and Pi (good to merge) and Codex (mergeable).
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.8
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2143d45815 |
fix: WAC wait_for_approval reads its own approval result, not the first (#10314)
In prepare_checkpoint_for_resume the resume_job lookup took the oldest row
for the job (ORDER BY created_at ASC LIMIT 1), so a WAC workflow with
multiple sequential wait_for_approval() calls always read the first
approval's result for every step. Consumed rows are never deleted, so the
2nd and 3rd approvals inherited the 1st's result (all showed approved:true
even if the 2nd was cancelled and the 3rd timed out).
Track the resume_job row ids consumed by earlier approval steps in the
checkpoint (consumed_resume_ids) and exclude them, so each step reads its
own row. This is channel-agnostic and needs no clock reasoning:
resume_job.resume_id is only hash(step_key) for the inline resume URL; the
approval page, the in-run approve button, Slack, Teams and resume-as-owner
all store a random resume_id, so filtering by resume_id would drop those
approvals and return approved:false even for a legitimate approval. A
timed-out step matches no row and still falls to the else branch returning
{approved: false}.
Adds a regression test driving three sequential approvals (approved,
cancelled, timed-out) against Postgres.
Fixes WIN-2241
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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