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15
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5
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3d74f6ea2a |
feat: data table migration tools in ai sessions (#11723)
* feat: data table migration tools and role guidance in ai sessions Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: shared data table guidance and safer migration tool failures Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep a migration that fails to apply and let the session rewrite it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: rewrite only a pending migration and qualify fork isolation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5
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711e08c1d2 |
fix: bound the datatable migration lock wait and reap a dead holder (#11510)
* fix: bound the datatable migration lock wait and reap its dead holder Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019cpWeGy8jRMtWqvuRBpgu4 * docs: say what the migration lock keepalives cover behind a pooler Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019cpWeGy8jRMtWqvuRBpgu4 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e7fc1b2e2e |
feat: restricted job tokens per script and flow (#11484)
* feat: restricted job tokens (job_token_scopes on scripts and flows) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: admit flow-run reads, skip dedicated workers, gate on worker version Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep restricted jobs off flow runners, preserve scopes on rename and promotion Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep restricted jobs off every dedicated handoff, confine progress flow id Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: exclude restricted runnables from dedicated worker startup Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: gate restrictions on the release after 1.821.0 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: store per-job scopes on job_perms instead of v2_job, pin inline runs to the checked version Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: step-level job_token_scopes for flow steps and agent tools Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL * fix: fail closed on perms read errors, refuse restricted queue imports, gate step scopes in previews Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL * fix: carry a job's scopes on its completion so a re-run keeps the caller's cap Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL * fix: carry a zombie job's scopes into its completion Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL * fix: leave a zombie for the next sweep when its scopes cannot be read Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL * docs: correct the QueuedJobV2 completion comment Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL * fix: validate step scopes in batch flows, fail closed on unvalidated step scopes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL * fix: refuse flows with step or tool restrictions at push while an older worker is live Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL * fix: apply the step-scope worker gate to flow restarts Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL * fix: list the job token toggle with the other step and flow settings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL * chore: pin the EE companion merged with EE main Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL * perf: skip scope lookups for unrestricted jobs; list job token setting last Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL * style: rustfmt scopes tests Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL * fix: confine restricted job tokens to their own run lineage; drop remaining extra lookups Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 259ad3bfeef5285ba80eedc86309b11dca001220 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #843 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 2b77c0225dca441235daf7bf0a06ba968df0c927 New ee-repo-ref: 259ad3bfeef5285ba80eedc86309b11dca001220 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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8741843d2e |
feat: external instance cluster for data tables and Ducklake catalogs (#11197)
* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix * fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it `-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose. Naming a role exists precisely to not do that. A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a `datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments. Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it `?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation. The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under the default. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix". Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist. The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test Two review findings, both real. `attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable` returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its `?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key. `-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose name blocks the retry. Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its `resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it. Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through to the default role. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work. Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on rather than only asserting it in a comment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then `import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction. Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose name blocks the retry. That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable` now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and the stage that writes the entry only does the work. Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names, and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles. `create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a `wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included. The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an existing database always got. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database" This reverts commit |
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b7425443e1 |
fix: guard data table migration routes against operators and unauthorized authors (#11243)
* fix: refuse operators and unauthorized authors on data table migration routes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: check the replaced definition on migration upsert and skip unchanged writes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let data table admins edit migrations whose annotation no longer parses Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep migration delete idempotent when a concurrent delete wins Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Diego Imbert <70353967+diegoimbert@users.noreply.github.com> |
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0e807fb1dd |
feat: put a data table's connection under Postgres roles (#11020)
* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles
A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.
A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.
Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.
A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.
Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin
Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.
All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping
A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.
Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.
Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded
Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.
Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.
Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.
`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.
Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code
The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.
`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract
The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.
Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.
The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.
Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.
Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery
Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.
`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.
Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.
Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.
Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced
The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".
The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing
The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.
Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:
A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.
Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.
Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.
Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings
Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.
The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.
One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.
Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks
Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.
A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.
Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.
The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.
Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically
The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".
The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.
Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles
pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.
Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data
A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.
Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* nit worker error msg
* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it
`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.
A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.
Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it
`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.
The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry
The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".
Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands
Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.
The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test
Two review findings, both real.
`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.
`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy
Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.
Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.
Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist
The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.
Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created
A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.
That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.
Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database
A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.
`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"
This reverts commit
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130a2f7408 |
feat: instrument sandbox isolation, data tables and in-flow script edits (#10981)
* feat: instrument sandbox isolation, data tables and in-flow script edits Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GLnp4v49BozkDd3KeWn5Q3 * fix: address review findings on the new telemetry counters Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GLnp4v49BozkDd3KeWn5Q3 * refactor: inline single-site telemetry helpers and trim what is collected Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GLnp4v49BozkDd3KeWn5Q3 * docs: tighten the telemetry disclosure copy Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GLnp4v49BozkDd3KeWn5Q3 * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 5921c03c8e28642efd1c390f590c0dab9834fa99 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #780 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 548b5e0421a04a2d9a76cce6efc6c91b1d8560ee New ee-repo-ref: 5921c03c8e28642efd1c390f590c0dab9834fa99 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev> |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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3ce9bbc716 |
fix(datatables): stop a fork's pg_dump restore from failing silently (#10830)
* fix(datatables): stop a fork's pg_dump restore from failing silently Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018t5LRAAT6ixHkc955ifmg6 * fix(datatables): keep source ACLs when importing into a resource database Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018t5LRAAT6ixHkc955ifmg6 * fix(datatables): drop dump ownership on every import, ACLs only for instance targets Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018t5LRAAT6ixHkc955ifmg6 * fix(datatables): probe the target through psql and drop an instance source's grants Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018t5LRAAT6ixHkc955ifmg6 * fix(datatables): make a generated initial migration replayable elsewhere Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018t5LRAAT6ixHkc955ifmg6 * fix(datatables): keep a resource data table's own ACLs in its initial migration Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018t5LRAAT6ixHkc955ifmg6 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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3b2a6d7604 |
feat(datatables): add a down migration from the migration viewer (#10812)
* feat(datatables): add a down migration from the migration viewer Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ha889ogajX9jbqmwTaF8kD * fix(datatables): refuse an empty down migration and keep the saved one visible Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ha889ogajX9jbqmwTaF8kD * refactor(datatables): use unifiedSize on the new buttons and fix the lock comment Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ha889ogajX9jbqmwTaF8kD * fix(datatables): make the add-down exemption atomic against concurrent additions Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ha889ogajX9jbqmwTaF8kD * fix(datatables): re-test the whole observed row when an upsert skips the lock Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ha889ogajX9jbqmwTaF8kD * fix(datatables): re-test the observed row even when none was read, and sync the down draft on the leading change Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ha889ogajX9jbqmwTaF8kD --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c2deea13b7 |
fix(security): a WM_TOKEN job token can never be a global superadmin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr) (#10124)
* fix(security): a WM_TOKEN job token can never be a global superadmin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr)
Privilege escalation: an app/flow/schedule/trigger execution policy's `on_behalf_of`
(which a `wm_deployers` member can set) could point at a superadmin email. The
resulting job `WM_TOKEN` then passed the email-based superadmin checks, granting
instance superadmin. `forbid_superadmin_job_token` only guarded ~15 of ~75 routes.
Fix at the token layer: a WM_TOKEN must never satisfy a superadmin gate,
regardless of whose email it runs as (sentinel OR a real superadmin).
- `ApiAuthed` gains a `job_id` field, stamped once in `AuthCache::get_opt_job_authed`
from the resolved token's job_id (correct even on cache hits).
- `require_super_admin(db, email)` -> `require_super_admin(db, &ApiAuthed)`, rejects
`authed.job_id.is_some()`. `require_super_admin_email` kept for the few internal
callers without an ApiAuthed.
- `is_super_admin_authed(db, &ApiAuthed)` for the boolean `is_super_admin_email`
authorization branches on request handlers (workspace deletion, fork drops,
dev-workspace attach/archive, object-storage SSRF exemption, custom dbname, EE GHES
+ connected repositories, ...). Migrate ~75 sites (OSS + EE).
- CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB reads the *authenticated* job_id, not the caller-supplied
`?job_id` query param. Worker-tag check takes a precomputed job-aware `is_super_admin`
on the request path.
Execution-time on-behalf checks (scheduled/flow worker-tag, Cloud enqueue quota,
is_devops_email) are hardened in a follow-up — see
docs/followup-onbehalf-execution-privilege-hardening.md.
Regression tests: a superadmin-email WM_TOKEN is rejected on `require_super_admin`
routes, on `DELETE /workspaces/delete/{w}` (403, workspace preserved), and on the
CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB lookup with no `?job_id` (401); real superadmin tokens still succeed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap devops role at workspace admin and reject reserved on_behalf_of identities
Extends the job-token cap with three pieces:
- `require_devops_role` takes `&ApiAuthed` and rejects job tokens.
`is_devops_email` is true for superadmin emails, so every worker-management,
instance-config and service-log route was reachable by the same superadmin
`WM_TOKEN` that `require_super_admin` already rejects.
- A `job_id` claim that does not parse as a uuid rejects the token rather than
resolving to `None`, which would clear the job provenance and uncap it. Applies
to the internal JWT and the external `jwt_ext_` path.
- Defense in depth at store time: `validate_on_behalf_of` refuses the reserved
internal sentinels as an `on_behalf_of` on apps/flows/scripts/schedules/triggers,
and app execution refuses a policy carrying one — covering already-persisted and
forked-app rows that predate the cap. Deploying on behalf of a real user,
including a real superadmin, stays allowed; the cap handles that at execution.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): preserve job-token provenance when minting the proxy JWT
The MCP endpoint-tool proxy re-mints a JWT from the caller's ApiAuthed to
forward the proxied request, but passed job_id: None. A job's WM_TOKEN is
capped at workspace admin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr); dropping the job_id here
re-minted an uncapped token that satisfies require_super_admin /
require_devops_role on the proxied route (e.g. listWorkers exposing worker
IPs, job/workspace IDs, and sensitive tags).
Carry api_authed.job_id into create_jwt_token. Adds an in-module regression
that decodes the forwarded JWT and asserts the job_id is preserved for a job
caller and absent for a non-job caller.
Reported by Codex CI review (P1) on #10124.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the admin-or-devops gate at workspace admin for job tokens
require_admin_or_devops (the EE critical-alerts endpoints) grants when the
caller is a workspace admin OR an instance devops. is_devops_email is true
for superadmins, so a WM_TOKEN running on-behalf of a superadmin who is not a
member of the target workspace could clear the devops branch and read/ack that
workspace's critical alerts (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr). This gate takes a bare
email, not an ApiAuthed, so the token-layer cap could not see it.
Thread the caller's job-token provenance and reject the devops branch for job
tokens, matching require_devops_role. The workspace-admin branch stays allowed
— that is the cap ceiling. Adds an enterprise-gated regression proving the
bypass is closed and a real superadmin token still clears the gate.
Found while auditing the PR for bare-email gates the choke-point cap misses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap instance-global is_admin gates at workspace admin for job tokens
Three instance-global routes gate on the caller's own `is_admin` claim, which
`ApiAuthed.is_admin` carries into a WM_TOKEN (it is a workspace-admin claim,
true for superadmins too). A job token is capped at workspace admin
(GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr), so its is_admin claim must not authorize instance
actions on a route with no workspace binding:
- `unarchive_workspace` — unarchive an arbitrary workspace by id
- `prune_concurrency_group` — delete a global concurrency group
- `list_worker_groups` — return unobfuscated `env_vars_static` (may hold secrets)
Add job-token-aware `is_instance_admin` / `require_instance_admin` helpers (the
same shape as `require_super_admin` / `require_devops_role`) and use them at
these three sites. Workspace-scoped `require_admin(authed.is_admin, ...)` gates
are intentionally left unchanged — a workspace-admin job token is within the
cap there. Regression added covering all three; verified it lets a WM_TOKEN
unarchive/leak without the fix and is blocked with it.
Reported by Codex CI review (P1) on #10124.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): drop orphaned path_field_renames from EndpointTool test helper
The merge with main adopted main's mcp path-substitution refactor (#10162),
which removed the `path_field_renames` field from `EndpointTool` and its
consumer (`substitute_path_params` no longer takes per-field path renames).
main's `runner.rs` `ep` test helper still constructed the struct with
`path_field_renames: None`, so the workspace test build (cargo test --all,
which compiles windmill-mcp's own #[cfg(test)] module under the `server`
feature) failed with E0560. A plain `cargo check` does not compile that test
module, so it only surfaced in CI's cargo_test.
Remove the orphaned field to match the struct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: describe the sentinel-rejection policy the forged-identity test asserts
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: complete ApiAuthed initializers in feature-gated tests after merge
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: stop job tokens minting credentials that shed their provenance
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the MCP OAuth approval mint at the same elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the self-service password reset at the elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap app embed/SDK mints and scope widening at the elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep job tokens from destroying the account they run on behalf of
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: deny job tokens a foreign-workspace admin claim and workspace ejection
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: keep the follow-up inventory in the PR instead of the repo
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: make the session workspace status gate job-token aware
session_workspace_status derived its superadmin branch from a bare email
check, so a job token carrying a superadmin identity resolved the existence
of workspaces it has no relationship with rather than seeing them as
deleted. Switch to is_super_admin_authed, matching every other instance
gate reached from a request ApiAuthed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* revert: leave the global concurrency-group listing on the plain admin gate
The listing exposes concurrency keys across workspaces, which is metadata
rather than a capability, and it 401s rather than degrading. Keep the guard
on the prune route next to it, which is the destructive one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep the instance-admin gate on the global concurrency listing
The listing spans every workspace's concurrency keys, and the gate rejects
only job tokens: the !is_admin branch is the pre-existing check, so
workspaced tokens and interactive admins are unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to d30af67d38954f9012f7bad08da23e347344b4c6
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #664 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 7870573dbc3360f99bada143f094c67dce0d9e9c
New ee-repo-ref: d30af67d38954f9012f7bad08da23e347344b4c6
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: hugocasa <hugo@casademont.ch>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Ruben Fiszelandwindmill-internal-app[bot]
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bfc3f5242a |
feat: sync data table migrations to git, gated by a new object type (#10436)
* fix: auto-sync data table migrations to the linked git repo * fix: deploy data table migrations when a data table is renamed or deleted * fix: hold new data table names to the git-sync-safe charset * fix: reject leading-dot data table names and warn on unsyncable legacy names * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 15c9eef2a4f867eb90d841aee1ce762f4b725589 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #702 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: e2fb073a3d0057683666424e463b2ce423664caa New ee-repo-ref: 15c9eef2a4f867eb90d841aee1ce762f4b725589 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * feat: make data table migrations a git-sync object type with its own toggle * fix: never let an untracked checkout delete data table migrations on push * fix: confirm ambiguous data table migration deletions instead of dropping them * fix: settle ambiguous migration deletions before the dry-run preview prints * fix: restore the split shared-UI comment and count migration records in prompts * chore: keep the deletion-safety doc block attached to its function * fix: trust git history, not the working tree, for migration deletions * fix: scope migration history to HEAD, detect shallow clones and subdir roots * chore: give the unattested-history case a remedy that applies to it * chore: pair each unattested-history cause with its own remedy * fix: treat a sparse checkout as unattested history for migration deletions * fix: normalize the sparse-checkout boolean and give it a remedy that works * chore: describe both shapes of unattested migration history * chore: update ee-repo-ref to a786cd42b5aaf0aa6789fbb723d956560f93b1b3 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #703 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 4f312642b5d8fd37ab5e20473a011d6f1d299cf6 New ee-repo-ref: a786cd42b5aaf0aa6789fbb723d956560f93b1b3 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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02c4a9e515 |
fix: carry the token label into job-run audit rows (#10433)
* fix: carry the token label into job-run audit rows * docs: state the audit end-user precedence at the push signature * chore: point ee-repo-ref at the companion branch * docs: state the username/end_user split at the push signature * feat: keep the audit caller searchable when a token label takes end_user * fix: skip the caller parameter when it repeats the end user |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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61f2d8dc6a |
feat: let the merge UI target an arbitrary workspace (#10417)
* feat: let the merge UI target an arbitrary workspace Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the target picker reachable when a comparison fails Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review findings on the arbitrary merge target Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: collapse app/raw-app conversions and offer a comparison retry Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: make a re-scan replace the candidate set and keep retry reachable Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: drop destructive rows from the selection when a recompute flips them Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep bulk selection and refreshes out of the removal opt-in Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: serialize a full scan against dev attachment on the same pair Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the compare view reachable from drafts and prune stale selections Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: make the destination badge the target picker and reorder the settings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: render the destination trigger as the same badge as the source Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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fbf9f04e10 |
fix: surface the real postgres error when data table migrations fail (#10371)
* fix: surface the real postgres error when data table migrations fail Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review nits on the data table migration error fix Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: name the exact grant a data table migration needs Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: quote both identifiers in the data table grant hint Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add a data table connection and privilege check to workspace settings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: report data table privileges from the capability fields, not the grant list Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: read grant targets from the server and drop the public schema guess Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: render the search_path suggestion server-side and pin the granted database Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: key the connection check on request identity, not the data table name Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: declare the data table check schema field nullable and required Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e47aedac0a |
feat: add SQL migrations for data tables (#9693)
* feat: add datatable_migrations table * feat: add route to run datatable migrations * feat: sync datatable migrations as .up.sql/.down.sql files * feat: add datatable migrate up/down commands and post-push run prompt * feat: add datatable migrate new command to scaffold migrations * feat: add datatable migrations management UI * feat: prompt to create migration on DDL in datatable SQL editors * feat: support running a single specific datatable migration * feat: view migration content, run single migration, fix stacked modal * feat: per-row revert button with out-of-order warning * fix: avoid migrations list flicker on refresh after an action * feat: generate initial datatable migration via pg_dump * fix: surface datatable migration API error details in toasts * fix: revert created migration if create-and-run fails to run * fix: include postgres error detail in migration run/rollback failures * feat: sync datatable migrations as files via the workspace export * refactor: move datatable migrations to migrations/datatable/ path * fix: drop redundant datatable_migration label in sync output * fix: exclude datatable migration sql files from script metadata generation * feat: run datatable migrations as user-permissioned labeled jobs * feat: reject invalid datatable migrations on sync push * feat: datatable migrate up/down default to all datatables, --datatable to target one * fix: surface postgres error detail when datatable migrations fail to run * chore: regenerate CLI docs for datatable migrate commands * feat: default new datatable migration to a BEGIN/END transaction template * fix: validate datatable migration name and datatable at the API boundary * fix: ensure detected DDL ends with semicolon when wrapped in transaction * fix: re-prompt instead of stripping DDL when new-migration modal is cancelled * feat: refresh datatable schema after running a migration from the SQL REPL * feat: record db manager DDL on data tables as migrations * feat: make datatable migrations opt-in per data table * fix: make migration view editor read-only so its code can scroll * fix: don't re-prompt DDL guard when creating a migration without running * feat: generate down migrations for db manager DDL (postgres) * fix: correct down migration for db manager alters (no double-wrap, serial) * feat: explain migrations purpose with a tooltip in the migrations modal * compare paeg * feat: add datatable_migration kind to workspace diff pipeline * chore: point ee-repo-ref at datatable_migration git-sync companion * fix: harden datatable migration version allocation and initial-migration bookkeeping, add tests * feat: deploy and run datatable migrations on workspace merge Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Refactor + handle datatable setting delete/rename * refactor: move datatable migration rename/delete cascade into module Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(windmill-utils-internal): bump to 1.7.1 for datatable migration deploy provider methods Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(db-manager): add Migrations button to top bar, make Refresh icon-only Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * BEGIN/END placeholder in down migration * feat: autofocus migration name input and flag it red when empty Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(datatable-migrations): allow non-admins to create/run/revert migrations, gate only opt in/out Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * border nits * refresh db manager schema on migrations * BEGIN/END scaffold in CLI * feat(cli): push local datatable migrations before running on migrate up Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: flag invalid migration name with red border, not just empty Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: drop random slug from auto-generated migration names Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: offer revert-and-delete when deleting an installed migration Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: record fork merge as a migration when target datatable opts in * nit * clone migrations on fork * windmill-utils-internal * fix(datatable-migrations): serialize run/rollback with a per-db advisory lock Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(db-manager): fail closed when migrations-status check errors on DDL apply Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: fix generate_initial migration ordering comment to match code * chore(datatable-migrations): remove unused update_datatable_migrations endpoint Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: run DDL migration guard on the script editor Test button Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * split * ee-repo-ref * chore(frontend): sync package-lock with package.json (@emnapi deps) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatable-migrations): never resolve instance credentials into migration job args datatable_database_arg eagerly resolved instance data-table credentials (including the shared instance-wide Postgres password) and passed them as the migration job's plaintext `database` arg, landing in v2_job.args. Since the run route has no admin gate, a non-admin could run a migration and read args.database to recover the password, granting cross-workspace psql access to all instance data-table DBs. Pass a `datatable://<name>` reference for both resource-backed and instance data tables instead; the pg executor already resolves it to real credentials server-side at run time, so nothing sensitive is ever stored in the job args. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * nit * fix: handle dollar-quoting and comments when splitting SQL statements * feat: deploy datatable migrations on merge with explicit opt-in error * fix(frontend): sync package-lock with npm 11 peer-dep resolution npm ci failed with 'Missing: @emnapi/core@1.11.2 / @emnapi/runtime@1.11.2 from lock file'. @napi-rs/wasm-runtime declares @emnapi/core|runtime ^1.7.1 as peerDependencies while @rolldown/binding-wasm32-wasi pins them to exactly 1.10.0. Newer npm (bundled with node 24 in CI) installs the peer deps at the highest match (1.11.2) alongside rolldown's nested 1.10.0, so the ideal tree needs both versions; the committed lock only had 1.10.0. Regenerate the lock with npm 11.18 so it carries both 1.11.2 (top-level, for the peer deps) and 1.10.0 (nested, for rolldown's pin). Verified npm ci passes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * nit npm publish * fix: fail closed on migrations-status error in fork schema merge * nit CI emnapi/core version * prevent initial_datatable_migration if migrations already exist * fix(datatable-migrations): validate persisted data table names as path segments edit_datatable_config only validated rename segments, not the actual settings.datatables keys, so a data table could be saved directly under a name like '..' or one containing '/'. Since new tables default to migrations_enabled = true, generate_initial_datatable_migration would then insert a migration row and the sync export would build migrations/datatable/<name>/... paths from that name, producing malformed or directory-escaping export paths. Validate every persisted data table name in edit_datatable_config (alongside the existing rename checks) and add validate_datatable_path_segment to generate_initial_datatable_migration for defense in depth. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: scope datatable _wm_migrations by data table and cascade renames/deletes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(system_prompts): resolve nested local command groups in CLI docs generator The CLI docs generator anchored on the first `new Command()` in a file and never resolved locally-defined command groups passed as `.command("name", localCmd)`. For datatable this flattened the nested `migrate` group: it emitted `datatable new/up/down` plus a bare `datatable migrate`, and mislabeled the datatable command with the migrate group's description. jobs was broken the same way (its description was pull's, and pull/push rendered empty). Anchor block extraction on the `export default`ed command, recurse into locally-defined `const x = new Command()` groups mounted as subcommands, and render nested sub-subcommands. Regenerated docs now show `datatable migrate new/up/down` and `jobs pull/push` with their real options. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: drop unreleased _wm_migrations legacy-upgrade handling Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: return datatable migration SQL from getItemValue for the diff drawer Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(frontend): use windmill-utils-internal 1.8.2 for migration diff drawer Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * nit * nit * fix: handle datatable migration renames on push and dedupe timestamps * fix: reject rewriting an already-applied datatable migration on upsert Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): add missing @emnapi/core and @emnapi/runtime lockfile entries Resolves npm ci EUSAGE failure: the optional cpu:wasm32 @rolldown/binding-wasm32-wasi declares deps on @emnapi/core@1.11.2 and @emnapi/runtime@1.11.2 that had no resolved lockfile entries. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(cli): datatable migrate up/down default to main datatable, not all Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: fail closed when applied status unreadable on datatable migration rewrite Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: surface full error detail in Database Manager DDL/query errors * "See migration" button in the toast * feat: add Enter shortcut to Create-a-migration in the DDL guard * fix(frontend): warn before running a newly-created datatable migration out of order The row-level Run action warns when earlier migrations are still pending, but the create-and-run paths ran a just-created migration with `only` directly, applying it ahead of older pending migrations without that confirmation. Reuse the same "Run migration out of order" confirmation across all create-and-run paths via a shared helper (datatableMigrationUtils): - NewDataTableMigrationModal "Create and run" (and the DDL guard path) - DatatableSchemaDiff fork→parent merge - dbOps schema ops (DB manager create/alter/drop) — the pure factory throws a MigrationRunCancelled sentinel on decline, which DBTableEditor treats as a silent cancel Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep renamed datatable migrations visible in compare view * fix: record per-migration deployment on datatable migrations disable * fix(cli): run deployed datatable migrations after workspace merge The merge command upserted datatable_migration definitions into the target workspace and reported the item as successfully deployed, but never ran the migrations. For forked datatables backed by separate databases, this left the target schema unchanged until someone manually ran `wmill datatable migrate up`, while the CLI reported a successful merge. Collect the datatable migrations deployed (not deleted) into the target and, after the deploy loop, offer to run them via the existing offerToRunNewMigrations helper — the same post-deploy run prompt the push/sync path uses (interactive only; `--yes`/non-TTY skip the mutating run, matching push behavior). Export parseDatatableMigrationDeployPath so the merge path can parse the deployed items. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(backend): serialize datatable migration edits/deletes with the run lock A migration run snapshots a migration's code_up from datatable_migrations and only records its version in the data table's _wm_migrations after the job succeeds. upsert_datatable_migration checked _wm_migrations before allowing an edit but took no lock, so a concurrent edit could read "not applied yet", rewrite code_up/code_down, and then the in-flight run would record the version for the old SQL — leaving _wm_migrations pointing at SQL that was never applied (migrate up then skips it; rollback runs a down that doesn't match). Serialize definition rewrites and deletes with the same per-database advisory lock the run/rollback paths use: - Factor the connect+advisory-lock into lock_datatable_migration_runs and the applied-versions read into read_applied_versions_on_client. - run_datatable_migrations now snapshots the definitions AFTER taking the lock, so code_up can't change between snapshot and version-record. - upsert (when changing an existing def) and delete take the lock across the applied-check and the write; delete now rejects deleting an already-applied migration (would orphan its _wm_migrations record), symmetric with upsert. Both fail closed if the data table database is unreachable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): stack the out-of-order migration confirm above the DB editor preview Creating a table on a migrations-enabled data table opened the DB table editor's "Confirm running the following" preview modal, whose confirm triggers applyDdl, which then asks for out-of-order confirmation. Both are ConfirmationModals with a hardcoded z-[9999]; the out-of-order one lives in DBManagerContent (mounted before the editor), so it rendered behind the still-open preview modal. Add an optional zIndexClass prop to ConfirmationModal (default z-[9999], backward-compatible) and give the DB-manager out-of-order confirm z-[10000] so it stacks on top. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 27672e37df5d9dfde94f19963d5ffcdf8dd5448c This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #623 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 6c287041cd7edd4a77a4bc07ad0e156cec32cce4 New ee-repo-ref: 27672e37df5d9dfde94f19963d5ffcdf8dd5448c Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |