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0e807fb1dd |
feat: put a data table's connection under Postgres roles (#11020)
* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles
A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.
A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.
Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.
A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.
Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin
Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.
All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping
A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.
Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.
Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded
Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.
Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.
Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.
`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.
Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code
The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.
`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract
The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.
Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.
The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.
Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.
Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery
Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.
`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.
Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.
Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.
Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced
The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".
The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing
The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.
Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:
A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.
Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.
Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.
Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings
Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.
The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.
One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.
Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks
Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.
A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.
Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.
The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.
Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically
The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".
The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.
Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles
pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.
Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data
A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.
Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* nit worker error msg
* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it
`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.
A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.
Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it
`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.
The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry
The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".
Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands
Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.
The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test
Two review findings, both real.
`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.
`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy
Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.
Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.
Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist
The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.
Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created
A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.
That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.
Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database
A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.
`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"
This reverts commit
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 Ruben Fiszelandwindmill-internal-app[bot]
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e3e638f7f5 |
fix: skip instance group members that are not email addresses (#11128)
* fix: skip instance group members that are not email addresses * fix: keep provisioned members whose address only proper_email accepts * fix: judge instance group members by a mirror of the usr email constraint * fix: fold ascii only in the proper_email mirror, like the constraint * fix: let the database judge which instance group members usr will store * fix: cut a derived username to the column width so a long local part can be provisioned * chore: move the ee pin to the scim member doc fix * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 0780955effb657807d14f0eb503cba1d49cee007 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #801 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: ee6452d489563204a98df883703f78d5e74cdd69 New ee-repo-ref: 0780955effb657807d14f0eb503cba1d49cee007 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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ee9e550a48 |
feat(git-sync): sync extra_perms for variables (#11004)
* feat(git-sync): sync extra_perms for variables Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hvv5B8VP5Di4dbcCiVyZyE * refactor: trim the variable ACL-sync comment to the 4-line limit Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hvv5B8VP5Di4dbcCiVyZyE * test: cover the revoke direction of variable extra_perms sync Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hvv5B8VP5Di4dbcCiVyZyE --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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 GuilhemandClaude Opus 5
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5d5ad4e897 |
feat: edit folders and groups in a drawer that saves once (#10873)
* fix: portal the confirmation modal so drawers cannot cover it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K9UCPLT4t8PmrWunjfFsPW * fix: log a folder acl grant under the permission it granted Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K9UCPLT4t8PmrWunjfFsPW * fix: keep a table's actions column at its right edge Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K9UCPLT4t8PmrWunjfFsPW * feat: edit a folder in a drawer that saves once Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K9UCPLT4t8PmrWunjfFsPW * refactor: call the people on a folder or item members Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K9UCPLT4t8PmrWunjfFsPW * fix: edit a folder against the workspace the drawer targets Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K9UCPLT4t8PmrWunjfFsPW * refactor: drop the now-unused sticky actions column Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K9UCPLT4t8PmrWunjfFsPW * docs: correct the script editor drawer's modal placement note Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K9UCPLT4t8PmrWunjfFsPW * fix: pin the actions column without losing the row's hover tint Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K9UCPLT4t8PmrWunjfFsPW * feat: show the pinned column's seam only while the table overflows Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K9UCPLT4t8PmrWunjfFsPW * fix: draw the pinned column's seam as a shadow so it does not scroll away Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K9UCPLT4t8PmrWunjfFsPW * fix: fade the pinned column's tint in step with its row Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K9UCPLT4t8PmrWunjfFsPW * refactor: address review nits on the folder editor and pinned cell Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K9UCPLT4t8PmrWunjfFsPW * fix: keep the folder draft across a user-store refresh Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K9UCPLT4t8PmrWunjfFsPW * refactor: extract and test the folder draft's dirty check and permission diff Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K9UCPLT4t8PmrWunjfFsPW * fix: stop the folder editor showing state the server refused Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K9UCPLT4t8PmrWunjfFsPW * fix: keep a folder draft that no request ever reached the server Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01K9UCPLT4t8PmrWunjfFsPW * fix: keep unapplied folder edits dirty when a save partially fails * fix: block folder form edits while a save is in flight * fix: commit a typed folder label before save snapshots the draft * fix: count a typed folder label as an unsaved change * fix: keep escape in the label input from closing what encloses it * fix: capitalize folder table headers and drop a dead portal target * refactor: make the confirmation modal portal opt-in per call site * docs: name the stacking context that actually traps the discard dialog * fix: report a half-landed member removal so the baseline reconciles * feat: edit a group in a drawer that saves once * fix: freeze the group name once the group exists * fix: revoke the caller's own group acl last so the rest of the save is authorized * docs: state the group call-ordering invariant once * fix: report a failing post-save reload instead of dropping the rejection * fix: hand the folder list reload back so a failure is reported * fix: treat a rejected group create as inconclusive and catch a throwing onSaved * revert: stop inferring a group was created from its name being taken * fix: say when a failed group create may have saved the group anyway * fix: key the may-have-been-created hint on the name conflict, not the status * fix: skip the may-have-been-created hint when the group is known to exist * feat: open a folder's group member from its row * fix: stop showing the caller as an admin when the read failed * fix: give up the caller's own folder admin last, and label a create as one * fix: drop a folder member's acl before its owner entry * fix: remove a folder owner before their acl, and correct the rls rationale * docs: say the refusal is on the caller's last admin handle * fix: defer only the folder rows the caller is an admin through * docs: describe callerOwners as what the caller passes in * docs: drop the call-site restatement of the diff's own invariant * docs: record manager as a legacy group role * fix: treat a sent request as possibly committed when reconciling * fix: reconcile on any failed edit, and compare members as a set * fix: keep write access when only the reconcile read fails --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c2deea13b7 |
fix(security): a WM_TOKEN job token can never be a global superadmin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr) (#10124)
* fix(security): a WM_TOKEN job token can never be a global superadmin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr)
Privilege escalation: an app/flow/schedule/trigger execution policy's `on_behalf_of`
(which a `wm_deployers` member can set) could point at a superadmin email. The
resulting job `WM_TOKEN` then passed the email-based superadmin checks, granting
instance superadmin. `forbid_superadmin_job_token` only guarded ~15 of ~75 routes.
Fix at the token layer: a WM_TOKEN must never satisfy a superadmin gate,
regardless of whose email it runs as (sentinel OR a real superadmin).
- `ApiAuthed` gains a `job_id` field, stamped once in `AuthCache::get_opt_job_authed`
from the resolved token's job_id (correct even on cache hits).
- `require_super_admin(db, email)` -> `require_super_admin(db, &ApiAuthed)`, rejects
`authed.job_id.is_some()`. `require_super_admin_email` kept for the few internal
callers without an ApiAuthed.
- `is_super_admin_authed(db, &ApiAuthed)` for the boolean `is_super_admin_email`
authorization branches on request handlers (workspace deletion, fork drops,
dev-workspace attach/archive, object-storage SSRF exemption, custom dbname, EE GHES
+ connected repositories, ...). Migrate ~75 sites (OSS + EE).
- CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB reads the *authenticated* job_id, not the caller-supplied
`?job_id` query param. Worker-tag check takes a precomputed job-aware `is_super_admin`
on the request path.
Execution-time on-behalf checks (scheduled/flow worker-tag, Cloud enqueue quota,
is_devops_email) are hardened in a follow-up — see
docs/followup-onbehalf-execution-privilege-hardening.md.
Regression tests: a superadmin-email WM_TOKEN is rejected on `require_super_admin`
routes, on `DELETE /workspaces/delete/{w}` (403, workspace preserved), and on the
CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB lookup with no `?job_id` (401); real superadmin tokens still succeed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap devops role at workspace admin and reject reserved on_behalf_of identities
Extends the job-token cap with three pieces:
- `require_devops_role` takes `&ApiAuthed` and rejects job tokens.
`is_devops_email` is true for superadmin emails, so every worker-management,
instance-config and service-log route was reachable by the same superadmin
`WM_TOKEN` that `require_super_admin` already rejects.
- A `job_id` claim that does not parse as a uuid rejects the token rather than
resolving to `None`, which would clear the job provenance and uncap it. Applies
to the internal JWT and the external `jwt_ext_` path.
- Defense in depth at store time: `validate_on_behalf_of` refuses the reserved
internal sentinels as an `on_behalf_of` on apps/flows/scripts/schedules/triggers,
and app execution refuses a policy carrying one — covering already-persisted and
forked-app rows that predate the cap. Deploying on behalf of a real user,
including a real superadmin, stays allowed; the cap handles that at execution.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): preserve job-token provenance when minting the proxy JWT
The MCP endpoint-tool proxy re-mints a JWT from the caller's ApiAuthed to
forward the proxied request, but passed job_id: None. A job's WM_TOKEN is
capped at workspace admin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr); dropping the job_id here
re-minted an uncapped token that satisfies require_super_admin /
require_devops_role on the proxied route (e.g. listWorkers exposing worker
IPs, job/workspace IDs, and sensitive tags).
Carry api_authed.job_id into create_jwt_token. Adds an in-module regression
that decodes the forwarded JWT and asserts the job_id is preserved for a job
caller and absent for a non-job caller.
Reported by Codex CI review (P1) on #10124.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the admin-or-devops gate at workspace admin for job tokens
require_admin_or_devops (the EE critical-alerts endpoints) grants when the
caller is a workspace admin OR an instance devops. is_devops_email is true
for superadmins, so a WM_TOKEN running on-behalf of a superadmin who is not a
member of the target workspace could clear the devops branch and read/ack that
workspace's critical alerts (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr). This gate takes a bare
email, not an ApiAuthed, so the token-layer cap could not see it.
Thread the caller's job-token provenance and reject the devops branch for job
tokens, matching require_devops_role. The workspace-admin branch stays allowed
— that is the cap ceiling. Adds an enterprise-gated regression proving the
bypass is closed and a real superadmin token still clears the gate.
Found while auditing the PR for bare-email gates the choke-point cap misses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap instance-global is_admin gates at workspace admin for job tokens
Three instance-global routes gate on the caller's own `is_admin` claim, which
`ApiAuthed.is_admin` carries into a WM_TOKEN (it is a workspace-admin claim,
true for superadmins too). A job token is capped at workspace admin
(GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr), so its is_admin claim must not authorize instance
actions on a route with no workspace binding:
- `unarchive_workspace` — unarchive an arbitrary workspace by id
- `prune_concurrency_group` — delete a global concurrency group
- `list_worker_groups` — return unobfuscated `env_vars_static` (may hold secrets)
Add job-token-aware `is_instance_admin` / `require_instance_admin` helpers (the
same shape as `require_super_admin` / `require_devops_role`) and use them at
these three sites. Workspace-scoped `require_admin(authed.is_admin, ...)` gates
are intentionally left unchanged — a workspace-admin job token is within the
cap there. Regression added covering all three; verified it lets a WM_TOKEN
unarchive/leak without the fix and is blocked with it.
Reported by Codex CI review (P1) on #10124.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): drop orphaned path_field_renames from EndpointTool test helper
The merge with main adopted main's mcp path-substitution refactor (#10162),
which removed the `path_field_renames` field from `EndpointTool` and its
consumer (`substitute_path_params` no longer takes per-field path renames).
main's `runner.rs` `ep` test helper still constructed the struct with
`path_field_renames: None`, so the workspace test build (cargo test --all,
which compiles windmill-mcp's own #[cfg(test)] module under the `server`
feature) failed with E0560. A plain `cargo check` does not compile that test
module, so it only surfaced in CI's cargo_test.
Remove the orphaned field to match the struct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: describe the sentinel-rejection policy the forged-identity test asserts
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: complete ApiAuthed initializers in feature-gated tests after merge
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: stop job tokens minting credentials that shed their provenance
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the MCP OAuth approval mint at the same elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the self-service password reset at the elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap app embed/SDK mints and scope widening at the elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep job tokens from destroying the account they run on behalf of
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: deny job tokens a foreign-workspace admin claim and workspace ejection
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: keep the follow-up inventory in the PR instead of the repo
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: make the session workspace status gate job-token aware
session_workspace_status derived its superadmin branch from a bare email
check, so a job token carrying a superadmin identity resolved the existence
of workspaces it has no relationship with rather than seeing them as
deleted. Switch to is_super_admin_authed, matching every other instance
gate reached from a request ApiAuthed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* revert: leave the global concurrency-group listing on the plain admin gate
The listing exposes concurrency keys across workspaces, which is metadata
rather than a capability, and it 401s rather than degrading. Keep the guard
on the prune route next to it, which is the destructive one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep the instance-admin gate on the global concurrency listing
The listing spans every workspace's concurrency keys, and the gate rejects
only job tokens: the !is_admin branch is the pre-existing check, so
workspaced tokens and interactive admins are unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to d30af67d38954f9012f7bad08da23e347344b4c6
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #664 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 7870573dbc3360f99bada143f094c67dce0d9e9c
New ee-repo-ref: d30af67d38954f9012f7bad08da23e347344b4c6
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: hugocasa <hugo@casademont.ch>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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b5510333ea |
fix(groups): replace instance-group delta-patching with a state-based reconciler (#10686)
* fix(groups): replace instance-group delta-patching with a state-based reconciler Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TYi5MGYwUL6gjYMgQVY2Yx * fix(groups): follow instance-group renames through workspace references Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TYi5MGYwUL6gjYMgQVY2Yx * fix(groups): preserve historically-orphaned instance-group members on upgrade Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TYi5MGYwUL6gjYMgQVY2Yx * fix(groups): preserve retained-group orphans too in the upgrade migration Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TYi5MGYwUL6gjYMgQVY2Yx * test(groups): exercise the orphan-preservation migration; strip refs before converting Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TYi5MGYwUL6gjYMgQVY2Yx * test(groups): pin the migration's strip-before-convert order Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TYi5MGYwUL6gjYMgQVY2Yx * fix(groups): make reconciliation the last locking step in every mutation path Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TYi5MGYwUL6gjYMgQVY2Yx * fix(groups): make the workspace advisory lock first in the lock hierarchy Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TYi5MGYwUL6gjYMgQVY2Yx * fix(groups): lock workspaces before membership writes in single-user paths Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TYi5MGYwUL6gjYMgQVY2Yx * fix(groups): use the instance_group row as the group-level mutex Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TYi5MGYwUL6gjYMgQVY2Yx * fix(groups): take an exclusive instance_group table lock in overwrite_igroups Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TYi5MGYwUL6gjYMgQVY2Yx * chore: update ee-repo-ref to af02d6bce55512b65c56adcbf69a8e15cd124d23 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #726 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: ec2feac82636869731666e5c6578b6c078e9aeb2 New ee-repo-ref: af02d6bce55512b65c56adcbf69a8e15cd124d23 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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93b811fd8d |
fix: git sync missed metadata-only deploys, deploy check missed job link (#10662)
* fix: git sync missed metadata-only deploys, deploy check missed job link Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: skip the deploy hook when the mute toggle matched no row Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: pin ee ref forward of main so the bump only adds this change Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to a65162b22b127b54c0686095ee1b16b04e3111f7 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #724 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: ac5f646c3ace7e5841200c6b83b34fb4371340d9 New ee-repo-ref: a65162b22b127b54c0686095ee1b16b04e3111f7 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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15a6382c89 |
remove unused mut breaking backend CI (#10320)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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71b7135cf2 |
feat: multiple homepage sort orders via an efficient merged runnables endpoint (#10297)
Adds recently-updated / oldest / name A-Z / name Z-A sort orders to the homepage (WIN-2236), produced server-side by a new merged, index-backed, keyset-paginated GET /w/{workspace}/runnables/list so a chosen order is globally correct across scripts + flows + apps and stays efficient on large workspaces.
- Backend: UNION ALL of script/flow/app ordered by index (Merge Append + LIMIT); keyset (sort_key, path, kind, tiebreak) cursor; per-branch LIMIT bounds correlated projections; starred-first pinning; RLS + scope-token filters in SQL. Archived view returns the latest row per path. Migration adds time + lowered-name indexes (built CONCURRENTLY).
- Frontend: server-side sort/kind/owner filters + hybrid search (instant client + on-demand server pagination); file-explorer tree with every folder and your user namespace as lazy-loaded top-level nodes (per-owner "Load more", nested subfolders, bounded "expand all", in-place re-sort without collapse or flicker); the client sorts by the server fetch ordinal to reproduce the endpoint's exact order; empty state distinguishes an empty workspace from too-narrow filters.
Reviewed clean by Claude and Pi (good to merge) and Codex (mergeable).
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.8
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564b93b968 |
(cloud) restrict folder creation, sharing and group creation in demo workspace (#10257)
* feat: restrict folder creation, sharing and group creation in demo workspace Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: guard update_folder sharing bypass and gate folder editor/share ACL controls in demo Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: guard remove_owner grant path and gate alternate folder-create controls; keep pure-revoke controls enabled Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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68debab877 |
feat(triggers): add AMQP (RabbitMQ) trigger via lapin (#10230)
* feat(triggers): add AMQP (RabbitMQ) trigger using the lapin library Fixes WIN-2214 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(triggers): defer AMQP cross-workspace deploy pending utils-internal publish Revert the amqp_trigger additions to the shared windmill-utils-internal TriggerDeployKind and the frontend cross-workspace deploy adapter: the frontend installs the published npm package, which lacks the new kind until a release is cut. AMQP create/edit/delete/list/sync/capture are unaffected (they use local types); only cross-workspace deploy/merge of AMQP triggers waits on the package bump. Also document the at-most-once ack in the consumer loop. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(triggers): address AMQP review — at-least-once ack, workspace cascade, contracts - ack AMQP deliveries only after successful dispatch; nack+requeue on failure - add ON DELETE CASCADE workspace FK so amqp_trigger rows are cleaned on workspace deletion (and the listener stops) - fix the /amqp_triggers/test OpenAPI body and add amqp_trigger to WorkspaceDiffRow.kind - register AMQP in the generated workspace trigger tool (create_trigger) - drop banned $bindable defaults on optional props in the config section - add build_uri unit tests (encoding, ports, vhost) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(triggers): stop AMQP poison-message loop and reconnect on transient drops Chaos testing against a live RabbitMQ broker showed the previous nack(requeue) + immediate re-poll spun a tight redelivery loop (~1000 critical-error reports/sec) on a poison message, and any connection blip permanently disabled the trigger (lapin has no built-in reconnect). - on dispatch failure: nack+requeue then stop consuming; the listener framework re-lists the trigger after its ping goes stale (~15s), backing redelivery off to that cadence instead of a tight loop (verified: rate dropped from ~1000/s to ~1 per ~26s, message preserved) - on connection/stream error: stop and let the framework reconnect instead of disabling; persistent failures are still disabled via get_consumer (verified: a forced connection close now auto-reconnects and resumes) - finish the AI create-trigger action wiring for AMQP: add amqp to CreatedResourceTriggerKind, the action-card registry, and the drawer registry so the result card renders and its "Open" action works Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(triggers): complete AMQP frontend registries and defer merge rows - add amqp to capturableTriggerTypes (so AmqpCapture mounts), the Runs jobTriggerKinds filter, and CLOUD_DISABLED_TRIGGER_TYPES - wire AMQP into global AI chat mode: TRIGGER_KINDS, the request union, writeTriggerSchema, triggerServices, and the draft adapter - stop emitting actionable AMQP fork-comparison rows (revert amqp_trigger from TRIGGER_OR_SCHEDULE_TABLES) since cross-workspace deploy is deferred until windmill-utils-internal is published — avoids a deploy that fails with "Unknown kind: amqp_trigger" - use design-system TextInput instead of raw <input> in the config section Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(triggers): complete AMQP session/draft registries and constrain prefetch - add amqp to the session-deploy, draft-compare, preview-router, and copilot workspace-item registries so AMQP drafts/deploys/nav/path resolution work - include amqp_count in the MoveDrawer attached-trigger rename warning - replace the raw prefetch <input> with a design-system TextInput bounded to an integer 1-65535 (backend u16) and block save on invalid values Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(triggers): make AMQP disconnect/reconnect consistent with the Kafka trigger lapin, like rdkafka, has no transparent reconnect, so the AMQP listener now mirrors the Kafka trigger's explicit reconnect loop instead of relying on the framework re-list (which disabled the trigger once get_consumer failed on a sustained outage): - get_consumer returns cheaply; consume owns a (re)connect loop that retries with a 30s backoff, reports a critical error every 10 failed attempts, and reports a recovered critical error once it reconnects — never disabling the trigger on a connectivity failure - a consumer/stream error breaks out to reconnect rather than disabling - dispatch failure still nacks+requeues (at-least-once) with a short backoff to avoid a tight poison-message loop, keeping the connection alive Verified against a live RabbitMQ broker: killing the broker keeps the trigger enabled and retrying (attempt N), and restarting it auto-reconnects (logs "reconnected after N attempts") and resumes dispatch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(triggers): complete AMQP capture registries and constrain prefetch contract - add the 'amqp' case to triggerKindToTriggerType so opening the AMQP editor from a capture button no longer throws "Unknown TriggerKind: amqp" - register AmqpIcon in CaptureTable's icon map and add an AMQP entry to the script/flow CaptureButton menu - bound the OpenAPI prefetch_count to an integer 1-65535 (matches the Rust u16) and regenerate clients/prompts - require a non-empty exchange name when the exchange binding is enabled - build_uri: fall back to "/" on a blank vhost and bracket IPv6 hosts (+ tests) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(triggers): wire AMQP into pipeline graph, git-sync, and preprocessor types - asset_graph: discover attached amqp_trigger rows and emit an AMQP TriggerEdge so AMQP triggers render (and can be opened/deleted) on the data-pipeline canvas - frontend pipeline graph: add amqp to NativeTriggerKind, the add-trigger menu, node presentation, event-trigger set, annotation keywords, and the editor/service registrations - git-sync: add the amqp_trigger include pattern (+ test) so an AMQP git-sync deployment stages only its .amqp_trigger.* file, not an unrelated same-path object - preprocessor starters: add the AMQP event to the generated TS/Python/PHP trigger event types (kind/payload/exchange/routing_key/queue_name/redelivered/ delivery_tag) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(triggers): finish AMQP pipeline/parser wiring, prefetch validation, source lists - fix a stray edit that corrupted the pre-existing MqttTriggerEditor import ($lib/... path) in PipelineTriggerEditors.svelte - reject prefetch_count = 0 server-side in validate_config (RabbitMQ treats 0 as unlimited) and defensively skip basic_qos(0) in build_consumer (covers the capture path that bypasses CRUD validation) - recognize `// on amqp` in the canonical parser (TriggerSpec::Amqp) and add amqp to the CLI non-autorun/event-trigger sets so a pipeline cascade never runs an AMQP-only node as a manual root without an event - add amqp to the preprocessor intro lists and both pipeline AI instructions Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(triggers): reject zero AMQP prefetch in all paths and finish guidance lists - extract a shared validate_amqp_options used by both CRUD validate_config and build_consumer, so capture configs (which bypass CRUD validation) also reject prefetch 0 instead of silently connecting with an unlimited buffer (+ unit tests for 0/1/65535/None) - add AMQP to the main script-writing preprocessor-sources prompt and the CLI triggers-skill guidance list Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(triggers): de-duplicate AMQP prefetch comment and fix GET response text - keep the zero-prefetch rationale only on the shared validate_amqp_options doc; drop the redundant call-site comments - correct the getAmqpTrigger OpenAPI 200 description ("deleted" -> "retrieved") Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to aaa6cb89b05b76139252c64f057e53b94d12ac60 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #680 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 5da5fd65aca9594b2611837a52e4677b544b0380 New ee-repo-ref: aaa6cb89b05b76139252c64f057e53b94d12ac60 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * chore(migrations): consolidate the four AMQP migrations into one The table and the three enum ADD VALUE statements (trigger_kind, job_trigger_kind, draft_kind) are one atomic feature. ALTER TYPE ... ADD VALUE runs inside the migration transaction on PG >= 14 (Windmill's minimum) since the amqp_trigger table doesn't reference those enum types, so they can share a single migration instead of four. Verified applying cleanly in a single transaction on a fresh DB. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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b5e69ffba6 |
fix(security): enforce token scope filtering on folder list endpoints (#10193)
* fix(security): enforce token scope filtering on folder list endpoints * fix: apply folder scope filtering before pagination * fix: keep SQL pagination for unrestricted tokens on folder lists * fix: bound scoped folder-list scan with chunked pagination * fix: use keyset pagination for scoped folder-list scan * refactor: reduce folder scope fix to the minimal predicate filter * chore: drop folder list scope test |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.8
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383c70523b |
fix(folders): allow dots and at-signs in folder owner validation (#9856)
Folder owners use the format u/<username>, and usernames are frequently email addresses containing `.` and `@`. The folder creation path bypasses validate_owner(), so these owners get inserted successfully, but add_owner and remove_owner both call validate_owner() and rejected any later modification of email-style owners. Extend the character allowlist to accept `.` and `@` (and update the error message). SQL injection risk is already mitigated by the bind-parameter queries introduced alongside this validation. Fixes WIN-2116 Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.8
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0dbd9c1231 |
perf: eliminate dual-connection DB pool contention across worker, queue, and api (#9798)
* perf: eliminate dual-connection DB pool contention across worker, queue, and api Reuse the held transaction (or move pool reads before begin()) instead of checking out a second pool connection while a tx is open, extending the fix from #9789/#7861. Targets the per-worker pool (max 5) hot paths plus several server-pool API handlers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: pass owned pool to get_email_from_permissioned_as in http trigger handler The generified signature takes impl PgExecutor; the http trigger handler passed &db where db is already &DB, yielding &&Pool which does not impl PgExecutor (only surfaced under the full feature set in CI). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep RLS-exposed reads on the non-RLS pool and isolate flow-eval reads in a savepoint Addresses review of the dual-connection sweep: - worker_flow: wrap the stop_after_all_iters_if reads in a SAVEPOINT. The caller swallows the error and keeps using tx, so a DB read failure must not leave the outer transaction aborted (it would fail the later commit). Matches the previous pool-read semantics. - Revert reads that were moved onto an RLS (user_db) transaction back to the non-RLS pool, since RLS row-visibility/role context can change results: push_scheduled_job (email/tag/settings lookups; reachable with a user_db tx from api-schedule/api-flows), push_inner native-retry dedicated_worker routing (RLS isolation variants), resources.rs app-namespace folder auto-create (non-admins must not be blocked), and the script archive/delete UPDATEs. Non-RLS db.begin() reuse and move-before-begin are kept. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: failpoint proving the stop_after_all_iters_if savepoint isolates an aborted read Adds a worker-crate failpoints feature and a data-driven hook: when the stop_after_all_iters_if expr is the magic sentinel, the in-evaluation read runs SELECT 1/0 to abort its (savepoint) transaction. The test asserts the flow still completes (iteration marked failed) — which only holds if the savepoint keeps the outer status-update transaction committable. Without the savepoint the abort would poison the outer tx and the job would never complete. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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 Amey Pawar
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84df11177f |
fix(folders): allow hyphens in folder names (#9566)
The create-folder UI and API rejected hyphens in folder names, even though hyphens are valid in paths elsewhere: owner/path validation already permits them, and folders with hyphens can be created via the CLI or by deploying to an `f/<folder>/...` path. This inconsistency blocked the common `folder-name` convention (e.g. relative imports like `../folder-name/logic.ts`). Allow `-` in the folder-name regex on both the backend (create endpoint) and the frontend create form, and update the validation messages. Fixes #8474 |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.8
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eba70ce735 |
dedup folder labels to prevent each_key_duplicate crash (#9565)
Folder labels are exposed verbatim as `inherited_labels` (via the
`folder_labels` SQL function) and rendered in keyed `{#each}` blocks that
throw Svelte's `each_key_duplicate` on a repeated key, crashing the list
views. The UI dedups labels on entry, but API / CLI / git-sync writes do
not, so a folder.yaml with `labels: [foo, foo]` persists duplicates.
- Dedup on write in create_folder and update_folder (order-preserving).
- Make folder_labels() dedup on read so it is resilient regardless of how a
row was populated, plus a one-time cleanup of already-persisted duplicates
so direct folder.labels reads (folder list, editor) are safe too.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Fable 5
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ad37eab82b |
copy folder labels on workspace fork, normalize cleared labels to NULL (#9529)
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Fable 5
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765f50c474 |
feat: folder-level label inheritance for scripts, flows and jobs (#9524)
* feat: folder-level label inheritance for scripts, flows and jobs Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: use SECURITY DEFINER folder_labels() for RLS-consistent inheritance Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: extend folder label inheritance to apps, resources, variables, schedules Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.8
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9d9c5038ce |
fix(api): handle multi-version scripts when removing granular ACL (#9388)
* fix(api): handle multi-version scripts when removing granular ACL
remove_granular_acl built a CTE whose `old` subquery selects one row per
matching table row, then read it back via the scalar subquery
`(SELECT old_write FROM old)` in the RETURNING clause. For the `script`
table the PK is (workspace_id, hash), so a path with multiple deployed
versions yields several rows sharing the same (workspace_id, path). When
two or more versions carried the ACL key, `old` returned multiple rows and
PostgreSQL rejected the scalar subquery with "more than one row returned by
a subquery used as an expression", making it impossible to remove an ACL
entry from a script's permissions panel.
All versions share the same extra_perms value (the UPDATE applies to every
matching row), so any single row's old_write is representative. Add
`LIMIT 1` to the scalar subquery. Other kinds are unaffected because they
have a unique constraint on (workspace_id, path/name).
Introduced by
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Ruben Fiszel
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5e909b2b4f |
feat(git-sync): sync extra_perms for flows/scripts/apps (#9162)
* feat(git-sync): sync extra_perms for flows/scripts/apps * fix(git-sync): hash extra_perms, fix script no-op + up-to-date checks * refactor(git-sync): route extra_perms through /acls/* instead of update endpoints * fix(git-sync): dispatch raw_app perm changes via DeployedObject::RawApp * fix(git-sync): wire applyExtraPermsDiff into pushRawApp + per-change logs * feat(git-sync): opt-in tarball perms, no-op when yaml omits, audit logs, validation * fix(git-sync): replace remaining bool literal in EE-only trigger export call * fix(git-sync): raw_app /acls/* hits app table; refetch after create * fix(git-sync): drop unnecessary post-deploy refetch (folder perms not merged) * fix(git-sync): raw_app /acls/get; reject malformed local extra_perms * audit: distinct raw_apps prefix so dashboards can split raw_app ACL events |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.5
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1174d7d77f |
refactor: replace SELECT * with explicit column lists (#9010)
* refactor: replace SELECT * with explicit column lists Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update sqlx offline query cache * chore: update sqlx offline query cache * chore: update sqlx offline query cache with EE support * chore: update sqlx offline query cache, no deletions * chore: update sqlx offline query cache after rebase * fix: correct column names in explicit script query lists - concurrency_limit → concurrent_limit (matches DB column name) - runnable_settings → runnable_settings_handle (matches DB column name) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: add missing delete_after_secs column to script queries Also add integration test covering all explicit-column export queries. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add workspace export integration test covering all explicit-column queries Covers tarball_workspace (folder, script, resource, resource_type, variable, schedule, usr, group_) and the mcp_oauth_client SELECT query from windmill-mcp. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add tarball export integration test covering all explicit-column queries Single test creates one of each entity type and exercises every runtime-checked explicit-column query in tarball_workspace. Uses archive_type=tar to avoid zip feature-gate in CI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: fix stale verification step and CI contradiction in update-sqlx skill - Regenerate current_files.txt after EE cache restoration so step 4 reports accurate diff - Scope "Never use SQLX_OFFLINE=true" to local prepare (CI legitimately uses it) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: remove Co-Authored-By from commit skill template * refactor: extract SCRIPT_COLUMNS const to single source of truth Replaces 5 duplicated 44-column lists with a shared const in windmill-types. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.5
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392888d113 |
docs: add SAFETY comments to all dynamic SQL call sites (#9009)
* docs: add SAFETY comments to all dynamic SQL call sites Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: address review feedback on SAFETY comments - Fix missed comment for obo_triggers loop in offboarding.rs - Fix variable name in comment (table -> table_name) in offboarding.rs - Fix api-settings comment to reference inline VALID_NAME regex, not validate_dbname() - Add SAFETY comments to batch_execute calls in api-settings - Fix db.rs comment: PG_SCHEMA is env var, not compile-time constant - Add doc comments on RunnableSettingsTraitInternal constants * docs: remove misleading SAFETY comment on static SQL --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d6c642b170 |
feat: add Azure Event Grid triggers (#8888)
* feat: add Azure Event Grid triggers (EE)
Introduces a new enterprise trigger kind `azure` that supports three
modes via a single unified trigger type:
- basic_push: Azure Event Grid basic — custom topics, system topics
(Storage, Resource Manager, Key Vault, etc.), domains (push only)
- namespace_push: Event Grid Namespace topics (CloudEvents over HTTP push)
- namespace_pull: Event Grid Namespace topics (HTTP pull with lock-token
ack/reject for dead-lettering)
Auth uses a Service Principal resource (tenant_id, client_id,
client_secret, subscription_id). Subscriptions are created in
CloudEvents 1.0 schema so the push webhook handler and the pull listener
share one payload parser.
Backend
- New crate `windmill-trigger-azure` (OSS stubs + EE impl symlinked from
windmill-ee-private)
- Migration `azure_trigger` table with CHECK constraints enforcing
mode/columns coherence
- `TriggerKind::Azure`, `JobTriggerKind::Azure`,
`DeployedObject::AzureTrigger` variants
- Push route `/api/azure/w/{workspace}/*path` handles classic
Event Grid SubscriptionValidation handshake and CloudEvents 1.0
abuse-protection OPTIONS handshake
- Optional inbound JWT validation (audience check only for v1)
- Feature flag `azure_trigger` propagated through windmill-api,
windmill-store (resource helper), and added to ee_core
Frontend
- `triggers/azure/` editor with mode toggle (basic/namespace-push/
namespace-pull) and per-mode config (topic ARM id / namespace +
topic name / subscription / filters / push auth / pull options)
- Registered in icon map, display names, save functions, badge,
wrapper, editor, add-trigger menu
OpenAPI
- `AzureTrigger`, `AzureTriggerData`, `AzureMode`,
`AzureSubscriptionMode`, `AzureDeliveryConfig`, `TestAzureConnection`
schemas; `/azure_triggers/*` endpoints; client regenerated
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to eaa7c3a9cb37a9ccc93f10a2535d929365acd2d8
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #541 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 9689014e8c12c36c1059fd8fa5758d550b8b8bc9
New ee-repo-ref: eaa7c3a9cb37a9ccc93f10a2535d929365acd2d8
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
* feat(azure-trigger): secret-auth push, ARM discovery, capture isolation, CLI + parity
Frontend:
- Split mode selector into Namespace/Basic + Pull/Push
- ARM resource dropdowns (namespaces, Basic topics, namespace topics)
populated from the service principal; cascade with stale-selection
reset on SP / edition change
- Remove stale authenticate toggle + audience input (server-managed
push_auth_config has replaced them)
- Azure listing page: "Create from template" button; "Also delete Azure
subscription" toggle in the delete modal; simplified trigger label
falling back to path
- AzureCapture.svelte: "Test subscription name" with -wm-capture suffix
- CompareWorkspaces.svelte: wire Azure for fork/compare
- Drop Trigger-deployed/event-loss warning (capture subscription is
isolated with -wm-capture)
Backend:
- Shared-secret push auth (see EE crate for detail)
- JSONB push_auth_config column (renamed from delivery_config), #[serde(skip)]
so clients/CLI/exports never see it
- Drop redundant enabled column; mode supersedes
- Azure capture infra: AzureTriggerConfig + set_azure_trigger_config +
azure_payload route + TriggerKind::Azure arm; PT15M queue TTL on
capture subscriptions so they bound storage after tab close
- Granular ACLs, users offboarding, trash, git-sync deployed-object:
all include azure_trigger
CLI:
- Add azure to TRIGGER_TYPES, pushObj dispatch, getTypeStrFromPath,
trigger commands (get/update/create/list/template), sync delete
switch + regex; e2e test for `trigger new --kind azure`
- system_prompts: SCHEMA_MAPPINGS + schema_names include AzureTrigger;
auto-generated/* regenerated
Skill:
- .claude/skills/adding-a-trigger/ checklist covering every file that
needs editing when wiring a new trigger type (learned from this PR)
ee-repo-ref bumped to b0e490cbf3724b7b64c6a5b010e3bdf24acd873c.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(azure-trigger): ci — ShareModal Kind + regenerated system_prompts
- frontend/src/lib/components/ShareModal.svelte: add 'azure_trigger'
to the Kind type so the listing page's "Permissions" action compiles
(ts2345 — caught by npm_check on CI, missed by fast-check locally).
- system_prompts/auto-generated/: regenerate to drop the stale
delivery_config / AzureDeliveryConfig fields from the Azure schema
(check-freshness on CI).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(azure-trigger): use workspace constant_time_eq crate
Drop hand-rolled constant-time compare in favour of the workspace
constant_time_eq crate (same one used by http_trigger_auth).
ee-repo-ref bumped to 9659382d47286e7f7f66d01b6f5dd8d4ed34848b.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(azure-trigger): pass placeholder + disabled via inputProps
`TextInput`'s `placeholder` and `disabled` go through its `inputProps`
prop — CI's `npm run check` caught the stale top-level passing that
`npm run check:fast` missed. Align with the DefaultEmailConfigSection
pattern.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(azure-trigger): correct LATEST_GIT_SYNC_SCRIPT_PATH version to 28213
The hub deploy of the azure-aware sync-script is version 28213, not
28214. Backend was pinning a non-existent hub script, which broke the
git_sync_e2e suite (every deploy's sync step 404'd).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(azure-trigger): add azure_triggers to token scope selector + skill
- windmill-api/src/token.rs: `build_trigger_scope_domains` was missing
`("azure_triggers", "Azure Event Grid")`, so the CreateToken UI's scope
selector didn't surface azure_triggers:read/write. Backend already had
`ScopeDomain::AzureTriggers` wired (scopes.rs), this just exposes it.
- .claude/skills/adding-a-trigger/SKILL.md: capture both scope-related
files under the hardcoded-arrays section so future triggers don't miss
the UI surface.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(adding-a-trigger-skill): clarify token.rs scope effect
Not a regression — nothing was working before. Skipping TRIGGER_DOMAINS
just means the scope works via API/CLI but has no UI checkbox.
* docs(adding-a-trigger-skill): trim token.rs bullet
* fix(azure-trigger): regen openapi-deref + swap textarea for TextInput
- Run build_openapi.sh to regenerate openapi-deref.{yaml,json} with the
12 azure_triggers paths + schemas. These files are served by the
runtime (include_str! in windmill-api/src/lib.rs) to external SDK
consumers; without this regen the new endpoints wouldn't be advertised.
- Replace the raw <textarea> for event type filters with the
design-system TextInput in textarea mode (frontend/CLAUDE.md bans raw
HTML elements).
Addresses cubic + claude PR review items.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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64c58c824f |
feat: add deploy restriction rule and fork review requests (#8804)
* feat: add deploy restriction rule and fork review requests Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref.txt for fork review requests Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address PR review comments on fork review requests Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: rename fork review requests to deployment requests Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref.txt for deployment request rename Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: inline deployment request panel into deploy layout Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: place Request deployment button to the left of Deploy Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: inline fork triggers into main deploy list Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: open real trigger detail drawer for inline fork triggers Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: email notifications for merge completion and reply pings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: update deployment_request + protection_rule tables on workspace id rename Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 972893c3870e4c4a70a35748abed282d88904805 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #528 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 5684d1c17d930b17849c1e5d7577891e64682d45 New ee-repo-ref: 972893c3870e4c4a70a35748abed282d88904805 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6
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60211c1d19 |
feat: folder default_permissioned_as rules for ownership defaults on deploy (#8801)
* feat: add folder default_permissioned_as rules for ownership defaults on deploy Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remove unnecessary auth guard on default_permissioned_as — rules are advisory only Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: regenerate system prompts with new CLI commands Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address CI review findings — TOCTOU, race condition, email validation, type coercion Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: add sqlx offline cache for test queries (fixes cargo_test CI) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address remaining review findings — incomplete request bodies, dead code, redundant import Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address remaining review findings — full script fields, reactive stores, catch-all validation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: app/schedule/trigger set-permissioned-as fetch remote first to avoid data loss Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: app set-permissioned-as avoid creating redundant app version Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: compact user/group toggle + select for folder default_permissioned_as rules Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: collapse default_permissioned_as section by default in folder editor Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: include default_permissioned_as in FolderFile CLI type for YAML round-trip Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: process folder.meta changes before items in push to apply new rules immediately Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: clone default_permissioned_as on fork/rename + add full lifecycle tests Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add no-op guarantee test — folder without rules behaves like before Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: rename cliBehavior to syncBehavior — more accurate scope Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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92b9ac72c5 |
fix: compute highest workspace role across all instance groups (#8633)
* fix: compute highest workspace role across all instance groups when adding user to group Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref.txt Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add regression tests for instance group role precedence Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 15dd361793564ab50bc485b71b042da4cfc1d32c This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #501 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 7e9d0e7ec0b52585cab368b7351e3a5654da3589 New ee-repo-ref: 15dd361793564ab50bc485b71b042da4cfc1d32c Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * refactor: extract compute_highest_workspace_role helper and clean up role logic Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref.txt Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to e08a87450627bef9013498e40ee93a47bedda7ee This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #502 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: a4ba20109813332320839488da5ecf83ca8f70b4 New ee-repo-ref: e08a87450627bef9013498e40ee93a47bedda7ee Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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0389d9601c |
chore: upgrade axum 0.7 to 0.8 (#8539)
* chore: upgrade axum 0.7 to 0.8 and related dependencies Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add route reachability tests for ~80 previously untested endpoints Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: switch feature-gated trigger handlers from axum::async_trait to async_trait crate Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: update new trash routes to axum 0.8 path syntax Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to latest EE commit Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: upgrade route tests to assert 2xx responses with proper data setup Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: restore npm_proxy and ai_routes tests using local echo servers Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: gate workspace fork test behind enterprise feature flag Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add ~40 more endpoint tests (jobs authed, health, favorites, ACLs, reachability) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review findings from axum 0.8 upgrade - Use cookie value_trimmed() instead of value() for cookie 0.18 compat - Update comments still referencing old :workspace_id syntax Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 61ae055ea31481f1899953e9d5f65566b8c707b1 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #486 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 0059d175a6fdddf52998b183bf91059b224704ac New ee-repo-ref: 61ae055ea31481f1899953e9d5f65566b8c707b1 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * test: add test for new get_imports endpoint Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remove unused import in raw_apps test Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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69ce946241 | feat: add trashbin system for soft-deleting items (#8519) | ||
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a26a2e8092 |
defense in depth against SQL injection in folder, oauth, and SCIM queries (#8496)
* fix: use bind parameters for folder owner in jsonb_set queries Replace format! string interpolation of owner into jsonb_set path with proper $N bind parameters to prevent potential SQL injection. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref.txt Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to faeaa43bbe2ba4804f80b828b85fd4d6daef096c This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #477 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 0d4444cb5825fa43629d856cc8565cc052512d4c New ee-repo-ref: faeaa43bbe2ba4804f80b828b85fd4d6daef096c Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.5
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9a6ce44c84 |
fix: exclude wm_deployers group from CE group limit check (#8429)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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18b3528ba4 |
feat: instance groups instance-level role support (#8404)
* [ee] feat: instance groups instance-level role support Add ability to assign instance-level roles (superadmin/devops) to instance groups. Group members automatically receive the role with proper precedence: manual elevated roles always win, superadmin > devops. - Migration: add instance_role to instance_group, role_source to password - Role propagation on all mutation paths (add/remove/update/delete/import) - SCIM sync integration (companion PR: windmill-ee-private#463) - Frontend: role toggle in group editor, role column in tables, role source indicator in superadmin settings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 278a3887f759f9d1146554baa0765518d5bc70f2 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #463 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: b407fe4604153d09ff223e11d43c2df83a1de5d0 New ee-repo-ref: 278a3887f759f9d1146554baa0765518d5bc70f2 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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5f0ef936d1 | feat: add sandbox annotations, volume mounts, for AI sandbox starting with claude (#8058) | ||
 wendrul
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2851b6b7ca | feat: restriction rulesets for workspaces (#7879) | ||
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6
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fa53a87107 |
fix: add missing :name param to groups/is_owner route
The handler expected Path((w_id, name)) but the route was registered as /is_owner without :name, making the endpoint unreachable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6
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c580572252 |
refactor: extract windmill-api-scripts and windmill-api-users subcrates (#7850)
* refactor: extract windmill-api-scripts and windmill-api-users subcrates Split the monolithic windmill-api crate by extracting scripts.rs, flows.rs, users.rs, and users_oss.rs into dedicated subcrates. This reduces incremental rebuild times when editing these modules. Changes: - Create windmill-api-scripts crate (scripts.rs + flows.rs, ~4.3K lines) - Create windmill-api-users crate (users.rs + users_oss.rs, ~2.4K lines) - Move clear_schedule to windmill-queue (shared by scripts, flows, workspaces) - Move username utilities (VALID_USERNAME, INVALID_USERNAME_CHARS, generate_instance_wide_unique_username) to windmill-common/src/usernames.rs - Move COOKIE_DOMAIN, IS_SECURE, WithStarredInfoQuery, BulkDeleteRequest, WebhookShared to windmill-common for cross-crate access - Original files in windmill-api become thin stubs with pub use re-exports - EE-dependent route handlers remain in windmill-api (create_user, rename_user, set_password, reset_password, etc.) - Feature forwarding for enterprise, private, parquet, no_auth Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: extract windmill-api-workspaces subcrate (Step 3) Move workspaces.rs, workspaces_extra.rs, workspaces_oss.rs, and workspaces_ee.rs into a new windmill-api-workspaces crate (~7K lines). Routes that depend on windmill-api internals (AI copilot, teams, tarball export, critical alerts, stripe) remain in the windmill-api stub. The subcrate handles all other workspace management routes. Also moved send_email_if_possible to windmill-common/email_oss.rs to make it available across subcrates without circular deps. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * all * refactor: extract windmill-api-groups subcrate (groups.rs + folders.rs) Extract groups.rs (1,093 lines) and folders.rs (833 lines) into a new windmill-api-groups subcrate. Both modules had clean dependencies on already-extracted crates (windmill-api-auth, windmill-common, windmill-api-workspaces). Also removes unused re-exports of get_instance_username_or_create_pending and INVALID_USERNAME_CHARS from windmill-api/src/utils.rs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: add granular_acls.rs and folder_history.rs to windmill-api-groups Extract granular_acls.rs (395 lines) and folder_history.rs (68 lines) into the windmill-api-groups subcrate. Both modules only depend on already-extracted crates and belong to the same access-control domain as groups and folders. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remove unused imports and dead code from subcrate extraction - Remove unused BASE_URL import from lib.rs - Remove workspaces_extra.rs and workspaces_oss.rs re-export stubs (no consumers in windmill-api) - Remove dead send_email_if_possible OSS stub (callers moved to windmill-api-users) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * all * chore: bust CI cargo cache for subcrate split Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: re-export BASE_URL for EE files that use crate::BASE_URL Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: forward no_auth feature to windmill-api-users, remove dead code - Add "windmill-api-users/no_auth" to windmill-api's no_auth feature so the login bypass in users.rs:1600 activates correctly - Remove dead send_email_if_possible from windmill-api-users/users_oss.rs Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: re-enable cargo cache for backend tests Cache was disabled to bust stale entries from before subcrate split. Now that a clean build has run, re-enable for faster CI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: install mold+clang in CI workflows The .cargo/config.toml uses mold linker for x86_64-linux. Build scripts require linking even during cargo check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: increase cargo test timeout to 30 min Exit code 143 (SIGTERM) means the 20-min timeout was hit during compilation without cache. Bump to 30 min as safety net. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: limit cargo build jobs to 4 to prevent OOM in CI Exit code 143 (SIGTERM) after 8 min = OOM kill during compilation. 8 parallel LLVM codegen jobs exhaust memory on ubicloud-standard-8. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |