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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Ruben Fiszel
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7dd5ccd374 | docs: tighten the guest session invariant comments | ||
 Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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636c027b58 |
fix: a guest may use anonymous apps; await the stale-session logout; trim comments
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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03e0504d95 |
refactor: enforce the guest switch once at the auth door; sign-in for a guest of another app
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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b317002dd6 |
fix: the label alone governs a guest; refuse guests with accounts; unserialize discovery
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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75bde58bb8 |
fix: make the guest grant a server-minted label, not a declarable scope
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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0edfee970b |
feat: guest app execution mode, a fourth role that takes no seat
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BayTppRCstWX6qTf3LMco5 |
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 hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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9022dc9d44 |
fix: confine job tokens to workspace-scoped API routes (#10631)
* fix: confine job tokens to workspace-scoped API routes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the object-storage connection test reachable from a job token Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the workspace-exists check the CLI makes reachable from a job Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: reconcile the job-token caps after #10124 The workspace-confinement middleware answers a workspace-less route before the privilege gate behind it runs, so the cases #10124 added on those routes now see 403 rather than 401. Rejection is what they assert, but two of them needed more than a status change: - `list_worker_groups` asserted only that the response body omits the static env value, which an error body satisfies for the wrong reason. It now asserts the status, keeping the secret check as a second assertion. - `require_super_admin` lost its only unshadowed route. `GET /api/w/{workspace}/users/list_addable` is gated solely by that call and names a workspace, so it reaches the gate and pins it at 401. The module doc states the two-layer rule once; the file covers both caps, so it is no longer named for either one alone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: correct the workspaces/exists rationale and the parquet gate note `workspace` carries no row-level security, so `exists_workspace` running through `user_db` does not filter by membership as the comment claimed. State what the route actually discloses — whether a workspace id is taken. The object-storage case explained why a 404 would satisfy the assertion for the wrong reason, which described the earlier `assert_ne!(403)`; against the 422 it now asserts, a 404 fails. Say instead why the case is gated on the feature. * fix: let a job token keep the workspace-less routes that carry no workspace Confinement refused every route outside the allowlist, including ones that answer purely from the caller's own account or from the request body. Those cross no workspace boundary, so refusing them buys nothing: - `users/email` returns a value already inside the token, and `workspaces/allowed_domain_auto_invite` tests the caller's own address against a static list. Neither opens a transaction. - `users/usage` reads the caller's own row; `users/tutorial_progress` reads and upserts a UI bitfield keyed on the same email. - `schedules/preview` takes no `ApiAuthed` at all — it computes the occurrences of the cron expression in the body and returns nothing the caller did not send. The rule, not the list, is what the doc comment states: answers from the caller's own account, the request body, or content identical for every workspace; never naming another workspace, never instance configuration. The candidates it excludes are written down with their reasons, since `users/list_invites` reads as caller-scoped until you notice the response carries a workspace id per invite. Regression covers both directions — the new entries answer, and the rejected caller-scoped reads stay refused. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: reach the privilege gates confinement hides `require_devops_role` and `require_instance_admin` gate only workspace-less routes, so confinement answers every request that would reach them: no HTTP case can tell whether they still cap job tokens, and both could lose that check with this suite green. `require_super_admin` has a workspace-scoped route to reach it; these two have none, so call them directly instead. The identity used is the fixture's real superadmin, so the passing half proves the rejection keys off `job_id` rather than off the user. Also separate two claims the write-allowlist doc had merged into one sentence: no entry writes outside the caller's own account, but what each may read differs, and the workspace-existence check answers for any id. * docs: say that the object-storage probe writes The write-allowlist lead claimed no entry writes state outside the caller's own account. `test_s3_bucket` puts an object into the store the body names and deletes it again, so it does write; a failure between the two leaves the object behind. The invariant that holds is about Windmill state. Say so in the lead, and describe the put/delete in the entry itself rather than leaving "acts only on the store the request body describes" to imply a read. * test: cover the last two job-token gates confinement hides Seven guards key on `ApiAuthed::job_id`. Three keep a workspace-scoped route and are exercised over HTTP; the other four are reachable only through workspace-less routes, which confinement now answers first, so nothing observed whether they still cap job tokens. `require_devops_role` and `require_instance_admin` were already called directly. Add the two that were not: `forbid_superadmin_job_token`, and `forbid_elevated_job_token`, whose call sites are `create_token`, `update_token_scopes` and `set_password` — all workspace-less. Both key on two conditions rather than one, so all three combinations are pinned: neither fires without job provenance, and neither fires for an unelevated identity. The second matters — collapsing either into a blanket job-token refusal would stop ordinary users creating tokens, and no other case would catch it. The doc comment records which of the seven each route covers. * docs: correct which job-token gates have no observable route The previous commit put `forbid_elevated_job_token` among the guards reachable only through workspace-less routes, and its message named three call sites. It has six, and two are workspaced: `mint_app_embed_token` and `mint_raw_app_sdk_token`. Its superadmin branch is therefore already exercised over HTTP — the 401 the embed-token case asserts is this gate. So three of the seven lack an observable route, not four. Its direct assertions stay: the embed-token case only ever reaches it with an elevated identity, and the unelevated-negative case is what would catch the gate being collapsed into a blanket job-token refusal. * test: pin is_instance_admin, and stop enumerating gates in prose `is_instance_admin` is `authed.is_admin && authed.job_id.is_none()`, so a census built by searching for `job_id.is_some()` could not see it. Both its call sites are workspace-less, and it returns a bool that selects obfuscation rather than refusing — a job token reading `true` leaks `env_vars_static` instead of being turned away. Pin both directions. The doc comment tried to account for every job-token guard and which route exercised it. It was wrong three times running: the count, the call sites of `forbid_elevated_job_token`, and the claim that the CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB case covers `is_super_admin_authed` when that path tests `job_id` inline. A table that has to be rederived from six crates to stay true does not belong in a comment, so it now states only why these calls are direct. * docs: name the right is_instance_admin caller The comment credited "the concurrency-group listing" with obfuscating rows. The second caller is `prune_concurrency_group`, which returns PermissionDenied; the obfuscating one is `list_worker_groups`. Keep the claim to that single caller, which is what makes this guard fail by leaking `env_vars_static` rather than by admitting a request. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c2deea13b7 |
fix(security): a WM_TOKEN job token can never be a global superadmin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr) (#10124)
* fix(security): a WM_TOKEN job token can never be a global superadmin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr)
Privilege escalation: an app/flow/schedule/trigger execution policy's `on_behalf_of`
(which a `wm_deployers` member can set) could point at a superadmin email. The
resulting job `WM_TOKEN` then passed the email-based superadmin checks, granting
instance superadmin. `forbid_superadmin_job_token` only guarded ~15 of ~75 routes.
Fix at the token layer: a WM_TOKEN must never satisfy a superadmin gate,
regardless of whose email it runs as (sentinel OR a real superadmin).
- `ApiAuthed` gains a `job_id` field, stamped once in `AuthCache::get_opt_job_authed`
from the resolved token's job_id (correct even on cache hits).
- `require_super_admin(db, email)` -> `require_super_admin(db, &ApiAuthed)`, rejects
`authed.job_id.is_some()`. `require_super_admin_email` kept for the few internal
callers without an ApiAuthed.
- `is_super_admin_authed(db, &ApiAuthed)` for the boolean `is_super_admin_email`
authorization branches on request handlers (workspace deletion, fork drops,
dev-workspace attach/archive, object-storage SSRF exemption, custom dbname, EE GHES
+ connected repositories, ...). Migrate ~75 sites (OSS + EE).
- CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB reads the *authenticated* job_id, not the caller-supplied
`?job_id` query param. Worker-tag check takes a precomputed job-aware `is_super_admin`
on the request path.
Execution-time on-behalf checks (scheduled/flow worker-tag, Cloud enqueue quota,
is_devops_email) are hardened in a follow-up — see
docs/followup-onbehalf-execution-privilege-hardening.md.
Regression tests: a superadmin-email WM_TOKEN is rejected on `require_super_admin`
routes, on `DELETE /workspaces/delete/{w}` (403, workspace preserved), and on the
CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB lookup with no `?job_id` (401); real superadmin tokens still succeed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap devops role at workspace admin and reject reserved on_behalf_of identities
Extends the job-token cap with three pieces:
- `require_devops_role` takes `&ApiAuthed` and rejects job tokens.
`is_devops_email` is true for superadmin emails, so every worker-management,
instance-config and service-log route was reachable by the same superadmin
`WM_TOKEN` that `require_super_admin` already rejects.
- A `job_id` claim that does not parse as a uuid rejects the token rather than
resolving to `None`, which would clear the job provenance and uncap it. Applies
to the internal JWT and the external `jwt_ext_` path.
- Defense in depth at store time: `validate_on_behalf_of` refuses the reserved
internal sentinels as an `on_behalf_of` on apps/flows/scripts/schedules/triggers,
and app execution refuses a policy carrying one — covering already-persisted and
forked-app rows that predate the cap. Deploying on behalf of a real user,
including a real superadmin, stays allowed; the cap handles that at execution.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): preserve job-token provenance when minting the proxy JWT
The MCP endpoint-tool proxy re-mints a JWT from the caller's ApiAuthed to
forward the proxied request, but passed job_id: None. A job's WM_TOKEN is
capped at workspace admin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr); dropping the job_id here
re-minted an uncapped token that satisfies require_super_admin /
require_devops_role on the proxied route (e.g. listWorkers exposing worker
IPs, job/workspace IDs, and sensitive tags).
Carry api_authed.job_id into create_jwt_token. Adds an in-module regression
that decodes the forwarded JWT and asserts the job_id is preserved for a job
caller and absent for a non-job caller.
Reported by Codex CI review (P1) on #10124.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the admin-or-devops gate at workspace admin for job tokens
require_admin_or_devops (the EE critical-alerts endpoints) grants when the
caller is a workspace admin OR an instance devops. is_devops_email is true
for superadmins, so a WM_TOKEN running on-behalf of a superadmin who is not a
member of the target workspace could clear the devops branch and read/ack that
workspace's critical alerts (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr). This gate takes a bare
email, not an ApiAuthed, so the token-layer cap could not see it.
Thread the caller's job-token provenance and reject the devops branch for job
tokens, matching require_devops_role. The workspace-admin branch stays allowed
— that is the cap ceiling. Adds an enterprise-gated regression proving the
bypass is closed and a real superadmin token still clears the gate.
Found while auditing the PR for bare-email gates the choke-point cap misses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap instance-global is_admin gates at workspace admin for job tokens
Three instance-global routes gate on the caller's own `is_admin` claim, which
`ApiAuthed.is_admin` carries into a WM_TOKEN (it is a workspace-admin claim,
true for superadmins too). A job token is capped at workspace admin
(GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr), so its is_admin claim must not authorize instance
actions on a route with no workspace binding:
- `unarchive_workspace` — unarchive an arbitrary workspace by id
- `prune_concurrency_group` — delete a global concurrency group
- `list_worker_groups` — return unobfuscated `env_vars_static` (may hold secrets)
Add job-token-aware `is_instance_admin` / `require_instance_admin` helpers (the
same shape as `require_super_admin` / `require_devops_role`) and use them at
these three sites. Workspace-scoped `require_admin(authed.is_admin, ...)` gates
are intentionally left unchanged — a workspace-admin job token is within the
cap there. Regression added covering all three; verified it lets a WM_TOKEN
unarchive/leak without the fix and is blocked with it.
Reported by Codex CI review (P1) on #10124.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): drop orphaned path_field_renames from EndpointTool test helper
The merge with main adopted main's mcp path-substitution refactor (#10162),
which removed the `path_field_renames` field from `EndpointTool` and its
consumer (`substitute_path_params` no longer takes per-field path renames).
main's `runner.rs` `ep` test helper still constructed the struct with
`path_field_renames: None`, so the workspace test build (cargo test --all,
which compiles windmill-mcp's own #[cfg(test)] module under the `server`
feature) failed with E0560. A plain `cargo check` does not compile that test
module, so it only surfaced in CI's cargo_test.
Remove the orphaned field to match the struct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: describe the sentinel-rejection policy the forged-identity test asserts
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: complete ApiAuthed initializers in feature-gated tests after merge
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: stop job tokens minting credentials that shed their provenance
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the MCP OAuth approval mint at the same elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the self-service password reset at the elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap app embed/SDK mints and scope widening at the elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep job tokens from destroying the account they run on behalf of
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: deny job tokens a foreign-workspace admin claim and workspace ejection
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: keep the follow-up inventory in the PR instead of the repo
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: make the session workspace status gate job-token aware
session_workspace_status derived its superadmin branch from a bare email
check, so a job token carrying a superadmin identity resolved the existence
of workspaces it has no relationship with rather than seeing them as
deleted. Switch to is_super_admin_authed, matching every other instance
gate reached from a request ApiAuthed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* revert: leave the global concurrency-group listing on the plain admin gate
The listing exposes concurrency keys across workspaces, which is metadata
rather than a capability, and it 401s rather than degrading. Keep the guard
on the prune route next to it, which is the destructive one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep the instance-admin gate on the global concurrency listing
The listing spans every workspace's concurrency keys, and the gate rejects
only job tokens: the !is_admin branch is the pre-existing check, so
workspaced tokens and interactive admins are unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to d30af67d38954f9012f7bad08da23e347344b4c6
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #664 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 7870573dbc3360f99bada143f094c67dce0d9e9c
New ee-repo-ref: d30af67d38954f9012f7bad08da23e347344b4c6
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: hugocasa <hugo@casademont.ch>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Ruben Fiszelandwindmill-internal-app[bot]
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dda59767c2 |
feat: stamp webhook trigger_kind on token-driven job runs (#10431)
* feat: stamp ui vs webhook trigger_kind on direct job runs * fix: gate ui trigger kind on min worker version and dedupe display names * docs: state that the ui trigger kind attributes rather than proves * refactor: fold the trigger fallback into one trigger_or_fallback helper * feat: hold trigger_kind as a tolerant label on the worker paths * chore: refresh the sqlx offline cache for the trigger_kind label queries * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7de7daff5eed410e0c815ad6b292d2b4303f02f2 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #700 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 974ab910d9a30c5565e1198ee312acc6d11239f3 New ee-repo-ref: 7de7daff5eed410e0c815ad6b292d2b4303f02f2 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * fix: keep the API job structs tolerant of unknown trigger kinds too * chore: point ee-repo-ref at the merged EE main --------- Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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3716a71fd7 |
fix: credit the token owner instead of the token label in the audit trail (#10423)
* fix: credit the token owner instead of the token label in the audit trail Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review findings on token-owner audit attribution Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: carry token-label provenance explicitly instead of inferring it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: point ee-repo-ref at the companion branch Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: trust only non-forgeable token labels to name the acting entity Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: reject reserved system-token labels at token creation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: narrow the token-label guard to server-minted namespaces Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: add the provenance field to the remaining ApiAuthed literals Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stop trusting the email- label, which no mint produces Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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f9d5da11b7 |
feat: allow changing an account email in the superadmin settings (#10355)
* feat: allow changing an account email in the superadmin settings * fix: cover slack_email and usage rows, and scope job rewrites to the queue * fix: compare the destination email case-insensitively * fix: only warn about the consequences once the email is edited * docs: warn that changing an account email is a last resort * fix: repoint app policies and raw-email permissioned_as, reject self-change * fix: repoint folder default rules and guard the varchar(55) job column |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.8
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91e1b087a2 |
feat(auth): add runtime NO_AUTH mode for authentication bypass (#9962)
* feat(auth): add runtime NO_AUTH mode for authentication bypass Adds a runtime `NO_AUTH` env flag that makes every request resolve as the `admin@windmill.dev` superadmin with no login required, so self-hosted deployments can front Windmill with their own authenticating gateway without building a dedicated `oss` (compile-time `no_auth`) binary. - `NO_AUTH` is honored in any build but is force-disabled when `CLOUD_HOSTED` is set, so the managed cloud always enforces real auth. - The existing compile-time `no_auth` feature keeps its always-on behavior (`cfg!(feature = "no_auth") || *NO_AUTH`), so `oss` builds are unchanged. - `Tokened` now yields a synthetic token in no-auth mode so handlers that require it (e.g. global_whoami, called by the frontend on load) resolve. - A loud startup banner warns when the mode is on; `HIDE_NO_AUTH_BANNER` silences it once the operator has deliberately deployed behind a gateway. Fixes WIN-2131 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(auth): dismissable NO_AUTH warning banner via global setting Replaces the HIDE_NO_AUTH_BANNER env flag with a UI warning banner that can be permanently dismissed for all users from within the running instance (not exposed in instance settings). - New `no_auth_banner_dismissed` global setting, only ever written by dismissing the banner itself. - `GET /api/settings/no_auth_banner` returns whether to show the banner (true only when NO_AUTH is active and it hasn't been dismissed). - NoAuthBanner.svelte renders a top-of-app warning in NO_AUTH mode; its dismiss button opens a confirmation modal, then writes the global setting via the existing setGlobal endpoint so it stays hidden for everyone. - The server still logs the startup NO_AUTH warning unconditionally. Fixes WIN-2131 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): resolve NO_AUTH in AuthCache so all_runnables works Codex/Pi review flagged that `/api/users/all_runnables` still failed in NO_AUTH mode: `get_all_runnables` extracts `Tokened` and re-validates the request token per workspace via `AuthCache::get_authed`, which rejected the fabricated `"no_auth"` token (no matching DB row) with a 400. Short-circuit `AuthCache::get_opt_job_authed` (the resolver behind `get_authed`) to the admin superadmin in no-auth mode, so any direct cache caller resolves without a real token. Single-source the mode check and the synthetic identity via `is_no_auth()` / `no_auth_admin_authed()` and reuse them across the extractor, resolver, and login paths. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * revert(auth): drop the NO_AUTH dismissable UI banner The in-app banner added a GET /api/settings/no_auth_banner request to every instance load for little benefit. The startup log warning already surfaces that auth is bypassed to operators, so drop the banner, its endpoint, and the no_auth_banner_dismissed global setting entirely. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.8
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76a9523009 |
feat: use derived username instead of email for non-member superadmins (#9857)
* feat: use derived username instead of email for non-member superadmins Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review - drop redundant username cache, guard whoami membership by email Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: use explicit non_member boolean instead of role string for superadmin banner Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: resolve email from password table for non-member superadmin permissioned_as Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: resolve non-member superadmin drafts via shared username->email resolver Adds resolve_username_to_email (usr, then super_admin password fallback for both derived-username and email modes) and uses it in get_email_from_permissioned_as and the drafts get/list endpoints, so a non-member superadmin's drafts resolve and no email leaks into the drafts payload. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: superadmin-not-in-workspace schedule uses derived username as permissioned_as Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: resolve non-member superadmin identity in draft owner-circles, username_to_email, and home filter Applies the password-fallback username resolution to the script/flow/app/draft owner-circle subqueries and the username_to_email endpoint (was an admins-workspace 'username == email' hack), and switches the home items-list user-folder filter to the non_member flag instead of the now-broken username-contains-@ heuristic. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: backfill non-member superadmin favorites from email to derived username Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: propagate DB errors in username resolution instead of leaking email (CI review) Addresses cubic-dev-ai P2: get_instance_username_or_fallback_to_email now returns Result and only falls back to the email for a genuine 'no derived username'; a query error propagates so callers fail closed rather than leaking the raw email as the acting username. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: clarify non-member superadmin popover (username used + admin permissions) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep username_to_email endpoint member-only to not disclose non-member superadmin email (CI review) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: forbid disabling automate_username_creation once usernames assigned (CI review) Makes the setting effectively one-way once instance-wide usernames exist, so the global-uniqueness invariant that keeps stored u/<username> identities (schedules/triggers/drafts/superadmin ownership) unambiguous can never be dropped back to workspace-local uniqueness. Re-saving false on an already-disabled instance stays a no-op. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 4.8
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e19594df2a |
fix: re-enforce scoped API token boundaries across handlers (#9712)
* fix: re-enforce per-path token scope on store rename, delete and interpolation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: enforce token scope on workspace export and resume-url minting Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: enforce per-item and runnable scope on trigger create paths Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: enforce app write scope before persistence and on rename Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: enforce scope containment on mcp oauth approval Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: scope mcp endpoint-proxy jwt to the proxied route Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: treat resource-linked variables and resources as covered by resource scope Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: only require variables:read for plaintext-secret workspace export Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: handle singlestepflow resume, reject empty mcp grant, scope var-skipped tarball Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.7
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7003998a57 |
fix(auth): tighten token-owner fallback for unscoped tokens (WIN-1978) (#9293)
* fix(auth): reject unscoped tokens with cross-workspace forged owners (WIN-1978) An unscoped token (workspace_id IS NULL) whose `owner` field references a user, group, or unprefixed value that is not present in the target workspace must not authenticate. The previous fallback in the `u/<username>` branch granted `(is_admin=false, is_operator=true)` when no `usr` row matched in the target workspace, letting a token holder who could mutate the `token` table cross workspace boundaries with operator privileges. The `g/<groupname>` branch likewise silently accepted any group name as a "group user", and the no-prefix branch granted operator state from arbitrary owner strings. Both are now rejected unless the owner matches a real user/group membership in the target workspace. Adds an integration regression covering all three forged-owner shapes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: drop integration regression for auth fallback The test added in the previous commit relies on a sqlx::query! that requires offline-cache regeneration; removing per code-review preference to keep this PR scoped to the auth-layer fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d666e8431c |
feat: read-only flag on API tokens (#9144)
* feat: read-only flag on API tokens, orthogonal to scopes Add a per-token `read_only` boolean set at creation time. When true, the token can only call HTTP methods classified as Read (GET/HEAD/OPTIONS). Mutating methods and job-run actions are rejected with 403, regardless of which scopes are attached. Surfaced as a prominent toggle in the standard token-creation flow and a discreet `2xs` toggle in MCP mode (where users often want write access, so we don't bias them toward enabling it). MCP enforcement: read-only tokens hide all script/flow/hub tools from `list_tools` and only see endpoint tools whose method is GET, and the runner rejects `call_tool` on anything mutating. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: review fixes for read-only token flag - Exempt /api/mcp/* and /mcp/* paths from the read-only middleware check. MCP transport runs over POST (streamable HTTP / SSE), so otherwise the middleware would 403 every MCP request before the runner could enforce read-only at the tool-call level. - Tighten is_endpoint_read_only to GET only, matching the read_only_hint that create_endpoint_annotations actually emits. - Add unit test for check_read_only_for_route covering GET/HEAD/OPTIONS, mutating methods, and run paths. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump ee-repo-ref to read-only-trigger-toggle Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): make read-only toggle discreet in both modes Match the MCP-mode treatment in standard mode: text-tertiary, 2xs, shared "Read-only" label. The tooltip switches per mode so the explanation still fits the context. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): gate read-only toggle behind Limit token permissions The read-only toggle now only shows when the user has limited the token's scopes (standard mode) or in MCP mode (which always picks an MCP scope). Turning the limit off also resets read-only so it doesn't silently stick. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(frontend): hide incompatible MCP tools when read-only is on When the read-only toggle is on in MCP mode: - Endpoint badges and the custom-mode endpoint MultiSelect filter to GET. - Already-selected non-GET endpoints are pruned from the scope. - The scripts/flows preview is replaced with a note explaining they're hidden (the runner already rejects script/flow runs for read-only). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): place read-only toggle at top of limited scope area The previous gate required at least one scope to be picked before the read-only toggle appeared, which made it look missing while the user was still building their scope list. Move the toggle inside ScopesPicker: - Standard mode: sits directly under the "Limit token permissions" toggle whenever Limit is on, before the scope selector. - MCP mode: sits at the top of the MCP scope block. readOnly is now $bindable on ScopesPicker so CreateToken still owns the value. The auto-reset on un-limit moves into ScopesPicker too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): nest read-only toggle inside the scope list card Place the read-only toggle at the top of the scope list (between the Selected Scopes summary and the bordered domain list) via a new optional topSlot snippet on ScopeSelector. Keeps ScopeSelector decoupled from read-only specifics; ScopesPicker fills the slot. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 9bc8160be50b3e57a60daf4e1b71c389a6e02b8a This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #571 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: f53d26e6685dfd60bfa67686fbd7358169cfd130 New ee-repo-ref: 9bc8160be50b3e57a60daf4e1b71c389a6e02b8a Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * fix: address CI review for read-only token flag - P1 (Codex): narrow the MCP middleware exemption from "any /api/mcp/*" to just the streamable HTTP transport endpoints (/api/mcp/gateway, /api/mcp/w/{ws}/{mcp,sse,list_tools}). Without this, a read-only token could POST /api/mcp/gateway/oauth/server/approve and mint a follow-on non-read-only MCP token via the OAuth code/token exchange. - P2 (Claude/cubic): fix test comment/assertion mismatch — the run-path assertion now exercises GET (which is what the RUN_PATH_ACTIONS elevation comment describes) in addition to POST. Add a regression assertion for /api/mcp/gateway/oauth/server/approve. - P2 (cubic): short-circuit script/flow/hub-script/resource fetches in MCP list_tools when read_only is on — they would only be discarded below, so skipping the DB and resource fan-out is pure win. - P2 (cubic): when scopes are pre-supplied via the CreateToken prop, the ScopesPicker isn't rendered, which previously hid the read-only toggle entirely. Render it next to the pre-supplied scopes display. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 4.7
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ee3d82f01f |
fix(native-triggers): serialize Google channel renewal across replicas (#9060)
* fix(native-triggers): serialize Google channel renewal across replicas `sync_all_triggers` runs every 5 minutes on every windmill-app replica with no leader election. Multiple replicas were each rotating the webhook token, creating a new Google watch channel, and racing the trigger UPDATE — leaving the loser's new token (in `token`) and channel (in Google) orphaned. Cloud was accumulating ~5 leaked tokens/week without the silent best-effort `delete_token_by_hash` ever logging a warning. Wrap each per-trigger renewal in a transaction and acquire the row with `SELECT … FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED`. Contending replicas skip the row instead of duplicating the work. The lock spans `rotate_webhook_token` → Google API call → `update_native_trigger_service_config` and is only released on commit. Re-checks `should_renew_channel` after acquiring the lock so a replica that committed seconds earlier doesn't trigger a duplicate renewal. The pattern matches existing batch-cleanup paths in `monitor.rs` (job-retention sweep) and other `FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED` call sites. Also logs at `debug!` when `delete_token_by_hash` finds no matching row, so future investigations can distinguish "deleted" from "not found" without changing the `Ok(false)` contract. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fixup! fix(native-triggers): serialize Google channel renewal across replicas * fixup! fix(native-triggers): serialize Google channel renewal across replicas fixup! fix(native-triggers): serialize Google channel renewal across replicas Address claude review: - #5: per-skip log info -> debug (expected outcome under SKIP LOCKED) - #2: warn moved out of delete_token_by_hash to the call site that knows the expected state (try_renew_channel_locked); other callers are race-prone and shouldn't warn - #3: NULL service_config now warns (anomalous case) - #4: post-Google-API DB-update + commit failures log distinctly so the channel-orphan case is grep-able Plus: add 14d expiry to Google webhook tokens via ServiceName::webhook_token_expiration, mint fresh ephemeral-webhook-{service}-{rd5} labels at create + rotate so the existing 'ephemeral-' filter excludes them from user-token email/critical-alert paths (no filter changes in 3 places). Orphans now self-clean via the existing expiry sweep in monitor.rs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fixup! fix(native-triggers): serialize Google channel renewal across replicas fixup! fix(native-triggers): serialize Google channel renewal across replicas Address second-round review: - Claude #1 (P2): username_override_from_label now strips the 'ephemeral-' prefix for ephemeral-webhook-* labels, so created_by stays webhook-{service}-{rd5} instead of changing to label-ephemeral-webhook-... (preserves audit/job-list filter compatibility) - Codex (P2): updated renew_channel doc — labels are no longer copied; rotate mints fresh ephemeral-webhook-google-{rd5} with 14d expiration - Claude #3 (optional): test_rotate_webhook_token now asserts the rotated Google token has an ephemeral-webhook-google-* label and a populated expiration Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fixup! fix(native-triggers): serialize Google channel renewal across replicas fixup! fix(native-triggers): serialize Google channel renewal across replicas Reconsider the previous fixup: stripping the 'ephemeral-' prefix made created_by no longer match token.label exactly, defeating the linking purpose. Just allowlist 'ephemeral-webhook-' alongside the other recognized webhook/email/ws prefixes — created_by becomes ephemeral-webhook-google-XXXXX, matching token.label exactly. The 'ephemeral-' substring also informs operators that this is a system-managed auto-expiring token vs a user-managed webhook trigger. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 4.7
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66db873651 |
fix: surface scope errors as 403 and show real message in CLI (#8953)
* fix: surface scope errors as 403 and show real message in CLI Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review feedback on scope error PR - Backend: also patch handler-level check_scopes (lib.rs:223) — without this, endpoints using check_scopes (scripts, flows, jobs, …) still returned 401 for scope failures, which the CLI would render as the misleading auth message. - CLI: strip backend file refs and the duplicated "Permission denied:" / "Not authorized:" prefix from the surfaced error body. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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42d3e8c789 |
fix: enrich OTEL log records with per-request LogContext (#8812)
* fix: enrich OTEL log records with per-request LogContext Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: add otlp_smoke example for manual OTEL log bridge verification Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 5d6b713b74fc46735807f5c32883002e8d976fbc This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #529 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 45959d063bc941c567488d330b5819601cdd2d3d New ee-repo-ref: 5d6b713b74fc46735807f5c32883002e8d976fbc Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * refactor: store LogContext in ArcSwap instead of Mutex Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: pin ee-repo-ref to ArcSwap branch commit * chore: update ee-repo-ref to be2f3d4d11bb7110200524d7157caab3aac53996 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #530 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 45b4d7963a9ebcd583d1a87abe7d07d3d521584a New ee-repo-ref: be2f3d4d11bb7110200524d7157caab3aac53996 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6
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3959fe8297 |
feat: add workspace-level service accounts (#8560)
* feat: add workspace-level service accounts (EE) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * sqlx * sqlx * chore: update ee-repo-ref Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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0389d9601c |
chore: upgrade axum 0.7 to 0.8 (#8539)
* chore: upgrade axum 0.7 to 0.8 and related dependencies Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add route reachability tests for ~80 previously untested endpoints Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: switch feature-gated trigger handlers from axum::async_trait to async_trait crate Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: update new trash routes to axum 0.8 path syntax Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to latest EE commit Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: upgrade route tests to assert 2xx responses with proper data setup Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: restore npm_proxy and ai_routes tests using local echo servers Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: gate workspace fork test behind enterprise feature flag Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add ~40 more endpoint tests (jobs authed, health, favorites, ACLs, reachability) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review findings from axum 0.8 upgrade - Use cookie value_trimmed() instead of value() for cookie 0.18 compat - Update comments still referencing old :workspace_id syntax Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 61ae055ea31481f1899953e9d5f65566b8c707b1 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #486 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 0059d175a6fdddf52998b183bf91059b224704ac New ee-repo-ref: 61ae055ea31481f1899953e9d5f65566b8c707b1 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * test: add test for new get_imports endpoint Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remove unused import in raw_apps test Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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efb4a27d51 |
fix: replace email with permissioned_as for triggers/schedules (#8439)
* refactor: replace email with permissioned_as for triggers/schedules
Add a new `permissioned_as` column (format: `u/{username}`, `g/{group}`,
or raw email) to all trigger tables and schedule. This value is used
directly for job permission checks, removing the need for email lookups
when creating/updating triggers.
- Migration: add permissioned_as to all 9 trigger tables + schedule,
drop email from trigger tables (schedule keeps it for backwards compat)
- Backend: resolve_email() (async, DB) -> resolve_permissioned_as() (sync)
- Email cache: get_email_from_permissioned_as() with quick_cache for
places that still need email (fetch_api_authed, schedule backwards compat)
- Frontend: rename email/preserve_email -> permissioned_as/preserve_permissioned_as
in deploy data and OpenAPI schemas
- Tests updated for new field names and u/{username} format
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix sqlx/build
* update ee ref
* refactor: simplify resolve_edited_by to always use authed username
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix compile + migration
* update ref
* test: add trigger trait method tests for permissioned_as queries
Add tests that call TriggerCrud and Listener trait methods directly
to verify dynamic SQL correctly references the permissioned_as column.
Covers get_trigger_by_path, list_triggers, set_trigger_mode, and
fetch_enabled_unlistened_triggers for all trigger types.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* update sqlx
* fix: use permissioned_as directly for schedules and fix audit RLS for groups
- Schedule: permissioned_as only set on create, not on edit/set_enabled
- Schedule: stop reading email column, use get_email_from_permissioned_as
- Triggers: use fetch_api_authed_from_permissioned_as instead of edited_by
- Triggers: rename listener fields for clarity (username -> edited_by)
- Fix audit author username for group permissioned_as (g/test -> group-test)
to match session.user, preventing RLS policy violations on audit_partitioned
- OpenAPI: remove permissioned_as/preserve_permissioned_as from EditSchedule
- Add backwards-compat comments for schedule email writes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: regenerate system prompts for permissioned_as field
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix build
* refactor: generalize onBehalfOf naming, add permissioned_as to EditSchedule
- Frontend: rename onBehalfOfPermissionedAs -> onBehalfOf with comments
explaining it carries emails for flows/scripts and permissioned_as for
triggers/schedules
- Frontend: rename getOnBehalfOfEmail -> getOnBehalfOf,
getOnBehalfOfPermissionedAsForDeploy -> getOnBehalfOfForDeploy,
customOnBehalfOfEmails -> customOnBehalfOf
- Backend: add optional permissioned_as/preserve_permissioned_as to
EditSchedule with COALESCE (only updates when provided)
- Backend: add on_behalf_of audit log for schedule edit
- Backend: remove unused resolve_on_behalf_of_permissioned_as
- Tests: remove email assertions from schedule update test (email is
just backwards compat, only permissioned_as matters)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: preserve email column when permissioned_as is preserved on schedule edit
Derive email from the preserved permissioned_as via cache lookup instead
of always writing authed.email. This keeps the email column consistent
with the old behavior for backwards compat with old workers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: update deploy UI labels from "edited by" to "run as" for triggers
Triggers now use permissioned_as (not edited_by) for permissions, so
update the deploy UI wording to reflect this. Also update wm_deployers
group description to mention schedules and permissioned_as.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: use u/username format for custom trigger/schedule deploy selection
When picking a custom user for trigger/schedule deployment, store
u/${username} (permissioned_as format) instead of the email. Flows/scripts
continue to use email format for on_behalf_of_email.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: show u/username format for "me" option in trigger deploy selector
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: simplify OnBehalfOfSelector to return the right format per kind
OnBehalfOfSelector now handles the email vs permissioned_as format
internally based on kind:
- triggers: returns u/username, displays u/username in all options
- flows/scripts/apps: returns email, displays username
The onSelect callback now takes (choice, value?) where value is already
in the correct format. Parent components just store it directly without
needing to know about the format difference.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: always show u/username format in OnBehalfOfSelector for all kinds
Display is now consistent: all kinds show u/username in the selector.
The returned value still differs (email for flows/scripts, u/username
for triggers) since the backend APIs expect different formats.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: replace email with permissioned_as in http_trigger test insert
The email column was dropped from trigger tables in the migration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: review fixes — migration, app policy, capture cleanup, naming
- Migration: remove DEFAULT '', use nullable → populate → SET NOT NULL
- App policy: set both on_behalf_of and on_behalf_of_email for all choices
- OnBehalfOfSelector: return OnBehalfOfDetails {email, permissionedAs} instead of ambiguous value
- Remove unused email field from Capture struct and query
- Rename getSourceEmail/getTargetEmail → getSourceOnBehalfOf/getTargetOnBehalfOf
- Rename test functions from preserve_email to preserve_permissioned_as
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: add permissioned_as to all test schedule INSERTs
Since the migration no longer uses DEFAULT '', all INSERTs must
explicitly provide permissioned_as. Updated test fixtures and
schedule_push tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: strip permissioned_as from exports/sync, fix OpenAPI required field
- Add permissioned_as to workspace export strip list (like edited_by)
- Add permissioned_as to CLI TriggerFile Omit list
- Fix TriggerExtraProperty.required: email → permissioned_as
- Regenerate frontend and CLI types
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: remove accidentally committed generated files
These directories are gitignored and should not be tracked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: regenerate system prompts for permissioned_as schema changes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: remove permissioned_as from CLI TriggerFile Omit list
Already stripped in workspace export, no need to also omit from the type.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: optimize email cache key and revert TriggerFile Omit change
- Use single concatenated string for cache key instead of (String, String) tuple
- Remove permissioned_as from CLI TriggerFile Omit (already stripped in export)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: zero-allocation email cache lookups using Equivalent trait
Use a borrowed EmailCacheKey(&str, &str) for cache lookups via
quick_cache's Equivalent support. Only allocates (String, String)
on cache miss for insert. This is called on every trigger fire
and schedule push.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: add permissioned_as to Schedule required fields in OpenAPI spec
The backend always returns permissioned_as (non-optional String),
so the schema should reflect that.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: handle group- prefix in migration UPDATE statements
edited_by can be 'group-{name}' for group-owned triggers/schedules.
The migration now correctly maps these to 'g/{name}' format instead
of incorrectly producing 'u/group-{name}'.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "fix: handle group- prefix in migration UPDATE statements"
This reverts commit
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51957f7d92 |
feat: mcp oauth gateway (#8443)
* feat: extract McpScopeSelector into reusable component Extract scope selection UI from CreateToken.svelte and mcp_authorize page into a shared McpScopeSelector.svelte component to reduce duplication. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add MCP gateway endpoint for workspace-agnostic access Add /api/mcp/gateway endpoint that allows MCP clients to connect without knowing the workspace ID upfront. During OAuth, the user picks their workspace on the consent page. The token is then scoped to that workspace. This enables a single URL for the Anthropic connectors directory. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address PR review nits - Use onClick prop instead of legacy on:click directive in McpScopeSelector - Remove unused catch variable in workspace loading Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: deduplicate gateway OAuth handlers into shared inner functions Extract build_oauth_metadata, build_protected_resource_metadata, oauth_authorize_inner, and oauth_approve_inner so gateway handlers are thin wrappers. Also revert formatting-only changes in auth.rs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: gate run_inline test helpers behind cfg(feature = "run_inline") Imports and helper functions were not gated, causing unused-import and dead-code errors when compiling without the run_inline feature. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Update SQLx metadata --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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f2be625348 |
feat: store hashed tokens instead of plaintext (#8217)
* feat: store hashed tokens in the token table instead of plaintext
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: address review issues in token hash migration
- Update all base.sql fixtures to include token_hash/token_prefix columns
- Keep plaintext token for webhook tokens (needed for URL reconstruction)
- Restore get_token_by_prefix to query DB for webhook tokens
- Fix down migration to delete NULL-token rows before restoring NOT NULL
- Update parser fixture standalone schema
- Update EE dedicated_worker_ee.rs to use token_hash/token_prefix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: restore sqlx offline cache (only add new query files)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: keep writing plaintext token column for backward compat
Write to token column alongside token_hash until MIN_VERSION_SUPPORTS_TOKEN_HASH
(1.649.0) is reached. This ensures older workers can still authenticate
during rolling upgrades. Remove the separate UPDATE in new_webhook_token
since create_token_internal now writes plaintext directly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: branch on MIN_VERSION to write plaintext token or null
Check MIN_VERSION_SUPPORTS_TOKEN_HASH at runtime: write plaintext to
token column while old workers exist, switch to NULL once all workers
are >= 1.649.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: set MIN_VERSION_SUPPORTS_TOKEN_HASH to 1.650.0
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: use token_hash for email lookup and expiry notifications
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: rotate webhook tokens instead of recovering plaintext from DB
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: use token_hash for native trigger token lookups and deletes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* sqlx
* refactor: drop webhook_token_prefix from native_trigger table
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: backward compat for token rotation and make webhook_token_hash NOT NULL
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: prevent panic on short superadmin secret token prefix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: prevent panic on short superadmin secret token prefix
Replace all `token[0..TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN]` slicing with
`token.get(..TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN).unwrap_or(token)` to prevent
panics when a token shorter than 10 chars is provided (e.g.
malformed Authorization header, short superadmin secret).
Co-authored-by: hugocasa <hugocasa@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: prevent panic on short token prefix slicing
Replace all `token[0..TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN]` with safe
`token.get(..TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN).unwrap_or(token)` to prevent panics
on malformed tokens shorter than 10 characters.
Co-authored-by: hugocasa <hugocasa@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "fix: prevent panic on short superadmin secret token prefix"
This reverts commit
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 Pyra
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baf2bcf14d |
feat: make WM_END_USER_EMAIL display users from different workspaces (#8208)
Signed-off-by: pyranota <pyra@duck.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6
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9ff8a85af6 |
refactor: extract windmill-api into subcrates for parallel compilation (#7845)
* refactor: extract windmill-api into 4 subcrates (api-auth, store, api-sse, api-jobs) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: eliminate refresh_token OnceLock bridge in windmill-store Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: eliminate FromRequestParts OnceLock bridge in windmill-api-auth Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: wire subcrates into workspace and clean up unused re-exports Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: resolve cargo check --all-features errors in subcrate wiring Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * sqlx * all * chore: update ee-repo-ref for warning fixes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: extract windmill-trigger crate and expand windmill-api-jobs Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: extract windmill-trigger-kafka crate from windmill-api Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: extract windmill-trigger-postgres crate from windmill-api Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: extract windmill-trigger-websocket and windmill-trigger-mqtt crates Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: extract windmill-trigger-nats, sqs, gcp, and email crates Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: extract windmill-trigger-http crate from windmill-api Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: move token creation and permission helpers to windmill-api-auth Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: extract windmill-native-triggers crate from windmill-api Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * sqlx * all * refactor: extract windmill-api-embeddings crate and fix CI warnings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: resolve type mismatch in oauth2_oss and remaining warnings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: use correct HTTP_CLIENT config in embeddings crate (30s timeout, cert override) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * all * fix: gate oauth_refresh_ee on oauth2 feature to fix warnings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * all --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |