Commit Graph
3665 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5 8953ca670a feat: make hub integrations usable as examples in global AI chat (#10599)
* feat: make hub integrations usable as examples in global chat

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep web search guidance in sync with provider capability

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: resync web search guidance before the request is built

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: carry loop web search availability into every prompt rebuild

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: drop web search guidance on the completions api fallback

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: correct onBeforeIteration contract for the fallback re-entry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: give the ai chat hub script descriptions and integration metadata

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: treat authored hub metadata as evidence the scripts were curated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: treat hub curated as three-state and speak only for a stated true

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: let the benchmark hub serve integration metadata

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: benchmark the hub tool against a real integration's scripts and metadata

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: cover two more real integrations where the scripts already answer

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: report metadata_source from whether the fixture has authored meta

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: parse the hub resource type schema instead of relaying it as a string

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: match integration suggestions on slug words instead of substrings

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: search the integration a query names outright instead of ranking past it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: reject hub integration slugs that would re-target the proxied request

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: add a mentioned integration's hits instead of filtering the search to it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep named-integration hits under the content cap and unmangle fixture placeholders

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: cut the middle of a capped hub result instead of repeating its tail

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: cap hub results by keeping the best of the ranked and named hits

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep a named integration that ranking placed below the content cap

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: let plan mode use the hub integration lookup

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: mark which hub integrations carry authored provider knowledge

The hub flags the integrations whose document holds hand-written provider
knowledge, so a caller can tell before spending a call on the metadata
endpoint: 18 of ~216 qualify, and for the rest the endpoint returns what
was inferred from the same scripts a search already hands back.

Carry the flag onto search results, where the model first meets a slug, so
get_hub_integration is aimed at the few instead of guessed at. A hub that
predates the flag omits it and nothing is marked.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: stop the documented mark reading as a reason not to call

The flag says the hub additionally holds provider knowledge checked against
the live API. It is not a signal to skip the lookup elsewhere: that call
still returns the resource type and the usage-ranked examples, neither of
which a search result carries, and neither guessable.

The prompt said to read a script instead when the mark is absent, which
traded those for a guess on the ~198 undocumented integrations.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the benchmark's documented flag true to what it serves

The eval hub reported Baremetrics and Holded as undocumented while its
metadata endpoint handed back their authored notes, so a case could teach
the model the flag means nothing. Derive it from both fixture sources, and
pin the agreement.

Also trims the documentedIntegrations comment to the four lines AGENTS.md
allows, keeping the case-folding constraint.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the benchmark hub mostly undocumented, like the real one

Adding holded and baremetrics to the documented set resolved the fixture's
contradiction the wrong way: it left five of six integrations marked, against
the live hub's 18 of ~216, and claimed authored notes for two the hub reports
as having none. Drop the notes instead. Their auth and endpoints are in their
shipped scripts, which is what the cases that use them are about.

Also drops the last two places still describing the flag as a reason to spend
or skip the metadata call.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: let the model name the integration instead of guessing it from the query

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: word web search guidance conditionally instead of tracking provider capability

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: open the hub metadata route to job tokens and share one integrations fetch

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: record a copied hub script's source where write_script keeps it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin that a query narrows to the integration it was given

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: match integration suggestions on the name the hub curates

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: name an integration the hub leaves unnamed from the local word table

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 20:04:06 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5.5 8c7dcbbda5 feat: agents as a standalone kind with home listing, detail and editor pages (#11332)
* feat: list agents on the home page and create them from the new menu

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep runnables out of the agents view and anchor a new agent once saved

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: autosave a new agent's first edit and list agents past one page

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add agent detail and editor pages

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: explain when an agent cannot be run and drop the broken agent move

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep query params and a unique path when creating an agent

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: lead the home list with agents and keep rows while the agent view loads

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: treat a loading agent as undeployed when leaving the editor page

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: agent detail page config panel, run page on form runs, chat badge

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: agent configuration modal and draft paths like other new items

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep a new agent draft-free until the first input, land agents with runnables

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: place AI agent after apps in the new menu and describe chat and flow use

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: new agents start with managed memory, editor form says how to turn it off

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: clearer managed memory hint in the agent editor form

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: share the agent editor's pane notice as a PaneNotice component

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: name a new agent after a path no resource holds

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: tell repeated tool names apart and hide permissions on draft-only agents

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: agent configuration beside the model in the chat composer and above the form

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: center the agent run form, configuration beside its Run button

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: icon-only agent configuration button beside Run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: agents run on behalf of their deployer through a run-by-path endpoint

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: agents keep their run-as identity in their value, preserved by the CLI

The identity an agent runs as lives in `value.on_behalf_of` instead of a column. Every write
of an agent resolves it server-side as a flow's is: the writer's own, unless an admin or
wm_deployers member asks to keep it, and a folder default on create. Retyping a resource into
an agent resolves its value the same way. Export leaves it out; the run endpoint reads it and
drops it from the step's inputs.

The CLI follows the app model: a pushed agent never takes its identity from the tracked file,
an unchanged agent compares equal to the deployed one, and an admin or deployer push claims
the deployed identity back. The owner-change pre-check lists agents.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: deploying an agent draft from review keeps its deployed identity

As for an app: an agent draft carries no identity, so the review page claims the deployed one
back, which the backend honours for an admin or wm_deployers member. The draft diff leaves the
deployed identity out, since a draft never holds one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: deploying an agent to another workspace offers the run-as choice

An agent deployed to prod/staging, merged from a fork or promoted with `wmill workspace merge`
gets the same identity choice as a flow or an app: the target's current one, the deployer, or
a picked user, sent as a principal the way a trigger's is. The source workspace's principal is
never copied, and a difference in identity alone is not a change in the workspace compare or
its diff.

The frontend consumes the published windmill-utils-internal, so its deploy provider carries the
same rewrite until that version ships.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: agent identity on fork, agent-scoped job reads, and the run license gate

A fork re-points an agent's identity at its creator when they may not preserve someone else's,
and at the creator when it names nobody in the fork, as it does an app's. A token scoped to
`jobs:run:agents:<path>` reads back the runs it starts, chat turns included. The agent run
endpoint checks the enterprise license like every other run entrypoint.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a CLI push decides agent identity handling by the tracked file's type

An agent retyped into another resource by a push kept neither its value's `on_behalf_of` as the
file stated it nor clear of the old agent's identity. The file's type now decides, and only a
deployed agent's identity is claimed back.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: agents run as the caller, with a note on what a shared one needs

Drops the agent run-as identity: its storage in the agent value, the backfill, the resolution
on every write, and its handling in export, the CLI, draft and cross-workspace deploys, forks
and the workspace compare. The run endpoint runs as the caller, so an operator or reader runs an
agent with their own access. The editor tells the author of a folder agent that anyone running
it needs access to its AI resource and to what its tools use.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: agent editor comments describe runs as the caller

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: agent editor pane notes use Alert

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: agent editor pane notes render as Alert

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: agent editor notes as regular Alerts, not banners

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: agent path as its own editor level, and evals on the agent page

The path leaves the agent form: the editor dialog opens it as a level, as it does evals, and the
editor page in a drawer. The agent page gains Evals, in a dialog. The page supplies the run
form, keeping it out of the editor the flow editor reaches.

The draft edit gate no longer throws when a focused, changed field is removed: the `change` that
removal fires lands mid-teardown, so the gate opens just after instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: agent settings as the resource editor's header fields, behind a cog

The agent's own settings (path, labels, workspace specific, description) open from a cog as
the flow and script editors' do, laid out as the top of the resource editor. The folder note is
gone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: agent settings fields and cog, completing the rename

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: evals open as a dialog over the agent editor page

The editor page opens an agent's evals over itself, as the agent page does, with the unsaved
edits offered to a run; the editor dialog keeps evals as a level of its own. The two pages share
the dialog.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the unreachable model provider note reads like the unreachable agent one

Same warning level and wording as the note above it, with the path inline rather than in
parentheses that lost their spaces.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the unreachable model provider note offers editing the agent too

Editing the agent to use a provider the reader can access is often the simpler way out; offered
when the reader can write the agent, with Unlink and asking for access.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: provider note lists asking for access as its own option

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: shorter provider note, without the header's buttons repeated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: evals only for those who can edit the agent

Evaluating builds datasets and runs against the agent, which is authoring: the agent page and the
editor offer it only with write access to the agent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: agent page actions ordered as the script and flow pages

The menu leads and Edit comes last, as DetailPageHeader lays them out.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the agent editor dialog's levels slide in built on the first visit

Warmed, as the evals pane's levels are, so settings and evals are mounted before the first
navigation rather than inside its transition. Evals are only in the strip where they can be
opened.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the agent's settings report path errors, and hold nothing a reader can edit

The path field reads its error back, so it shows it and keeps deploy blocked on it.
Labels are shown rather than editable without write access. Evals wait for the load
to know they can be opened, and the page layout builds no levels it never shows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: one builder for an agent's run flow, and the agent page on the shared header

The run endpoint and evals build the agent's one-step flow through the same function.
The agent page uses DetailPageHeader, whose error handler, tag and trigger context are
now optional, and whose menu items keep their disabled state. The home row and the
page share the agent's menu and delete.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the agent page's menu is built from its current path

Deploy settings are the workspace's, so they load once and the menu is derived from
them rather than fetched per path, where a superseded fetch could land after a
navigation. The shared run-flow builder lives with agent runs rather than evals.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the scoped-read comment names the run-flow builder as it is

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 18:40:05 +02:00
ca44043e12 feat: let operators compose flows when the workspace grants the right (#11228)
* feat: let a workspace withdraw operator schedule and trigger writes

Operators can create, edit and delete schedules and triggers today through the
API, CLI and MCP, while the operator_settings flags beside them only hide those
pages. An admin who wants operators to see what is scheduled without letting
them change it cannot express that. Add manage_schedules and manage_triggers as
enforced settings, gated at the schedule handlers and at the generic TriggerCrud
routes so every trigger kind is covered by one check.

They name capabilities operators already hold, so they are granted unless
withdrawn, and absence has to mean "never configured" rather than a value. The
read coalesces to true; the update endpoint merges into the stored jsonb with
the two fields as Option<bool>, so an omitted key keeps what is stored.
operator_settings is git-synced as a whole object, so a settings file written
before these keys existed reaches the endpoint on every pull, and a serde or SQL
default of either polarity would turn that pull into a silent withdrawal or
restoration.

The rights are read through a per-process cache, so withdrawing one publishes a
notify_event that drops the entry on every replica.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dsf6VC4MVLisiEoeQkgbr4

* feat: let operators compose flows when the workspace grants the right

Adds operator_settings.builder_flows: a workspace setting that lets every
operator compose flows out of runnables that already exist. It does not make
them authors. The boundary the operator role draws is authoring code and running
arbitrary code, and this does not move it: check_flow_is_composition_only walks
the value and refuses anything carrying code, including the shapes an obvious
walk misses (code hoisted into a flow_node, an AI agent step's tools, and a
linked ai_agent resource whose tool list is resolved at run time).

What the walk cannot settle it returns for the caller to authorize under RLS:
the worker tags the steps pin, every runnable they reference, and the (path,
hash) of every version-pinned step. Composing a path is enough to run it and to
run it as whoever it runs as, since the worker resolves a step's path with the
root DB handle and adopts that runnable's on_behalf_of. A pinned hash needs its
own check because dispatch ignores the path beside it.

The gate runs on every write and on both request-supplied-value paths, flow
preview and flow dependencies, or either becomes the way to run what the write
path refuses.

Operators of a builder workspace consume a full author seat; the EE companion
carries the counting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dsf6VC4MVLisiEoeQkgbr4

* feat: enforce operator write rights on the router and in the UI

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: close the capture gap and gate the trigger editors' write actions

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: gate acl writes and the native trigger drawer behind manage rights

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: refuse operator writes with 403 and gate sharing at the drawer

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: resolve identity in the operator write gate only for writes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: gate the suspended-jobs actions and stop the route check refusing reads

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: explain the empty-state create button when operator writes are withdrawn

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: audit operator settings changes and fold path writes into native rows

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: open locked editors read-only and group the operator settings

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: skip email and azure lookups on editor open while triggers are locked

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: state each operator-rights rationale once in comments

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address CI review findings on operator write rights

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep capture move gated and skip it in the builders while locked

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: refuse builder-rights violations with 403 so operators stay logged in

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: trim duplication in the operator builder gates

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: hide build app from builder operators on the flow page

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: point at the companion EE PR merged with EE main

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep a builder's drafts list loading past drafts they cannot write

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: hide saved agents from builder operators in the step picker

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: note the inlined seat rule and drop orphaned sqlx entries

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: stop a builder's step test from logging them out

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: refuse a builder's dependency job on a path it cannot write

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep builders from adding dynamic dropdown code to a flow

A flow's dropdown code runs as whoever loads its form, so a builder may keep or drop the code stored on the flow it updates, never add or change it. The builder's editor hides the dropdown types and code, and previews options through the deployed flow; the inline dropdown refusal is a 403 so it no longer logs operators out. Also trims rationale comments repeated across sites.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: show why saving operator settings failed

The seat-cap refusal on granting builder rights explains what to do; the toast now carries the server's message instead of a generic failure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: check builder flow drafts like deploys and treat dropdown code as code

A developer who loads a builder's flow draft in the editor runs its dynamic dropdown code as themselves, so a builder's draft now passes the same checks as a deploy. Dropdown code is refused like step code rather than kept or dropped, which also removes the exact-match comparison that refused builders over whitespace.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: bill a builder workspace's operators as developers on cloud

The cloud seat count behind the Premium page, the sidebar usage and the fork cap still weighed every operator at half a seat, while the builder right makes them authors. The out-of-repo invoicing job must follow the same rule.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: check a builder's flow draft as it will be stored

Draft storage strips NUL escapes after the builder check, so a key ending in one (value\u0000, x-windmill-dyn-select-code\u0000) passed the check as an unknown field and was stored under its plain name. The check now reads the sanitized text.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: list a builder's flow drafts and hide hub imports from builders

A builder's undeployed flows now appear in the home list, the flow list and the folder counts. Hub project imports and templates bring scripts and apps along, so builders are no longer offered them. The docs record builders' JavaScript expressions as an accepted risk.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the stored builder right when a settings payload omits it

A git-synced settings file written before the key existed withdrew the right on every push. builder_flows now follows the manage_* rights: an omitted key leaves the stored value, and the CLI does not count it as a difference.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: word builder refusals by what the flow contains, test the tag refusal

A builder refused on a developer's flow never changed its code, so the refusals now describe the flow ("has inline code, so only a developer can edit this flow") rather than an authoring attempt. The grant confirmation uses the neutral dialog: granting changes billing but destroys nothing. The integration test pins the refusal of a worker tag the workspace cannot use.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read builder rights from the operating workspace, gate the flow page's audit logs entry

Builder rights now come from useOperatorBuilderFlows(), next to the schedule and trigger locks, so an editor embedded for another workspace answers about that workspace; the legacy AI chat, one instance for the whole app, reads the navigation workspace. The flow page's Audit logs entry follows the operator audit_logs setting now that builders open that menu. Operator settings reset every value on load, null settings included, so nothing carries over from the previous workspace.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: pick a dynamic dropdown's code source by the operating user's role

The flow input editor, the flow test panel and the flow chat send the dropdown request to the operating workspace, so they now also choose inline versus deployed code by the role held there, through useOperatingUser(), instead of the navigation workspace's.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 40ac1c5f8cbce3843b582d9b392d3f3cc7eca3e6

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #815 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 31c9e66884b8ca805b20bbfad41fc428fbedbc0e

New ee-repo-ref: 40ac1c5f8cbce3843b582d9b392d3f3cc7eca3e6

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-30 18:09:14 +02:00
GuilhemandClaude Opus 5.5 083db5e388 feat: open chat path pill actions from a hover menu (#11441)
* feat: open chat path pill actions from a hover menu

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: build the path pill menu rows from Button

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: resolve chat path pills by a draft's chosen name

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: alias a draft name only to an item of the same kind

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 14:02:38 +02:00
Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel f890355211 chore(main): release 1.820.0 (#11404)
* chore(main): release 1.820.0

* Apply automatic changes

---------

Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-29 20:26:55 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 c5f59d6ccc fix: drop caller-supplied _MODULES at push for every job (#11418)
* fix: drop caller-supplied _MODULES at push for every job

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: never interpolate _MODULES into a tag and drop unused mut

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 20:17:32 +02:00
d1260d7c5a feat: refuse OIDC tokens to previews that impersonate a path their user cannot write (#11396)
* feat: add provenance claims to job OIDC tokens and mark preview sub

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: require a flow or script job's version to belong to its path for deployed

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: derive app script paths server-side and test job provenance in CE

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: count an app script as deployed only when a deployed app run stamped it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: state the deployed condition for the preview sub prefix

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: keep the plain OIDC sub for previews by users who can write the path

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: refuse OIDC tokens to previews by users who cannot write the path

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: keep OIDC token issuance unchanged, leaving provenance to the claims

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: name the root job's trigger claim root_trigger_kind

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: report the request-supplied paths in a job's provenance

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: count a worker-pushed preview under deployed code as deployed

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: drop the claimed parent of a restarted flow preview

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: only read a job's modules from its args when it is a preview

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: never count a preview whose modules came in its args as deployed

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to dba91044a174f8c9275fefea2619dc966b0f9250

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #832 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: a703cb17776d0858255fbfd817dce132377d3e80

New ee-repo-ref: dba91044a174f8c9275fefea2619dc966b0f9250

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-29 19:09:48 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5 cf5c49c3dc feat: restart perpetual runs on the version a deploy makes runnable (#11200)
* feat: opt-in move of perpetual runs to a newly deployed script version

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the perpetual-run opt-in across relocks and check the new version's tag

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the tag check on a perpetual version switch

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: count perpetual runs past the first queue page in the deploy prompt

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: restart perpetual runs on the version a deploy makes runnable

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: claim a perpetual run and queue its replacement in one transaction

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: honour a cancel that lands after the worker last read its queue row

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: leave the lost-cancel fix to its own PR and match the scale down to 0 wording

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: run a preprocessor the deployed version adds over the arguments carried over

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* style: shorten the wording of the modal's argument warning

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: never preprocess a restarted perpetual run, as every other restart does

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: preprocess for a replacement whose run had not been through one

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: push a perpetual replacement without the deployed debounce settings

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: name the runs the deploy button restarts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: skip the perpetual restart lookups on a deploy that is not perpetual

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: move perpetual runs before anything that can fail after the deploy commits

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: report cancellation on the queue listing so the deploy prompt can skip it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: pass the tag workspace to the availability check after the merge

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* style: say which arguments are defined differently and which values are kept

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: resolve a dynamic tag before checking it for a restarted run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin that a deployed dynamic tag is checked as it resolves

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 18:03:43 +02:00
bda00c6cad fix: run custom schedule handlers as the schedule (#11398)
* fix: run custom schedule handlers as the schedule

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: correct handler identity comment and pin preset path check

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: pin preset handler paths instead of matching their name

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: warn on unpinned preset-named schedule handlers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 12a83524b81368043bc939caeb3764fd27a32523

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #833 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: bcfb0838f105d5bffbe49c6ed787116662ebe796

New ee-repo-ref: 12a83524b81368043bc939caeb3764fd27a32523

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-29 18:01:34 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 6064aecdec feat: stop cross-origin isolating the raw app editor (#11411)
* feat: stop cross-origin isolating the raw app editor

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0166irwM15U8vZjc58MsU54U

* docs: drop stale raw app editor reload comments

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0166irwM15U8vZjc58MsU54U

* feat: drop wm_coep from the default raw app embed snippet

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0166irwM15U8vZjc58MsU54U

* chore: pin the UI builder that type-checks without cross-origin isolation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0166irwM15U8vZjc58MsU54U

* docs: name the proxy-isolated case behind the remaining isolation checks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0166irwM15U8vZjc58MsU54U

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 16:52:49 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 054109d855 fix: create workspace forks in the background, with progress (#11406)
* fix: create a fork in the background so a proxy timeout cannot cut it

create_fork copies the whole workspace inside the request, which can run
past the route timeout of an ingress in front of Windmill (Envoy's 15s
default), and the UI then reports a failure for a fork still being made.

create_fork?background=true now returns once the request is validated and
records the copy in workspace_fork_creation, which the new
fork_creation_status endpoint reads. The wizard and AI-session forks use it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: drain background forks on shutdown and fork in the background from the CLI

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: settle fork polls by the fork's existence, adopt in-flight creations

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: show which part of the copy a fork being created is in

The background copy reports its phase (data tables, settings, resources,
scripts, flows, apps, drafts, triggers) through a watch channel. The heartbeat
task records it on the fork's creation row as soon as it changes, and
fork_creation_status returns it. The fork wizard shows it on its button, and
the CLI logs each step.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: join a retried fork creation server-side, settle status by the fork's existence

A retry from the same user and parent joins the creation in flight instead
of being refused, so clients no longer match the refusal's wording, and
another requester can never adopt it. The status route reports a fork that
exists under its parent as completed, whatever its run's record says. Clients
give up on failing polls after a time window rather than a count, which a
rolling deploy can exhaust.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: drop fork-creation joins and existence probes

A second request for a fork being created is refused again; only the
AI-session fork, whose request never varies, waits for its own earlier one.
Clients recognise a server without background forks by its synchronous
answer instead of probing for a workspace by id, which could name another
parent's fork.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: poll a background fork by the id of its own attempt

create_fork?background=true answers with a creation id, and the status
route reads that attempt only, for the user who started it. A retry that
reuses the fork id is a new attempt, so a poller never reads another
attempt's outcome. The AI-session fork no longer adopts a creation in flight,
which it could not tell apart from someone else's.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: record a fork's completion in its own commit, resume a session's fork after reload

The attempt is marked complete in the transaction that creates the fork, so
the status never infers completion from a workspace that may belong to
another request. An AI session keeps the creation id on its pending fork and,
after a reload mid-copy, waits for that attempt instead of requesting the
fork again.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 15:26:41 +02:00
AlexRV12 c34abf7330 fix: refuse flow preview restarts from runs the caller cannot read (#11407) 2026-09-29 14:46:51 +02:00
8741843d2e feat: external instance cluster for data tables and Ducklake catalogs (#11197)
* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it

`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it

`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry

The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands

Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test

Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy

Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist

The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created

A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database

A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"

This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation

A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted

Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal

Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart

A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved

Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it

Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting

Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`

Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers

A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename

A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles

The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition

Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition

The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition

The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it

Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license

Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition

The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): data table roles in the DB manager and raw apps

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: never add a role to the reference of a data table whose name contains '?'

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read the roles of a data table whose name contains '?'

The generated client leaves a '?' in a path param unencoded, so the lookup
404'd and the raw-app picker blocked Start on such a data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): refuse a reference naming both a legacy data table and a role

When a workspace stores both `sales` and a legacy `sales?role=analytics`, the
reference resolved to the legacy entry without a role, so browsing `sales` as
`analytics` reached another data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: declare the default role in migrations written for a data table whose name contains '?'

Such a data table connects as its default role without naming it, so the
migrations the manager wrote for it declared no role and ran as admin.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* feat(datatables): set up an external instance cluster for data tables

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): send external cluster passwords as SCRAM verifiers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): scope external cluster credential readers to the crate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* [ee] feat(datatables): external_instance data tables on the external cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): compare the external cluster settings under a row lock before storing setup

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): only drop external databases Windmill marked, and check use under the lock

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles

A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.

A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.

Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.

A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.

Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin

Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.

All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping

A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.

Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.

Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded

Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.

Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.

Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.

`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.

Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code

The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.

`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract

The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.

Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.

The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.

Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.

Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery

Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.

`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.

Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.

Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.

Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced

The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".

The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing

The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.

Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:

A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.

Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.

Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.

Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings

Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.

The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.

One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.

Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks

Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.

A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.

Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.

The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.

Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically

The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".

The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.

Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles

pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.

Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data

A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.

Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* nit worker error msg

* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it

`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it

`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry

The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands

Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test

Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy

Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist

The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created

A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database

A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"

This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation

A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted

Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal

Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart

A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved

Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it

Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting

Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`

Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers

A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename

A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles

The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition

Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition

The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition

The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it

Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license

Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition

The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* feat(datatables): Ducklake catalogs on the external instance cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): never grant CREATEROLE to custom_instance_user on the external cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): state the authorization contract of external database usage lookups

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): drop a DuckDB data table secret once its ATTACH has used it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf(datatables): resolve a workspace's data tables per pointer hop, not per entry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): hold the parent's settings while a fork points at its data tables

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse repointing the external cluster while it is in use, and keep verify-ca working for pg_dump

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): protect external databases pending fork cleanup, and describe Ducklake usage in the API

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): per-cluster data table role catalogs, with roles on the external instance cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): write the external cluster setting under the lifecycle lock, and check fork targets are registered

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): register external fork catalogs under the lifecycle lock, and keep certificate verification in DuckDB attaches

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep certificate verification when DuckDB attaches an external data table

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep certificate verification when DuckDB attaches an external data table

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse fork cleanup of an external database another workspace uses

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse rolling back while external data tables are under roles, and type external_instance in the CLI

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): stop counting storage-only fork cleanup rows as uses of an external database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bind fork database copies to their workspace, and count every use before dropping one

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): authenticate instance database setup before writing its status, and keep a fork reservation across it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): create external databases only on a cluster setup succeeded on, and document the registry reader

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep only the most recently used DuckDB root certificate files

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): migrate fork reservations on workspace rename, and lock the parent's data tables for the whole fork

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): take the fork data table lock once, before the external cluster's

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): describe the external instance cluster and how to run one locally

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep fork reservations private, drop a cleaned-up entry with its database, and serialize cleanup with settings saves

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): hold the fork lock across a fork import, and carry the reservation inside the setup write

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): check the external cluster setting on its own transaction, and gate the registry probe

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #787 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 0edd40979cf36bfba59323f3f6a0811ae1369cf5

New ee-repo-ref: 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): keep DuckDB root certificate files in the job directory

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: drop the unused json import from the settings crate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): drop the serde_json::json import left unused by the fork setup write

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): accept external_instance data tables in the settings form type

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize fork database reservations, cleanup, setup and Ducklake saves on the database

- A fork copy is created and registered under its workspace's fork lock, and refused once the
  workspace is archived; a rename re-migrates reservations under that lock after archiving.
- Ducklake saves lock every instance database they newly name, as data table saves do.
- Instance database setup holds the database's lock until its entry is written.
- Fork import also holds the database's lock across the restore.
- Cleanup re-reads the entry under its locks before dropping anything.
- Non-superadmins no longer see fork copies reserved for workspaces they are not in.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): state the authorization contract of the external cluster status and write check

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): lock the fork copy at finalization, and order cleanup's registry write after its settings row

- Fork finalization holds the copy's database lock from its availability check to the commit.
- Cleanup removes the registry entry in its own transaction, in a task of its own, instead of on a
  second connection; a rename migrates reservations after its settings rewrites, so both take the
  settings rows before the registry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): hold the fork lock across a rename's settings copy

Fork cleanup of the old id could otherwise drop a copy the renamed workspace goes on using. Also
states the authorization contract of the instance database drop helpers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse moving the external cluster to another host or port while it holds databases

Every settings writer goes through the same check as removal: the login, TLS and maintenance
database may still change, the cluster may not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): clone a data table under roles with its owners and grants (#11120)

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UbrtwiYNfayrmqouBJHwGV

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: open the raw app data table drawer when the workspace has none

Selecting the first data table of an empty list passed undefined to the name
check, which threw instead of opening the drawer on no data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): offer cloning a data table under roles where its grants can be replayed

The server clones such a data table and replays the source's owners and grants,
which only the Enterprise Edition does, so the fork wizard hid both clone
options everywhere instead of on a build that cannot replay them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: name the placeholder the empty raw app data drawer renders

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): replace a job directory file at the DuckDB root certificate path instead of trusting it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the enterprise refusal the role pickers read as 'not under roles'

The server's sentence and the frontend's copy of it were coupled by nothing,
so rewording either one turned every role picker on a community build into a
failed lookup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): type Ducklake catalogs on the external instance cluster in the settings form

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): read a roles answer only for the workspace it was asked in

A fork and its parent each have their own roles on a data table of the same
name, so an answer stamped with the name alone settled the role from the
workspace the editor was acting on before.

Also derive the AI table creation flag from the data replaced into the editor:
data naming no data table left the flag on from before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep an instance database a settings save is waiting to name

Cleanup for a database whose setup failed took the lock first, read no user,
and dropped it while a save blocked on that same lock was about to commit a
reference to it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): check the workspace stamp in the default database selector too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): read what a save racing instance-database cleanup committed

A transaction blocked on the lock may still roll back, so keeping the database
for it stranded one whose name then blocks every retry: it is let through and
its outcome read instead. The waiter query also matches this database's locks
only, since pg_locks spans the cluster.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): tell a waiting request apart from the workspaces using a database

Both callers render what cleanup returns as the workspaces that keep the
database, so a waiting request's pid read as one of them. Each now words that
case itself, and the give-up comment names where the kept name actually goes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): take the cleanup lock on a connection the pool cannot reclaim

A session lock outlives the future holding it, so a cancellation between
taking it and releasing it handed a locked session back to the pool, where
every later settings save waits on it. Detached, the connection closes when it
is dropped and the server releases the lock with the session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): close the cleanup connection on drop instead of detaching it

Detaching released the pool permit while the session stayed alive, so
concurrent cleanups waiting on their locks could open as many connections as
they liked. Closing on drop covers the same cancellation and keeps them
counted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 179d2454a063ee818a9387a1eafdd354a217a16c

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #802 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: c2e43f5b5ff753d339b70e232fd17b6ffecb054d

New ee-repo-ref: 179d2454a063ee818a9387a1eafdd354a217a16c

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #798 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 3145e422d61d580f0a82804f075285c112879da0

New ee-repo-ref: fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): classify a fork import's target from the resolution that built its connection

A second read could see the entry flipped to a resource and skip the reservation check while the
connection already built still reached the instance cluster.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): run external database lifecycle on the caller's transaction, one lock order for fork cleanup

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): check a fork copy's reservation on the locked transaction's connection

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): make and drop fork copies of external data tables on the external cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a fork whose external copy something already names

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): check an external fork copy's uses before removing its entry, so child fork pointers still count

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): migrate external cluster fork reservations on workspace rename

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): configure the external instance cluster and pick its databases from the UI

Instance settings gets an External Postgres tab: the cluster's connection, the setup run
with its report, and the databases Windmill created there. Data table and Ducklake settings
offer the external_instance kind, with a picker over those databases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the external cluster form out of the instance settings the page bulk-saves

The form seeded its key into the settings store after the page snapshotted them, so merely
opening the tab made the page send a setting the validator refuses, failing an admin's
unrelated save. The form is local state now, and only the setup writes the key.

The database picker also treats a superadmin-only listing as authoritative: a workspace
admin, who cannot list, no longer sees a saved database as missing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(tests): app paths are validated, so a guest app cannot be renamed to one with a space

Path validation on apps landed after this test, which still expected a space to be accepted
and created its fixture on a ':' path. The scopable-path guard it exists for is kept by
planting that path on the row, which is now the only way an app can hold one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): one Managed Postgres tab, and a switch for Windmill's own database

The instance settings tab covers both substrates Windmill administers: the external cluster,
which can now be disabled once nothing sits on it, and Windmill's own database, which an
operator can turn off so the cluster is the only one a workspace may newly name. A save that
names it then refuses, as the create endpoint does.

Workspace settings name them the way an admin meets them: Postgres Resource, and Managed
instance, qualified as Internal or External only while both are on offer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): offer the external cluster in the add-data-table wizard, and give Ducklake its room back

The wizard gets the external cluster as a fourth substrate: pick a database it already holds
or name a new one, which the run creates before writing the entry, so Try again does not trip
on a database the last attempt made.

Ducklake's maintenance column moves into the settings popover next to the extra args, which
the wider catalog select had squeezed the name box out of.

A setting a component saves itself now also moves the page's baseline, or Discard would
restore what it replaced and a later save would send that stale value back.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): only a database this wizard run made makes its retry idempotent

A retry skipped the create whenever the name was registered, which let a run adopt a database
another superadmin had made and share their data without the warning the existing-database
branch shows. The run tracks what it created instead, and reports it so Discard can say the
database is still there. Creating one now refreshes the registry the next run's default name
and its validation read, and that default counts the external cluster's databases rather than
the instance's.

Row ownership carries the substrate: "instance" and "external_instance" can hold the same name,
and a row repointed between them while a run probes must not read as that run's own.

Also fixes the merge leftovers in the DuckDB executor's tests, which cargo check never compiles:
the new PgDatabase field and the attach helper's job directory.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): shorten the picked managed kind, and say what an empty database list means

The closed select has room for the qualifier, not the whole name, so a picked managed kind
reads "Managed (Internal)". An external entry gets the tooltip its internal counterpart has,
and a database picker with nothing in it says to type a name rather than "No items found".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the wizard's external-database bookkeeping optional and parked

The run deps gained a required field, which every existing caller of runSetup -- the sibling
test suite included -- does not pass. It defaults to empty instead, the parked payload carries
it across a Supabase redirect as it claims to, and a resumed run counts it as something left
behind. Two regressions pin the create: made on a first attempt, skipped only for a database
this run made.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): review an external-cluster database as one, not as a Postgres resource

The review step fell through to the resource branch for the new provider, so it announced a
connection already in the workspace for a database that does not exist yet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): show the server's refusal instead of an object in the toast

Saving data table settings passed the whole error to the toast, which rendered the request
and response as JSON, and the instance-database wizard replaced it with "check console".
Both surface the message the API sent, through the helper that exists for it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: point at the EE commit dropping the unused import

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): define a role on the cluster its data table sits on

The permissions drawer created and listed roles without naming a cluster, so a role defined
from an external data table became a login on Windmill's own, and the refresh then replaced
the correct catalog with the internal one. The drawer passes the data table's cluster to both.

The wizard also read a database it had just created as a name collision, which blocked
returning to the failed attempt and finishing under the same name.

And the merge had left the CONNECT-grant pass and its log in both the caller and the callee.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): manage the external cluster's role catalog, and name the cluster in the copy

The roles drawer offered one catalog, so the external cluster's roles could only be reached
through a data table sitting on it — and became unreachable once the last one was gone, while
the cluster could not be unset until they were dropped. Opened from the page it now offers the
clusters the instance has; a data table's own drawer still pins its cluster, and its copy names
that cluster rather than "the instance".

A DuckDB attach also decides whether to verify certificates the way every other Postgres
connection does, so a resource carrying a root certificate is no longer downgraded to require
here alone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bind the roles list to the cluster it was read for

Switching catalogs left the previous cluster's rows on screen and applied whichever response
landed last, so a slower read could seat one cluster's logins under the other's heading while
every control acted on the wrong id — invisible where a name exists on both. The switch clears
the rows, a token discards a response the selection has moved past, and the controls stay inert
while a catalog is being read.

The drop confirmation also names the cluster whose databases it reaches.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to dfe7b8b9204d21e0264fbea1c6f6eedf9e738d56

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #810 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 30db1b33bda0446f5fc5dfe353fbb226d57a26d4

New ee-repo-ref: dfe7b8b9204d21e0264fbea1c6f6eedf9e738d56

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
2026-09-29 14:45:47 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5.5 97fa55b719 feat: detect and alert when a schedule skips occurrences (#10917)
* docs: plan for detecting skipped schedule occurrences

Design plan only, no implementation. Records the scheduler's re-anchoring
behaviour, the measurements behind it, and the three-piece design that came
out of reviewing the alternatives.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LJ9wpjWp2YgLUSqt1Ai5d6

* docs: state the user-facing outcome in the schedule plan

The plan described the mechanism but never what a user would see, which made it
hard to judge what the work is worth.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LJ9wpjWp2YgLUSqt1Ai5d6

* docs: state which cause the schedule plan catches, and correct its scope

Records which of the two causes each piece covers, and corrects the overrun
scope: a script schedule carrying retry or dynamic_skip is pushed as a
SingleStepFlow, so it re-arms at step 0 entry and its occurrences overlap like
a flow's. Resolves the no_flow_overlap question, splits the read-time work into
bounded detection and editor-only counting behind measured croner costs, and
fixes the delivery order.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LJ9wpjWp2YgLUSqt1Ai5d6

* feat: count the occurrences a schedule skipped

A schedule that overruns its interval, or waits for a worker, silently loses
the occurrences in between: the scheduler keeps one queued occurrence and
re-anchors on the clock, so nothing records that a run was due and never
happened.

Recovers the sequence from rows that already exist rather than writing per
occurrence. `push_scheduled_job` anchors on `now_from_db` inside the
transaction that inserts the job, and `v2_job.created_at` defaults to that
same transaction timestamp, so `scheduled_for = find_next(created_at)` holds
exactly and the whole occurrence history is derivable.

The schedules list reports how many of the recent runs were followed by a lost
occurrence, and a new occurrences endpoint carries the per-run wait and
duration behind it. Detection is one `find_next` per gap, which stays bounded
on a full page; counting walks the gap and runs only for a single schedule.

The one write is `occurrence_baseline_at`, advanced at create, edit,
re-enable and re-arm. Gaps older than it span a pause, a cron change, a
re-enable or a reconciler re-arm, none of which mean runs were lost.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LJ9wpjWp2YgLUSqt1Ai5d6

* feat: show the wait and run time behind a schedule's skipped occurrences

The list badge says a schedule is losing runs; this says which of the two
causes did it. A large wait means not enough workers, a long run means the job
outgrew its interval, and the pair is what tells them apart. Sits under the
existing upcoming-events panel, so due and overdue read together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LJ9wpjWp2YgLUSqt1Ai5d6

* feat: flag a schedule that is running late right now

Reconstruction is retrospective: a gap only appears once the next occurrence
has a row, which needs the current one to finish. A schedule wedged mid-run
shows nothing until it moves, which is the case an operator most wants to see.

An occurrence still in flight past the time its own successor was due will
cost that successor, so `now > find_next(scheduled_for)` is the signal, needing
no threshold and self-calibrating across a daily and a per-minute schedule. It
applies only where occurrences serialize; an overlapping schedule starts its
successor on time and would flag constantly while healthy.

The queue is read in one aggregating pass keyed on (trigger, runnable_path)
rather than a subquery per schedule, and an overlapping schedule holds more
than one root row, hence the aggregate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LJ9wpjWp2YgLUSqt1Ai5d6

* feat: run the schedule overrun alert from the monitor pass

Wires `schedule_overrun_alerts` in next to `jobs_waiting_alerts`, every 30
iterations (~5 min). Its Enterprise implementation lives in
windmill-labs/windmill-ee-private#772; only the wiring and the OSS stub are
here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LJ9wpjWp2YgLUSqt1Ai5d6

* chore: refresh the sqlx offline cache

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LJ9wpjWp2YgLUSqt1Ai5d6

* feat: record and alert when a schedule skips occurrences

push_scheduled_job compares each chained occurrence with the slot after
the previous one. A gap is written to schedule.skipped_occurrences off the
push transaction, alerts once when a clean schedule starts skipping, and
recovers on the next clean chain. The schedules list shows a badge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LJ9wpjWp2YgLUSqt1Ai5d6

* feat: alert only on a streak of skipping runs, keep a recent skip visible

The skip state now describes the current streak and is written in the push
transaction, so it commits or rolls back with the push. The alert fires
once when 3 runs in a row skipped, and the list keeps a muted badge for 7
days after the latest skip. Editing or toggling a schedule resets it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LJ9wpjWp2YgLUSqt1Ai5d6

* fix: name the missed-occurrence state after what it counts, alert only once committed

Renames the columns to late_run_streak, missed_occurrences and
last_missed_at, keeps the missed count after a streak ends so the muted
badge can show it, and rewords both badges. The alert task now reads the
streak FOR SHARE, which waits for the push transaction, so a push that
rolls back and retries alerts once. A failed slot count leaves the streak
untouched, and a schedule deleted mid-push no longer fails it. Adds an
integration test for the streak and its reset.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LJ9wpjWp2YgLUSqt1Ai5d6

* fix: recover the late run alert, store the missed slot, name it missed throughout

The alert now recovers (and so acknowledges itself) when a streak that
alerted ends on a run on time, under the schedule:{path} resource used by
the other trigger alerts. last_missed_at records the last missed cron slot
rather than when the late run chained, and the counting helpers say
missed, since skipped already names occurrences queued and not run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LJ9wpjWp2YgLUSqt1Ai5d6

* fix: scope the late run alert to its workspace, acknowledge it on edit, toggle and delete

Recovery acknowledges alerts by resource alone, so the resource now
carries the workspace. Editing, toggling or deleting a schedule clears
its streak and a disabled or deleted one never chains a run on time, so
those handlers acknowledge its open alert after committing. Past the
1000-slot cap, last_missed_at falls back to the detection time.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LJ9wpjWp2YgLUSqt1Ai5d6

* refactor: raise the late run alert like the other critical alerts

Drops the recovery, the workspace-scoped resource and the acknowledgement
on edit, toggle and delete: the alert now fires once per streak with no
resource and is acknowledged from the alerts feed, as the trigger and job
failure alerts are. The FOR SHARE read stays, so a push that rolls back
across the flow path's retries still alerts once. Notes in openapi that
past 1000 misses in one late run the count is a floor and the time
approximate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LJ9wpjWp2YgLUSqt1Ai5d6

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 12:40:25 +02:00
GuilhemandClaude Opus 5 f367eaf6d0 feat: run turns in several flow chat conversations at once (#11202)
* feat: run turns in several flow chat conversations at once

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep finished turns finished and cached chats current in the flow chat pool

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: attribute a turn's rows by job id as well as sequence

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: count only real stream updates and retry the job-id read

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep a chat that holds an unsent draft, and take one back when its first turn is withdrawn

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: ignore a stale running-turn snapshot, keep a withdrawn chat's draft, poll after clean stream ends

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: follow the turn running now when the listing named one already over

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep replacement turns and SSE fallback moving

* fix: keep replacement turn handoffs active

* fix: preserve unread badge line height

* fix: settle local fallback handoffs

* fix: settle refused turn handoffs

* fix: scope turn handoffs to conversation

* fix: drop stale turn handoffs

* refactor: move the queued message and 409 handling into per-conversation turns

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address cubic's review of the parallel flow chat turns

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: clear a stale failure on refresh, and tighten the docs and test waits

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: recover running rows past the first page, and drop the failure a re-read disproves

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: check the running-turn query at compile time, and narrow what a refresh clears

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: settle a failed turn only from an answer that turn wrote

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: settle a failed turn from its own answer, and only while it is still the failure shown

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: drop a failure whose answer arrived even when a newer turn owns the error

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: free an answered failure whatever the turn that started meanwhile is doing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: drop a rows read that a turn outran, rather than merging it under newer messages

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: drop a rows read whose conversation was left and opened again

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: hand over a file still being read when its composer goes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: count a drop's routing as work in flight, so its file is handed over too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: hold the send until every file a conversation is owed has landed

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: keep a panel mounted per conversation instead of handing its draft over

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the withdrawn chat whose composer was written in, not the empty one

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the chat in front of the reader when both withdrawn composers were written in

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep a retry's own run arguments when a turn elsewhere refuses it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: name panels apart across pools, and read a flow's inputs when its chat is built

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 11:36:30 +02:00
Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel 651a6b01f5 chore(main): release 1.819.0 (#11364)
* chore(main): release 1.819.0

* Apply automatic changes

---------

Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-29 08:33:39 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 cedd6dc901 fix: hold interpolated references and captures to the token path scopes (#11391)
* fix: hold interpolated references and captures to the token path scopes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: let a resource read cover its own linked secret variable

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: resolve policy-granted app upload resources on the viewer's rls

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: cover multi-secret linked variables and keep capture paths out of refusals

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 18:34:55 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 163a4ffa4e fix: scope flow resume to its workspace and minting to the job's run (#11392)
* fix: scope flow resume to its workspace and minting to the job's run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: name the lineage columns resume minting checks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 18:31:44 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 14a2619ad2 fix: gate batch rerun on job read access, scope started_at to workspace (#11387)
* fix: gate batch rerun on job read access and scope started_at lookup to the workspace

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: assert batch rerun denial comes from the read gate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 18:29:58 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 3eaf2888c0 fix: scope workspace dependencies create to the path workspace (#11385)
* fix: scope workspace dependencies create to the path workspace

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: state the workspace_id must-match contract in the spec and struct

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 18:15:10 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 f4dcaf3e45 fix: list only the paths the caller can read in path autocomplete (#11388)
* fix: list only the paths the caller can read in path autocomplete

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: bound the path autocomplete cache by total path count

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 17:55:16 +02:00
990a726409 feat: add provenance claims to job OIDC tokens (#11369)
* feat: add provenance claims to job OIDC tokens and mark preview sub

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: require a flow or script job's version to belong to its path for deployed

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: derive app script paths server-side and test job provenance in CE

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: count an app script as deployed only when a deployed app run stamped it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: state the deployed condition for the preview sub prefix

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: keep the plain OIDC sub for previews by users who can write the path

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: refuse OIDC tokens to previews by users who cannot write the path

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: keep OIDC token issuance unchanged, leaving provenance to the claims

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: name the root job's trigger claim root_trigger_kind

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 421cf2a8b4f98b421e93c0fc7c1c378314a66e50

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #831 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 7acd384875deba4b01a502e628a153b11c82eecb

New ee-repo-ref: 421cf2a8b4f98b421e93c0fc7c1c378314a66e50

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-28 11:42:58 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 893e64f630 fix: only restart a flow on a version of its own path and workspace (#11376)
* fix: only restart a flow on a version of its own path and workspace

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin cross-workspace restart version rejection

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 14:10:21 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 90f9e59321 fix: only let a job's own token claim run lineage (#11367)
* fix: only let a job's own token claim its lineage on the run endpoints

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: drop an unclaimable run lineage instead of refusing the run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: only let a job's own token run its workflow-as-code tasks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 14:09:59 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 e2be584ca5 fix: let custom workspace error handlers send email with the instance SMTP (#11365)
* fix: let custom workspace error handlers send email with the instance SMTP

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: state what the error handler email allowlist guarantees

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 22:18:40 +02:00
Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel 3974bbeac6 chore(main): release 1.818.0 (#11294)
* chore(main): release 1.818.0

* Apply automatic changes

---------

Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-25 18:42:49 +00:00
9a1c6e5081 feat: let a workspace withdraw operator schedule and trigger writes (#11226)
* feat: let a workspace withdraw operator schedule and trigger writes

Operators can create, edit and delete schedules and triggers today through the
API, CLI and MCP, while the operator_settings flags beside them only hide those
pages. An admin who wants operators to see what is scheduled without letting
them change it cannot express that. Add manage_schedules and manage_triggers as
enforced settings, gated at the schedule handlers and at the generic TriggerCrud
routes so every trigger kind is covered by one check.

They name capabilities operators already hold, so they are granted unless
withdrawn, and absence has to mean "never configured" rather than a value. The
read coalesces to true; the update endpoint merges into the stored jsonb with
the two fields as Option<bool>, so an omitted key keeps what is stored.
operator_settings is git-synced as a whole object, so a settings file written
before these keys existed reaches the endpoint on every pull, and a serde or SQL
default of either polarity would turn that pull into a silent withdrawal or
restoration.

The rights are read through a per-process cache, so withdrawing one publishes a
notify_event that drops the entry on every replica.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dsf6VC4MVLisiEoeQkgbr4

* feat: enforce operator write rights on the router and in the UI

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: close the capture gap and gate the trigger editors' write actions

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: gate acl writes and the native trigger drawer behind manage rights

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: refuse operator writes with 403 and gate sharing at the drawer

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: resolve identity in the operator write gate only for writes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: gate the suspended-jobs actions and stop the route check refusing reads

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: explain the empty-state create button when operator writes are withdrawn

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: audit operator settings changes and fold path writes into native rows

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: open locked editors read-only and group the operator settings

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: skip email and azure lookups on editor open while triggers are locked

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: state each operator-rights rationale once in comments

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address CI review findings on operator write rights

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep capture move gated and skip it in the builders while locked

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep admin and operator exclusive when setting a workspace role

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: use the shared section component for operator settings groups

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
2026-09-25 17:34:58 +00:00
e14da5c6bc feat(bedrock): add OIDC role assumption as a fourth auth mode (#10936)
* feat(bedrock): add OIDC role assumption as a fourth auth mode

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YCVb91fZp3dqM14KRPzoEn

* fix(bedrock): gate the OIDC cache correctly and assume the role once per job

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YCVb91fZp3dqM14KRPzoEn

* refactor(bedrock): check the OIDC region before minting a token

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YCVb91fZp3dqM14KRPzoEn

* fix(bedrock): keep OIDC session names collision-resistant, gate the copy on EE

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YCVb91fZp3dqM14KRPzoEn

* fix(bedrock): check the OIDC region before reusing cached credentials

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YCVb91fZp3dqM14KRPzoEn

* fix(bedrock): clear assumed-role sessions when AI settings change

invalidate_ai_request_cache_for_workspace cleared AI_REQUEST_CACHE only, so a
workspace's AI settings edit reset one cache and left the assumed-role sessions
keyed on the old config in place until STS expired them.

Also name the region requirement in the credentials-check hint, so following it
does not land on the OIDC path's region guard.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YCVb91fZp3dqM14KRPzoEn

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to de73db2bacfdc3eaa2e63b1827178bc198d54e5c

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #770 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: c43dab1e69b1cb3f685e6df07bff634dc2a0b734

New ee-repo-ref: de73db2bacfdc3eaa2e63b1827178bc198d54e5c

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-25 18:19:38 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 d931032706 perf: stop polling http trigger routes on workers and every minute (#11351)
* perf: read the http trigger version only as a 20 min safety net

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: check the http trigger version every 5 min instead of 20

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: load http trigger routers lazily on workers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* style: drop unrelated formatting from main.rs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: force the periodic http router rebuild and retry a failed one

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: retry a failed http router refresh from every caller

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 12:01:28 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 4b09558e13 feat: start a deferred queued job now without changing its id (#11347)
* feat: start a deferred queued job now without changing its id

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: refuse starting a schedule's upcoming tick early

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: hide run now on upcoming schedule ticks and register its audit op

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 10:43:46 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 d18d7043df feat: infer a script's schema when a deploy (e.g. MCP) sends none (#11339)
* feat: infer a script's schema from its code when a deploy sends none

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: merge an inferred schema into the previous one the way the editor does

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: parse non-JSON TS defaults natively and keep the schema on a failed inference

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: type untyped TS params from their literal shape when the default can't be evaluated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read literal TS defaults off the AST so the server types them like the editor

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: word the script schema description for both create and update

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: note that dbt scripts derive their schema from the descriptor

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 10:00:49 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 0bac766756 feat: refresh MCP tools when scripts and flows change (#11337)
* feat: notify MCP clients when a workspace's scripts or flows change

Advertise tools.listChanged and implement subscriptions/listen, so a
2026-07-28 client refreshes its tool list when scripts or flows are
deployed, archived, renamed or deleted. Changes reach every replica via
new statement-level notify_event triggers; MCP-originated changes also
signal the serving replica inline.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: signal each workspace once per notify-event poll batch

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: signal script/flow path moves, keep unrelated updates trigger-free

Row-level UPDATE OF archived/deleted/path triggers with a WHEN guard
replace the statement-level ones, which built transition tables for
every UPDATE on script and flow. Path moves from username changes and
offboarding are now signalled. subscriptions/listen is refused when the
client asks for nothing this server sends.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: signal path moves only for unarchived versions

A username change or offboarding rewrites the path of every version,
archived ones included, which would queue one notify_event per version.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: detect MCP tool-list changes by polling a workspace fingerprint

Replace the notify_event triggers and poller hook with a per-process,
per-workspace poll of a hash over the live scripts and flows, run only
while a subscriptions/listen stream watches that workspace. Every write
path (UI, CLI, git sync, user renames, workspace moves) is covered with
no migration; an MCP-originated change polls at once.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: announce the first fingerprint so a change before the baseline is not lost

Also poll immediately after a script/flow mutation through a
multi-workspace token, and pin the fingerprint test on a lock update,
which is the unrelated write that actually happens.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: open every tool-list subscription with one notification

A subscriber joining an existing watcher missed a change the watcher
recorded before it subscribed. Also move the fingerprint query to a
runnables module, since it spans scripts and flows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 09:38:41 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 1fd729ac1a feat: add an instance-wide accent color setting with sidebar tint (#11335)
* feat: add an instance-wide accent color setting with sidebar tint

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: paint the cached accent before the license resolves

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: serve the banner and accent color from one cached endpoint

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: invalidate the instance ui cache and bound it with a ttl

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the instance ui ttl under the client poll period

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: load the banner and accent color once per page load

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: read the banner and accent color without a server cache

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: show a cleared accent color as off

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 11:23:30 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 7593597617 fix: validate app and trigger paths, refuse traversal in workspace export (#11311)
* fix: enforce proper_id paths on apps and triggers, refuse traversal in export

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: skip proper_id on tables already holding non-conforming paths

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin archive entry path traversal guard

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: refuse windows-normalized traversal in export, check raw app path early

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: only treat a colon in the first archive segment as a drive prefix

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: accept a colon past the first archive segment

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* revert: drop proper_id migration, keep path validation in the API

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: validate paths in bulk http trigger creation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 15:50:32 +02:00
Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel 25c8bfaab4 chore(main): release 1.817.0 (#11268)
* chore(main): release 1.817.0

* Apply automatic changes

---------

Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-22 12:13:32 +00:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5 faf7b22be0 fix: apply token path scopes to the native trigger list (#11281)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 08:14:41 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5 9ad2c91ddb fix: enforce token path scopes on GET /raw_apps/list (#11284)
* fix: enforce token path scopes on GET /raw_apps/list

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: apply the raw app scope filter before the page limit

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: cover the bare prefix path in the raw app scope test

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 08:13:58 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5 69fafb9262 feat: check dynamic worker tags on the tag they resolve to (#11271)
* feat: check dynamic worker tags on the tag they resolve to

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the tag check after a flow preprocessor resolves the tag

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep tied tag placeholders exact and drop an unresolvable flow tag

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: describe tied tag placeholders in the custom tags editor

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: check workflow-as-code task tags on the tag they resolve to

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: judge a preprocessed flow's tag as written when it is run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: check a preprocessed flow's own tag, as written only where it reads args

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: explain dynamic tags in the worker tag picker

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: look up worker availability for typed static tags

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: poll worker availability with the tag list as it is at each run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: warn on custom tags with nothing fixed at their start or end

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: open the broad custom tag warning from the keyboard

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 07:30:48 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5 4d12ea4614 feat: deploy from the UI to a workspace on another instance (#11245)
* feat: deploy from the UI to a workspace on another instance

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the remote deploy proxy from being spent by a link

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: key remote deploy proxy URLs instead of a global client header

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the remote deploy proxy key out of logs and restricted hands

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: serialize remote deploy connect with account and key changes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: key remote deploy tokens to the account and connect by signing in

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: bind remote deploy connect to its target and order its locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: serialize remote deploy connect with target changes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: list every lock remote deploy connect takes in auth-surface

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: never wait on the membership lock in remote deploy connect

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep a superseded target response out of the settings form

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: void stale remote deploy tokens on read instead of locking in connect

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: void remote deploy tokens older than the last target change

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: order remote deploy connections by when their connect started

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: bind stored remote deploy tokens to the membership and target they were connected under

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: answer remote deploy connect without settings as no target

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 01:40:53 +02:00
Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel 965e8b0c23 chore(main): release 1.816.0 (#11237)
* chore(main): release 1.816.0

* Apply automatic changes

---------

Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-21 16:55:24 +00:00
hugocasa 787b7a6bcc Revert "feat(auth): 2 h login links and a click-to-sign-in page for emailed ones (#11203)" (#11267)
This reverts commit 5639187fec.
2026-09-21 16:54:28 +00:00
9f2685d788 perf: retire the legacy pre-partitioning audit table (#11240)
* perf: index audit logs by operation and limit each audit table on its own

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: key the audit operation index on id with a trailing timestamp

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: index the legacy audit table by operation too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: drop the legacy audit index and per-table limit from this PR

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: build the audit operation index in a background migration

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: retire the legacy pre-partitioning audit table

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: bound the legacy audit retirement's lock waits and keep the backfill guard

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: bound the audit index parent's lock wait and retry background steps

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 5370ae3a95a3dc10171f72da74286a654996eee6

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #818 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: aa367619a970de231f5c10cad470d9d42169fff8

New ee-repo-ref: 5370ae3a95a3dc10171f72da74286a654996eee6

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-21 15:24:07 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5 3b8c3264ec perf: index audit logs by workspace and operation (#11235)
* perf: index audit logs by operation and limit each audit table on its own

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: key the audit operation index on id with a trailing timestamp

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: index the legacy audit table by operation too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: drop the legacy audit index and per-table limit from this PR

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: build the audit operation index in a background migration

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: bound the audit index parent's lock wait and retry background steps

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 15:07:34 +00:00
c637b06a54 feat: add per-model context window override in workspace AI settings (#11232)
* feat: add per-model context window override in workspace AI settings

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the instance ai_config context window validation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: name the table-only context window lookup for what it is

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: drop the per-row assumed-window hint from the model limits card

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: fold the model limit default into an inline reset button

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: give the per-model settings cards one reset control

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: enforce the documented output limit bounds on the AI config

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: show inherited model limits as placeholders, like model pricing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: hugocasa <hugo@casademont.ch>
2026-09-21 14:44:03 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5 1b0f119c7b fix: check custom_instance_user can connect during instance database setup (#11244)
* fix: check custom_instance_user can connect during instance database setup

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: mark the custom_instance_user login ok before tearing the connection down

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 13:45:06 +00:00
e1e3692fbc feat: data table roles in the DB manager and raw apps (#11139)
* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles

A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.

A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.

Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.

A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.

Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin

Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.

All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping

A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.

Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.

Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded

Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.

Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.

Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.

`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.

Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code

The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.

`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract

The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.

Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.

The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.

Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.

Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery

Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.

`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.

Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.

Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.

Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced

The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".

The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing

The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.

Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:

A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.

Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.

Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.

Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings

Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.

The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.

One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.

Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks

Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.

A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.

Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.

The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.

Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically

The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".

The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.

Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles

pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.

Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data

A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.

Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* nit worker error msg

* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it

`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it

`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry

The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands

Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test

Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy

Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist

The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created

A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database

A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"

This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation

A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted

Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal

Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart

A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved

Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it

Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting

Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`

Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers

A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename

A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles

The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition

Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition

The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition

The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it

Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license

Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition

The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): data table roles in the DB manager and raw apps

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: never add a role to the reference of a data table whose name contains '?'

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read the roles of a data table whose name contains '?'

The generated client leaves a '?' in a path param unencoded, so the lookup
404'd and the raw-app picker blocked Start on such a data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): refuse a reference naming both a legacy data table and a role

When a workspace stores both `sales` and a legacy `sales?role=analytics`, the
reference resolved to the legacy entry without a role, so browsing `sales` as
`analytics` reached another data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: declare the default role in migrations written for a data table whose name contains '?'

Such a data table connects as its default role without naming it, so the
migrations the manager wrote for it declared no role and ran as admin.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles

A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.

A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.

Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.

A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.

Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin

Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.

All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping

A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.

Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.

Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded

Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.

Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.

Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.

`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.

Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code

The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.

`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract

The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.

Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.

The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.

Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.

Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery

Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.

`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.

Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.

Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.

Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced

The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".

The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing

The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.

Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:

A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.

Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.

Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.

Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings

Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.

The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.

One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.

Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks

Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.

A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.

Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.

The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.

Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically

The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".

The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.

Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles

pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.

Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data

A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.

Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* nit worker error msg

* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it

`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it

`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry

The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands

Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test

Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy

Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist

The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created

A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database

A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"

This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation

A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted

Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal

Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart

A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved

Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it

Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting

Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`

Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers

A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename

A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles

The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition

Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition

The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition

The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it

Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license

Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition

The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): drop a DuckDB data table secret once its ATTACH has used it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf(datatables): resolve a workspace's data tables per pointer hop, not per entry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): hold the parent's settings while a fork points at its data tables

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #787 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 0edd40979cf36bfba59323f3f6a0811ae1369cf5

New ee-repo-ref: 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* feat(datatables): clone a data table under roles with its owners and grants (#11120)

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UbrtwiYNfayrmqouBJHwGV

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: open the raw app data table drawer when the workspace has none

Selecting the first data table of an empty list passed undefined to the name
check, which threw instead of opening the drawer on no data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): offer cloning a data table under roles where its grants can be replayed

The server clones such a data table and replays the source's owners and grants,
which only the Enterprise Edition does, so the fork wizard hid both clone
options everywhere instead of on a build that cannot replay them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: name the placeholder the empty raw app data drawer renders

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the enterprise refusal the role pickers read as 'not under roles'

The server's sentence and the frontend's copy of it were coupled by nothing,
so rewording either one turned every role picker on a community build into a
failed lookup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): read a roles answer only for the workspace it was asked in

A fork and its parent each have their own roles on a data table of the same
name, so an answer stamped with the name alone settled the role from the
workspace the editor was acting on before.

Also derive the AI table creation flag from the data replaced into the editor:
data naming no data table left the flag on from before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep an instance database a settings save is waiting to name

Cleanup for a database whose setup failed took the lock first, read no user,
and dropped it while a save blocked on that same lock was about to commit a
reference to it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): check the workspace stamp in the default database selector too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): read what a save racing instance-database cleanup committed

A transaction blocked on the lock may still roll back, so keeping the database
for it stranded one whose name then blocks every retry: it is let through and
its outcome read instead. The waiter query also matches this database's locks
only, since pg_locks spans the cluster.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): tell a waiting request apart from the workspaces using a database

Both callers render what cleanup returns as the workspaces that keep the
database, so a waiting request's pid read as one of them. Each now words that
case itself, and the give-up comment names where the kept name actually goes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): take the cleanup lock on a connection the pool cannot reclaim

A session lock outlives the future holding it, so a cancellation between
taking it and releasing it handed a locked session back to the pool, where
every later settings save waits on it. Detached, the connection closes when it
is dropped and the server releases the lock with the session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): close the cleanup connection on drop instead of detaching it

Detaching released the pool permit while the session stayed alive, so
concurrent cleanups waiting on their locks could open as many connections as
they liked. Closing on drop covers the same cancellation and keeps them
counted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #798 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 3145e422d61d580f0a82804f075285c112879da0

New ee-repo-ref: fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-21 12:03:01 +00:00
9994e03bc7 feat: add an ACL editor for data table roles (#11063)
* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #787 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 0edd40979cf36bfba59323f3f6a0811ae1369cf5

New ee-repo-ref: 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-19 23:23:50 +02:00
f00b2fcb1e feat: drafts follow their item through a move; behind means base ≠ head (#10577)
* refactor: give home multi-select a reserved gutter and a menu entry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep checkbox theming and reserve the gutter on non-selectable rows

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: carry every draft with an item when it moves

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: move draft-only items and warn editors when an item moves

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: put the home selection checkbox back in the kind icon slot

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FaEacdxR6M6VDej6C9r39

* feat: animate the home bulk bar and exit selection at zero

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FaEacdxR6M6VDej6C9r39

* fix: keep dialog icon badges round and the panel inside narrow viewports

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FaEacdxR6M6VDej6C9r39

* fix: address review findings on the draft-carry path

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FaEacdxR6M6VDej6C9r39

* fix: keep a staged rename when a move carries the draft

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: restamp only the deployer's own carried draft

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: scope the moved-save restamp to the mover as well

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read the app move's author from the head version, not the draft's base

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: carry a flow draft's baseline path so deploying it cannot un-move the flow

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: reject unsupported kinds in move_draft, survive NUL-poisoned draft rows

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: skip NUL-poisoned rows in every draft-value rewrite, not just the first

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: report a NUL-poisoned draft on move instead of 500ing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: name the attempted operation in the NUL rejection message

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: drop dead selection code and comments that outlived their state

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: describe script staleness as head-pinned, which is what the loader does

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: correct the third staleness comment left claiming a stable fork base

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address CI review — auth order, save race, carry failure, path validation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: gate operators earlier, skip the write tx without lineage, unblock a chained move

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: run the post-write moved re-assert under RLS, not the raw pool

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the moved answer to what the saver can see

The post-write re-assert names a path and a username, and nothing at any
layer stopped it reading them off a raw pool connection. Swapping the
transaction back to `db.begin()` compiles and passes everything else, so
the guard has to be a test: a non-admin saving at a path whose item moved
into a folder they cannot see gets `saved`, while the admin gets `moved`.

Also drops two doc comments still arguing that clearing the write gate at
the old path removes the need for an RLS envelope. It does not — the gate
resolves the old path and the re-assert asks about the new one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: name the real deploy path and stop restating the RLS constraint

`update_path` is not a symbol in this repo; a script move goes through
`create_script`. The re-assert's comment re-derived the disclosure argument
that already sits on `resolve_moved_to_in`, where a caller would break it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: state the RLS and restamp constraints once each

The RLS envelope was argued at three sites in drafts.rs; it now sits only on
`resolve_moved_to_in`, whose signature is what a caller would break. The
restamp scoping was copy-pasted at all three deploy call sites while already
documented in full on `move_drafts_for_path`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: carry both path keys on a move, and grant the draft sequence

The upsert now runs as `windmill_user`, so it calls nextval on `draft_id_seq`
as that role. The only thing granting that is the ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES in
20250205131523, whose DO block swallows failures — so an instance where it
errored would fail every autosave with `permission denied for sequence`.

A draft value carries two path keys: the typed one and a mirror the editors
keep in step with it while it differs from the row's path. Rewriting only the
typed one left the mirror naming the old location, and the loaders prefer the
mirror — reopening a moved session script restored the old path and the next
save un-did the move. Both keys now follow, in the move endpoint and in the
passive carry, under the same tri-state rule.

`typed_path_field` answered `draft_path` for every non-script kind, including
resources, variables and triggers, which have no such key. It returns `None`
for them now, and `move_draft` reads its guard off that mapping so the movable
set and the field mapping cannot drift apart.

Also documents that `move_drafts_for_path` mutates every owner's row and
enforces nothing itself, and parses the draft payload once per save instead of
three times.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the two-key move, and stop the down migration breaking instances

Revoking the sequence grant would strip a privilege a healthy instance had
before this migration ran — the grant it adds is indistinguishable in the
catalog from the one ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES gives at creation time — so the
down is a comment, matching the other grant-only migrations.

The mirror rewrite is spread over three sites that have to agree and fails
silently when they don't, so it gets a test: a draft carrying both path keys
has both moved, and one carrying neither mirror does not gain one. It reads
the value back over HTTP rather than with `sqlx::query!`, which would need an
offline cache entry of its own.

Also drops twelve `.sqlx` entries this branch added and then superseded, and
corrects the doc and openapi text that still described only the typed path
being rewritten.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: point the empty down at the grant it is declining to revoke

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: drop the restamp and tri-state; a move relocates the draft row only

A deploy that renames an item is a deploy like any other: every draft on the item
goes stale, and the stale prompt with its diff is the single mechanism to catch up.
move_drafts_for_path now touches only the row's path column, so the value keeps the
base version the draft actually forked from, and the "moved" patch carries no
version restamp. DraftBaseVersion shrinks to the three per-kind lineage fields.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: stale prompt links to a diff that names and lets you pick the deployed version

The stale-draft prompt gains "See what changed", which opens the diff drawer. The
drawer resolves the deployed side by the draft row's own path (not the typed path,
which after a rename still names the archived row), labels which version the left
pane is, and offers a picker over the item's deployed history for scripts, flows
and raw apps. The history endpoints return created_by (and created_at for apps)
so each entry can name its deployer. "Restore to deployed" moves to the header
actions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: move_to asserts the response status

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep a script draft's base at the version it forked from

The script editor seeded the draft's parent_hash from the deployed head on every
load, and the next autosave persisted it, so a draft behind the deploy read as up
to date after being opened once. The base now comes from the draft when one
exists; the head is only used for a fresh checkout or an explicit topHash. Deploy
already fetches the live head and confirms on mismatch, so the base is what makes
that check meaningful. The webhook "run this version" URL uses the deployed hash
rather than the draft's base.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: store the version a draft forked from in one draft.base column

Every kind kept its fork base under a different name and type inside the
value: parent_hash (hex) for scripts, version_id for flows, parent_version for
apps. draft.base holds it as one text id, derived on save from the value so
every writer fills it the same way, backfilled by the migration (rows holding a
NUL are skipped, since ->> raises on them). The get-by-path overlay exposes it
as draft_base and the drafts list as base; the editors and the compare page
read that one field and compare it to the head as text.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: raw-app drafts carry a fork base, so behind means base != head for them too

The raw-app bundle never carried the version it forked from, which left raw apps
on the timestamp check that self-heals as you type, and the header's deploy guard
read a version prop nothing set, so deploying over a newer version never asked.
The route now stamps parent_version into the bundle (the draft's own base when it
has one, else the head), the server derives draft.base from it, the stale prompt
compares it to the head and links to the diff, and the editor threads it to the
header so the deploy guard confirms. A deploy re-pins the base to the version it
wrote.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: refuse a rename onto a path that already holds a draft

A draft occupies its path the way a deployed item does: a never-deployed item,
or a draft left on an archived script. Renaming onto it would either merge two
items or leave the losing row stranded at a path its item has left. The move now
refuses with a BadRequest inside the deploy's transaction, so the rename itself
fails and the source stays deployed. Every draft on the item then moves; there is
no longer a left-behind count to report.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: save drafts by row id, so an open editor follows its draft through a move

A rename carries every draft on the item to the new path. An editor left open
across it was still saving by the path it opened on, which the server had to
refuse and answer with where the item went (the "moved" handshake and its
modal). The draft row has an id: the get-by-path overlay now returns it as
draft_id, every later save sends it, and the server writes the row wherever it
is and answers with that path. The editor then follows: it flushes what it holds,
tells the user, and navigates to the item's new path, where the stale prompt
says what changed. The lineage-based move resolvers, the moved status and the
moved modal are gone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: the out-of-date prompt names both versions and can take the latest as the new base

The prompt now says which version the draft forked from and which is deployed
(and by whom), instead of two timestamps, and gains "Take latest, keep my
edits": the draft's base moves to the head and its content stays, so the user
can acknowledge a newer version without discarding their work. Each route sets
its kind's base field on the draft value and persists it; the raw-app bundle
carries it already, so setting the state is enough there.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: two-action out-of-date prompt; taking the latest moves into the diff drawer

Four buttons made the prompt hard to read. It keeps "See what changed" and a
red "Use latest" (it replaces the draft); closing it is keeping the draft.
"Take latest, keep my edits" moves to the diff drawer's header, offered only
while the draft is behind, so the user takes the latest with the diff in front
of them. Scripts, flows and raw apps pass the action through their diff drawer;
the classic app editor has no drawer wired to the prompt and loses it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: drop the draft_id_seq grant; the draft upsert runs on the raw pool

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a moved draft's path keys follow it, and a refused rename names the draft's owner

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: follow a moved draft on tab close, and deploy a followed flow at its new path

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: write a followed draft by id against the row's own path keys; keep base on assign and clone

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: look up a script's head at its row path, and show flow and app version ids bare

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: session editors save by draft id; raw apps keep a legacy draft's base unknown

Also advance the raw-app base on deploy, relocate once per move, drop the
hoisted operator check and the unread base on drafts/list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: guard a base-unknown raw-app deploy against the head at load; keep the base in session hydration

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: the server follows a moved draft through a move record, not client-sent row ids

A move writes old path -> new path (per workspace and kind, per owner for a
draft-only move) in its transaction; a draft save or discard addressed to a
path the caller has no draft at resolves through it and keeps the moved
draft's path keys. Creating an item at a path drops the records leaving it.
Every writer (edit routes, sessions, chat, CLI, the tab-close flush) follows
without passing an id, so the id plumbing is gone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: session loaders keep a draft's base, and a failed relocation flush stays put

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a draft-only app move refuses the other app kind; a session keeps an unknown base unknown

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin a teammate's carried draft; name the kind that refuses a draft move

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: an unknown base stays unknown in every loader, and an owner move extends an item move

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a clone keeps only a base it can resolve; a base-unknown script deploys without a false guard

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a workspace clone sanitizes a NUL-bearing draft instead of copying it unstripped

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: move records follow an account rename and deletion; a legacy draft says why it cannot move

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: an owner move extends only the item's own route, not another user's

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a redeploy ends a route off its path, take-latest persists on raw apps, stale picker loads are dropped

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a poisoned draft's path keys follow a move, legacy only bypasses routing on a delete, picker loads are generation-guarded

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: count picker load generations, and report a skipped legacy upsert as a conflict

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a legacy discard follows the item's move record too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a failed version load keeps the picker on what the diff shows; one spelling for a legacy delete

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the picker marks the version on display as head, restore compares the head, relocation follows the last move

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: say so when a version fails to load in the diff picker

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take latest re-reads the head at click time; type the kept head as prepared diff data

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: taking the latest moves the head each editor knows, not just the base

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: take latest adopts the head the diff shows, and is offered while the drawer sees the draft behind

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a head nobody could name is not behind, so take latest is not offered without one

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the flow drawer's head is the version its payload came from, and its callback type says so

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a NUL in a move's summary is dropped, and take latest simply adopts the head it was handed

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a loaded raw-app draft keeps its own fork base, and an unknown head is refused

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a routed discard names where it landed, a superseded drawer opening is dropped, and a loaded draft keeps its base in every editor

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a legacy draft occupies its destination, a superseded opening writes nothing, and a loaded flow draft keeps no base it lacks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the drawer owns its opening, a loaded script draft keeps no base it lacks, and a legacy occupant says who can clear it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: taking the diff drawer without a token claims it, and the classic app editor takes one

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a retried routed discard still names the destination, and filling the drawer takes the opening too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a no-op routed discard names the destination only to someone who could write there

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the no-op routed discard gates its answer on reading the destination, and a session draft keeps its unknown base

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: abandoning an opening clears the drawer it still owns

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: an app deploy pins only a version it wrote as the next draft's base

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the deploy-override diff takes an opening its editor can hand back

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: pin the version this deploy wrote even when one landed on top, and tighten three comment blocks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a deploy claims only the version it appended to the head it read, and names the head separately

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a deploy always names the head it left behind, and pins a base only when it can claim one

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the derived base is read after the sanitizer, and a deploy that claims nothing leaves no base to compare

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the route's lineage follows an in-place deploy, and the raw-app editor's event type carries the head

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: the raw-app deploy comment says what that editor actually does with version

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a group member can be told where their item went, and a deploy names the head's author

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: an emptied selection is no shift anchor, and a deploy leaves no draft for the prompt to compare

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: session tabs compare the same base pair, and a consumed draft is not out of date

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a failed anchor read is not a raced deploy, and take latest closes only its own drawer

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: an unclaimed deploy always confirms, and the prompt keeps warning a loaded teammate draft

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: the base-unknown confirmation says what it knows, and two comments match the guard

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the other app kind collides whoever owns it, and session tabs get a head to compare

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the cross-kind refusal reads properly, and a session flow keeps its own response's head

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a fresh session checkout takes the head its payload came from, and a deploy keeps the base it pinned

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the move endpoint validates its source path, and two comments say what their branch does

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: an unanswered head read confirms rather than assuming the app editor is current

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a deploy is not blocked by the draft a move carried to its destination

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: an unread head confirms with the copy for caution, not for an observed deploy

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the move record alone excuses a carried draft at the destination, whoever owns it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: an app deploy answers with the version it wrote, so the editor stops inferring it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: the rename assertion reads the deploy's json answer

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the unread-head warning reads as caution in the deploy drawer too, and the cross-kind refusal names a remedy

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a reused destination retires the routes pointing at it, and draft_base stays out of diffs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the app head is the tail of app.versions, not the newest timestamp

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: app history lists in deployed order, so the picker numbers it right

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the ordering test's setup sql compiles offline, and the head join names its app

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: kinds that cannot move skip the move lookup, and the move wording needs read

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: a deploy history comes a page at a time, so the diff drawer opens at once

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a history stays whole unless asked to page, and pages inside the version array

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: an asked-for history page is bounded, and a failed one is not the end of the list

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: an unasked history is whole again, and an absurd page is empty not an error

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: naming only a page still asks for one, and a stray version stays reachable

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a fork's nul-poisoned draft arrives clean, so its dangling identity repoints too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a raw app names its deployed version even when the history will not load

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
2026-09-18 20:54:23 +02:00
Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel 01b38320ea chore(main): release 1.815.0 (#11212)
* chore(main): release 1.815.0

* Apply automatic changes

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Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-18 15:28:25 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5 37e493ae66 feat: add an instance setting to refuse a token in MCP URLs (#11162)
* feat: add an instance setting to refuse a token in MCP URLs

MCP clients are commonly configured with the token in the URL
(`/api/mcp/w/{workspace}/mcp?token=...`). A URL-borne credential ends up in
browser history, proxy logs and referrers, so an instance can now turn that
channel off with the `mcp_disable_token_query_param` global setting and leave
the Authorization header as the only way in, which sends MCP clients through
the OAuth flow the endpoints already advertise.

The rejection is a middleware on both the workspaced and the gateway MCP
mounts, layered outside everything that reads a token and inside the
WWW-Authenticate layer, so the 401 carries the resource pointer a client needs
to start OAuth discovery.

Off by default. With it on, the token drawer and the home connect drawer stop
offering to mint a token for an MCP URL and hand over the bare URL instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read the MCP URL policy when a URL is asked for, and drop the all-workspaces option

Two review findings on the token drawer:

The policy was read once per page load and cached for the browser session, so a
superadmin turning the setting on left every open tab handing out `?token=` URLs
the server now refuses. Both entry points now read it when the user actually asks
for an MCP URL: when MCP mode is entered, and when the connect drawer opens.

The workspace picker offered "All workspaces / Multi-workspace", but the gateway's
consent screen binds the token it issues to the one workspace picked there, so
OAuth has no multi-workspace grant to hand out. That entry is now token-only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: don't guess the MCP URL policy, and say where the switch lands on restart

Review findings:

The comment on the settings load claimed `MODE=mcp` as the target deployment, but
that mode joins no monitor loop, so the startup pass is its only read and a change
lands on restart. That is true of every global setting there, `base_url` included;
the comment now says so, and the setting description tells an operator running
dedicated MCP servers what to expect.

A failed settings probe resolved to "tokens allowed", so with the switch on the
drawer would mint a non-expiring token and hand over a URL the server refuses for
as long as it exists. The probe now propagates its error and the panel reports it
with a retry, creating nothing until the answer is known.

The test passed a valid token, so it could not tell a rejection before
authentication from one after it. It now also sends a token that was never valid
and asserts the middleware's own message, which fails if the layer moves inward.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: withhold the MCP URL until a workspace is picked

With no persisted workspace the store starts undefined, so opening the drawer from
/user/workspaces before choosing one rendered a copyable
`/api/mcp/w/undefined/mcp`. It reads like a real URL and a client pointed at it
would never connect. The panel now asks for a workspace instead, matching the guard
the token branch already has on its generate button.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: drop the coverage-status note from the MCP switch test

It documented what the test does not reach rather than a constraint the next
reader could break; that belongs in the PR, not the module doc. The layer-order
rationale, which is what a future edit would break, stays.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: fall back to the bare MCP URL instead of alerting on a failed read

When the setting read fails, show the bare URL rather than an error with a retry.
It works whichever way the setting is, so no alert is needed, and it still never
mints a token for a URL the server may refuse. The connect drawer's wording falls
back the same way so the blurb matches the panel.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: move the MCP URL token setting to Core

It sat in the Auth/OAuth/SAML list, which the settings sidebar shows under SSO,
suggesting a dependency on SSO that does not exist: MCP OAuth has Windmill act as
the authorization server, and any login method, password included, completes it.
It is an instance-wide credential policy, so it now lives with the other ones in
Core, kept out of quick setup like its neighbours.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 15:24:00 +02:00