* fix(apps): make public apps opt into cross-origin isolation via wm_coep
Public app pages served at /public/* and custom paths /a/* were not
getting the COEP/COOP/CORP headers, so they were blocked when embedded
as an iframe inside a cross-origin-isolated page (e.g. another raw app,
which sets Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp). A nested
document loaded into a require-corp context must itself set COEP for
the iframe to load.
Rather than applying the isolation headers to all public pages (which
would also force COEP on classic apps and break subresources without
CORP, e.g. external image URLs or embeds), public apps now opt in via
a `wm_coep` query param on the embed URL:
<iframe src="https://<domain>/public/<ws>/<secret>?wm_coep=on">
The app publish drawer gains a URL/Embed toggle: "URL" shows the plain
shareable link (param-free), "Embed" shows a ready-to-copy iframe
snippet with wm_coep baked in, so the flag is discoverable exactly when
embedding and absent otherwise.
`wm_coep` is consumed internally and stripped from the app `query`
context so it doesn't collide with app-defined params. Only params we
own are stripped (an explicit set), not the whole `wm_` prefix.
Fixes GIT-884
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* nit
* nit
* fix(apps): only bake wm_coep into embed snippet for raw apps
AppEditorHeaderDeploy is shared by the classic (AppEditorHeader) and raw
(RawAppEditorHeader) deploy drawers. The embed snippet unconditionally
appended ?wm_coep=on, which for a classic/low-code app forces COEP
require-corp on the document and breaks no-CORP cross-origin subresources
(external <img> in AppImage/AppStatCard/AppNavbar, {@html} embeds in
AppHtml, CDN import() in AppCustomComponent) — the exact regression the
opt-in design avoids.
Add a `rawApp` prop (default false); the raw header passes rawApp. The
flag is appended only for raw apps; classic apps get a plain iframe
snippet, and the wm_coep helper text is shown only for raw apps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CLI deploys (sync push, set-permissioned-as) went through the same
create/update endpoints as a UI "deploy from draft", which delete the
draft at that path. That silently wiped teammates' in-progress drafts on
every push. Add a transient skip_draft_deletion deploy flag (mirroring
deployment_message) that the CLI sets; the backend then skips the
DELETE FROM draft for scripts, flows, and apps. UI deploys are unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
get_token_using_oauth resolved the AI OAuth resource's token_url and
POSTed to it without any SSRF validation, while base_url is validated in
get_base_url. A workspace member with resources:write could point
token_url at an internal/metadata address (e.g. 169.254.169.254),
turning the server into an authenticated blind SSRF probe.
Validate the resolved token_url with validate_url_for_ssrf before the
request, gated behind the same ALLOW_PRIVATE_AI_BASE_URLS opt-in as
base_url so private AI deployments keep working consistently for both
URL fields. ALLOW_PRIVATE_AI_BASE_URLS is now pub so windmill-api can
reuse it instead of re-parsing the env var.
* fix(ai): disable redirect following on AI proxy client to close SSRF
The AI proxy validates the configured base_url against SSRF rules but the
shared HTTP client followed up to 10 redirects without revalidating the
hops, so a public base_url could 3xx the server into a private/internal
address (e.g. the Docker socket or cloud metadata). Disable redirect
following so the validated host is the only one the server connects to.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(ai): remove heavy redirect SSRF integration test
Drop the integration-test-level regression for redirect following; it
spins up a full API server + DB for a one-line client-config change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api): don't follow symlinks when reading service log files
Defense in depth on top of the existing `..` path-traversal check in
the get_log_file handler: reject the request if the final path
component is a symlink, so a planted symlink in the logs directory
cannot be used to read arbitrary files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api): authorize and harden the jobs_u get_log_file endpoint
The unauthenticated jobs_u get_log_file endpoint served any job's log
file to anyone who knew the job UUID, with no authorization. Gate it the
same way as get_job_logs: look up the job (the log directory name is the
job id) filtered by workspace and the caller's scope tags, and only allow
non-logged-in callers to read logs of jobs created by the anonymous user.
Also add defense in depth: refuse to read through a symlink so a planted
symlink in the logs directory cannot be used to exfiltrate arbitrary files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`announce_server_started` writes a `server_heartbeat:{INSTANCE_NAME}` row
on each startup. INSTANCE_NAME is a fresh random string per process, so
the row is never updated again and a new row is inserted on every
restart, growing background_task_state unboundedly.
Add an hourly monitor task that deletes server_heartbeat:* rows older
than 7 days. Older rows cannot influence check_any_server_started (which
only considers heartbeats refreshed after the restart was initiated), so
they are safe to prune.
Fixes WIN-1990.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(jobs): enforce anonymous-only guard on `only_result` job updates
The `jobs_u/getupdate/{id}` and `jobs_u/getupdate_sse/{id}` endpoints
accept `only_result=true`. In that branch, `get_job_update_data` queried
the result solely by (workspace_id, job_id) and skipped the
`created_by == "anonymous"` check that the non-only_result path and
adjacent unauthenticated endpoints apply. An unauthenticated requester
who learned a private job UUID could therefore retrieve that job's
output.
Hoist the guard to the top of `get_job_update_data` so both branches are
covered.
Fixes WIN-1980
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: fold `created_by` check into existing only_result queries
Avoids the extra `SELECT created_by` round-trip per call by joining
`v2_job` once in the two queries that handled the unauth path and
checking inline. Behavior is identical to the prior commit; the SSE
polling loop now does one query per poll instead of two for
unauthenticated callers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: cache anonymous_verified across SSE polls
Replace the LEFT JOIN approach with an upfront `SELECT created_by`
guarded by a new `&mut bool anonymous_verified` parameter that mirrors
`early_return_suppressed`. The SSE polling loop now performs the auth
check exactly once per stream rather than per poll, and the data SQL
reverts to its original form so authenticated callers pay no extra
cost. `created_by` cannot change after job creation, so caching the
verification across polls is safe.
Cost matrix:
- Authed (any path): 0 extra queries
- Unauthed one-shot: 1 extra query (unavoidable)
- Unauthed SSE: 1 extra query at stream start, 0 per poll
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: scope anonymous check to only_result branch
The non-only_result branch already enforces the `created_by` check via
its main query, so a top-level hoisted check duplicated work for
unauthenticated default-path callers. Move the check inside the
`if only_result.unwrap_or(false)` block — exactly where the bypass
lives — and leave the non-only_result path untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* [ee] feat(service-accounts): allow choosing role at creation time
Previously, service accounts were hardcoded to operator and could not be
used as the CLI sync user since they had no write access. They also only
counted as 0.5 seat each.
This change:
- Extends `NewServiceAccount` to accept optional `is_admin` / `operator`
(defaults to `operator=true` for backward compatibility).
- Exposes a role picker in `AddUser.svelte` when creating a service
account (Operator / Developer / Admin).
- Lets admins update a service account's role from the user list (it
used to be locked to "Operator" with a tooltip).
- Updates the OpenAPI spec + regenerates the frontend client.
A developer/admin service account counts as 1 seat under the existing
seat-cap logic (operators stay at 0.5).
Companion PR on windmill-ee-private updates the `INSERT INTO usr` to
honour the chosen role.
Fixes WIN-1985
* [ee] feat(service-accounts): wm_deployers opt-in for Dev role
When creating a service account with role=Developer, surface a toggle
"Add to wm_deployers" (recommended). Members of wm_deployers can deploy
on behalf of other users — the typical setup when the service account is
used as the CLI sync / CI deploy identity.
- `NewServiceAccount` gains an optional `add_to_deployers` flag.
- Frontend defaults the toggle to on but only shows it under Developer
(admins have it implicitly; operators can't deploy).
- Tooltip links to docs.windmill.dev "Run on behalf of".
Companion EE PR updates the handler to INSERT into usr_to_group for
wm_deployers when the flag is set.
Refs WIN-1985
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 974ed42067d9f63acb42332b671b8c01ffd4b625
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #589 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: f7dbc3cc2ba21c396f4828881e3b9d9ab6f50c69
New ee-repo-ref: 974ed42067d9f63acb42332b671b8c01ffd4b625
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
* [ee] fix(service-accounts): unhardcode role in superadmin user list
Two review issues from the merged #9307 / #589:
1. P1 — The global Users tab in #superadmin-settings still pinned every
service account to "Operator". Now it shows the actual role
(Admin / Operator / Developer), derived from the SA's usr row.
- `list_users_as_super_admin`: replaced `true as operator_only` with
the real `operator` value, and added `is_workspace_admin` from the
row (NULL for password users since their admin status is
per-workspace).
- `global_whoami`: when the email belongs to a service account, look
up its real `operator` / `is_admin` instead of pinning to operator.
- `SuperadminSettingsInner.svelte`: drop the hardcoded "Operator"
badge; render Admin / Operator / Developer using the new fields,
matching the workspace-level view.
2. P2 — Regenerate the bundled `openapi-deref.{yaml,json}` so the
`createServiceAccount` body (now exposing `is_admin`, `operator`,
`add_to_deployers`) and the new `GlobalUserInfo.is_workspace_admin`
field show up at runtime in `/api/openapi.{yaml,json}`.
Bumps `ee-repo-ref.txt` to the EE follow-up that adds the offline
seat-cap check on `create_service_account`.
Refs WIN-1985
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to b7a6068c1f3dc845e012959268b2426f0de4d697
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #590 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 0b1307c21d1bfd6fb43a03c2ba39d2a8bf8e6470
New ee-repo-ref: b7a6068c1f3dc845e012959268b2426f0de4d697
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(queue): audit-log workspace-fairness cap transitions
When the cloud per-workspace fairness mechanism adds a workspace to the
capped set or releases one, write `workspace_fairness.capped` /
`workspace_fairness.uncapped` audit-log entries to the affected workspace.
The cluster admin can review the full timeline from the `admins` workspace
audit view with `all_workspaces=true`; per-workspace owners see their own
events in their normal audit list.
Only the per-cycle refresh winner emits entries (matching where the heavy
aggregation runs), so a fleet of N workers does not produce N duplicates
per transition. The diff is computed against the value already in
`background_task_state` rather than the winner's in-memory cache, so a
freshly-restarted process winning the claim does not spuriously emit
"newly capped" entries for workspaces that were already capped before it
started.
Audit writes are best-effort: failures are logged via tracing and do not
abort the refresh cycle.
Fixes WIN-1984
* feat(queue): scope fairness audit to admins workspace + queue-metrics pane
- Write `workspace_fairness.capped` / `workspace_fairness.uncapped` to the
`admins` workspace (was: per-affected-workspace) with the affected
workspace_id moved to the `resource` field. Cluster admins now get the
full timeline in one place without `all_workspaces=true`.
- Add `GET /workers/workspace_fairness_events` returning the last 100
events. Cloud-gated (returns `[]` on non-cloud) and devops-only.
- Add a `WorkspaceFairnessEvents` Section to the Queue Metrics drawer,
rendered only when `isCloudHosted()` is true. Shows time / event
badge / workspace / parameters with a refresh button.
Fixes WIN-1984
* feat(github-app): hide cloud-only UI on self-managed + admin assignment UI
Two related UX fixes for the GitHub App self-managed (GHES) integration:
1. On self-managed instances, the per-installation Export button and the
"Import installation from other instance" section in the workspace UI both
hide. Both round-trip a JWT carrying only {installation_id, account_id} with
no github_base_url, so they would produce broken cloud-style installs on a
self-managed instance. The previous Export attempt also failed with
"No JWT token received from server" because self-managed installs store an
empty JWT by design.
2. New "Workspace assignments" panel in instance settings (GhesAppSettings.svelte)
that auto-discovers installations of the configured GHES App and lets the
super-admin assign them to specific workspaces. Workspace users without
GitHub permissions no longer need to install the App themselves — the admin
provisions the link from instance settings. Admin-provisioned installs show a
"Provisioned by admin" badge in the workspace UI and can only be removed by
the super-admin from instance settings.
Backend support is in the EE companion PR
windmill-labs/windmill-ee-private#588.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to da5189cf69a453de3855057f41be0d84e5910707
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #588 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: d959b83ce413ad531e9cc28e0f8199cdecb73a31
New ee-repo-ref: da5189cf69a453de3855057f41be0d84e5910707
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(ai): enforce RLS and scope check on user-supplied X-Resource-Path
The AI proxy handler accepts an X-Resource-Path header to override the
configured workspace AI provider. When supplied, the handler loaded the
resource value from the resource table using the root DB pool with no
resources:read scope check, so any authenticated workspace user could
point X-Resource-Path at a restricted AI resource (e.g. one in a folder
they cannot read) and the proxy would use that resource's provider
credentials for the outbound AI request.
For user-supplied resource paths, now require resources:read:{path}
scope and fetch the resource through user_db.begin(&authed) so RLS
enforces the same folder/group boundary as the resource API. The RLS-
scoped $var: resolution stays in place as defense in depth. The
admin-configured workspace/instance ai_config path is unchanged.
Fixes WIN-1971
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(ai): regression test for X-Resource-Path RLS enforcement
Cover all four cases:
- non-admin pointing X-Resource-Path at a restricted resource is rejected
- non-admin pointing it at a resource they own still works
- admin can point it at any resource
- workspace-configured proxy flow (no X-Resource-Path) is unchanged
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Diego Imbert
Ruben Fiszel
Diego Imbert
hugocasa
centdix
Alexander Petric