* fix: parse python 3.12-3.15 syntax by moving the python parsers to ruff
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: pin async for loops in the python wac dag
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: tell main apart from a look-alike line inside a string
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep import split and async for as before, fix sql asset path panic
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: upgrade the native runtime to the current deno crates and v8 150
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep data and blob fetches working under no_network
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: pin the simdutf v8 archive and keep telemetry on http exporters
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: force the http otlp exporter for native telemetry and pin v8
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: retry transient AI provider failures before output reaches readers
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep completed AI streams, stop retrying prompt blocks, bound retry-after
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: share the AI send-error retry rule between agent and proxy
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: accept a clean end of stream from OpenAI-compatible providers
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: classify AI provider errors the way the reference clients do
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: count a Gemini function call as the end of its turn
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: count an Anthropic stop_reason as the end of its stream
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: accept a Gemini answer that reports usage and no output
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: accept a Gemini stream that closes cleanly with no output
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
* feat: audit instance settings writes and bulk job cancels
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: audit each setting of a bulk save as it is written
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to acb254ac509aff244849c09e50a8d39aae185138
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #852 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 3dfc563bc95881183fb6c49d39984023b9b83075
New ee-repo-ref: acb254ac509aff244849c09e50a8d39aae185138
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat: add trigger, tag, run-as and digest claims to job OIDC tokens
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: parse digest floats exactly and derive the codebase digest like push
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: give flows that reference flow nodes no digest and keep --json clean
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: list flow step digests from module positions only
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: skip the pulled module-script digest check on windows
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 71b8c1042fd8188c2d2882476f12b671cb5ba421
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #840 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: ba1870536789a43c5b6ec18522a93edb9cb07f3d
New ee-repo-ref: 71b8c1042fd8188c2d2882476f12b671cb5ba421
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: unstick postgres jobs on large results with custom-typed columns
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: carry the parked-rows delivery fix in the postgres fork
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: describe postgres queries before streaming instead of parking rows
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* perf: skip the postgres describe for statements that return no rows
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: look for returning in the whole postgres statement
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: read the leading postgres keyword past nested block comments
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: end leading postgres line comments at CR too
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: create a fork in the background so a proxy timeout cannot cut it
create_fork copies the whole workspace inside the request, which can run
past the route timeout of an ingress in front of Windmill (Envoy's 15s
default), and the UI then reports a failure for a fork still being made.
create_fork?background=true now returns once the request is validated and
records the copy in workspace_fork_creation, which the new
fork_creation_status endpoint reads. The wizard and AI-session forks use it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: drain background forks on shutdown and fork in the background from the CLI
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: settle fork polls by the fork's existence, adopt in-flight creations
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: show which part of the copy a fork being created is in
The background copy reports its phase (data tables, settings, resources,
scripts, flows, apps, drafts, triggers) through a watch channel. The heartbeat
task records it on the fork's creation row as soon as it changes, and
fork_creation_status returns it. The fork wizard shows it on its button, and
the CLI logs each step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: join a retried fork creation server-side, settle status by the fork's existence
A retry from the same user and parent joins the creation in flight instead
of being refused, so clients no longer match the refusal's wording, and
another requester can never adopt it. The status route reports a fork that
exists under its parent as completed, whatever its run's record says. Clients
give up on failing polls after a time window rather than a count, which a
rolling deploy can exhaust.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: drop fork-creation joins and existence probes
A second request for a fork being created is refused again; only the
AI-session fork, whose request never varies, waits for its own earlier one.
Clients recognise a server without background forks by its synchronous
answer instead of probing for a workspace by id, which could name another
parent's fork.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: poll a background fork by the id of its own attempt
create_fork?background=true answers with a creation id, and the status
route reads that attempt only, for the user who started it. A retry that
reuses the fork id is a new attempt, so a poller never reads another
attempt's outcome. The AI-session fork no longer adopts a creation in flight,
which it could not tell apart from someone else's.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: record a fork's completion in its own commit, resume a session's fork after reload
The attempt is marked complete in the transaction that creates the fork, so
the status never infers completion from a workspace that may belong to
another request. An AI session keeps the creation id on its pending fork and,
after a reload mid-copy, waits for that attempt instead of requesting the
fork again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it
`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.
A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.
Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it
`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.
The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry
The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".
Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands
Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.
The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test
Two review findings, both real.
`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.
`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy
Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.
Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.
Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist
The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.
Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created
A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.
That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.
Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database
A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.
`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"
This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.
The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation
A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.
The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted
Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.
Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal
Three fixes from review.
`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.
The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.
`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart
A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:
- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
each one to disable.
This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved
Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it
Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting
Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`
Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.
Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers
A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.
Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename
A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles
The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition
Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.
Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition
The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition
The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it
Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license
Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition
The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4
New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): data table roles in the DB manager and raw apps
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: never add a role to the reference of a data table whose name contains '?'
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: read the roles of a data table whose name contains '?'
The generated client leaves a '?' in a path param unencoded, so the lookup
404'd and the raw-app picker blocked Start on such a data table.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix(datatables): refuse a reference naming both a legacy data table and a role
When a workspace stores both `sales` and a legacy `sales?role=analytics`, the
reference resolved to the legacy entry without a role, so browsing `sales` as
`analytics` reached another data table.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: declare the default role in migrations written for a data table whose name contains '?'
Such a data table connects as its default role without naming it, so the
migrations the manager wrote for it declared no role and ran as admin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* feat(datatables): set up an external instance cluster for data tables
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): send external cluster passwords as SCRAM verifiers
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): scope external cluster credential readers to the crate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* [ee] feat(datatables): external_instance data tables on the external cluster
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix(datatables): compare the external cluster settings under a row lock before storing setup
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): only drop external databases Windmill marked, and check use under the lock
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry
Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles
A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.
A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.
Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.
A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.
Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin
Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.
All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping
A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.
Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.
Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded
Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.
Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.
Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.
`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.
Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code
The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.
`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract
The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.
Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.
The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.
Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.
Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery
Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.
`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.
Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.
Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.
Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced
The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".
The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing
The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.
Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:
A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.
Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.
Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.
Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings
Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.
The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.
One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.
Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks
Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.
A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.
Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.
The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.
Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically
The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".
The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.
Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles
pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.
Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data
A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.
Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* nit worker error msg
* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it
`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.
A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.
Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it
`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.
The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry
The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".
Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands
Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.
The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test
Two review findings, both real.
`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.
`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy
Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.
Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.
Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist
The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.
Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created
A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.
That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.
Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database
A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.
`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"
This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.
The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation
A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.
The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted
Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.
Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal
Three fixes from review.
`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.
The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.
`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart
A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:
- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
each one to disable.
This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved
Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it
Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting
Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`
Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.
Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers
A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.
Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename
A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles
The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition
Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.
Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition
The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition
The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it
Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license
Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition
The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4
New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry
Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* feat(datatables): Ducklake catalogs on the external instance cluster
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): never grant CREATEROLE to custom_instance_user on the external cluster
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(datatables): state the authorization contract of external database usage lookups
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): drop a DuckDB data table secret once its ATTACH has used it
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* perf(datatables): resolve a workspace's data tables per pointer hop, not per entry
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): hold the parent's settings while a fork points at its data tables
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): refuse repointing the external cluster while it is in use, and keep verify-ca working for pg_dump
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): protect external databases pending fork cleanup, and describe Ducklake usage in the API
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): per-cluster data table role catalogs, with roles on the external instance cluster
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): write the external cluster setting under the lifecycle lock, and check fork targets are registered
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): register external fork catalogs under the lifecycle lock, and keep certificate verification in DuckDB attaches
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): keep certificate verification when DuckDB attaches an external data table
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): keep certificate verification when DuckDB attaches an external data table
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): refuse fork cleanup of an external database another workspace uses
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): refuse rolling back while external data tables are under roles, and type external_instance in the CLI
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): stop counting storage-only fork cleanup rows as uses of an external database
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): bind fork database copies to their workspace, and count every use before dropping one
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): authenticate instance database setup before writing its status, and keep a fork reservation across it
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): create external databases only on a cluster setup succeeded on, and document the registry reader
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): keep only the most recently used DuckDB root certificate files
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): migrate fork reservations on workspace rename, and lock the parent's data tables for the whole fork
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): take the fork data table lock once, before the external cluster's
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(datatables): describe the external instance cluster and how to run one locally
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): keep fork reservations private, drop a cleaned-up entry with its database, and serialize cleanup with settings saves
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): hold the fork lock across a fork import, and carry the reservation inside the setup write
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): check the external cluster setting on its own transaction, and gate the registry probe
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry
Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #787 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 0edd40979cf36bfba59323f3f6a0811ae1369cf5
New ee-repo-ref: 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
* fix(datatables): keep DuckDB root certificate files in the job directory
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: drop the unused json import from the settings crate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): drop the serde_json::json import left unused by the fork setup write
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): accept external_instance data tables in the settings form type
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): serialize fork database reservations, cleanup, setup and Ducklake saves on the database
- A fork copy is created and registered under its workspace's fork lock, and refused once the
workspace is archived; a rename re-migrates reservations under that lock after archiving.
- Ducklake saves lock every instance database they newly name, as data table saves do.
- Instance database setup holds the database's lock until its entry is written.
- Fork import also holds the database's lock across the restore.
- Cleanup re-reads the entry under its locks before dropping anything.
- Non-superadmins no longer see fork copies reserved for workspaces they are not in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): state the authorization contract of the external cluster status and write check
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): lock the fork copy at finalization, and order cleanup's registry write after its settings row
- Fork finalization holds the copy's database lock from its availability check to the commit.
- Cleanup removes the registry entry in its own transaction, in a task of its own, instead of on a
second connection; a rename migrates reservations after its settings rewrites, so both take the
settings rows before the registry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): hold the fork lock across a rename's settings copy
Fork cleanup of the old id could otherwise drop a copy the renamed workspace goes on using. Also
states the authorization contract of the instance database drop helpers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): refuse moving the external cluster to another host or port while it holds databases
Every settings writer goes through the same check as removal: the login, TLS and maintenance
database may still change, the cluster may not.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): clone a data table under roles with its owners and grants (#11120)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UbrtwiYNfayrmqouBJHwGV
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: open the raw app data table drawer when the workspace has none
Selecting the first data table of an empty list passed undefined to the name
check, which threw instead of opening the drawer on no data table.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): offer cloning a data table under roles where its grants can be replayed
The server clones such a data table and replays the source's owners and grants,
which only the Enterprise Edition does, so the fork wizard hid both clone
options everywhere instead of on a build that cannot replay them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: name the placeholder the empty raw app data drawer renders
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): replace a job directory file at the DuckDB root certificate path instead of trusting it
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: pin the enterprise refusal the role pickers read as 'not under roles'
The server's sentence and the frontend's copy of it were coupled by nothing,
so rewording either one turned every role picker on a community build into a
failed lookup.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): type Ducklake catalogs on the external instance cluster in the settings form
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): read a roles answer only for the workspace it was asked in
A fork and its parent each have their own roles on a data table of the same
name, so an answer stamped with the name alone settled the role from the
workspace the editor was acting on before.
Also derive the AI table creation flag from the data replaced into the editor:
data naming no data table left the flag on from before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): keep an instance database a settings save is waiting to name
Cleanup for a database whose setup failed took the lock first, read no user,
and dropped it while a save blocked on that same lock was about to commit a
reference to it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): check the workspace stamp in the default database selector too
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): read what a save racing instance-database cleanup committed
A transaction blocked on the lock may still roll back, so keeping the database
for it stranded one whose name then blocks every retry: it is let through and
its outcome read instead. The waiter query also matches this database's locks
only, since pg_locks spans the cluster.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): tell a waiting request apart from the workspaces using a database
Both callers render what cleanup returns as the workspaces that keep the
database, so a waiting request's pid read as one of them. Each now words that
case itself, and the give-up comment names where the kept name actually goes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): take the cleanup lock on a connection the pool cannot reclaim
A session lock outlives the future holding it, so a cancellation between
taking it and releasing it handed a locked session back to the pool, where
every later settings save waits on it. Detached, the connection closes when it
is dropped and the server releases the lock with the session.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): close the cleanup connection on drop instead of detaching it
Detaching released the pool permit while the session stayed alive, so
concurrent cleanups waiting on their locks could open as many connections as
they liked. Closing on drop covers the same cancellation and keeps them
counted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 179d2454a063ee818a9387a1eafdd354a217a16c
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #802 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: c2e43f5b5ff753d339b70e232fd17b6ffecb054d
New ee-repo-ref: 179d2454a063ee818a9387a1eafdd354a217a16c
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #798 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 3145e422d61d580f0a82804f075285c112879da0
New ee-repo-ref: fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
* fix(datatables): classify a fork import's target from the resolution that built its connection
A second read could see the entry flipped to a resource and skip the reservation check while the
connection already built still reached the instance cluster.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): run external database lifecycle on the caller's transaction, one lock order for fork cleanup
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): check a fork copy's reservation on the locked transaction's connection
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): make and drop fork copies of external data tables on the external cluster
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): refuse a fork whose external copy something already names
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): check an external fork copy's uses before removing its entry, so child fork pointers still count
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): migrate external cluster fork reservations on workspace rename
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): configure the external instance cluster and pick its databases from the UI
Instance settings gets an External Postgres tab: the cluster's connection, the setup run
with its report, and the databases Windmill created there. Data table and Ducklake settings
offer the external_instance kind, with a picker over those databases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): keep the external cluster form out of the instance settings the page bulk-saves
The form seeded its key into the settings store after the page snapshotted them, so merely
opening the tab made the page send a setting the validator refuses, failing an admin's
unrelated save. The form is local state now, and only the setup writes the key.
The database picker also treats a superadmin-only listing as authoritative: a workspace
admin, who cannot list, no longer sees a saved database as missing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(tests): app paths are validated, so a guest app cannot be renamed to one with a space
Path validation on apps landed after this test, which still expected a space to be accepted
and created its fixture on a ':' path. The scopable-path guard it exists for is kept by
planting that path on the row, which is now the only way an app can hold one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): one Managed Postgres tab, and a switch for Windmill's own database
The instance settings tab covers both substrates Windmill administers: the external cluster,
which can now be disabled once nothing sits on it, and Windmill's own database, which an
operator can turn off so the cluster is the only one a workspace may newly name. A save that
names it then refuses, as the create endpoint does.
Workspace settings name them the way an admin meets them: Postgres Resource, and Managed
instance, qualified as Internal or External only while both are on offer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): offer the external cluster in the add-data-table wizard, and give Ducklake its room back
The wizard gets the external cluster as a fourth substrate: pick a database it already holds
or name a new one, which the run creates before writing the entry, so Try again does not trip
on a database the last attempt made.
Ducklake's maintenance column moves into the settings popover next to the extra args, which
the wider catalog select had squeezed the name box out of.
A setting a component saves itself now also moves the page's baseline, or Discard would
restore what it replaced and a later save would send that stale value back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): only a database this wizard run made makes its retry idempotent
A retry skipped the create whenever the name was registered, which let a run adopt a database
another superadmin had made and share their data without the warning the existing-database
branch shows. The run tracks what it created instead, and reports it so Discard can say the
database is still there. Creating one now refreshes the registry the next run's default name
and its validation read, and that default counts the external cluster's databases rather than
the instance's.
Row ownership carries the substrate: "instance" and "external_instance" can hold the same name,
and a row repointed between them while a run probes must not read as that run's own.
Also fixes the merge leftovers in the DuckDB executor's tests, which cargo check never compiles:
the new PgDatabase field and the attach helper's job directory.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): shorten the picked managed kind, and say what an empty database list means
The closed select has room for the qualifier, not the whole name, so a picked managed kind
reads "Managed (Internal)". An external entry gets the tooltip its internal counterpart has,
and a database picker with nothing in it says to type a name rather than "No items found".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): keep the wizard's external-database bookkeeping optional and parked
The run deps gained a required field, which every existing caller of runSetup -- the sibling
test suite included -- does not pass. It defaults to empty instead, the parked payload carries
it across a Supabase redirect as it claims to, and a resumed run counts it as something left
behind. Two regressions pin the create: made on a first attempt, skipped only for a database
this run made.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): review an external-cluster database as one, not as a Postgres resource
The review step fell through to the resource branch for the new provider, so it announced a
connection already in the workspace for a database that does not exist yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): show the server's refusal instead of an object in the toast
Saving data table settings passed the whole error to the toast, which rendered the request
and response as JSON, and the instance-database wizard replaced it with "check console".
Both surface the message the API sent, through the helper that exists for it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: point at the EE commit dropping the unused import
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): define a role on the cluster its data table sits on
The permissions drawer created and listed roles without naming a cluster, so a role defined
from an external data table became a login on Windmill's own, and the refresh then replaced
the correct catalog with the internal one. The drawer passes the data table's cluster to both.
The wizard also read a database it had just created as a name collision, which blocked
returning to the failed attempt and finishing under the same name.
And the merge had left the CONNECT-grant pass and its log in both the caller and the callee.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): manage the external cluster's role catalog, and name the cluster in the copy
The roles drawer offered one catalog, so the external cluster's roles could only be reached
through a data table sitting on it — and became unreachable once the last one was gone, while
the cluster could not be unset until they were dropped. Opened from the page it now offers the
clusters the instance has; a data table's own drawer still pins its cluster, and its copy names
that cluster rather than "the instance".
A DuckDB attach also decides whether to verify certificates the way every other Postgres
connection does, so a resource carrying a root certificate is no longer downgraded to require
here alone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): bind the roles list to the cluster it was read for
Switching catalogs left the previous cluster's rows on screen and applied whichever response
landed last, so a slower read could seat one cluster's logins under the other's heading while
every control acted on the wrong id — invisible where a name exists on both. The switch clears
the rows, a token discards a response the selection has moved past, and the controls stay inert
while a catalog is being read.
The drop confirmation also names the cluster whose databases it reaches.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to dfe7b8b9204d21e0264fbea1c6f6eedf9e738d56
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #810 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 30db1b33bda0446f5fc5dfe353fbb226d57a26d4
New ee-repo-ref: dfe7b8b9204d21e0264fbea1c6f6eedf9e738d56
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
* fix: judge IPv4 embedded in IPv6 and pin the object storage test connect
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: let the public-only object store client reach the egress proxy
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: refuse private IP literals and the proxy host in the public-only store client
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: refuse the egress proxy as a target whether named or an IP literal
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: let a workspace withdraw operator schedule and trigger writes
Operators can create, edit and delete schedules and triggers today through the
API, CLI and MCP, while the operator_settings flags beside them only hide those
pages. An admin who wants operators to see what is scheduled without letting
them change it cannot express that. Add manage_schedules and manage_triggers as
enforced settings, gated at the schedule handlers and at the generic TriggerCrud
routes so every trigger kind is covered by one check.
They name capabilities operators already hold, so they are granted unless
withdrawn, and absence has to mean "never configured" rather than a value. The
read coalesces to true; the update endpoint merges into the stored jsonb with
the two fields as Option<bool>, so an omitted key keeps what is stored.
operator_settings is git-synced as a whole object, so a settings file written
before these keys existed reaches the endpoint on every pull, and a serde or SQL
default of either polarity would turn that pull into a silent withdrawal or
restoration.
The rights are read through a per-process cache, so withdrawing one publishes a
notify_event that drops the entry on every replica.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dsf6VC4MVLisiEoeQkgbr4
* feat: enforce operator write rights on the router and in the UI
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: close the capture gap and gate the trigger editors' write actions
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: gate acl writes and the native trigger drawer behind manage rights
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: refuse operator writes with 403 and gate sharing at the drawer
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* perf: resolve identity in the operator write gate only for writes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: gate the suspended-jobs actions and stop the route check refusing reads
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: explain the empty-state create button when operator writes are withdrawn
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: audit operator settings changes and fold path writes into native rows
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: open locked editors read-only and group the operator settings
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: skip email and azure lookups on editor open while triggers are locked
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: state each operator-rights rationale once in comments
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: address CI review findings on operator write rights
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep capture move gated and skip it in the builders while locked
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep admin and operator exclusive when setting a workspace role
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: use the shared section component for operator settings groups
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
* perf: read the http trigger version only as a 20 min safety net
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* perf: check the http trigger version every 5 min instead of 20
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* perf: load http trigger routers lazily on workers
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style: drop unrelated formatting from main.rs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: force the periodic http router rebuild and retry a failed one
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: retry a failed http router refresh from every caller
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: infer a script's schema from its code when a deploy sends none
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: merge an inferred schema into the previous one the way the editor does
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: parse non-JSON TS defaults natively and keep the schema on a failed inference
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: type untyped TS params from their literal shape when the default can't be evaluated
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: read literal TS defaults off the AST so the server types them like the editor
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: word the script schema description for both create and update
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: note that dbt scripts derive their schema from the descriptor
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: trust the system CA store for SMTP TLS
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* ci: run the smtp-gated backend tests
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: depend on webpki-roots 1 directly
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 48193da8cb30bc4ae82a50f944caef85d8a20b48
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #826 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: cd3447143b25d9f3301975feca4b202755f2508f
New ee-repo-ref: 48193da8cb30bc4ae82a50f944caef85d8a20b48
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat: deploy from the UI to a workspace on another instance
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep the remote deploy proxy from being spent by a link
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: key remote deploy proxy URLs instead of a global client header
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep the remote deploy proxy key out of logs and restricted hands
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: serialize remote deploy connect with account and key changes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: key remote deploy tokens to the account and connect by signing in
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: bind remote deploy connect to its target and order its locks
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: serialize remote deploy connect with target changes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: list every lock remote deploy connect takes in auth-surface
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: never wait on the membership lock in remote deploy connect
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep a superseded target response out of the settings form
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: void stale remote deploy tokens on read instead of locking in connect
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: void remote deploy tokens older than the last target change
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: order remote deploy connections by when their connect started
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: bind stored remote deploy tokens to the membership and target they were connected under
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: answer remote deploy connect without settings as no target
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(jwt): route JWK algorithm lookup through one helper
Add `windmill_common::jwt::jwk_algorithm` as the single place that reads a
JWK's `alg`, and make `guest_jwt::jwk_algorithms` use it. EE code will call
the same helper, so the upcoming jsonwebtoken bump (which renames the field
to `key_algorithm: Option<KeyAlgorithm>`) only has to touch the helper's body.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(security): bump jsonwebtoken to 10
Resolves dependency alerts 193 and 344 (jsonwebtoken) and, for the
windmill-parser-wasm lock, 341 (ring 0.16).
- jsonwebtoken 8.3.0 -> 10.4.0 with the `rust_crypto` backend (10.x has no
default crypto backend). `jwk_algorithm` now reads `key_algorithm` (a
`KeyAlgorithm`, signing and encryption algorithms alike) and maps only the
signing subset onto `Algorithm`; `guest_jwt::jwk_algorithms` refuses a key
naming a non-signing `alg` (RSA-OAEP, ...) instead of treating it as
alg-less. `decode_without_verify` moves off the removed
`insecure_disable_signature_validation` onto `dangerous::insecure_decode`.
- Workspace lock: only jsonwebtoken and `pem 1.1.1` (removed) change; the
rust_crypto tree was already present. `ring 0.16.20` stays in
backend/Cargo.lock because `gcp_auth 0.9.0` holds it.
- windmill-parser-wasm lock: jsonwebtoken 8.3.0 -> 10.4.0 drops `ring 0.16.20`
(jsonwebtoken was its only holder there), `spin 0.5.2`, `untrusted 0.7.1`,
`base64 0.13.1`; `pem 1.1.1 -> 3.0.6` and `serde_json 1.0.143 -> 1.0.151`
were forced by the new jsonwebtoken.
- ee-repo-ref.txt -> 514eb5f5 (windmill-ee-private chore/ee-dep-bumps, on top
of the previous ref d252afcc), which reads the JWK algorithm through
`windmill_common::jwt::jwk_algorithm` and builds proto `KeyValue`s with
`..Default::default()`.
The opentelemetry 0.32 bump is deferred: tracing-opentelemetry 0.33 removed
`OtelData`/`PreSampledTracer`, which the EE `otel_ee.rs` log bridge uses, and
`otel` ships in every EE image (`ee_core`); that bridge needs a
`Dispatch`-based rewrite first.
Checks (SQLX_OFFLINE, EE files from 514eb5f5): cargo check --features
all_sqlx_features; --features all_sqlx_features,private; --features
enterprise,private,otel; cargo test -p windmill-common --lib jwt (22 passed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(jwt): keep audience-bearing tokens and 8192-bit RSA keys working on jsonwebtoken 10
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 6f3161192ab0eba36a8630b92e6765a36a3326fc
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #809 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 7dcc5741c2fa9f9997b3da085f1f18ffc1e446d6
New ee-repo-ref: 6f3161192ab0eba36a8630b92e6765a36a3326fc
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles
A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.
A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.
Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.
A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.
Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin
Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.
All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping
A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.
Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.
Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded
Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.
Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.
Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.
`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.
Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code
The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.
`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract
The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.
Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.
The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.
Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.
Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery
Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.
`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.
Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.
Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.
Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced
The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".
The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing
The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.
Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:
A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.
Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.
Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.
Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings
Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.
The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.
One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.
Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks
Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.
A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.
Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.
The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.
Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically
The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".
The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.
Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles
pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.
Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data
A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.
Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* nit worker error msg
* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it
`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.
A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.
Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it
`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.
The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry
The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".
Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands
Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.
The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test
Two review findings, both real.
`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.
`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy
Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.
Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.
Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist
The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.
Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created
A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.
That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.
Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database
A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.
`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"
This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.
The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation
A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.
The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted
Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.
Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal
Three fixes from review.
`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.
The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.
`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart
A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:
- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
each one to disable.
This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved
Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it
Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting
Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`
Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.
Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers
A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.
Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename
A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles
The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition
Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.
Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition
The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition
The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it
Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license
Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition
The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4
New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): drop a DuckDB data table secret once its ATTACH has used it
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* perf(datatables): resolve a workspace's data tables per pointer hop, not per entry
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): hold the parent's settings while a fork points at its data tables
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #787 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 38d6fcf2aeb39cfdac21814bbdbbcc02911e566a
New ee-repo-ref: 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat: store mcp tool call, result and reasoning on flow conversation rows
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep the failure reason and web search citations on tool rows
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: persist a structured answer as its own row and keep reasoning-only rows from closing a turn
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep a failed Windmill tool's error on its conversation row
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: let a structured answer row claim its streamed thinking
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: scope a structured answer's claim to its own turn and document the row fields as stored
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: claim a textless assistant row only within the newest turn
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: store the thinking that led to a tool call on the tool row
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep tool calls in stream order and scope a structured answer to its turn
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: store the files a user message carried as object-storage references on its row
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(chat-sdk): read a message's attachments and build their download URL
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(chat-sdk): carry a loaded user message's attachments in AI SDK metadata
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: store the model's call and what it got back on every tool row
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: pass no extras in the orphaned-conversation test's message insert
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(chat-sdk): keep a stored JSON null tool result instead of the row text
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: label a tool call the turn finished without as not finished
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep a structured answer's streamed call out of the did-not-finish label
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: write a turn's conversation rows in order and describe stored tool calls
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: await the image answer row like the agent loop's other rows
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(chat-sdk): place a row nothing streamed by its sequence, not at the end
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(chat-sdk): place only tool rows by sequence, keep a closing row last
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(flow chat): show a failed tool's error, and no Retry on a running or stopped turn
A failed tool card showed the row label in place of the error the row now
stores. The live tool result now reports failures, so a failed call briefly
flagged a running turn as failed; a stopped turn, whose last row is the
failed tool or the cancelled flow's failure, offered Retry too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: split ai agent memory into agent policy, run memory id and step history
* fix: scope string memory ids to workspace and flow, keep nested tool history inputs
* chore: update sqlx cache for the flow context query
* docs: describe memory id scoping as collision-free rather than isolated
* chore: regenerate openflow json after merging main
* fix: offer no memory id for legacy manual memory, document linked history inputs
* fix: seed provided messages from legacy manual memory and hide its note once set
* fix: bypass memory when a provided messages expression evaluates to null
* fix: require a user message when provided messages are empty
* chore: keep the empty messages comment within the line width
* docs: name the history inputs wherever linked steps list their flow-local inputs
* docs: keep the memory storage path on one line
* feat: managed memory with an inherited or custom memory id per step
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: list a custom memory id in the test run form and name where an inherited one comes from
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep memory id out of the add-field menu and drop the memory id telemetry
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep legacy auto memory without an id working after an untouched redeploy
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: rename step messages to previous_messages and address review
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style: rewrap comments and docs lines lengthened by the previous_messages rename
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: read agent memory as either a legacy shape or the current one
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: name the memory setting in ignored-input notes and keep conversions honest
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep a legacy memory count unset on open and read a cleared count as off
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: address review on cleared test history and zero-count memory
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: drop flow-local keys from a linked agent resource before interpolating it
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep a linked resource's own inputs as fallbacks and note ignored history on image runs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: restore the linked agent draft tests and log ignored history on every image run
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: resolve the one-of variant from the value when the selected one leaves the list
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: treat zero-count managed memory as off when enabling chat mode and shorten comments
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: stop requiring user_message in the openflow agent contract when previous messages are the prompt
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): run auto-pull as the admin who enabled it
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): audit the admin grant fork pulls make
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: bump ee ref for the post-commit fork grant audit
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): address review nits on the auto-pull stamp
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to ccada062c072d7b74894b63863728fd1ef9bdffd
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #799 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 7cee30f0cf12721cba551cd754dc817444810470
New ee-repo-ref: ccada062c072d7b74894b63863728fd1ef9bdffd
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: skip instance group members that are not email addresses
* fix: keep provisioned members whose address only proper_email accepts
* fix: judge instance group members by a mirror of the usr email constraint
* fix: fold ascii only in the proper_email mirror, like the constraint
* fix: let the database judge which instance group members usr will store
* fix: cut a derived username to the column width so a long local part can be provisioned
* chore: move the ee pin to the scim member doc fix
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 0780955effb657807d14f0eb503cba1d49cee007
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #801 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: ee6452d489563204a98df883703f78d5e74cdd69
New ee-repo-ref: 0780955effb657807d14f0eb503cba1d49cee007
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs: add design doc for automatic git-to-windmill pull sync
* docs: add migration plan and implementation phases to git-sync pull design
* feat(git-sync): add auto_pull settings schema and pull enqueue primitive
Adds AutoPullSettings/AutoPullMode/AutoPullStatus on GitRepositorySettings
(workspace_settings.git_sync JSONB), the GIT_SYNC_PULL_SCRIPT_PATH constant,
and should_pull/effective_poll_interval_s helpers with unit tests. Exports the
EE enqueue_git_pull_job primitive. Foundation for repo→Windmill auto-pull.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(git-sync): poll repos and auto-pull new commits into the workspace
Phase 1 of automatic repo → Windmill sync. A monitor task (EE-licensed,
single-replica via advisory lock) git ls-remotes each auto-pull-enabled
repository ~every minute and enqueues a pull when the tracked branch moves,
reusing the {workspace_id}:git_sync concurrency key so pulls serialize with
in-flight push commits.
- windmill-store: background (no-authed) resolver get_git_repo_head_for_autopull
that resolves the repo resource (incl. $var: refs) and ls-remotes; GitHub-App
repos are skipped here and will sync via webhooks (phase 2).
- monitor.rs: poll/reconcile/persist with optimistic sha advance and failure
status; targeted jsonb update so concurrent settings edits aren't clobbered.
- edit_git_sync_repository: preserve server-owned auto_pull state on UI save.
- openapi: AutoPullSettings/AutoPullMode/AutoPullStatus + auto_pull field.
- frontend: per-repo "Automatically deploy changes from Git" toggle with last
sync status; demote the GitHub Actions link to an advanced CI option.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(git-sync): wire webhook lifecycle + receiver; share reconcile logic
OSS side of phase 2 auto-pull webhooks:
- edit_git_sync_repository creates/removes the repo webhook on save (EE-gated,
best-effort → falls back to polling).
- monitor poller now delegates to the shared windmill_git_sync reconcile/persist
helpers (also used by the webhook receiver), removing duplicated logic.
- export the shared reconcile/persist/failure helpers; bump EE ref.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(git-sync): bump EE ref for phase 3 in-app PR creation
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(git-sync): show webhook vs polling status on the auto-pull toggle
When a repo has an active webhook (auto_pull.webhook_id set), the status line
reads "instant via webhook"; otherwise it reads the ~1-minute polling cadence.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(git-sync): post PR diff check on dry-run completion (phase 4)
Worker completion hook in process_completed_job: when a DeploymentCallback job
carrying the __git_sync_pr_check marker finishes, parse the dry-run SyncResponse
and patch the GitHub check run with the diff summary (success/neutral/failure).
Export enqueue_git_pull_dry_run; bump EE ref.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(git-sync): bump EE ref (drop unused GHES webhook_secret)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* revert(git-sync): defer phase 4 PR diff checks (OSS side)
Remove the worker completion hook that posted the PR check run, drop the
enqueue_git_pull_dry_run re-export and the orphaned sqlx cache, bump EE ref.
Phases 1-3 (polling, webhooks, in-app PR creation) are unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "revert(git-sync): defer phase 4 PR diff checks (OSS side)"
This reverts commit 0137d3ca48.
* chore(git-sync): point EE ref at restored phase 4 commit
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(git-sync): bump EE ref for clone_ref dry-run
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(git-sync): bump init-repository hub script to v28784
Picks up the clone_ref param (windmill-integrations#158) so the phase 4 PR-check
dry-run can clone the PR head. Backward compatible; manual pull/push and the
automated pull/poller/webhook all move to the same published version.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(git-sync): bump EE ref for auto-pull admin-permissioning fix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(git-sync): bump EE ref for superadmin pull fallback
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): refresh auto-pull tooltip; bump EE ref for webhook secret encryption
The auto-pull toggle tooltip claimed GitHub App repos would sync via
webhooks "in a future update"; webhook delivery now works, so describe
the webhook-vs-polling behavior accurately. Bump the EE ref to pick up
encrypting the webhook HMAC secret at rest.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): poll app-backed repos in auto/polling mode
The auto-pull poller skipped app-backed repos (the ls-remote head check
can't authenticate a tokenless URL), so auto- and polling-mode app repos
never synced when their webhook wasn't live. Wire the poller to fetch the
head via the GitHub API for app repos and reconcile. Bump the EE ref.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(git-sync): auto-pull UI — direction split, delivery mode, fallback notice
Reorganize the repository card into two clearly labeled directions:
"Push to Git on deploy (Windmill → Git)" and "Pull from Git (Git →
Windmill)". In the pull section:
- new connections default to auto-pull enabled (webhook with polling
fallback); existing repos load with auto-pull off and are unchanged
- a Delivery selector chooses "Webhook with polling fallback" or
"Polling only (air-gapped)"
- a notice surfaces webhook_error when delivery falls back to polling
- a reminder to remove any pre-existing GitHub Action that pushed into
Windmill, to avoid conflicting double-syncs
Adds the webhook_error field to AutoPullSettings (+ openapi) and bumps
the EE ref.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(git-sync): clearer push indicator + gate webhook delivery to app repos
- Push-on-deploy is shown with a check icon + concise line (via the
shared GitSyncModeDisplay, restyled from the oversized "Sync:" text);
the setup wizard reuses it without the check (pre-save preview).
- The delivery-mode selector only shows for GitHub App-backed repos;
token-based repos show a "webhooks require the GitHub App (managed or
GHES)" note with a docs link and poll instead. Bumps the EE ref.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(git-sync): fork auto-sync (phase 5) + live deploy check (phase 6)
Phase 5 — fork auto-sync configured at the parent (replaces the *-to-forks
GitHub Actions):
- Add fork_open_prs + fork_pull_sync to GitRepositorySettings (openapi + UI).
- UI: two "Forks of this workspace" toggles in the repo card, gated on
app-backed and not-a-fork; serialize the flags on save.
- On fork creation, strip the inherited auto_pull block (and fork_* flags) from
the copied git_sync repo: a fork must not carry the parent's webhook id (it
would delete the parent's hook on disable) or self-poll on top of the parent's
fan-out. Push-direction config + installation are still inherited unchanged.
Phase 6 — live deploy status check on the commit (Cloudflare-style): an
in-progress "Windmill" check on the head commit that flips to "Deployed N
changes"; completion handled by the generalized git-sync check hook.
Bump EE ref for the phase 5-6 EE implementation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* chore(git-sync): bump EE ref for PAT auto-pull mode normalization
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): address PR review findings
- webhook_secret: redact from the settings API response and Debug output (still
persisted encrypted); it's a server-only HMAC key the UI never needs.
- poller: honor each repo's effective poll interval (relaxed ~10 min when a
webhook is live) instead of probing every ~60s tick.
- settings save: roll back a just-created webhook if the settings transaction
doesn't commit, so a failed save can't orphan a hook.
- auto-pull head check: fail SSH remotes with an actionable message (background
polling has no SSH identity) instead of a confusing ls-remote error.
- deploy/PR check summary: a pull result carrying neither changes nor a settings
diff now falls back to the unsummarized path instead of a false "in sync".
- UI: reset isGithubApp on resource change / failed fetch so webhook + fork
controls can't show for the wrong repo.
- tests: cover parse_git_sync_changes and format_change_list edge cases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): correct feature gating for OSS builds
- monitor.rs: keep the AUTO_PULL_LAST_POLL static, slack const, and
poll_git_auto_pull_inner all behind #[cfg(feature = "private")] (an inserted
static had split the cfg off the function, ungating it in OSS builds).
- edit_git_sync_repository: the webhook create/rollback block references
windmill_common::git_sync_ee (private module), so gate it on
all(enterprise, private) instead of enterprise only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* chore(sqlx): cache workspace_diff query pulled in from origin/main
Re-merged origin/main (advanced past the earlier merge); regenerate the offline
sqlx entry for the new workspace_comparison test query so SQLX_OFFLINE builds
(cargo_test) pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): address Codex review findings (webhook cleanup on delete)
- Deleting a git-sync repository now tears down its managed GitHub webhook
(deletion bypassed the sync_repo_webhook lifecycle, orphaning the hook so
GitHub kept delivering to the instance).
- Worker completion hook rolls back the optimistic auto-pull sha on job failure
(OSS side of the EE change) + caches the new marker query. Bump EE ref.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): delete repo webhook after the removal commits
Codex re-review nits:
- delete_git_sync_repository deleted the webhook before the settings transaction
committed; a failed save would then leave the repo pointing at a hook that no
longer exists (sync_repo_webhook treats a set webhook_id as live and won't
recreate it). Capture the hook id, commit the DB removal, then delete the hook.
- Reword a fork-copy comment to drop drafting-history wording per AGENTS.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): reconcile the edit-path webhook after the settings commit
Codex nit: edit_git_sync_repository ran sync_repo_webhook before the transaction
committed. The rollback only covered created hooks, but sync_repo_webhook also
deletes a hook on disable/switch-to-polling — a commit failure then left the DB
with a webhook_id whose hook was already gone (and it wouldn't be recreated).
Save + commit first, then reconcile the webhook against the durable config and
persist any hook id/secret change (best-effort). Bump EE ref.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): preserve webhook secret on whole-config save + default on visible add
Codex nits:
- edit_git_sync_config saved the client config verbatim, so the webhook_secret
redacted from the GET response would be dropped (breaking delivery). Preserve
server-owned auto-pull state (webhook id/secret, synced sha, last status) per
repo from the existing settings, matching edit_git_sync_repository.
- addSyncRepository (the visible add path) didn't set the auto_pull default, so
new sync repos added from the UI came up with auto-deploy off. Match
addRepository's default (webhook + polling fallback).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* refactor(git-sync): drop fork_pull_sync (parent-level keep-forks-in-sync)
Removes the "Keep forks in sync with the tracked branch" toggle and its
fan-out. Pulling the tracked branch straight into every fork was the
inconsistent piece; the consistent model is per-fork branch sync (each
fork tracks its own wm-fork/** branch), which is a separate follow-up.
fork_open_prs is kept. Also tightens the fork toggle-section spacing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): detect dev workspaces in CLI fork branch derivation
isForkWorkspace / computeGitSyncDeployBranch keyed off the wm-fork- id
prefix. Dev workspaces are forks with a custom, prefix-less id, so their
wm-fork/** branch was never derived or created. Detect them via
parent_workspace_id too (which the backend already passes), mirroring the
backend's `parent.is_some() || wm-fork- prefix` rule.
Pairs with the hub-script clone-flag fix (windmill-integrations#163); both
take effect once the CLI is released and the pinned version is bumped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): reconcile webhooks on full-config save
edit_git_sync_config preserved server-owned webhook fields but never
created or deleted the managed GitHub webhook, so enabling auto-pull
through the whole-config endpoint only polled, and disabling or removing
a repo left an orphan hook still delivering. Mirror the per-repository
endpoint: after the commit is durable, reconcile every saved repo's
webhook (sync_repo_webhook) and delete the hooks of repos the save
removed, including the clear-whole-config case. Addresses the Codex nit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): address Codex nits (webhook orphan on cleared auto_pull, fork detection)
- edit_git_sync_config: also delete a repo's old webhook when the save drops
the repo OR clears its auto_pull. Webhook fields are only preserved onto a
Some auto_pull, so a save that present-but-clears a repo would otherwise
orphan its hook.
- GitSyncRepositoryCard: isFork now uses parent_workspace_id OR the wm-fork-
prefix (was AND), matching the backend/CLI rule, so prefix-less dev
workspaces are detected as forks and don't show the parent fork-PR toggle.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* docs(git-sync): update design doc for the dropped fork_pull_sync
Phase 5 documented "Keep forks in sync with the tracked branch"
(fork_pull_sync) and its fan-out as implemented; that feature was removed.
Rewrite the section to reflect what ships (fork_open_prs), note the drop +
the per-fork-branch follow-up, and remove the stale fan-out mentions
elsewhere. Addresses the Codex nit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): redact webhook secrets from workspace export; fix doc endpoints
- Export (P1): strip the server-owned auto_pull state (webhook secret/id/error
+ synced sha + last pull status) from git_sync before it is written into an
export's settings.json for both settings formats. The HMAC webhook secret
must never leave the server (matching the GET-settings redaction), and a
re-imported workspace must not inherit another install's hook/sync state.
- Docs: the webhook receiver is a single per-workspace endpoint
/api/w/{workspace}/github_app/webhook (host-aware for managed + self-managed);
update the stale push_webhook/{id} and instance-global /api/github_app/webhook
references.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): skip deleted/archived workspaces in the auto-pull poller
The poller scanned workspace_settings directly, so an archived (soft-deleted)
or renamed-away workspace — whose settings row persists — kept polling and
could enqueue a pull into a dead workspace. Join workspace and require
NOT deleted. The EE webhook receiver gets the same filter (ee ref bumped).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): never trust client-supplied server-owned auto-pull fields
Both write endpoints (edit_git_sync_repository, edit_git_sync_config)
persisted caller-supplied auto_pull.webhook_id / webhook_secret /
webhook_error / last_synced_sha / last_pull_status when adding a repo or
newly enabling auto-pull, letting a client inject a webhook id/secret or
fake sync state. Strip those server-owned fields from the request up front;
existing repos re-derive them from the DB (carried over), new ones start
clean and the server (re)creates the webhook.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): merge webhook fields post-commit instead of clobbering the row
The post-commit webhook reconcile in edit_git_sync_repository and
edit_git_sync_config wrote the whole pre-reconcile git_sync snapshot back
after the main save committed. A concurrent git-sync edit or poller status
write that landed in the gap could then be dropped by the stale snapshot.
Re-read the current row and merge only the reconciled webhook id/secret/error
for the repos the reconcile actually changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* feat(git-sync): parent-managed fork sync + PR-on-deploy toggles
Fork sync (push-on-merge-to-forks parity): a parent-level
auto_pull.sync_forks toggle routes changes on each fork's wm-fork/** branch
into that fork workspace, via the parent's existing webhook and one extra
fork-heads listing per poll tick (git ls-remote pattern for token repos,
git/matching-refs for app-backed). Fork state is a server-written
status-only auto_pull blob on the fork's own repo entry; the fork's card
shows a read-only "managed in the parent workspace" line with its branch
and last pull status. Dev workspaces (prefix-less ids) use the same branch
parsing (unit-tested in windmill-common).
PR-on-deploy: opening PRs for Windmill-pushed branches moves into the
deploy pipeline, per repo toggle (promotion_open_prs on the promotion
repo; parent-level fork_open_prs for fork deploys). The push job carries a
marker and the job-completion hook derives the pushed branch (helper
unit-tested against the CLI formula) and opens the PR outbound, so it
works without inbound webhooks; the webhook-side wm_deploy PR arm is
removed. The documented open-pr-* GitHub Actions remain valid alternatives
(PR creation is idempotent).
Fork guards: promotion mode, enabled auto-pull, and fork_open_prs are
rejected on fork workspaces (they are parent-managed; a fork's deploys
always target its wm-fork/** branch) and the promotion card is hidden in a
fork's settings. Enabling auto-pull now also requires EE, and the
post-commit webhook reconcile persists the normalized delivery mode.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* feat(git-sync): dev workspaces sync with their environment-label branch
A dev workspace's git branch is its environment label verbatim (dev/
staging, default dev) — a first-class env branch like the documented
push-on-merge-staging layout — instead of the wm-fork/** form. The label
rides the deploy job args (backend → hub script → CLI
--dev-workspace-label), the PR completion hook derives the same head, the
webhook/poller route label branches into the matching dev-workspace child
(poller lists them alongside wm-fork/* via extra ls-remote refs / per-label
API lookups), and manual pulls from the UI pass clone_ref accordingly. The
CLI refuses to deploy when the label branch equals the checked-out tracked
branch, which would otherwise commit fork content straight to it.
Because the branch is keyed on the label, the label is now immutable after
creation: set at create/attach only, the set_dev_workspace_label endpoint
is removed and the settings tab shows it read-only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* feat(git-sync): nested fork routing + fork-of-dev branch rooting
A fork of a dev workspace now roots its wm-fork/** branch on the dev's
environment-label branch (the content it diverged from) and its PR merges
back into that branch: the backend passes parent_dev_workspace_label with
the deploy (parent row joined in both enqueue paths), the CLI gains
--parent-dev-workspace-label and checks it before the wm-fork- prefix
fallback when rooting a fork-of-a-fork branch, and the PR completion hook
uses it as the PR base.
Fork sync routing covers the whole live descendant chain of the
webhook/poller workspace (recursive, depth-capped) instead of direct
children only, and fork_open_prs is resolved at the root ancestor — only
the root can hold auto-pull config, so grandchild forks sync through it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* feat(git-sync): PR deploy-preview comment, clearer check copy, app-only hints
- The PR diff completion hook maintains one managed comment on the PR
(Cloudflare deploy-preview style: workspace, status, commit, collapsible
change list), upserted per synchronize via a hidden marker. The check run
stays for required-check gating.
- A settings difference in the diff summary is worded by cause: the PR
changes wmill.yaml, vs pre-existing drift between the repo's wmill.yaml
and the workspace, vs undetermined (neutral wording).
- Deploy-status check titles name the target workspace ("Deployed 2
change(s) to staging"), since GitHub shows a head commit's checks on any
PR containing it and a bare "Deployed" read as if the PR had deployed.
- Token-based repos see a hint pointing at the open-pr-on-commit /
open-pr-on-fork-commit workflows where the app-only PR toggles would be;
an API-set toggle on a non-app repo now logs a warning naming the
fallback; the design doc lists app-only features and their degradation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): EE-gate auto-pull UI, fork pull clone_ref, no-op push PR gate
- CE: the auto-pull and fork-PR toggles are disabled with an EE badge, and
new sync repos only default them on when licensed (basic git sync is
available on CE since #8493, but auto-pull is EE and the backend rejects it)
- The pull modal passes clone_ref for wm-fork- forks (wm-fork/<tracked>/<id>)
so a manual pull fetches the fork branch instead of the tracked branch head
- PR-on-deploy skips no-op pushes: when the push script reports pushed=false
(e.g. the deploy was caused by an auto-pull), the completion hook no longer
ensures a PR, so closed PRs aren't recreated by the sync loop
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* chore: refresh package-lock after main merge (windmill-utils-internal 1.8.2)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* test: auto-pull e2e integration tests; fix PR comment table formatting
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): runtime license gate for auto-pull saves; user/group promotion-branch parity
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): explain in-sync PR verdicts with the repo's sync filter scope
A PR that only touches files outside the repository's include paths gets
"In sync", which reads as a wrong verdict; the check summary (and managed
comment) now name the filters, e.g. "Only files matching this repository's
sync filters deploy on merge: `f/**` (excluding `f/pat/**`)."
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* feat(git-sync): clearer card copy/structure; surface PR-creation failures
- Fork sync toggle renamed and kept in the pull section; the fork PR toggle
moves to the push section with a note that push settings apply to forks
- Fork/dev workspaces' push section names their actual branch instead of the
tracked-branch line; promotion repos hide the pull direction (promotion
pushes deploy branches on top of a sync-mode setup)
- Promotion mode line describes the wm_deploy/** branch + merge-to-promote
flow; workflow-fallback hints lead with the how-to and link to the docs;
test connection button demoted from accent per brand guidelines
- New server-owned open_pr_error on repo settings: the deploy completion hook
records why a PR couldn't be opened (e.g. app permission not yet approved)
and clears it on the next success; shown as a warning under the PR toggles
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix: cfg-gate scope-note helper (dead code on OSS builds)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): license-gate preserved auto-pull; attach strips parent-only settings
- edit_git_sync_repository re-checks the runtime Enterprise gate against the
EFFECTIVE repo state after preservation: the older-client arm copies the
existing auto_pull back, which the request-side check never saw
- attach_dev_workspace now mirrors the fork-creation copy on the attached
workspace's own git sync: promotion repos dropped, auto_pull/fork PRs/PR
error stripped, and any managed webhook deleted after commit (the attached
workspace is parent-managed and must not keep pulling its old tracked branch)
- integration test: attaching an auto-pull-enabled workspace strips it
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): detach clears standalone parent; reject label == tracked branch
- detach_dev_workspace clears parent_workspace_id for prefix-less (attached
standalone) workspaces so they stop classifying as forks and deploying to
wm-fork/** branches; wm-fork- re-designated forks keep their parent; cache
invalidations mirror attach
- dev-workspace create/attach reject an environment label that equals a
git-sync repository's tracked branch (prod's or the candidate's): deploys
would target the very branch the repo syncs from, and the CLI guard would
fail every push job after the fact
- CLI unit tests: prefix-less fork beats wm_deploy derivation; isForkWorkspace
parent-id argument
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* chore(git-sync): bump hub script pins (push 28786, pull 28785)
Published from windmill-integrations #163 with windmill-cli@1.753.1-gitsync.0:
dev-workspace label deploys, fork-of-dev rooting, fork checkout on the
existing remote branch, and the pushed-flag result.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): no parent-only defaults on fork repos; rename strips webhook state
- addSyncRepository skips the auto_pull/fork_open_prs defaults on fork/dev
workspaces where the backend rejects them (saving a new sync repo from an
EE fork 400'd deterministically)
- change_workspace_id strips webhook id/secret/error from the copied git_sync
and deletes the stale GitHub hooks post-commit: they deliver to the old
(archived) workspace URL, so the new workspace would report a live webhook
while polling at the relaxed interval; next save re-registers cleanly
- EE: PR diff checks for contributor-fork PRs clone the synthetic
pull/<n>/head ref (head.ref doesn't exist in the base repo)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* chore(git-sync): bump pull script pin to hub/28787 (synthetic PR ref support)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): targeted jsonb update for open_pr_error (no full-blob clobber)
The full read-modify-write raced the poller's concurrent last_synced_sha /
last_pull_status writes on the same column; mirror the EE status writer and
update only the matching repository element's open_pr_error key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* style(git-sync): inline EE badge on gated toggles (matches settings nav)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* copy(git-sync): both directions in page/card descriptions; clearer promotion flow
- Page header and sync-card description mention the pull direction, not only
push-on-deploy
- Promotion description walks the actual flow (wm_deploy/** branch, merge to
promote, sync the target workspace) and points at the PR toggle / workflow;
the Git Promotion docs link now also shows on configured cards, not only in
the empty state
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): resolve branch-less resources' default branch for fork sync
A git resource without an explicit branch polled as the bare "HEAD" ref,
which the fork/dev-label fan-out cannot scope (wm-fork/<branch>/*), so fork
sync silently never ran on polling-only repos. Resolve the remote's default
branch name with `ls-remote --symref HEAD` (one call for name + head sha);
"HEAD" only remains when resolution fails. The polling e2e test now uses a
branch-less resource to cover this shape.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): runtime license gate for in-app PR creation
promotion_open_prs/fork_open_prs are rejected on save without an Enterprise
plan (like auto_pull), and the deploy completion hook re-checks the plan
before opening PRs so flags stored while licensed stop driving GitHub calls
after a lapse.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* feat(git-sync): app-aware pull defaults, always webhook delivery, token-repo guidance
- Pull-from-Git defaults on only for app-backed repos (applied when the
selected resource resolves); polling is opt-in for token repositories,
with a warning alert recommending the GitHub App (instant pull + in-app
PRs) or the sync GitHub workflow
- App repos always use webhook delivery with polling fallback: the delivery
selector is gone and a stored polling mode is normalized back to auto
- Post-save modal reflects the auto-pull state instead of telling the user
to turn on a toggle that is already on
- Non-app PR hints recommend the GitHub App explicitly
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* copy(git-sync): single info box for token-repo pull guidance
Merges the instant-pull recommendation with the GitHub Action conflict note,
shown only for non-app repos; app repos need neither, and the redundant
'instant webhook sync requires' line is gone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* copy(git-sync): keep the GitHub Action conflict note on app repos
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* copy(git-sync): anchor docs links to their exact sections
GitHub App references point at integrations/git_repository#github-app, the
workflow hints at deploy_gh_gl#github-actions-setup, and the sync workflow
at git_sync#github-actions (all anchors verified against the live docs).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* copy(git-sync): fork workflow hint links to git_sync#github-actions
open-pr-on-fork-commit is documented on the git_sync page, not deploy_gh_gl.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* fix(git-sync): fork PRs are opt-in on new connections too
Only auto-pull and fork sync default on for new app-backed connections;
opening pull requests stays a deliberate per-repo decision.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* feat(git-sync): default the managed PR on for new app-backed promotion repos
A promotion deploy's wm_deploy/** branch exists to be merged; without a PR
it's an orphaned branch. Fork PRs stay opt-in. Also scope the sync-repo
auto-pull default to sync mode so promotion repos can't pick it up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* docs(git-sync): GHES self-managed app permission setup
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* docs(git-sync): frame permission update against GitHub Actions, not polling
Existing installations don't have polling; their git-to-Windmill direction
runs on GitHub Actions today, so the approval text describes the update as
replacing those workflows and notes every feature is opt-in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PP5gBSPfo1YtkL1sWVAjJm
* feat(git-sync): gate GitHub PRs on Windmill CI test results (WIN-2051)
Add a "Windmill CI tests" GitHub check run on any PR against the tracked
branch, so a workspace-fork customer can mark it a required status check and
have Windmill's own CI tests (the `// test:` annotation) block the PR —
replacing the GitHub Action that polls the CI-test results API.
Driven by the pull_request webhook (same event as the Phase 4 diff check): a
new git_sync_ci_test_check table tracks one check per (fork workspace, PR head
commit); a per-ci_test-job completion hook (result_processor) and the git-sync
poller sweep (monitor) conclude it. Reuses the Checks: write grant from #9552;
token repos keep the documented Action. See docs Phase 7.
EE logic lives in windmill-ee-private (git_sync_ee.rs); see ee-repo-ref.txt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(sqlx): drop two cache entries orphaned by the merge
Both queries were rewritten on main; nothing in the sources produces them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(migration): describe the CI-test check as webhook-opened, not deploy-opened
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: bump ee-repo-ref (skipped CI-test check on unmapped PRs)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(git-sync): skipped check for unmapped PRs; correct the installation rationale
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): cascade CI-test check rows with their workspaces; review fixes (EE ref)
Deleting a fork (the normal end of the one-fork-per-PR flow) or its parent
must not fail on the check table's foreign keys.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): CI-test check waits for the head's deploy; ignore retired tests (EE ref)
Design doc: GitLab scope, pending-while-deploying and retired-test rules.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): CI-test verdict matches jobs against current test references (EE ref)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): record the pushed head as synced; CI-test check waits for it (EE ref)
The push completion hook records the commit the deploy push script reports as
the branch's synced sha, mirroring what a pull records. The check row stores
head_ref. Requires the hub push script version that reports the sha; the pin
is bumped once it is published.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): CI-test check row keeps the newest check run when creates race (EE ref)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci-tests): queue CI tests before a deploy or dependency job completes
The dispatch was detached, so a finished deploy did not yet imply its tests
existed. The git-sync PR check reads "deploy settled" as "tests queued", so the
dispatch is awaited at all three sites; errors are still only logged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(ci-tests): sqlx cache for the pull-success readiness clause; bump EE ref
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(ci-tests): readiness waits for pull success, failed deploy fails the check; sqlx cache; EE ref
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci-tests): queue resource-triggered CI tests before the update is acknowledged
Same ordering guarantee as scripts and flows: the git-sync PR check
treats a finished pull as "the deploy's tests exist". Also carries the
sqlx cache for the tested-item liveness filter and the EE ref.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci-tests): dispatch on flow/resource create, sweep outside the auto-pull lock, pushed-head map
- create_flow and create_resource queue CI tests the way the update paths do
- the check sweep runs after the advisory unlock so GitHub calls never extend
the auto-pull tick
- AutoPullSettings gains last_pushed_sha (settings round-trips keep it); the
EE push hook writes it instead of last_synced_sha so auto-pull still pulls a
commit someone else pushed under ours
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): last_pushed_sha is server-owned auto-pull state
Clear it from client-supplied settings, carry it over from the existing
entry on save, and keep it out of workspace exports, like the other sync
state fields. Correct the two doc comments that still described the
pushed head as the synced head.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(git-sync): say which pull toggles the PR checks depend on
The repo webhook created by the pull toggle is what delivers pull request
events, and fork sync is what lets a fork PR's externally pushed commits
reach the fork workspace before its CI tests check is read.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(git-sync): CI check readiness reads a synced-head event log
New git_sync_synced_head table: one row per commit a workspace reflects
on a branch, written by the pull completion hook on success (from the
pull marker's branch and sha) and by the push completion hook from the
push script's reported sha. The check reads that instead of inferring
sync state from the auto-pull settings jsonb, so AutoPullSettings gets
no pushed-sha field and the settings gates for it go away. Pull success
now also runs the auto-pull completion hook.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci-tests): queue CI tests before the deploy push is enqueued; schema summary
The synced-head row a push writes is what makes the PR check read the
fork's results, so the tests must be queued before the push job exists.
Reordered at the script create, lockfile, and resource sites (flows
already push from their dependency job). Lists the two new tables in
summarized_schema.txt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(ci-tests): newest synced head decides readiness; EE ref
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(ci-tests): newest synced head decides readiness
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): synced heads keyed by repository; check row keeps the repo resource path
Both tables are unreleased, so their migrations gain the column in place.
The push hook reads the push job's repository from its args again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): CI check rows keyed by repository; EE ref
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(git-sync): pin the deploy push script to hub/28956
The version whose main returns the push outcome {pushed, sha, branch},
which the completion hook records as the branch's synced head.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(ci-tests): tooltips name GitHub for the CI check; drop the sanitization test; docs and EE ref
The sanitization test guarded a field that no longer exists and now only
re-exercised pre-existing behavior. The design doc carries the repository
key and the row-before-create order.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(ci-tests): re-fire resets the run id; pinned-script reason on timeout; EE ref
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): record the commit a pull checked out; skip a rebased push
The pull script now reports the sha and branch its clone landed on, so
the synced head is what was applied rather than the head observed when
the pull was enqueued (the marker stays the fallback). A push the script
had to rebase sits on commits the workspace has not pulled, so it is not
recorded; the pull those commits trigger records the head.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(git-sync): pin the push script to hub/28958 and the pull script to hub/28957
The versions whose results report a rebased push and the commit a pull
checked out.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(ci-tests): queued-pull wait and kept failure on re-fire; EE ref
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(ci-tests): sqlx cache for the prune and skipped-guard queries; EE ref
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(ci-tests): a failed head passes only on newer runs; EE ref
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(ci-tests): the PR check runs the head's own suite
The synced-head row records the CI test runs dispatched for the head
(tests_dispatched_at, ci_test_job_ids); the check reads exactly those.
windmill-git-sync now owns the check lifecycle (it can enqueue jobs) and
depends on windmill-dep-map for the dispatcher. The deploy-site changes
that ordered per-item dispatch before the push existed only for the old
workspace-wide verdict and are restored to main's form; flow and resource
creation keep the per-item dispatch they lacked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci-tests): suite runs are not debounced, run as the workspace admin, and a dead dispatch claim is retaken
EE ref f30eaf8: the head's suite no longer shares debounce keys with
deploy-triggered runs (a superseded run dropped out of the verdict), runs as
the workspace admin an auto pull resolves rather than the sync job's identity
(which retention could remove), and a dispatch claim that never recorded ids
is retaken after 5 minutes. sqlx cache and design doc updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci-tests): the head's suite expands wildcard references
EE ref 53d77c3; sqlx cache updated for the reference and script queries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci-tests): bound the failed-deployment gate; keep a current head's check row
EE ref 63523d5; sqlx cache updated for the two changed queries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci-tests): the head's suite runs as the fork's owner; poster_workspace_id
EE ref a74af94. The unreleased check-table migration renames
github_workspace_id to poster_workspace_id (the workspace whose credential
posts the check); sqlx cache, schema summary and design doc follow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(git-sync): the PR check's suite runs as the fork's owner
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci-tests): CE-only build, UI pull-script pin, detached sweep
- The four check-lifecycle re-exports exist only on enterprise builds; gating
them on private alone broke the CE image (private without enterprise).
- hubPaths.json's gitInitRepo follows the server's pull-script pin (28957),
as every previous bump did and as the git-sync integration test asserts.
- The monitor spawns the CI-check sweep detached (EE ref f96aa31).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: bump EE ref to a1d7a1e
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci-tests): advance the PR check off the worker's completion loop
Concluding a check calls GitHub; the completion loop finishes jobs serially,
so the evaluation is spawned detached (idempotent, retried by the poller).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(git-sync): check-row-before-create order, retarget events; EE ref 40079e0
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a4da009a5eae72bd55f34de41ba7929b53d53c9b
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #662 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 4845e823bfaa28d3258b4c2fb1e9e2781dde382f
New ee-repo-ref: a4da009a5eae72bd55f34de41ba7929b53d53c9b
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5
GuilhemandClaude Opus 5