* fix: let operators use wmill.datatable() from within running jobs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RHR4fytgt6m4q37WCXs2Rp
* fix: refuse content-driven redirects and deferral in the operator datatable exemption
* fix: check the datatable exemption against the expanded query, not the raw content
* fix: fail closed on a language-overriding expansion and state the exemption's real scope
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Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`POST /api/w/{workspace}/jobs/run_inline/preview` ran request-supplied
code inline (in-process, e.g. DuckDB) but was missing the operator
authorization guard that its sibling `/jobs/run/preview` enforces. An
authenticated operator — the most restricted role, which must not run
preview jobs — could execute arbitrary code in a single request
(file read/write, and OS command execution via the DuckDB `shellfs`
extension when worker egress is available).
This is the incomplete-fix residual of CVE-2026-22683 / GHSA-9q9g-rp9x-244h,
whose v1.615.0 patch covered the entity-CRUD endpoints but left this
direct inline-exec sink uncovered.
Add the same `is_operator` guard from `run_preview_script`. Audited the
rest of the preview/inline arbitrary-code endpoints (run_preview_script,
run_bundle_preview_script, run_preview_flow_job, the wait_result
wrappers, run_dynamic_select inline variant, dependency jobs) — all
already carry the guard. The `run_inline_script_by_path`/`by_hash`
endpoints run deployed scripts (operator-allowed, scope-checked) and
correctly remain ungated.
Fixes WIN-2043 (GHSA-pp5h-96x3-3wqq).
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ruben FiszelandClaude Fable 5.1