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dca9221b9f8ffcba7fc0ff0c71b5e5bc30460a66
168
Commits
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9217608471 |
fix: keep pre-connection triggers working, and guard reconnects and service removal
- The migration recovers a service's connection when the workspace row lost its path, which saving the OAuth app or an abandoned instance connect used to do. - A trigger created without a connection uses the shared account, as older clients and trigger specs expect. - Only whoever connected a path, or an admin, may reconnect over it. - Removing a service or sharing an account checks a path-scoped token against what it touches. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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313ade29f8 |
fix: point native trigger error hints at the account picker and the shared account
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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4b86fba9a2 |
feat: let an admin share one native trigger connection with the whole workspace
Members can use the shared connection without reading its token. It reuses workspace_integrations.resource_path, so existing workspace connections stay usable by members after upgrading. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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b66b7bd57b |
fix: key token write-back by account and serialize trigger creation with disconnect
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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5863c0c5b8 |
feat: let native triggers act through per-user or shared connections
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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30522188be |
refactor: link a variable to its OAuth account only in the connect flow
The variable endpoints no longer take an account link from the caller. The connect flows create the token variable first and pass its path to create_account, which links it server-side. This replaces the creator check and the created_by bookkeeping, along with both migrations. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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2852192179 |
fix: follow a non-member superadmin's instance username on the OAuth accounts they created
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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221ad12125 |
fix: keep an oauth account's creator in step with the user's username
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c289d1bf12 |
test: cover a permitted relink through a variable update
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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83ec52168f |
test: cover relinking an oauth account through a variable update
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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4818bac55f |
fix: drop an oauth account link the caller may not hold instead of failing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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5fc5327e60 |
test: drop empty doctest and lib-test targets, ignore service tests (#11852)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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5f5bc16d59 |
test: stop backend tests waiting out real time they do not need (#11851)
* test: stop backend tests waiting out real time they do not need Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: delete the unused workspace_dependencies fixture Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e0138a7374 |
test: find the mcp preprocessor probe tool by its new name (#11833)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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6f7737f9f9 | fix: reserve handler group names for admins (#11823) | ||
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c09038b106 |
fix: hold mcp token references to resource reference scopes (#11803)
* fix: require variables:read for the token variable of an mcp resource A token scoped to resources:read/write on an MCP resource could have the API decrypt the variable the resource's `token` points at and send it as a bearer to the resource's URL. The url and header `$var:` references already required variables:read on the variable; the token reference now does too, checked before the OAuth refresh touches that variable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let an mcp resource's scope cover the variables it references A scoped token reading or calling an MCP resource resolved its token variable with the resource scope alone, but its url and header variables also needed variables:read on each. The resource scope now covers all three; RLS still bounds them to secrets the caller can read. Reverts the token-side check from the previous commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: scope resource references when they are written, not when they are read A token scoped to a resource now reads everything that resource references (`$var:`, `$jsonvar:`, `$res:`), through get_value_interpolated and the MCP tool routes alike. What makes that safe moves to the write: create, update, update_value and version restore refuse a scoped token adding a reference it holds no read scope on. References the stored value already carries are kept, since whoever put them there was allowed to. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: hold every resource reference writer to its own user's read rights A resource-scoped reader resolves stored references as itself, so an unscoped session could plant a reference to a secret its own user cannot read and have a reader's scoped token resolve it. Adding a reference now also requires the writer's user to see its target under RLS. A reference to nothing yet stays allowed, since a promotion pushes resources before the secrets they use. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: vet only variable references on write and keep nested resources scoped A nested `$res:` brought along the variables of a resource the writer could see but whose references it could not read, and what it references can change after it is written. It needs its own read scope again, and the write check covers only `$var:`/`$jsonvar:`. An MCP token stored as a bare path resolved as a variable without being vetted on write. It now needs its own variables:read scope, and the `$var:` prefix is parsed with strip_prefix, as the write check does. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep variable scopes on result-cache resources The worker writes job output to g/results/<hash> straight to the table, so its references never pass the write check. A token scoped to such a resource still needs read scope on the variables it references. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: require read rights on kept references and pin result-cache resources to g/results/ Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: check resource variable references at read time, with wildcard resource scopes covering matching variables Returns to the read-time rule: a variable a resource references needs variables:read on it, unless it is the resource's linked secret or a wildcard pattern in the token's resources: scopes matches it. The MCP token reference is now held to that rule like the url and header references. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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0b980546b1 |
feat: agents run on behalf of their deployer (#11430)
* Revert "docs: agent editor comments describe runs as the caller" This reverts commit |
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8c0185d55a |
feat: let operators save resource and variable drafts (#11736)
* feat: operators get AI sessions `prefersSessionHandoff` stops taking the role, so every AI entry point an operator can reach — Ask AI, the home composer, Open in session, the flow editor's hand-off, the raw-app template picker — opens a session for them like anyone else. The sessions page drops its refusal, and the layout stops keeping them on the docked chat. In the sidebar they now get the Workspace/AI Sessions switch and session mode, and lose the Ask AI entry that stood in for them, since the pane behind it is no longer the one they are sent to. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: operators get run-oriented examples in the home composer Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: note builder_flows in the operator composer examples comment Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: gate session tools and editors on operator rights Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: keep operator AI sessions behind a browser opt-in Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep flows refused in the prompt for operators without builder rights Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: decide every frontend edit check through one editRights module Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let admins who are also operators open session editors, as drafts.rs does Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: let operators with manage rights save schedule and trigger drafts Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep rebase_draft from operators who can only draft schedules and triggers Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: let operators save resource and variable drafts Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: name deploy and delete tools only where a kind is left to act on Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: list an operator's draft-only resources and variables while they may draft them Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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4f712318c3 |
feat: run previews as the runnable's on_behalf_of identity (#11778)
* feat: run script and flow previews on behalf of another user Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse operators and detect servers that drop preview on_behalf_of Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: editor previews run as the configured on_behalf_of identity Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: probe before submitting, keep step and viewer data identity in previews Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: never let a job token request viewer data access on a preview Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: open impersonated preview logs with who they run as and who asked Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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74c5f82c67 |
feat: let operators with manage rights save schedule and trigger drafts (#11646)
* feat: operators get AI sessions `prefersSessionHandoff` stops taking the role, so every AI entry point an operator can reach — Ask AI, the home composer, Open in session, the flow editor's hand-off, the raw-app template picker — opens a session for them like anyone else. The sessions page drops its refusal, and the layout stops keeping them on the docked chat. In the sidebar they now get the Workspace/AI Sessions switch and session mode, and lose the Ask AI entry that stood in for them, since the pane behind it is no longer the one they are sent to. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: operators get run-oriented examples in the home composer Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: note builder_flows in the operator composer examples comment Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: gate session tools and editors on operator rights Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: keep operator AI sessions behind a browser opt-in Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep flows refused in the prompt for operators without builder rights Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: decide every frontend edit check through one editRights module Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let admins who are also operators open session editors, as drafts.rs does Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: let operators with manage rights save schedule and trigger drafts Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep rebase_draft from operators who can only draft schedules and triggers Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: list operators' schedule and trigger drafts under their draft rights Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: say which drafts write_draft gates now that schedules and triggers have their own Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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49147827d6 |
fix: fork data tables sharing one database into a single copy (#11755)
* fix: give data tables forked from one database a single shared copy * fix: key shared-copy cleanup by server as well as database name * fix: refuse dropping a shared resource-backed copy another clone still uses |
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694ed7a0eb |
fix: keep applied migrations and db settings in data table copies (#11753)
* fix: keep applied migrations and db settings in data table copies Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: scope copied db settings per transaction and send timestamps as iso Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: copy migrations and settings only into a fresh import target Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci: install the latest pg_dump for backend integration tests Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci: enable pgdg so the latest pg_dump is installed Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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b7b3306195 |
feat: read data as the job's identity, viewer is opt-in per runnable (#11744)
* feat: connect a data table as the job's own identity unless the runnable opts into its viewer Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: key cached results by the data table mode and keep the flag across ai edits Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: hash the cache key's mode and viewer as fixed fields so no argument name can forge them Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 2f74548ad1ec50c8e1faf17e42d5648160e833f1 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #878 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 4ad768a777fff9f1ecc86a2803bc27d80f8242d6 New ee-repo-ref: 2f74548ad1ec50c8e1faf17e42d5648160e833f1 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * feat: rename the flag to viewer_data_access and apply it to object storage permission rules Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: describe viewer_data_access as covering object storage rules too Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 0ffb633473c5465513576afc6f54d18f93c7f1e1 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #879 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: e9e06a9eb94168f46b378276b01fa0117dc7d8ed New ee-repo-ref: 0ffb633473c5465513576afc6f54d18f93c7f1e1 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * feat: show the viewer data access control as an icon button Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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a3653593f2 |
fix: keep the resource type search current between daily fills, and serve it without an index (#11712)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015YR13nJWziUSWktZwhC7dx Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a298ed3fc1 |
feat: add the viewer's roles to unnamed data table connections (#11709)
* feat: connect to a data table with every role of the job's viewer Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: key a cached result by the run's recorded viewer Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: pin the per-viewer cache key and fix a stale doc sentence Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: length-prefix the viewer in the result cache key Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: drop data table role set logins unused for 30 days Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: pin the ee ref with the set login sweep fixes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: pin the ee ref with the sweep retry fix Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: give the cache key test its own migrated database Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add the viewer's roles to a data table connection that names none The default role of a data table under roles is now a floor: a connection naming no role also holds the roles its viewer is a tenant of, unless the default is admin. This replaces the explicit as=viewer option, which is removed from the reference parser, the executors and both clients. The roles drawer warns while the default is admin and confirms before removing the default role. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: let a data table have no default role A connection naming no role then holds its viewer's roles only and is refused without any. The roles drawer offers the choice, states what an unnamed connection gets for the current settings, says who gets admin while it is the default, and notes who owns a table created over several roles. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: start a data table's roles with admin open to everyone Turning roles on from the drawer seeded admin with no tenant, which refused every non-admin member's job as soon as it was saved. It now starts open to everyone, so the toggle changes nothing until the roles are edited, and the drawer warns for as long as everyone can connect as admin. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 40ab35596e6fcb82a4dfc56e186befb807f8e2af This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #873 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: a5def184a29fffab8ed42c70c5a7445b2b3cbe98 New ee-repo-ref: 40ab35596e6fcb82a4dfc56e186befb807f8e2af Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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4be67fe3ac |
fix(groups): recompute member roles when an instance group role is cleared (#11708)
* fix(groups): recompute member roles when an instance group role is cleared Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: restore sqlx cache entry still used by the scim group delete Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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02e4697157 |
feat: let operators compose full-code apps when the workspace grants it (#11229)
* feat: let operators compose full-code apps when the workspace grants it Adds operator_settings.builder_apps, the second builder right, granted independently of flows because the two are not equally verifiable: a composed flow is checked in full server-side, while a full-code app is a browser-built bundle no check can read. The app right rests instead on forced sandbox isolation, a refusal of Viewer execution mode, and a deploy-time check of every runnable the app can reach. BuilderKind arrives with the second kind and is a mandatory argument, so no gate can mean "either" by accident: one that did would authorize an app write on a flows-only workspace. The only surfaces reading .any() are the ones that are genuinely not per-kind, the seat a membership costs and listing drafts. validate_operator_composed_app checks two surfaces rather than one, because they are not the same list: the policy's triggerables and the runnableByPath entries in the app value, which is what the deployed bundle actually resolves against. Every colon in a triggerable key is a possible split, since execute_component looks up "<component>:<path>" with an unrestricted component string. create_app_raw_source stays closed: it compiles caller-supplied sources with a bundler job on a worker, which is arbitrary code execution. Builders lose nothing, since the browser and the CLI both bundle locally and deploy through the multipart endpoints. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dsf6VC4MVLisiEoeQkgbr4 * fix: list a builder's app drafts and refuse inline code in them Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 6d15ff957df4dcd5129e1ab217eab1a13af62fbb Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: check a builder app as it will be stored Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: show the home list edit button to builder operators Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: pause the raw app preview for an app an operator deployed Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let app builders save a full-code app's deploy settings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: record the builder app settings path, public apps and the editor preview Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: cache the merged EE seat usage query The EE query now reads audit_partitioned and skips service accounts, so the cached entry for its builder_apps predicate no longer matched and offline EE builds failed with no cached data. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: pause the raw app preview for loaded drafts and unknown authors A draft loaded from an operator ran in the viewer's preview because the pause only checked the app's last deployer, and an author no longer in the workspace read as a developer. The pause now checks a loaded draft's owner, records it in the viewer's draft until the preview is run or deployed, and holds when the author cannot be found. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: name guest apps among the modes a builder may deploy Guest runs as the publisher with no Viewer fallback, like Publisher and Anonymous, and RestrictGuestAppDeployment refuses it per workspace. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep a loaded draft's preview paused in AI sessions and chat edits The session draft codec and the chat's draft save dropped loaded_from, so opening a paused operator draft in an AI session, or editing it through the chat, ran it with the viewer's session. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: pin builder refusals for low-code apps and unreviewed previews Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the operator mark when loading a developer's copy of a draft Loading another user's draft recorded only who saved it, so a developer's copy of an operator draft they never previewed opened unpaused for the next person who loaded it, running the operator's code with their session. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let builders restore a full-code app from deployment history Restore always sends allow_kind_change, which the builder check refused even for a full-code version restored over a full-code app. Builders now drop the flag, so the locked kind check still refuses an actual conversion. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: rustfmt the builder checks in jobs.rs Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: record the builder kind-check race as an accepted risk Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: never trust the owner name a loaded draft carries A loaded draft's loaded_from is written by its owner, so an operator could name a developer, or leave it empty, and the next person to load the draft previewed it unpaused. A loaded draft that carries any mark now stays paused as unattributable; an unmarked one is still checked against its real owner. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: record viewer-supplied resources in builder apps as an accepted risk Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: say that the app right lets operators write frontend code The settings section and the docs told admins builder operators "still cannot write code", but the app right has them write the app's frontend bundle. Only backend code stays out of reach. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: state the raw-source closure once and drop an unreachable preview case Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf: look up only the author when deciding whether to pause the preview Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: pin that the app right alone bills operators as developers Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: point ee-repo-ref at the EE seat test Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: drop the editor preview pause now that sandboxed apps preview isolated Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse a builder operator's app draft without the sandbox Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: turn the sandbox on when a builder operator opens the app editor Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse builder app drafts naming runnables they cannot read Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: note the editor preview asks before minting a builder app token Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: trim the builder app check comments to the constraints Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse an app runnable whose runType is not script, flow or hub Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: check builder app draft policy keys like a deploy does Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: count main's half-seat service accounts in the builder billing test Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: name the builder policy check for drafts as well as deploys Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let a builder app draft autosave with a stale triggerables_v2 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: check the script version a builder app would run, not any version Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse viewer mode in a builder app draft as on deploy Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: hold builder app drafts and deploys to one check Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: say a builder's script may not have finished deploying Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: cap builder app triggerable keys before reading every colon split Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse a builder app draft that runs as someone else Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: conform builder app drafts saved by the AI chat as the editor does Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: record that a deployed builder draft runs as its deployer Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse builder app runnables not written as plain text Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: a builder draft may carry its builder's own run identity Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: offer builders Start with AI only when it opens a session Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: name full-code apps in the builder rights confirmation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: name only the granted builder rights in the confirmation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: note a wm_deployers builder may keep another run identity Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: give builders a starter app that calls no missing runnables Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: seed the builder starter under the picker for builders Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: qualify the builder run identity comment for wm_deployers Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: resolve builder app script hashes before opening the RLS transaction Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: run the builder app tests serially to share the rights cache safely Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: give builders the builder starter on a fresh editor load Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: drop a new-app load overtaken while waiting for the workspace list Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep main's 401 for operators previewing without the app right Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 5d7726c4979070ee8db4fb9e8014152872a641ba This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #816 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 7151060bfc02908e97d9344b3820ee33a4951322 New ee-repo-ref: 5d7726c4979070ee8db4fb9e8014152872a641ba Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * refactor: let the app row's edit button trust its write flag Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: point ee-repo-ref at the merged EE companion Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: note the session raw-app editor does not conform builder drafts yet Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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588d8463df |
feat: let a job see that its worker is draining (#11612)
* feat: let a job see that its worker is draining * fix: gate worker draining check on job visibility and export sdk helper * fix: keep draining across re-registration and ignore parked jobs * fix: reset draining only on worker startup registration * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 55feb2e84332179faa4e17aeb419f7f480df79a6 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #857 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: e5010fa046a3aba93595d1bf44eb6a0cef2b5273 New ee-repo-ref: 55feb2e84332179faa4e17aeb419f7f480df79a6 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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d7d18f00af |
feat: improve data table roles and grants UX (#11562)
* feat: improve data table roles and grants UX Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep selected bordered badges the same height as unselected ones Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse taking over roles with members and test grant statements Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep grant filter chips while a filter is set Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: check a taken-over role can log in with the new password Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: select several grant filter tags at once Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: explain where schema and table permissions are set Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the grant create row on one line Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: show grants as a role and its privileges Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: show grants in a table with role, privileges and scope Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: hide the grant scope when it can only be the object itself Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: grant schema usage along with grants inside the schema Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: confirm before closing the roles drawer with unsaved changes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to c4002f777f56d90bb0471164291889850c85179d This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #848 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 7937634a52d04caeb083da94e189705cd00796b3 New ee-repo-ref: c4002f777f56d90bb0471164291889850c85179d Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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eab3dd5a52 |
fix: ignore schedule missed-run counters in workspace compare (#11570)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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99e96d3f78 |
fix: let instances withhold signing secrets from the settings API (#11483)
* fix: never return the instance signing secrets from the settings API Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: tell wmill instance get-config users that jwt_secret is not exported Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: point ee-repo-ref at the oidc signing key fix Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: block rsa_keys from agent workers and keep get-config stdout pure yaml Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep server secrets in exports by default behind EXPORT_SERVER_SECRETS Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 43b2ce8866a393b2666b17647ddb1466afc70bb1 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #842 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 3a0d0c3f45eeb9f5fe8d50ce3798239aa9101a22 New ee-repo-ref: 43b2ce8866a393b2666b17647ddb1466afc70bb1 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * fix: withhold server secrets on any non-true EXPORT_SERVER_SECRETS value Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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26be1d7da8 |
feat: add test key button to AI resource drawers (#11466)
* feat: add test key button to AI resource drawers * fix: scope-check inline AI resource values and keep test model editable * fix: keep test model editable for unsaved resources, own-key provider check |
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d2830cb4a0 |
fix: stop running deleted script versions from worker caches (#11456)
* fix: stop running deleted script versions from worker caches Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: reuse script cache invalidate and test the deletion notify payload Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep a deleted copy from shadowing the same hash in another workspace Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: drop deletions missed while down and fills racing the eviction Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: batch deletion events, evict path caches and cover version pruning Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: evict the raw-import cache on both passes and split large deletion events Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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6fe992aebe |
make RunForm schedule props optional and expect 403 for operator drafts (#11449)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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8c7dcbbda5 |
feat: agents as a standalone kind with home listing, detail and editor pages (#11332)
* feat: list agents on the home page and create them from the new menu Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep runnables out of the agents view and anchor a new agent once saved Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: autosave a new agent's first edit and list agents past one page Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add agent detail and editor pages Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: explain when an agent cannot be run and drop the broken agent move Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep query params and a unique path when creating an agent Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: lead the home list with agents and keep rows while the agent view loads Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: treat a loading agent as undeployed when leaving the editor page Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: agent detail page config panel, run page on form runs, chat badge Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: agent configuration modal and draft paths like other new items Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep a new agent draft-free until the first input, land agents with runnables Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: place AI agent after apps in the new menu and describe chat and flow use Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: new agents start with managed memory, editor form says how to turn it off Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: clearer managed memory hint in the agent editor form Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: share the agent editor's pane notice as a PaneNotice component Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: name a new agent after a path no resource holds Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: tell repeated tool names apart and hide permissions on draft-only agents Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: agent configuration beside the model in the chat composer and above the form Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: center the agent run form, configuration beside its Run button Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: icon-only agent configuration button beside Run Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: agents run on behalf of their deployer through a run-by-path endpoint Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: agents keep their run-as identity in their value, preserved by the CLI The identity an agent runs as lives in `value.on_behalf_of` instead of a column. Every write of an agent resolves it server-side as a flow's is: the writer's own, unless an admin or wm_deployers member asks to keep it, and a folder default on create. Retyping a resource into an agent resolves its value the same way. Export leaves it out; the run endpoint reads it and drops it from the step's inputs. The CLI follows the app model: a pushed agent never takes its identity from the tracked file, an unchanged agent compares equal to the deployed one, and an admin or deployer push claims the deployed identity back. The owner-change pre-check lists agents. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: deploying an agent draft from review keeps its deployed identity As for an app: an agent draft carries no identity, so the review page claims the deployed one back, which the backend honours for an admin or wm_deployers member. The draft diff leaves the deployed identity out, since a draft never holds one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: deploying an agent to another workspace offers the run-as choice An agent deployed to prod/staging, merged from a fork or promoted with `wmill workspace merge` gets the same identity choice as a flow or an app: the target's current one, the deployer, or a picked user, sent as a principal the way a trigger's is. The source workspace's principal is never copied, and a difference in identity alone is not a change in the workspace compare or its diff. The frontend consumes the published windmill-utils-internal, so its deploy provider carries the same rewrite until that version ships. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: agent identity on fork, agent-scoped job reads, and the run license gate A fork re-points an agent's identity at its creator when they may not preserve someone else's, and at the creator when it names nobody in the fork, as it does an app's. A token scoped to `jobs:run:agents:<path>` reads back the runs it starts, chat turns included. The agent run endpoint checks the enterprise license like every other run entrypoint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: a CLI push decides agent identity handling by the tracked file's type An agent retyped into another resource by a push kept neither its value's `on_behalf_of` as the file stated it nor clear of the old agent's identity. The file's type now decides, and only a deployed agent's identity is claimed back. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: agents run as the caller, with a note on what a shared one needs Drops the agent run-as identity: its storage in the agent value, the backfill, the resolution on every write, and its handling in export, the CLI, draft and cross-workspace deploys, forks and the workspace compare. The run endpoint runs as the caller, so an operator or reader runs an agent with their own access. The editor tells the author of a folder agent that anyone running it needs access to its AI resource and to what its tools use. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: agent editor comments describe runs as the caller Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: agent editor pane notes use Alert Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: agent editor pane notes render as Alert Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: agent editor notes as regular Alerts, not banners Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: agent path as its own editor level, and evals on the agent page The path leaves the agent form: the editor dialog opens it as a level, as it does evals, and the editor page in a drawer. The agent page gains Evals, in a dialog. The page supplies the run form, keeping it out of the editor the flow editor reaches. The draft edit gate no longer throws when a focused, changed field is removed: the `change` that removal fires lands mid-teardown, so the gate opens just after instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: agent settings as the resource editor's header fields, behind a cog The agent's own settings (path, labels, workspace specific, description) open from a cog as the flow and script editors' do, laid out as the top of the resource editor. The folder note is gone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: agent settings fields and cog, completing the rename Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: evals open as a dialog over the agent editor page The editor page opens an agent's evals over itself, as the agent page does, with the unsaved edits offered to a run; the editor dialog keeps evals as a level of its own. The two pages share the dialog. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: the unreachable model provider note reads like the unreachable agent one Same warning level and wording as the note above it, with the path inline rather than in parentheses that lost their spaces. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: the unreachable model provider note offers editing the agent too Editing the agent to use a provider the reader can access is often the simpler way out; offered when the reader can write the agent, with Unlink and asking for access. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: provider note lists asking for access as its own option Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: shorter provider note, without the header's buttons repeated Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: evals only for those who can edit the agent Evaluating builds datasets and runs against the agent, which is authoring: the agent page and the editor offer it only with write access to the agent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: agent page actions ordered as the script and flow pages The menu leads and Edit comes last, as DetailPageHeader lays them out. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: the agent editor dialog's levels slide in built on the first visit Warmed, as the evals pane's levels are, so settings and evals are mounted before the first navigation rather than inside its transition. Evals are only in the strip where they can be opened. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: the agent's settings report path errors, and hold nothing a reader can edit The path field reads its error back, so it shows it and keeps deploy blocked on it. Labels are shown rather than editable without write access. Evals wait for the load to know they can be opened, and the page layout builds no levels it never shows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: one builder for an agent's run flow, and the agent page on the shared header The run endpoint and evals build the agent's one-step flow through the same function. The agent page uses DetailPageHeader, whose error handler, tag and trigger context are now optional, and whose menu items keep their disabled state. The home row and the page share the agent's menu and delete. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: the agent page's menu is built from its current path Deploy settings are the workspace's, so they load once and the menu is derived from them rather than fetched per path, where a superseded fetch could land after a navigation. The shared run-flow builder lives with agent runs rather than evals. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: the scoped-read comment names the run-flow builder as it is Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ca44043e12 |
feat: let operators compose flows when the workspace grants the right (#11228)
* feat: let a workspace withdraw operator schedule and trigger writes Operators can create, edit and delete schedules and triggers today through the API, CLI and MCP, while the operator_settings flags beside them only hide those pages. An admin who wants operators to see what is scheduled without letting them change it cannot express that. Add manage_schedules and manage_triggers as enforced settings, gated at the schedule handlers and at the generic TriggerCrud routes so every trigger kind is covered by one check. They name capabilities operators already hold, so they are granted unless withdrawn, and absence has to mean "never configured" rather than a value. The read coalesces to true; the update endpoint merges into the stored jsonb with the two fields as Option<bool>, so an omitted key keeps what is stored. operator_settings is git-synced as a whole object, so a settings file written before these keys existed reaches the endpoint on every pull, and a serde or SQL default of either polarity would turn that pull into a silent withdrawal or restoration. The rights are read through a per-process cache, so withdrawing one publishes a notify_event that drops the entry on every replica. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dsf6VC4MVLisiEoeQkgbr4 * feat: let operators compose flows when the workspace grants the right Adds operator_settings.builder_flows: a workspace setting that lets every operator compose flows out of runnables that already exist. It does not make them authors. The boundary the operator role draws is authoring code and running arbitrary code, and this does not move it: check_flow_is_composition_only walks the value and refuses anything carrying code, including the shapes an obvious walk misses (code hoisted into a flow_node, an AI agent step's tools, and a linked ai_agent resource whose tool list is resolved at run time). What the walk cannot settle it returns for the caller to authorize under RLS: the worker tags the steps pin, every runnable they reference, and the (path, hash) of every version-pinned step. Composing a path is enough to run it and to run it as whoever it runs as, since the worker resolves a step's path with the root DB handle and adopts that runnable's on_behalf_of. A pinned hash needs its own check because dispatch ignores the path beside it. The gate runs on every write and on both request-supplied-value paths, flow preview and flow dependencies, or either becomes the way to run what the write path refuses. Operators of a builder workspace consume a full author seat; the EE companion carries the counting. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dsf6VC4MVLisiEoeQkgbr4 * feat: enforce operator write rights on the router and in the UI Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: close the capture gap and gate the trigger editors' write actions Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: gate acl writes and the native trigger drawer behind manage rights Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse operator writes with 403 and gate sharing at the drawer Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf: resolve identity in the operator write gate only for writes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: gate the suspended-jobs actions and stop the route check refusing reads Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: explain the empty-state create button when operator writes are withdrawn Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: audit operator settings changes and fold path writes into native rows Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: open locked editors read-only and group the operator settings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: skip email and azure lookups on editor open while triggers are locked Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: state each operator-rights rationale once in comments Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address CI review findings on operator write rights Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep capture move gated and skip it in the builders while locked Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse builder-rights violations with 403 so operators stay logged in Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: trim duplication in the operator builder gates Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: hide build app from builder operators on the flow page Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: point at the companion EE PR merged with EE main Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep a builder's drafts list loading past drafts they cannot write Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: hide saved agents from builder operators in the step picker Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: note the inlined seat rule and drop orphaned sqlx entries Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stop a builder's step test from logging them out Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse a builder's dependency job on a path it cannot write Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep builders from adding dynamic dropdown code to a flow A flow's dropdown code runs as whoever loads its form, so a builder may keep or drop the code stored on the flow it updates, never add or change it. The builder's editor hides the dropdown types and code, and previews options through the deployed flow; the inline dropdown refusal is a 403 so it no longer logs operators out. Also trims rationale comments repeated across sites. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: show why saving operator settings failed The seat-cap refusal on granting builder rights explains what to do; the toast now carries the server's message instead of a generic failure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: check builder flow drafts like deploys and treat dropdown code as code A developer who loads a builder's flow draft in the editor runs its dynamic dropdown code as themselves, so a builder's draft now passes the same checks as a deploy. Dropdown code is refused like step code rather than kept or dropped, which also removes the exact-match comparison that refused builders over whitespace. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: bill a builder workspace's operators as developers on cloud The cloud seat count behind the Premium page, the sidebar usage and the fork cap still weighed every operator at half a seat, while the builder right makes them authors. The out-of-repo invoicing job must follow the same rule. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: check a builder's flow draft as it will be stored Draft storage strips NUL escapes after the builder check, so a key ending in one (value\u0000, x-windmill-dyn-select-code\u0000) passed the check as an unknown field and was stored under its plain name. The check now reads the sanitized text. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: list a builder's flow drafts and hide hub imports from builders A builder's undeployed flows now appear in the home list, the flow list and the folder counts. Hub project imports and templates bring scripts and apps along, so builders are no longer offered them. The docs record builders' JavaScript expressions as an accepted risk. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the stored builder right when a settings payload omits it A git-synced settings file written before the key existed withdrew the right on every push. builder_flows now follows the manage_* rights: an omitted key leaves the stored value, and the CLI does not count it as a difference. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: word builder refusals by what the flow contains, test the tag refusal A builder refused on a developer's flow never changed its code, so the refusals now describe the flow ("has inline code, so only a developer can edit this flow") rather than an authoring attempt. The grant confirmation uses the neutral dialog: granting changes billing but destroys nothing. The integration test pins the refusal of a worker tag the workspace cannot use. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: read builder rights from the operating workspace, gate the flow page's audit logs entry Builder rights now come from useOperatorBuilderFlows(), next to the schedule and trigger locks, so an editor embedded for another workspace answers about that workspace; the legacy AI chat, one instance for the whole app, reads the navigation workspace. The flow page's Audit logs entry follows the operator audit_logs setting now that builders open that menu. Operator settings reset every value on load, null settings included, so nothing carries over from the previous workspace. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: pick a dynamic dropdown's code source by the operating user's role The flow input editor, the flow test panel and the flow chat send the dropdown request to the operating workspace, so they now also choose inline versus deployed code by the role held there, through useOperatingUser(), instead of the navigation workspace's. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 40ac1c5f8cbce3843b582d9b392d3f3cc7eca3e6 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #815 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 31c9e66884b8ca805b20bbfad41fc428fbedbc0e New ee-repo-ref: 40ac1c5f8cbce3843b582d9b392d3f3cc7eca3e6 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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05bcc361af |
stop billing service accounts twice after a session refresh (#11408)
* fix: stop billing service accounts twice after a session refresh Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse refresh for expired, swept or impersonation tokens Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 5a2b6b8527250bd12cf856d8a667a9ef3106ec60 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #835 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 8cc94ec6aeb603b6f6ebbe1fa95b32fbec074b74 New ee-repo-ref: 5a2b6b8527250bd12cf856d8a667a9ef3106ec60 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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e6df8d78d4 |
fix: bound a resumed session fork's wait, keep its intent while in flight (#11413)
* fix: bound a resumed session fork's wait, keep its intent while the fork is in flight Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: wait for a session fork another request is creating instead of dropping it When the fork is refused as already being created by a creation whose id was lost, the session waits for it to show up among the user's workspaces and adopts it, rather than aborting the send. An 'already exists' answer is adopted like a duplicate key. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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054109d855 |
fix: create workspace forks in the background, with progress (#11406)
* fix: create a fork in the background so a proxy timeout cannot cut it create_fork copies the whole workspace inside the request, which can run past the route timeout of an ingress in front of Windmill (Envoy's 15s default), and the UI then reports a failure for a fork still being made. create_fork?background=true now returns once the request is validated and records the copy in workspace_fork_creation, which the new fork_creation_status endpoint reads. The wizard and AI-session forks use it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: drain background forks on shutdown and fork in the background from the CLI Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: settle fork polls by the fork's existence, adopt in-flight creations Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: show which part of the copy a fork being created is in The background copy reports its phase (data tables, settings, resources, scripts, flows, apps, drafts, triggers) through a watch channel. The heartbeat task records it on the fork's creation row as soon as it changes, and fork_creation_status returns it. The fork wizard shows it on its button, and the CLI logs each step. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: join a retried fork creation server-side, settle status by the fork's existence A retry from the same user and parent joins the creation in flight instead of being refused, so clients no longer match the refusal's wording, and another requester can never adopt it. The status route reports a fork that exists under its parent as completed, whatever its run's record says. Clients give up on failing polls after a time window rather than a count, which a rolling deploy can exhaust. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: drop fork-creation joins and existence probes A second request for a fork being created is refused again; only the AI-session fork, whose request never varies, waits for its own earlier one. Clients recognise a server without background forks by its synchronous answer instead of probing for a workspace by id, which could name another parent's fork. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: poll a background fork by the id of its own attempt create_fork?background=true answers with a creation id, and the status route reads that attempt only, for the user who started it. A retry that reuses the fork id is a new attempt, so a poller never reads another attempt's outcome. The AI-session fork no longer adopts a creation in flight, which it could not tell apart from someone else's. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: record a fork's completion in its own commit, resume a session's fork after reload The attempt is marked complete in the transaction that creates the fork, so the status never infers completion from a workspace that may belong to another request. An AI session keeps the creation id on its pending fork and, after a reload mid-copy, waits for that attempt instead of requesting the fork again. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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8741843d2e |
feat: external instance cluster for data tables and Ducklake catalogs (#11197)
* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix * fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it `-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose. Naming a role exists precisely to not do that. A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a `datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments. Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it `?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation. The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under the default. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix". Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist. The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test Two review findings, both real. `attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable` returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its `?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key. `-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose name blocks the retry. Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its `resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it. Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through to the default role. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work. Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on rather than only asserting it in a comment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then `import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction. Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose name blocks the retry. That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable` now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and the stage that writes the entry only does the work. Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names, and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles. `create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a `wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included. The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an existing database always got. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database" This reverts commit |
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cedd6dc901 |
fix: hold interpolated references and captures to the token path scopes (#11391)
* fix: hold interpolated references and captures to the token path scopes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let a resource read cover its own linked secret variable Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: resolve policy-granted app upload resources on the viewer's rls Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: cover multi-secret linked variables and keep capture paths out of refusals Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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3eaf2888c0 |
fix: scope workspace dependencies create to the path workspace (#11385)
* fix: scope workspace dependencies create to the path workspace Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: state the workspace_id must-match contract in the spec and struct Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9a1c6e5081 |
feat: let a workspace withdraw operator schedule and trigger writes (#11226)
* feat: let a workspace withdraw operator schedule and trigger writes Operators can create, edit and delete schedules and triggers today through the API, CLI and MCP, while the operator_settings flags beside them only hide those pages. An admin who wants operators to see what is scheduled without letting them change it cannot express that. Add manage_schedules and manage_triggers as enforced settings, gated at the schedule handlers and at the generic TriggerCrud routes so every trigger kind is covered by one check. They name capabilities operators already hold, so they are granted unless withdrawn, and absence has to mean "never configured" rather than a value. The read coalesces to true; the update endpoint merges into the stored jsonb with the two fields as Option<bool>, so an omitted key keeps what is stored. operator_settings is git-synced as a whole object, so a settings file written before these keys existed reaches the endpoint on every pull, and a serde or SQL default of either polarity would turn that pull into a silent withdrawal or restoration. The rights are read through a per-process cache, so withdrawing one publishes a notify_event that drops the entry on every replica. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dsf6VC4MVLisiEoeQkgbr4 * feat: enforce operator write rights on the router and in the UI Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: close the capture gap and gate the trigger editors' write actions Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: gate acl writes and the native trigger drawer behind manage rights Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse operator writes with 403 and gate sharing at the drawer Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf: resolve identity in the operator write gate only for writes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: gate the suspended-jobs actions and stop the route check refusing reads Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: explain the empty-state create button when operator writes are withdrawn Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: audit operator settings changes and fold path writes into native rows Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: open locked editors read-only and group the operator settings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: skip email and azure lookups on editor open while triggers are locked Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: state each operator-rights rationale once in comments Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address CI review findings on operator write rights Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep capture move gated and skip it in the builders while locked Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep admin and operator exclusive when setting a workspace role Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: use the shared section component for operator settings groups Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev> |
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faf7b22be0 |
fix: apply token path scopes to the native trigger list (#11281)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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586699c493 |
fix: apply SSRF validation to workspace webhook URLs (#11285)
* fix: apply SSRF validation to workspace webhook URLs Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: assert edit_webhook refuses a private webhook URL Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stop the webhook sender following redirects past the SSRF check Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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4d12ea4614 |
feat: deploy from the UI to a workspace on another instance (#11245)
* feat: deploy from the UI to a workspace on another instance Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the remote deploy proxy from being spent by a link Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: key remote deploy proxy URLs instead of a global client header Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the remote deploy proxy key out of logs and restricted hands Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: serialize remote deploy connect with account and key changes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: key remote deploy tokens to the account and connect by signing in Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: bind remote deploy connect to its target and order its locks Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: serialize remote deploy connect with target changes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: list every lock remote deploy connect takes in auth-surface Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: never wait on the membership lock in remote deploy connect Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep a superseded target response out of the settings form Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: void stale remote deploy tokens on read instead of locking in connect Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: void remote deploy tokens older than the last target change Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: order remote deploy connections by when their connect started Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: bind stored remote deploy tokens to the membership and target they were connected under Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: answer remote deploy connect without settings as no target Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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787b7a6bcc |
Revert "feat(auth): 2 h login links and a click-to-sign-in page for emailed ones (#11203)" (#11267)
This reverts commit
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b7425443e1 |
fix: guard data table migration routes against operators and unauthorized authors (#11243)
* fix: refuse operators and unauthorized authors on data table migration routes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: check the replaced definition on migration upsert and skip unchanged writes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let data table admins edit migrations whose annotation no longer parses Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep migration delete idempotent when a concurrent delete wins Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Diego Imbert <70353967+diegoimbert@users.noreply.github.com> |
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e1e3692fbc |
feat: data table roles in the DB manager and raw apps (#11139)
* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection, `custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table. A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares `-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch — grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`. A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before. Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint, `get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could `RESET ROLE` its way out of. A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not where an access decision should be made. Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant. All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the only right answer for the copy paths. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and `CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read. Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it calls a data table changes nothing about the data table. Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo. Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an `UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so the operation is retryable once the row is restored. Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table this workspace never had. `InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line. Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that predates this and sends no job id. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence. `list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the check runs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them. Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway. The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and `converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at the definition, which is where the next caller looks. Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and `resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker. Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a `StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now said at the field. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways. The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either. Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every login it described. `custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret, written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape: `datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist. No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to take it out. Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And `set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings row across validation and write. Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish: `read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and `converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's. Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but `extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names. Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot". The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it. `read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while `set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions` — it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own `global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles` and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a consequence of this change. Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing: A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step, and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose. Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction. Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which workspace is gone. Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed); the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog` was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog, `GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles` could also empty it outside the lock. The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it. One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision. The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check. Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit `main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table settings save and the workspace delete now show it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved. A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state. Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once from what it named before the save. The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named, with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal. Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint. Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call `/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant". The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that. Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role. The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing. Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed — and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one. Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * nit worker error msg * fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix * fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it `-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose. Naming a role exists precisely to not do that. A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a `datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments. Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it `?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation. The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under the default. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix". Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist. The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test Two review findings, both real. `attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable` returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its `?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key. `-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose name blocks the retry. Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its `resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it. Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through to the default role. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work. Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on rather than only asserting it in a comment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then `import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction. Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose name blocks the retry. That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable` now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and the stage that writes the entry only does the work. Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names, and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles. `create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a `wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included. The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an existing database always got. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database" This reverts commit |
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9994e03bc7 |
feat: add an ACL editor for data table roles (#11063)
* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #787 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 0edd40979cf36bfba59323f3f6a0811ae1369cf5 New ee-repo-ref: 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |