Commit Graph
19 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
e1e3692fbc feat: data table roles in the DB manager and raw apps (#11139)
* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles

A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.

A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.

Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.

A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.

Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin

Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.

All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping

A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.

Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.

Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded

Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.

Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.

Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.

`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.

Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code

The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.

`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract

The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.

Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.

The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.

Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.

Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery

Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.

`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.

Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.

Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.

Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced

The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".

The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing

The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.

Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:

A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.

Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.

Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.

Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings

Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.

The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.

One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.

Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks

Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.

A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.

Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.

The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.

Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically

The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".

The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.

Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles

pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.

Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data

A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.

Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* nit worker error msg

* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it

`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it

`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry

The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands

Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test

Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy

Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist

The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created

A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database

A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"

This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation

A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted

Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal

Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart

A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved

Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it

Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting

Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`

Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers

A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename

A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles

The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition

Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition

The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition

The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it

Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license

Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition

The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): data table roles in the DB manager and raw apps

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: never add a role to the reference of a data table whose name contains '?'

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read the roles of a data table whose name contains '?'

The generated client leaves a '?' in a path param unencoded, so the lookup
404'd and the raw-app picker blocked Start on such a data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): refuse a reference naming both a legacy data table and a role

When a workspace stores both `sales` and a legacy `sales?role=analytics`, the
reference resolved to the legacy entry without a role, so browsing `sales` as
`analytics` reached another data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: declare the default role in migrations written for a data table whose name contains '?'

Such a data table connects as its default role without naming it, so the
migrations the manager wrote for it declared no role and ran as admin.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles

A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.

A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.

Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.

A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.

Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin

Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.

All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping

A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.

Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.

Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded

Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.

Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.

Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.

`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.

Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code

The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.

`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract

The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.

Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.

The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.

Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.

Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery

Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.

`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.

Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.

Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.

Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced

The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".

The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing

The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.

Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:

A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.

Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.

Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.

Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings

Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.

The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.

One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.

Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks

Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.

A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.

Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.

The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.

Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically

The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".

The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.

Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles

pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.

Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data

A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.

Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* nit worker error msg

* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it

`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it

`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry

The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands

Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test

Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy

Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist

The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created

A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database

A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"

This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation

A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted

Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal

Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart

A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved

Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it

Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting

Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`

Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers

A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename

A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles

The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition

Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition

The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition

The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it

Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license

Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition

The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): drop a DuckDB data table secret once its ATTACH has used it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf(datatables): resolve a workspace's data tables per pointer hop, not per entry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): hold the parent's settings while a fork points at its data tables

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #787 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 0edd40979cf36bfba59323f3f6a0811ae1369cf5

New ee-repo-ref: 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* feat(datatables): clone a data table under roles with its owners and grants (#11120)

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UbrtwiYNfayrmqouBJHwGV

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: open the raw app data table drawer when the workspace has none

Selecting the first data table of an empty list passed undefined to the name
check, which threw instead of opening the drawer on no data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): offer cloning a data table under roles where its grants can be replayed

The server clones such a data table and replays the source's owners and grants,
which only the Enterprise Edition does, so the fork wizard hid both clone
options everywhere instead of on a build that cannot replay them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: name the placeholder the empty raw app data drawer renders

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the enterprise refusal the role pickers read as 'not under roles'

The server's sentence and the frontend's copy of it were coupled by nothing,
so rewording either one turned every role picker on a community build into a
failed lookup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): read a roles answer only for the workspace it was asked in

A fork and its parent each have their own roles on a data table of the same
name, so an answer stamped with the name alone settled the role from the
workspace the editor was acting on before.

Also derive the AI table creation flag from the data replaced into the editor:
data naming no data table left the flag on from before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep an instance database a settings save is waiting to name

Cleanup for a database whose setup failed took the lock first, read no user,
and dropped it while a save blocked on that same lock was about to commit a
reference to it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): check the workspace stamp in the default database selector too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): read what a save racing instance-database cleanup committed

A transaction blocked on the lock may still roll back, so keeping the database
for it stranded one whose name then blocks every retry: it is let through and
its outcome read instead. The waiter query also matches this database's locks
only, since pg_locks spans the cluster.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): tell a waiting request apart from the workspaces using a database

Both callers render what cleanup returns as the workspaces that keep the
database, so a waiting request's pid read as one of them. Each now words that
case itself, and the give-up comment names where the kept name actually goes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): take the cleanup lock on a connection the pool cannot reclaim

A session lock outlives the future holding it, so a cancellation between
taking it and releasing it handed a locked session back to the pool, where
every later settings save waits on it. Detached, the connection closes when it
is dropped and the server releases the lock with the session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): close the cleanup connection on drop instead of detaching it

Detaching released the pool permit while the session stayed alive, so
concurrent cleanups waiting on their locks could open as many connections as
they liked. Closing on drop covers the same cancellation and keeps them
counted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #798 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 3145e422d61d580f0a82804f075285c112879da0

New ee-repo-ref: fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-21 12:03:01 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.8 735f2b20c4 docs(cli): clarify workspace fork naming and parent-workspace context (Fixes WIN-2148) (#10012)
* docs(cli): clarify workspace fork naming and parent-workspace context

Expand `wmill workspace fork`'s help and interactive prompts so the two
positional arguments are self-explanatory:

- Command description now explains that the fork is created from the
  currently active (parent) workspace, that `workspace_name` is a
  friendly display name that may contain spaces (quote it), and that
  `workspace_id` is a bare slug auto-prefixed with `wm-fork-` which also
  determines the git branch name.
- Interactive name/id prompts reworded to match.

Regenerated system_prompts CLI guidance to reflect the new description.

Fixes WIN-2148

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(cli): default fork name to "<parent>'s fork", make it optional

The fork's display name is no longer effectively required — it now
defaults to "<parent workspace name>'s fork" (fetched via
get_workspace_name, falling back to the local profile name / id) and
stays fully overridable via the positional argument or interactive
prompt.

To produce this default, `setClient` and the parent-name lookup are
moved ahead of the name/id resolution. The id default is decoupled from
the possessive display name: when auto-naming, the id/branch slug is
derived from "<parent>-fork" (e.g. wm-fork-acme-fork) rather than the
awkward "<parent>-s-fork". Branch-rename forks keep their branch-derived
id.

Regenerated system_prompts CLI guidance.

Fixes WIN-2148

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(cli): fix workspace fork help — parent is branch-resolved, not active profile

Addresses the codex/pi review: the fork help said the parent is the
"currently active" workspace and told users to `wmill workspace switch`,
but createWorkspaceFork resolves the parent from the current git branch's
wmill.yaml mapping (tryResolveBranchWorkspace) and ignores the active
profile. Reword to describe the actual branch-based resolution.

Regenerated system_prompts CLI guidance.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(cli): note branch-derived fork id default in rename workflows

Addresses the codex review: the `[workspace_id]` help and the interactive
prompt said the default id is derived from the name, but rename workflows
(non-base branch / --from-branch) keep the branch-derived default
(`branchDefaultId ?? branchToForkId(idBasis)`) to keep the id/branch
aligned with the branch being converted. Document that special case
rather than changing the intentional behavior.

Regenerated system_prompts CLI guidance.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): cap auto fork name at 50 chars for long parent names

Addresses the codex review: the "<parent>'s fork" default appended
"'s fork" to a parent name that can itself be up to 50 chars (varchar(50)),
so a parent name over 43 chars produced a default exceeding the limit and
tripped the effectiveName.length > 50 guard — failing `wmill workspace
fork --yes` (or accepting the interactive default) for a valid parent.
Truncate the parent portion so the generated default stays within 50.

Verified end-to-end: a 48-char parent name now yields a 49-char default
("... Team's fork") and the fork is created successfully.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 16:41:32 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Fable 5 88c2d0e8e3 feat(cli): clarify fork-branch workspace auto-targeting in output (#9988)
* feat(cli): clarify fork-branch workspace auto-targeting in output

* fix(cli): auth comes from saved profile, not wmill.yaml, in fork notes

* fix(cli): consolidate workspace resolution logs, fork-target last-used profile

* chore: regenerate system prompts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): fork-target interactively created profiles, dedupe workspace line

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 17:08:09 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.8 b52972d0de fix: validate workspace name length (max 50 chars) on create and fork (#9854)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-01 10:42:15 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 4.8 5bdc4f83ce feat(cli): improve agent prompts/skills and workspace fork workflow (#9531)
* feat(cli): improve agent prompts/skills and workspace fork workflow

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): refuse fork --from-branch rename of a base branch

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(cli): auto-detect fork branch workflow, drop rt.d.ts refresh and legacy-name warning

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(skills): reconcile raw-app generate-metadata stance (agent offers+runs)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(skills): agent runs all CLI commands, gated on intent not on user typing them

Extends #9467's safe-vs-destructive model: the agent runs consequential commands (sync push, generate-metadata) itself too, gated on explicit user intent rather than handed to the user to type. The explicit-intent rule is the safeguard; an approval prompt is treated as a possible backstop, not assumed (auto-approve/headless runs have none).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "docs(skills): agent runs all CLI commands, gated on intent not on user typing them"

Reverts 9225e1759b. That commit over-reached: #9467 already established the safe-vs-destructive split, and the targeted item-6 fix already removed the passive "tell the user they can run <safe next step>" phrasing. The blanket "agent runs everything" principle pushed deploys to be more eager and carried a wrong "permission layer prompts for approval" claim (untrue in auto-approve/headless mode). Keep deploys conservative.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(cli): default fork workspace name/id to the current branch when renaming it

When 'wmill workspace fork' converts the current working branch into the fork branch, default the fork's name and id to that branch (sanitized to a slug, since branch names can contain '/'). Interactive: the prompt is pre-filled (enter to accept); non-interactive (--yes): used automatically. Adds a unit test for the slug derivation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): address fork review — guard fork-branch rename, cap+validate fork id

Two P2s from review:
- --from-branch refused when the current branch is already a fork branch (would detach the existing fork by renaming its branch).
- fork id slug capped to 42 chars (backend max 50 incl. wm-fork- prefix); auto-derived id is slugged; full id validated client-side before existsWorkspace/datatable cloning so an invalid id fails fast instead of leaving cloned Postgres databases behind.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-12 00:16:16 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Fable 5 fddabe9c5c feat: clear conflict error + force delete when reusing a fork workspace id (#9499)
* feat: clear conflict error + force delete when reusing a fork workspace id

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: guard fork force-delete against double submit

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-10 14:55:03 +00:00
windmill-internal-app[bot]andwindmill-internal-app[bot] e2f2e62ba5 fix: Add length validation to fork workspace ID and fix CLI name field (#9053)
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <1429786+windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-07 13:41:21 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.5 5b97092997 feat: unify CLI config to workspaces, deprecate gitBranches/environments (#8767)
* refactor: unify CLI config to workspaces, deprecate gitBranches/environments

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update frontend examples and regenerate system prompts for workspaces config

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: update test files to use workspaces config instead of gitBranches

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: handle --branch with --base-url correctly in sync pull/push

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: warn when --workspace overrides auto-detected branch or misses config entry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: show reason why workspace was selected in log message

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: clarify specificItems file naming uses gitBranch as suffix

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: rename branch-specific to workspace-specific, use workspace name as file suffix

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: rename branch-specific to workspace-specific, add comprehensive integration tests

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: simplify bind and init to be workspace-centric

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: make bind/unbind interactive with --workspace and --branch flags

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: make bind interactive with profile selection, workspace name, and optional branch

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: init offers to bind workspace using same flow as wmill workspace bind

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: skip backend git-sync check in init when no workspace was bound

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: skip all API calls in init when no workspace was bound

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: log when RT namespace is skipped, offer to generate it after bind

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: warn when no workspace bound during init

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: init git-sync check uses bound workspace, not active profile

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: init uses selected profile directly, avoids re-resolving and duplicate prompt

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: init skips requireLogin, uses bound profile token directly

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: auto-pick or prompt workspace from config when no branch matches

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: show configured workspaces list and bind hint in resolution messages

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: cache bound profile to avoid duplicate profile selection prompts in init

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: hoist boundProfile scope, add 2 comprehensive integration tests covering all flows

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: rt.d.ts prompt defaults to no when file exists, better description

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: remove empty overrides from generated config, add specificItems hint

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: add inline comments for non-trivial fields, add overrides/promotionOverrides hints to bound workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: regenerate system prompts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-09 19:46:34 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.5 4342c18541 feat: add CLI workspace merge command and enhance fork with datatable/color support (#8756)
* feat: add CLI workspace merge command and enhance fork with datatable/color support

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: abort fork on git branch failure, per-datatable error handling, guard resetDiffTally

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: add fork/merge integration tests covering full cycle

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: support deploying deletions during fork merge (archive/delete in target)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: share deploy logic between CLI and frontend via windmill-utils-internal

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: revert frontend to self-contained deploy, fix failure_module handling

The frontend imports windmill-utils-internal from npm (published v1.3.4)
which doesn't have the new deploy module yet. Revert frontend to its own
self-contained implementation with two improvements:
- Pass failure_module to getAllModules in flow deploy and getItemValue
- Add deleteItemInWorkspace for deploying deletions during merge

The shared deploy.ts in windmill-utils-internal remains for CLI use.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: share deploy logic via published windmill-utils-internal, add comprehensive integration tests

- Publish windmill-utils-internal v1.3.8 with DeployProvider interface
- Frontend now uses shared deploy module (deployItem, deleteItemInWorkspace,
  checkItemExists, getOnBehalfOf, getItemValue) via provider adapter
- Add 4 new integration test sub-tests: all item types, secret variables,
  special characters, partial deploy + resetDiffTally

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: remove unused folderName function from frontend utils_workspace_deploy

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-08 05:29:48 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.5 501a4ff2a9 fix: Improve CLI developer experience: error handling, sync workflow, JSON output, workspace forks (#8578)
* fix(cli): address 28 DX friction points across CLI commands

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(cli): regenerate system prompts after help text updates

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): address PR review feedback

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): update removeType tests to match lenient behavior

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): address CE/EE sync friction and improve JSON output

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): revert instance config masking to avoid breaking push flow

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): mask instance secrets by default with interactive prompt

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(cli): regenerate system prompts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): use stderr for errors, optimize skipped-files scan, rename --auto to --auto-metadata

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(cli): improve workspace fork lifecycle — delete-fork fallback, list-forks, --workspace override

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): update fork merge instructions to reference all merge methods

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): clarify skipped-files warning comment re DynFSElement traversal

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 08:41:52 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6 4fedfdfd11 feat(cli): add consistent get/list/new subcommands for all item types (#8047)
* feat(cli): add consistent get/list/new subcommands for all item types

Make the CLI consistent so every item type (script, flow, app, resource,
resource-type, variable, schedule, folder, trigger) supports get/list/new
subcommands, enabling the CLI to be used as a full API client in bash
scripts with jq piping.

- Add --json flag to all list commands for machine-readable output
- Register explicit "list" subcommand alongside default action
- Add "get <path> [--json]" subcommand to fetch single items from API
- Rename "bootstrap" to "new" for script/flow, keep "bootstrap" as alias
- Add "new" subcommand for resource, resource-type, variable, schedule,
  folder, and trigger to create local template YAML files
- Update cli-commands skill documentation for wmill init
- Add integration tests for all new commands

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* all

* feat: install wmill CLI in Docker images and use it for bash variable/resource access

- Install windmill-cli via bun in all Dockerfiles that include bun
- DockerfileCli: switch from node:slim to oven/bun:slim
- CLI: auto-configure from WM_WORKSPACE/WM_TOKEN/BASE_INTERNAL_URL env vars
  as last-resort fallback when no workspace is configured
- Frontend: replace curl-based bash snippets with wmill variable/resource get
- Add backend integration tests for wmill CLI in bash scripts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ci): install windmill-cli in backend test workflow

Ensures wmill is available on PATH for bash integration tests
that use `wmill variable get` and `wmill resource get`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(cli): replace @std/* Deno dependencies with Node.js equivalents

Replace @std/log with a lightweight custom logger (core/log.ts),
@std/path with node:path, and @std/yaml with the yaml npm package.
Also fix process hang on exit, add --node option to install_dev.sh,
and add missing hasRequiredPermissions to NpmProvider.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* all

* all

* all

* refactor(cli): replace @ayonli/jsext and @std/encoding with lightweight alternatives

Replace @ayonli/jsext (8.4MB) with tar-stream (32kB) for tar creation,
replace @std/encoding with Node.js Buffer.toString("hex"), and fix
@windmill-labs/shared-utils to use direct npm instead of JSR mirror.
Also resolve merge conflicts in sync.ts and fix pre-existing type errors.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): use singleQuote YAML output and pass yamlOptions in gitsync pull

The yaml library defaults to double quotes, but the codebase (and tests)
expect single-quoted strings. Add singleQuote: true to yamlOptions and
pass yamlOptions to gitsync-settings pull writeFile calls.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* all

* all

* fix(cli): address code review feedback

- Install CLI from source in backend tests instead of npm
- Fix script bootstrap catch block to re-throw "File already exists"
- Add type-safe local variable after trigger kind validation
- Use created_by instead of policy.on_behalf_of for app get output
- Note --kind is recommended for faster trigger lookup in help text
- Document node symlink purpose in Dockerfiles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ci): use /usr/bin for wmill wrapper to ensure it's in PATH

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ci): install wmill to ~/.local/bin to avoid permission issues

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci(backend): switch to Blacksmith runner and add cargo caching

- Switch from ubicloud-standard-16 to blacksmith-16vcpu-ubuntu-2404 for faster NVMe-backed builds
- Add stickydisk for cargo target directory (persistent NVMe cache across runs)
- Add cache for cargo registry and git dependencies
- Upgrade DuckDB FFI cache from actions/cache@v3 to useblacksmith/cache@v1
- Enable CARGO_INCREMENTAL=1 to benefit from persistent target cache

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix ci

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-22 07:53:28 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6 a2cefdf0a2 refactor(cli): migrate CLI from Deno to Bun/Node.js (#8041)
* fix: only enable EE features in test backend when license key is available

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: skip EE tests without license key and exclude test-skills from test discovery

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: unskip passing tests and add duplicate (remote, workspaceId) check in addWorkspace

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(cli): migrate from Deno APIs to Node.js/Bun-compatible APIs

Replace Deno-specific APIs with Node.js equivalents across the entire CLI
codebase to enable running on Node.js/Bun. Switch build system from dnt
to bun, update imports from jsr:/npm: prefixed to bare specifiers, and
add package.json/tsconfig.json for the Node.js ecosystem.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* all

* test(cli): expand test coverage with new integration and unit tests

Add standalone_commands.test.ts covering folder list, schedule list,
resource-type list/push/update, script show/run/bootstrap, and user
commands. Add unit tests for filePathExtensionFromContentType and
removeExtensionToPath. Add git_unit, local_encryption_unit,
resource_folders_unit, and settings_unit test files. Fix schedule
cron expressions (6-field format), add includeSchedules flag, improve
test setup with pre-build and auto-cleanup, and support TEST_CLI_RUNTIME=node.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): replace Deno.readFile with node:fs in WASM loaders and add schema parsing tests

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(cli): switch WASM parsers from local files to npm packages

Use published windmill-parser-wasm-* npm packages instead of local
wasm/ files. A loadParser() helper uses createRequire to resolve the
.wasm binary from node_modules and passes it to init() via
readFileSync, avoiding fetch() and Deno.readFile() patches.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(cli): add coverage for --locks-required lint feature

Add 15 tests covering the lock-checking functionality merged from main:
- checkMissingLocks: standalone scripts (python, bun, bash), inline
  lock file resolution (valid, empty, missing), flow inline rawscripts
  (with/without locks, nested forloopflow), app inline scripts, raw
  apps without backend folder
- runLint --locks-required integration: reports issues when locks
  missing, skips checks when flag absent, passes when locks exist

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci(cli): replace Deno with Bun in CI workflows

- cli-tests.yml: remove Deno setup, use `bun test` instead of
  `deno test`, add `bun install` step for dependency installation
- npm_on_release.yml: replace Deno setup with Bun setup for CLI
  publishing
- build.sh: add `bun install` before building so CI has dependencies

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): pre-start backend in test preload and remove Deno test leftovers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): normalize path separators for Windows compatibility

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* more tests + windows

* ci(cli): use Blacksmith runner for Windows tests

Switch test-windows job from windows-latest to blacksmith-16vcpu-windows-2025
for faster CI execution.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): fix Windows path separator expectations in unit tests

buildMetadataPath and extractResourceName normalize to forward slashes
internally, so tests should not expect platform-specific separators in
their output.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): fix Windows CI test failures for dev_server and script_run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): set BUN_PATH and NODE_BIN_PATH for backend worker on Windows

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci(cli): add SSH debug step on Windows test failure

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): use native path separators for ignore check in dev mode on Windows

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-21 21:19:04 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.5 dcee9fe7b1 feat: cli branch override (#7592)
* fix(cli): prevent duplicate 'Using non-dotted paths' log message

Add a flag to track whether the message has already been logged,
so it only prints once even if setNonDottedPaths is called multiple times.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(cli): add --branch option to sync pull/push commands

Add a --branch argument that allows overriding the current git branch
for sync operations. This enables:
- Using branch-specific settings even when not in a git repository
- Overriding the detected git branch when needed

The branch override is applied to:
- getEffectiveSettings() for branch-specific config overrides
- getSpecificItemsForCurrentBranch() for branch-specific items

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): correct log message for workspace fork branches

Use rawGitBranch instead of currentBranch in the log message when
showing the origin of a workspace fork branch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(cli): extend --branch support to specificItems functionality

Update getBranchSpecificPath and isCurrentBranchFile to accept optional
branchOverride parameter. This ensures that branch-specific file handling
(for variables, resources, triggers) works correctly with --branch flag.

Updated functions:
- getBranchSpecificPath(): now accepts branchOverride
- isCurrentBranchFile(): now accepts branchOverride
- elementsToMap(): now accepts branchOverride
- compareDynFSElement(): now accepts branchOverride
- prettyChanges(): now accepts branchOverride

All call sites updated to pass opts.branch through the call chain.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): resolve TypeScript type errors

- Fix Timeout type in dev.ts using ReturnType<typeof setTimeout>
- Add proper type casts for unknown error types
- Cast FlowModule to any to resolve generated type mismatch
- Cast Uint8Array to BlobPart for Blob constructor compatibility

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(cli): add unit tests for branch detection and --branch override

- Add specific_items.test.ts with 35 tests covering:
  - toBranchSpecificPath and fromBranchSpecificPath conversions
  - isSpecificItem pattern matching
  - isBranchSpecificFile detection
  - Round-trip path conversions
  - branchOverride parameter functionality

- Add conf_branch_override.test.ts with 6 tests covering:
  - getEffectiveSettings with branchOverride parameter
  - Branch-specific overrides application
  - promotionOverrides precedence
  - Fallback to top-level settings

- Fix containerized_backend.ts to use dynamic paths instead of
  hardcoded user home directories

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(cli): add conf.ts barrel file for test imports

Re-exports from src/core/conf.ts to support existing test imports.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* all

* fix(cli): pass --branch override to workspace resolution

Previously, the --branch flag was only used for config resolution but
not for workspace resolution. This caused confusing log messages that
showed the git branch (e.g., master) before showing the override branch.

Changes:
- Add branchOverride parameter to tryResolveBranchWorkspace()
- Add branchOverride parameter to resolveWorkspace()
- Pass opts.branch from sync pull/push to resolveWorkspace()
- Log "Using branch override" early in workspace resolution
- Remove duplicate log from getEffectiveSettings()

Now when using --branch foobar, the logs show:
  Using branch override: foobar
  Applied settings for Git branch: foobar
  ...

Instead of the confusing previous output that mentioned both master
and foobar.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(cli): remove redundant branch detection in elementsToMap

isCurrentBranchFile() already validates that a branch exists (via
branchOverride or git detection) before returning true. No need to
pre-compute currentBranch before calling it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-16 20:55:01 +00:00
Ruben Fiszel 2e577fc847 add tests for CLI 2025-12-26 20:32:42 +00:00
Ruben Fiszel 58ef965e20 fix(cli): cli behave as expected in forked workspaces 2025-11-30 15:15:27 +00:00
wendrulandRuben Fiszel 663bc3b19a feat: is_admin non propagation + change endpoint for forks (#6958)
* fix is_admin non propagation + change endpoint

* Add deprecated endpoint to tell users to update cli

* Fix endpoint definitions

* fix

* fix

* fix

* fix

* fix

* fix

---------

Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
2025-10-27 21:51:19 +00:00
wendrul 1cbc93a6c8 fix delete-fork cli command (#6583) 2025-09-11 12:23:43 +00:00
wendrul 6121fbb9ae workspace forks: fix cli build errors (#6580) 2025-09-11 08:55:16 +00:00
3dadcbe865 feat: forkables workspaces v0 (#6479)
* Add create_ephemeral workspace endpoint

* Add cli devShell

* List ephemeral workspaces + improve endpoint

* Add postgres function to clone a workspace (to be revisited)

* Clone workspace using the postgres function

* Add first iteration of ephemeral workspaces command

* Update display of forked workspaces

* Remove SQLX_OFFLINE

* Add UI to create ephemeral workspace

* Add option to exclude repository from being inherited to forks

* WIP: reworking cloning logic

* Fix cloning

* Fix redirect after creating fork

* Clean up cloning behaviour

* Rename ephemeral to fork

* emove ephemeral_workspaces table in favour of columns in  workspaces

* Fix display of forked workspaces

* Fix skip inherit git sync repo setting

* Fix fork invite display + creating fork as user

* Fix SideMenu bug

* Fix alignment

* Simplify migrations

* Update deletion of workspaces

* Delete forked workspace from cli

* Deleting fork workspaces from the UI as non-admin

* Update cli sync and fork creation to adapt to branches and forks

* Update fork prefix

* Remove skip tracking toggle

* Fix npm check warnings

* Fix last npm check

* fix: force stdin to Stdio::null for all user code execution (#6575)

Set stdin to Stdio::null for all Commands that execute user code across all supported languages to prevent unwanted input consumption. This affects Python, Deno, Bash, PowerShell, Go, Rust, PHP, Ruby, Java, C#, Ansible, Nu, and Bun executors.

The dedicated worker handler was intentionally left unchanged as it requires stdin for inter-process communication.

Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <209825114+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update ee-repo ref

* Update SQLx metadata

* Fix typos

---------

Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <209825114+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2025-09-10 17:42:45 +00:00