* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it
`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.
A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.
Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it
`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.
The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry
The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".
Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands
Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.
The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test
Two review findings, both real.
`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.
`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy
Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.
Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.
Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist
The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.
Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created
A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.
That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.
Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database
A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.
`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"
This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.
The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation
A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.
The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted
Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.
Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal
Three fixes from review.
`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.
The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.
`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart
A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:
- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
each one to disable.
This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved
Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it
Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting
Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`
Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.
Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers
A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.
Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename
A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles
The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition
Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.
Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition
The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition
The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it
Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license
Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition
The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4
New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): data table roles in the DB manager and raw apps
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: never add a role to the reference of a data table whose name contains '?'
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: read the roles of a data table whose name contains '?'
The generated client leaves a '?' in a path param unencoded, so the lookup
404'd and the raw-app picker blocked Start on such a data table.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix(datatables): refuse a reference naming both a legacy data table and a role
When a workspace stores both `sales` and a legacy `sales?role=analytics`, the
reference resolved to the legacy entry without a role, so browsing `sales` as
`analytics` reached another data table.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: declare the default role in migrations written for a data table whose name contains '?'
Such a data table connects as its default role without naming it, so the
migrations the manager wrote for it declared no role and ran as admin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* feat(datatables): set up an external instance cluster for data tables
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): send external cluster passwords as SCRAM verifiers
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): scope external cluster credential readers to the crate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* [ee] feat(datatables): external_instance data tables on the external cluster
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix(datatables): compare the external cluster settings under a row lock before storing setup
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): only drop external databases Windmill marked, and check use under the lock
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry
Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles
A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.
A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.
Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.
A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.
Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin
Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.
All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping
A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.
Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.
Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded
Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.
Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.
Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.
`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.
Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code
The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.
`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract
The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.
Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.
The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.
Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.
Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery
Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.
`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.
Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.
Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.
Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced
The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".
The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing
The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.
Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:
A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.
Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.
Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.
Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings
Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.
The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.
One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.
Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks
Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.
A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.
Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.
The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.
Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically
The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".
The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.
Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles
pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.
Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data
A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.
Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* nit worker error msg
* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it
`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.
A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.
Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it
`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.
The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry
The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".
Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands
Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.
The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test
Two review findings, both real.
`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.
`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy
Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.
Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.
Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist
The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.
Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created
A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.
That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.
Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database
A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.
`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"
This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.
The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation
A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.
The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted
Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.
Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal
Three fixes from review.
`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.
The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.
`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart
A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:
- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
each one to disable.
This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved
Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it
Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting
Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`
Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.
Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers
A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.
Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename
A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles
The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition
Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.
Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition
The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition
The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it
Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license
Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition
The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4
New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry
Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* feat(datatables): Ducklake catalogs on the external instance cluster
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): never grant CREATEROLE to custom_instance_user on the external cluster
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(datatables): state the authorization contract of external database usage lookups
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): drop a DuckDB data table secret once its ATTACH has used it
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* perf(datatables): resolve a workspace's data tables per pointer hop, not per entry
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): hold the parent's settings while a fork points at its data tables
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): refuse repointing the external cluster while it is in use, and keep verify-ca working for pg_dump
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): protect external databases pending fork cleanup, and describe Ducklake usage in the API
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): per-cluster data table role catalogs, with roles on the external instance cluster
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): write the external cluster setting under the lifecycle lock, and check fork targets are registered
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): register external fork catalogs under the lifecycle lock, and keep certificate verification in DuckDB attaches
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): keep certificate verification when DuckDB attaches an external data table
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): keep certificate verification when DuckDB attaches an external data table
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): refuse fork cleanup of an external database another workspace uses
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): refuse rolling back while external data tables are under roles, and type external_instance in the CLI
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): stop counting storage-only fork cleanup rows as uses of an external database
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): bind fork database copies to their workspace, and count every use before dropping one
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): authenticate instance database setup before writing its status, and keep a fork reservation across it
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): create external databases only on a cluster setup succeeded on, and document the registry reader
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): keep only the most recently used DuckDB root certificate files
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): migrate fork reservations on workspace rename, and lock the parent's data tables for the whole fork
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): take the fork data table lock once, before the external cluster's
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(datatables): describe the external instance cluster and how to run one locally
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): keep fork reservations private, drop a cleaned-up entry with its database, and serialize cleanup with settings saves
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): hold the fork lock across a fork import, and carry the reservation inside the setup write
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): check the external cluster setting on its own transaction, and gate the registry probe
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry
Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #787 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 0edd40979cf36bfba59323f3f6a0811ae1369cf5
New ee-repo-ref: 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
* fix(datatables): keep DuckDB root certificate files in the job directory
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: drop the unused json import from the settings crate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): drop the serde_json::json import left unused by the fork setup write
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): accept external_instance data tables in the settings form type
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): serialize fork database reservations, cleanup, setup and Ducklake saves on the database
- A fork copy is created and registered under its workspace's fork lock, and refused once the
workspace is archived; a rename re-migrates reservations under that lock after archiving.
- Ducklake saves lock every instance database they newly name, as data table saves do.
- Instance database setup holds the database's lock until its entry is written.
- Fork import also holds the database's lock across the restore.
- Cleanup re-reads the entry under its locks before dropping anything.
- Non-superadmins no longer see fork copies reserved for workspaces they are not in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): state the authorization contract of the external cluster status and write check
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): lock the fork copy at finalization, and order cleanup's registry write after its settings row
- Fork finalization holds the copy's database lock from its availability check to the commit.
- Cleanup removes the registry entry in its own transaction, in a task of its own, instead of on a
second connection; a rename migrates reservations after its settings rewrites, so both take the
settings rows before the registry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): hold the fork lock across a rename's settings copy
Fork cleanup of the old id could otherwise drop a copy the renamed workspace goes on using. Also
states the authorization contract of the instance database drop helpers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): refuse moving the external cluster to another host or port while it holds databases
Every settings writer goes through the same check as removal: the login, TLS and maintenance
database may still change, the cluster may not.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): clone a data table under roles with its owners and grants (#11120)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UbrtwiYNfayrmqouBJHwGV
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: open the raw app data table drawer when the workspace has none
Selecting the first data table of an empty list passed undefined to the name
check, which threw instead of opening the drawer on no data table.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): offer cloning a data table under roles where its grants can be replayed
The server clones such a data table and replays the source's owners and grants,
which only the Enterprise Edition does, so the fork wizard hid both clone
options everywhere instead of on a build that cannot replay them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: name the placeholder the empty raw app data drawer renders
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): replace a job directory file at the DuckDB root certificate path instead of trusting it
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: pin the enterprise refusal the role pickers read as 'not under roles'
The server's sentence and the frontend's copy of it were coupled by nothing,
so rewording either one turned every role picker on a community build into a
failed lookup.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): type Ducklake catalogs on the external instance cluster in the settings form
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): read a roles answer only for the workspace it was asked in
A fork and its parent each have their own roles on a data table of the same
name, so an answer stamped with the name alone settled the role from the
workspace the editor was acting on before.
Also derive the AI table creation flag from the data replaced into the editor:
data naming no data table left the flag on from before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): keep an instance database a settings save is waiting to name
Cleanup for a database whose setup failed took the lock first, read no user,
and dropped it while a save blocked on that same lock was about to commit a
reference to it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): check the workspace stamp in the default database selector too
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): read what a save racing instance-database cleanup committed
A transaction blocked on the lock may still roll back, so keeping the database
for it stranded one whose name then blocks every retry: it is let through and
its outcome read instead. The waiter query also matches this database's locks
only, since pg_locks spans the cluster.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): tell a waiting request apart from the workspaces using a database
Both callers render what cleanup returns as the workspaces that keep the
database, so a waiting request's pid read as one of them. Each now words that
case itself, and the give-up comment names where the kept name actually goes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): take the cleanup lock on a connection the pool cannot reclaim
A session lock outlives the future holding it, so a cancellation between
taking it and releasing it handed a locked session back to the pool, where
every later settings save waits on it. Detached, the connection closes when it
is dropped and the server releases the lock with the session.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): close the cleanup connection on drop instead of detaching it
Detaching released the pool permit while the session stayed alive, so
concurrent cleanups waiting on their locks could open as many connections as
they liked. Closing on drop covers the same cancellation and keeps them
counted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 179d2454a063ee818a9387a1eafdd354a217a16c
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #802 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: c2e43f5b5ff753d339b70e232fd17b6ffecb054d
New ee-repo-ref: 179d2454a063ee818a9387a1eafdd354a217a16c
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #798 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 3145e422d61d580f0a82804f075285c112879da0
New ee-repo-ref: fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
* fix(datatables): classify a fork import's target from the resolution that built its connection
A second read could see the entry flipped to a resource and skip the reservation check while the
connection already built still reached the instance cluster.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): run external database lifecycle on the caller's transaction, one lock order for fork cleanup
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): check a fork copy's reservation on the locked transaction's connection
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): make and drop fork copies of external data tables on the external cluster
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): refuse a fork whose external copy something already names
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): check an external fork copy's uses before removing its entry, so child fork pointers still count
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): migrate external cluster fork reservations on workspace rename
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): configure the external instance cluster and pick its databases from the UI
Instance settings gets an External Postgres tab: the cluster's connection, the setup run
with its report, and the databases Windmill created there. Data table and Ducklake settings
offer the external_instance kind, with a picker over those databases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): keep the external cluster form out of the instance settings the page bulk-saves
The form seeded its key into the settings store after the page snapshotted them, so merely
opening the tab made the page send a setting the validator refuses, failing an admin's
unrelated save. The form is local state now, and only the setup writes the key.
The database picker also treats a superadmin-only listing as authoritative: a workspace
admin, who cannot list, no longer sees a saved database as missing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(tests): app paths are validated, so a guest app cannot be renamed to one with a space
Path validation on apps landed after this test, which still expected a space to be accepted
and created its fixture on a ':' path. The scopable-path guard it exists for is kept by
planting that path on the row, which is now the only way an app can hold one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): one Managed Postgres tab, and a switch for Windmill's own database
The instance settings tab covers both substrates Windmill administers: the external cluster,
which can now be disabled once nothing sits on it, and Windmill's own database, which an
operator can turn off so the cluster is the only one a workspace may newly name. A save that
names it then refuses, as the create endpoint does.
Workspace settings name them the way an admin meets them: Postgres Resource, and Managed
instance, qualified as Internal or External only while both are on offer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): offer the external cluster in the add-data-table wizard, and give Ducklake its room back
The wizard gets the external cluster as a fourth substrate: pick a database it already holds
or name a new one, which the run creates before writing the entry, so Try again does not trip
on a database the last attempt made.
Ducklake's maintenance column moves into the settings popover next to the extra args, which
the wider catalog select had squeezed the name box out of.
A setting a component saves itself now also moves the page's baseline, or Discard would
restore what it replaced and a later save would send that stale value back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): only a database this wizard run made makes its retry idempotent
A retry skipped the create whenever the name was registered, which let a run adopt a database
another superadmin had made and share their data without the warning the existing-database
branch shows. The run tracks what it created instead, and reports it so Discard can say the
database is still there. Creating one now refreshes the registry the next run's default name
and its validation read, and that default counts the external cluster's databases rather than
the instance's.
Row ownership carries the substrate: "instance" and "external_instance" can hold the same name,
and a row repointed between them while a run probes must not read as that run's own.
Also fixes the merge leftovers in the DuckDB executor's tests, which cargo check never compiles:
the new PgDatabase field and the attach helper's job directory.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): shorten the picked managed kind, and say what an empty database list means
The closed select has room for the qualifier, not the whole name, so a picked managed kind
reads "Managed (Internal)". An external entry gets the tooltip its internal counterpart has,
and a database picker with nothing in it says to type a name rather than "No items found".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): keep the wizard's external-database bookkeeping optional and parked
The run deps gained a required field, which every existing caller of runSetup -- the sibling
test suite included -- does not pass. It defaults to empty instead, the parked payload carries
it across a Supabase redirect as it claims to, and a resumed run counts it as something left
behind. Two regressions pin the create: made on a first attempt, skipped only for a database
this run made.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): review an external-cluster database as one, not as a Postgres resource
The review step fell through to the resource branch for the new provider, so it announced a
connection already in the workspace for a database that does not exist yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): show the server's refusal instead of an object in the toast
Saving data table settings passed the whole error to the toast, which rendered the request
and response as JSON, and the instance-database wizard replaced it with "check console".
Both surface the message the API sent, through the helper that exists for it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: point at the EE commit dropping the unused import
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): define a role on the cluster its data table sits on
The permissions drawer created and listed roles without naming a cluster, so a role defined
from an external data table became a login on Windmill's own, and the refresh then replaced
the correct catalog with the internal one. The drawer passes the data table's cluster to both.
The wizard also read a database it had just created as a name collision, which blocked
returning to the failed attempt and finishing under the same name.
And the merge had left the CONNECT-grant pass and its log in both the caller and the callee.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): manage the external cluster's role catalog, and name the cluster in the copy
The roles drawer offered one catalog, so the external cluster's roles could only be reached
through a data table sitting on it — and became unreachable once the last one was gone, while
the cluster could not be unset until they were dropped. Opened from the page it now offers the
clusters the instance has; a data table's own drawer still pins its cluster, and its copy names
that cluster rather than "the instance".
A DuckDB attach also decides whether to verify certificates the way every other Postgres
connection does, so a resource carrying a root certificate is no longer downgraded to require
here alone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): bind the roles list to the cluster it was read for
Switching catalogs left the previous cluster's rows on screen and applied whichever response
landed last, so a slower read could seat one cluster's logins under the other's heading while
every control acted on the wrong id — invisible where a name exists on both. The switch clears
the rows, a token discards a response the selection has moved past, and the controls stay inert
while a catalog is being read.
The drop confirmation also names the cluster whose databases it reaches.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to dfe7b8b9204d21e0264fbea1c6f6eedf9e738d56
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #810 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 30db1b33bda0446f5fc5dfe353fbb226d57a26d4
New ee-repo-ref: dfe7b8b9204d21e0264fbea1c6f6eedf9e738d56
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
* feat: add an instance-wide accent color setting with sidebar tint
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: paint the cached accent before the license resolves
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: serve the banner and accent color from one cached endpoint
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: invalidate the instance ui cache and bound it with a ttl
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep the instance ui ttl under the client poll period
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: load the banner and accent color once per page load
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: read the banner and accent color without a server cache
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: show a cleared accent color as off
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: cap user token expiration with an instance setting
Adds `max_token_expiration_days`, an instance-wide ceiling on how far ahead a
token created through `POST /users/tokens/create` may expire. With it set, that
route refuses a token with no expiration and one that expires past the window;
absent or non-positive, nothing changes.
Only the user-facing handler enforces it. Server-side mints (native trigger
webhook tokens, app embed tokens, sessions) pick a lifetime the caller never
chooses and go straight to `create_token_internal`, so they stay uncapped, as
does the superadmin `impersonate` route.
Service accounts are exempt, in the workspace the token targets or in any
workspace for a global token, so unattended automation can keep longer-lived
credentials.
The token form now surfaces the API error instead of only logging it, and offers
"Expires In" in MCP mode as well: that mode always sent no expiration, which the
cap refuses, leaving MCP URLs impossible to generate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: shorten over-long token expirations instead of refusing them
Refusing a non-compliant request breaks the callers that cannot comply. The CLI
authorization page, `wmill user create-token` and the editor's language-server
token each pick a lifetime — usually none at all — with no way to read the
setting, so a cap made browser login hang and the editor lose its LSP root
rather than stopping the long-lived tokens the setting is aimed at.
`cap_token_expiration` now returns the expiration to store, shortening a request
that asks for too long or for none. The policy still holds absolutely, no caller
can break, and there is no clock-skew boundary where an expiration exactly at the
ceiling flips to an error. The token form needed no changes at all, so its MCP
and error-toast edits are gone with it.
Also drops the Enterprise badge on the setting, which nothing enforced, notes the
mint paths in docs/auth-surface.md, and pins that `tokens/impersonate` and the
second-workspace case stay outside the exemption.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: drop the unintended token-form change and correct the exemption docs
The token form needed no change once the ceiling shortens rather than refuses,
but the earlier revert restored from the index, which already held the staged
edit, so the MCP expiration field and the error toast stayed on the branch with
a comment justifying them by a refusal that no longer happens.
docs/auth-surface.md claimed a service-account row in any workspace exempts
outright; that only holds for a workspace-less token, which has no workspace to
match. A ceiling written as a string, which the YAML instance config and config
sync can both produce, now has a test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: offer only expirations within the ceiling in the token form
The server shortens a token that asks for longer than `max_token_expiration_days`
or for no expiration, which the token form could not tell anyone: a user picking
"No expiration" got the ceiling silently. The form now reads the setting and,
with one set, drops "No expiration" and every choice above it, adds the ceiling
itself as "N days (maximum)" and selects it, and says the instance limits tokens
to N days.
MCP mode hides the expiration field and always sent none, so with a ceiling the
field now shows there too and keeps its value across the toggle. Without a
ceiling the form is unchanged.
Reading it needs no superadmin: the setting joins the keys any logged-in user
can read through `GET /settings/global/{key}`. It holds a policy, not a secret.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: make the token form and the server agree on what counts as a ceiling
The form parsed `max_token_expiration_days` more loosely than
`cap_token_expiration`, so the two could disagree on whether a ceiling exists
at all. A `7.0` from the YAML instance config, or a string such as "7.0" or
"1e1", made the form hide "No expiration" and announce a 7-day limit while the
server capped nothing; a value between chrono's and JavaScript's date limits
preselected an expiration the server could not parse.
Both now read the same thing as a ceiling: a whole number of days from 1 to
1,000,000, stored as an integer, an integral float or a string of digits.
`parseMaxTokenExpirationDays` holds the frontend's copy, and the instance
settings validation uses it too, so the settings page no longer accepts a value
the server would ignore. The bound replaces the date-range guard on both sides.
Also corrects the rationale for shortening rather than refusing: the setting is
now readable by any logged-in user, so those callers do not read it rather than
cannot, and CLIs already installed never will.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap service-account tokens like everyone else's
The ticket exempted service accounts from `max_token_expiration_days`, but
their tokens are the long-lived ones a rotation policy is meant to bound, and
the exemption let any workspace admin get an uncapped token by impersonating
one. It also left the token form unable to agree with the server: an admin
impersonating a service account was offered only capped choices while the
server would have kept any.
`cap_token_expiration` now takes just the requested expiration, with no
per-caller lookup, and the service-account query and its cache entry are gone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap superadmin impersonation tokens and pin the frontend parser
`POST /users/tokens/impersonate` wrote its own token row with whatever
expiration the superadmin sent, so it was the one route left that could mint a
token that never expires with `max_token_expiration_days` set. The ceiling only
decides the stored expiration (the auth lookup never reads the setting), so
leaving it uncapped meant exactly that. It now goes through
`cap_token_expiration` like `create_token`; nothing in Windmill calls it, so no
caller changes.
Also adds `tokenExpiration.test.ts`, pinning which stored values
`parseMaxTokenExpirationDays` reads as a ceiling against the server's reading,
and documents that tokens existing when the setting is turned on or lowered
keep their expiration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: reject a max_token_expiration_days the token routes cannot read
The settings API and config sync stored any value for the key, and the token
routes can only read an unparseable one as no ceiling. A typo such as `7.5` or
"7.0" was accepted and silently turned the policy off.
`parse_max_token_expiration_days` in windmill-common is now the single server
reading of the setting: null or empty clears it, a whole number of days within
the bound is the ceiling, anything else is an error. The settings write hook and
`sync_global_settings_declarative` reject that error, and `cap_token_expiration`
reads through the same function, logging a value written around both.
Tests: the parser's accept/clear/reject table (the same table as the frontend
parser's), the settings API refusing 7.5, and config sync refusing "7.0".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: reserve the CLI login token label so its expiry does not email the user
With a token expiration ceiling, the token the CLI authorization page mints now
expires, so every `wmill` login earned an "expiring soon" and an "expired and
deleted" email and critical alert. The CLI already signs in again on its own
when that token stops working, so those notifications ask the user to do
nothing.
The page now labels it `cli-login:<username>` (previously `cli-<username>`),
reserved in `is_user_token` and its SQL and Svelte mirrors: no expiry
notifications, and the label cannot be edited. A colon-terminated namespace
like `embed_app:` and `impersonation:` keeps hand-made labels clear of it. Not
in `is_server_minted_label`, since the page mints through `/users/tokens/create`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: skip the expiring-soon warning for tokens that were short-lived from the start
A token whose whole lifetime fits in the 7-day warning window got its
"expiring soon" email (and critical alert, when enabled) minutes after it was
created, about a lifetime its creator had just picked. With an expiration
ceiling of 7 days or less that is every token created from the form or
`wmill token create`.
`register_token_expiry_notification` no longer queues a warning for such a
token. The window is now `TOKEN_EXPIRY_WARNING_DAYS`, shared with
`check_expiring_tokens`, so shortening the warning window can never leave
tokens of an intermediate lifetime with no warning at all. The "expired and
deleted" notice still goes out for every user token.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: exempt service-account tokens from the expiration ceiling again
Service accounts are the identity automation that needs a long-lived credential
runs as, so their tokens are exempt from `max_token_expiration_days` once more:
a service account in the workspace the token names, or in any workspace for a
workspace-less token. `tokens/impersonate` checks the impersonated account, so
a superadmin minting a token for a service account gets the same exemption.
The token form applies the same rule for the account it is running as, when
that account is a service account in the current workspace, which is what an
admin impersonating one sees; otherwise it would offer only capped choices
while the server keeps any.
Any workspace admin can create and impersonate a service account to hold an
uncapped token, so the ceiling bounds personal tokens; the doc comment and
docs/auth-surface.md say so.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: decide the token form's service-account exemption from the token's workspace
The form treated the account as a service account only when it was one in the
workspace the app was on, while the server checks the workspace the token is
for, or any workspace for a workspace-less token. With an email that is a
service account in one workspace and an ordinary member of another, picking the
other workspace in MCP mode offered "No expiration" and the server silently
stored the ceiling; the reverse hid the exemption.
`GET /workspaces/users` now returns each membership's `is_service_account`
(its query already joins the `usr` row), and the form applies the server's rule
to the token's own workspace. The selection becomes a derived value held within
the ceiling, so switching to a capped workspace never leaves an unoffered choice
selected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: add per-route CORS origin allowlist for HTTP triggers
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: fail closed on cold router cache and invalid origin input
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: resolve CORS route from the decoded path like the request handler
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: add instance-wide default allowed origins for HTTP routes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: let non-superadmins read the default allowed origins setting
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: badge the advanced section when a route's origins are restricted
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: state inherited origins on the control and use one hint row
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: trim the origins tooltip and relabel the toggle when a default exists
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep the origins format hint visible until an entry is wrong
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: state the at-least-one requirement in the origins hint
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: import the origins validator in the trigger-http tests
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: make an empty allowlist deny rather than fall back to the default
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: address review nits on origin validation and the CORS editor
* fix: derive the origins error from the stored list and tighten host validation
* fix: parse real IPv6 hosts and refuse a newly emptied allowlist
* refactor: make origin validation advisory except for null and non-ascii
* feat: let an empty allowlist be saved as deny every origin
* docs: document the empty allowlist as deny every origin
* fix: bound allowlists, reject commas, and decide cors after the handler
* chore: revert unrelated rustfmt churn in windmill-common tests
* chore: revert unrelated rustfmt churn in windmill-common
* chore: drop the route types the cors restructure replaced
* fix: take the stricter cors decision from before and after the handler
* fix: strip runnable cors headers when the routers are unavailable
* docs: document the allowlist bounds in the openapi schema
* fix: let an unavailable cors read defer to one that resolved
* refactor: carry the resolved cors policy from the handler to the middleware
* docs: describe why an unavailable read fails closed on the paths that reach it
* fix: validate the default origins on the declarative settings path
* test: keep the webhook doc comment with the test it describes
* fix: warn on impossible schemes and ports, and validate the instance setting
* feat: treat an empty allowlist as unset at both levels
* perf: decode the cors path only when the fallback needs it
* docs: document the empty allowlist as unset in the api schema
* docs: describe an empty allowlist as unset in the frontend comments
* docs: say what a null allowlist resolves to, not what it meant before the default existed
* docs: state what the validator refuses and why methods stay broad
* feat: exempt static asset routes from the origin allowlist
* fix: hide the origin control for every static target, not just websites
* fix: exempt only static websites, not single-file static assets
* fix: warn on an unclosed ipv6 host in the origins advisory
* fix: require assets present, not just the static website flag
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(git-sync): let GitHub webhooks register a dedicated base url
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): validate the webhook base url and apply it on change
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: pin ee ref for the git-sync webhook base url change
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): validate and reconcile the webhook base url on every write path
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): route every declarative settings writer through the same rules
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): let the reconciler own the webhook field write-back
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): make the webhook base url validators agree across UI and server
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): lock the workspace row across git_sync read-modify-writes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: pin the webhook base url validator to its server counterpart
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): retry a failed webhook move on every re-apply of the setting
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): retry pending webhook moves on every declarative re-apply
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): reject non-string webhook base urls and bound the sweep
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): reject credential-bearing webhook base urls
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): keep credentials out of webhook base url validation errors
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): redact through the last authority @ when reporting a bad url
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): stop echoing unparsed webhook base urls instead of scrubbing them
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): never echo a submitted webhook base url in validation errors
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): keep the submitted scheme out of validation errors
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(git-sync): drop the webhook sweep, surface stale receivers in settings
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): refresh the stale webhook list when settings are saved
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): mark registered_url nullable and drop the duplicated field error
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: pin ee ref after dropping the reconcile lock and CAS
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(git-sync): refresh the stale webhook list on category saves too
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to aa05ca8e97fc8265cd724753a80db37f83243254
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #695 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 3e6cd9226b68707233ae2434511fe5131dce808b
New ee-repo-ref: aa05ca8e97fc8265cd724753a80db37f83243254
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: treat empty global setting strings as unset
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: close protected-setting whitespace gap in diff and preserve empty ws override
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: move alert config from config table to global_settings
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref.txt
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: rename alert setting to alert_job_queue_waiting
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref.txt
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: add CLI unit tests for pullInstanceConfigs/pushInstanceConfigs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref.txt
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref.txt to merged main
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: add secretKeyRef support for jwt_secret and extra fields (rsa_keys)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref.txt
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 2c24cf597fdf8c4dccd483f1f1e5c49eb42ef3a3
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #508 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: ade3bb76f8e0a6e658313b54c7180577fc9efc37
New ee-repo-ref: 2c24cf597fdf8c4dccd483f1f1e5c49eb42ef3a3
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
* test: replace unit tests with integration tests for jwt_secret and rsa_keys
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref.txt
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat: improve operator ConfigMap settings handling
- Protect jwt_secret and min_keep_alive_version from deletion (add to
PROTECTED_SETTINGS)
- Expose jwt_secret in config exports (remove from HIDDEN_SETTINGS)
- Reject empty/null jwt_secret values with warning
- Clamp retention_period_secs to 30 days max on CE builds
- Improve apply_settings_diff logging: distinguish Created/Updated/Deleted
with from/to values and unchanged count summary
- Add sensitive value masking in logs with partial redaction (prefix/suffix)
for top-level secrets and nested sub-field masking for oauths, smtp,
object_store_cache_config, custom_instance_pg_databases
- Sort global_settings keys alphabetically in YAML export
- Order worker_configs with "default" and "native" first in YAML export
- Add tests for sorted YAML serializer
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: address PR review feedback
- Fix redact_string panic on multi-byte UTF-8 by using chars() instead
of byte-length slicing
- Protect jwt_secret from deletion via direct API
(set_global_setting_internal rejects empty/null with BadRequest)
- Add code comment documenting jwt_secret visibility trade-off
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: switch operator from CRD to ConfigMap
Replace the WindmillInstance CRD with a plain ConfigMap for the K8s
operator. This simplifies deployment (no CRD to install/manage, no
ClusterRole for custom API groups) while keeping the same config schema.
- Replace crd_ee.rs with configmap_ee.rs (parses data.spec YAML key)
- Rewrite reconciler_ee.rs: ConfigMap watcher + Event recorder instead
of CRD Controller + status subresource
- Add license_key preservation: if absent/empty in ConfigMap but present
in DB, the DB value is kept
- Remove print_crd_yaml() and "operator crd" subcommand
- Drop schemars, chrono, instance_config_schema dependencies
- Delete manifests/crd.yaml
- Update K8s example and README for ConfigMap approach
- RBAC now only needs a namespace-scoped Role (not ClusterRole)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: add superadmin YAML export endpoint and remove cache_clear from operator config
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Add windmill-operator crate for Kubernetes CRD-based instance config
Introduces a new `windmill-operator` crate that enables declarative
management of Windmill instance configuration via a Kubernetes
`WindmillInstance` CRD. The operator watches CRD resources and performs
full declarative sync of global_settings and worker configs to the
database, supporting GitOps workflows for instance-level configuration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Add tests for windmill-operator CRD and db_sync
- 9 unit tests for CRD serialization, deserialization, metadata, and
status field behavior
- 15 integration tests for db_sync using #[sqlx::test] with full
declarative sync coverage: upsert, delete, protected keys,
idempotency, worker config prefix handling, and end-to-end sync
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Replace untyped BTreeMap CRD fields with typed structs for schema validation
GlobalSettings, SmtpSettings, IndexerSettings, and WorkerGroupConfig now
have explicit typed fields with serde(flatten) catch-all for forward
compatibility. The generated CRD YAML includes a full OpenAPI v3 schema
that Kubernetes validates on kubectl apply.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Type opaque serde_json::Value CRD fields with real structs
Replace most remaining serde_json::Value fields in WindmillInstance CRD
with properly typed structs derived from the codebase:
- oauths: BTreeMap<String, OAuthClient>
- otel: OtelSettings
- otel_tracing_proxy: OtelTracingProxySettings with ScriptLang enum
- critical_error_channels: Vec<CriticalErrorChannel> (untagged enum)
- critical_alerts_on_db_oversize: DbOversizeAlert
- ducklake_settings: DucklakeSettings with nested catalog/storage types
- custom_instance_pg_databases: CustomInstancePgDatabases
- autoscaling (worker config): AutoscalingConfig with integration struct
- custom_tags, default_tags_workspaces: Vec<String>
- default_tags_per_workspace: bool
Still opaque (serde_json::Value): object_store_cache_config (kube-core
can't generate schemas for internally-tagged enums), secret_backend
(EE-private), slack, teams (no clear struct definitions).
Regenerated CRD YAML with full OpenAPI schema (352→703 lines).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Unify instance config types and add bulk GET/PUT API
Move all typed settings (GlobalSettings, WorkerGroupConfig, etc.) from
windmill-operator/crd.rs into windmill-common/instance_config.rs so both
the API server and operator share a single source of truth. Add diff/apply
logic (Merge mode for UI, Replace mode for operator) and InstanceConfig::from_db().
Add GET/PUT /settings/instance_config endpoints so the frontend loads all
settings in 1 call instead of 42, and saves with a single bulk PUT. The
backend handles the diff internally, running pre-write hooks for changed keys.
Refactor windmill-operator/db_sync.rs to use the shared diff+apply functions
and slim crd.rs down to the CRD wrapper with re-exports.
Includes 32 unit tests and 30 integration tests covering serialization,
diff logic, DB roundtrips, protected settings, and edge cases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: add Form/YAML toggle to instance settings UI
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: show Form/YAML toggle regardless of hideTabs prop
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: replace toggle button group with simple YAML toggle
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: mask sensitive fields in YAML view with show/hide toggle
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: hide internal settings and mask sensitive fields in YAML view
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: hide jwt_secret and min_keep_alive_version from API and config exports
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* all
* feat: add secretKeyRef support for sensitive fields in operator CRD
Allow sensitive fields (license_key, hub_api_secret, scim_token,
smtp_password, OAuthClient.secret, custom PG user_pwd) to reference
Kubernetes Secrets via the standard secretKeyRef pattern instead of
inlining values as plaintext YAML. The reconciler resolves all refs
by reading K8s Secrets before syncing to the database.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* all
* all
* all
* fix: merge main and update dev environment docs
Resolve merge conflicts from origin/main, fix duplicate
UV_INDEX_STRATEGY_SETTING import, and add Playwright MCP
testing instructions to CLAUDE.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* all
* fix: init tracing for CLI subcommands and deduplicate setting side-effects
Initialize tracing subscriber before early-return CLI paths (sync-config,
operator) so tracing calls are not silently dropped. Refactor
set_global_setting_internal to call run_setting_pre_write_hook instead of
duplicating the side-effect logic.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: add `wmill instance get-config` CLI command
Dumps the current instance config (global settings + worker configs) as
YAML. Supports --output-file to write to a file instead of stdout.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* all
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5