windmill

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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Diego Imbert Claude Opus 5 windmill-internal-app[bot]Ruben Fiszel	8741843d2e	feat: external instance cluster for data tables and Ducklake catalogs (#11197 ) * fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix * fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it `-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose. Naming a role exists precisely to not do that. A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a `datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments. Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it `?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation. The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under the default. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix". Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist. The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test Two review findings, both real. `attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable` returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its `?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key. `-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_` that no entry names and whose name blocks the retry. Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its `resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it. Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through to the default role. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work. Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on rather than only asserting it in a comment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then `import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction. Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_` that no entry names and whose name blocks the retry. That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable` now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and the stage that writes the entry only does the work. Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_` that no entry names, and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles. `create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a `wm_fork_` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included. The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an existing database always got. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database" This reverts commit `7dd3275a10`. The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it did before this PR. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_` behind, as it did before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes away once the clone is a single server-side operation. The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully copied database between its import and its final fork request. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry did the same. Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal Three fixes from review. `edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable, but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request. The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional `deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived from the stored configuration against the saved one. `delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on the missing parent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a data table now carries one or the other: - a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data table under roles; - roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names each one to disable. This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline fix from the same review round is kept. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30 seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it. The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete leaves a disabled role to retry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once, without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener connects after roles are committed and refuses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?` Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a listener for, now still counts as streaming. Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them: `a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends. The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns. Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles. A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins, CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses. Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise edition, refuse after authentication. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one not under roles resolves as before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4 New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(datatables): data table roles in the DB manager and raw apps Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: never add a role to the reference of a data table whose name contains '?' Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: read the roles of a data table whose name contains '?' The generated client leaves a '?' in a path param unencoded, so the lookup 404'd and the raw-app picker blocked Start on such a data table. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix(datatables): refuse a reference naming both a legacy data table and a role When a workspace stores both `sales` and a legacy `sales?role=analytics`, the reference resolved to the legacy entry without a role, so browsing `sales` as `analytics` reached another data table. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: declare the default role in migrations written for a data table whose name contains '?' Such a data table connects as its default role without naming it, so the migrations the manager wrote for it declared no role and ran as admin. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * feat(datatables): set up an external instance cluster for data tables Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): send external cluster passwords as SCRAM verifiers Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): scope external cluster credential readers to the crate Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * [ee] feat(datatables): external_instance data tables on the external cluster Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix(datatables): compare the external cluster settings under a row lock before storing setup Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): only drop external databases Windmill marked, and check use under the lock Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection, `custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table. A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares `-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch — grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or ``. A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before. Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint, `get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could `RESET ROLE` its way out of. A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not where an access decision should be made. Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant. All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the only right answer for the copy paths. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin putting a resource-backed data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and `CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read. Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it calls a data table changes nothing about the data table. Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo. Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an `UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so the operation is retryable once the row is restored. Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table this workspace never had. `InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line. Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that predates this and sends no job id. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence. `list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the check runs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them. Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway. The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and `converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at the definition, which is where the next caller looks. Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and `resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker. Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a `StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now said at the field. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways. The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either. Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every login it described. `custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret, written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape: `datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist. No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to take it out. Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And `set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings row across validation and write. Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish: `read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and `converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's. Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `` last time, but `extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names. Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot". The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it. `read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while `set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions` — it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own `global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles` and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a consequence of this change. Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing: A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step, and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose. Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction. Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which workspace is gone. Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed); the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog` was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog, `GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles` could also empty it outside the lock. The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it. One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision. The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check. Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit `main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table settings save and the workspace delete now show it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved. A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state. Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once from what it named before the save. The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named, with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal. Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint. Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call `/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant". The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that. Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role. The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing. Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed — and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one. Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * nit worker error msg * fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix * fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it `-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose. Naming a role exists precisely to not do that. A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a `datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments. Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it `?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation. The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under the default. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR * fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix". Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist. The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test Two review findings, both real. `attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable` returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its `?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key. `-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_` that no entry names and whose name blocks the retry. Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its `resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it. Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through to the default role. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work. Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on rather than only asserting it in a comment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then `import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction. Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_` that no entry names and whose name blocks the retry. That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable` now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and the stage that writes the entry only does the work. Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_` that no entry names, and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles. `create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a `wm_fork_` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included. The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an existing database always got. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database" This reverts commit `7dd3275a10`. The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it did before this PR. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_` behind, as it did before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes away once the clone is a single server-side operation. The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully copied database between its import and its final fork request. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry did the same. Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal Three fixes from review. `edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable, but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request. The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional `deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived from the stored configuration against the saved one. `delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on the missing parent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a data table now carries one or the other: - a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data table under roles; - roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names each one to disable. This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline fix from the same review round is kept. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30 seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it. The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete leaves a disabled role to retry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once, without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener connects after roles are committed and refuses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?` Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a listener for, now still counts as streaming. Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them: `a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends. The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns. Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles. A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins, CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses. Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise edition, refuse after authentication. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one not under roles resolves as before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb * chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4 New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * feat(datatables): Ducklake catalogs on the external instance cluster Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): never grant CREATEROLE to custom_instance_user on the external cluster Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(datatables): state the authorization contract of external database usage lookups Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): drop a DuckDB data table secret once its ATTACH has used it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf(datatables): resolve a workspace's data tables per pointer hop, not per entry Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): hold the parent's settings while a fork points at its data tables Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): refuse repointing the external cluster while it is in use, and keep verify-ca working for pg_dump Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): protect external databases pending fork cleanup, and describe Ducklake usage in the API Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(datatables): per-cluster data table role catalogs, with roles on the external instance cluster Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): write the external cluster setting under the lifecycle lock, and check fork targets are registered Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): register external fork catalogs under the lifecycle lock, and keep certificate verification in DuckDB attaches Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): keep certificate verification when DuckDB attaches an external data table Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): keep certificate verification when DuckDB attaches an external data table Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): refuse fork cleanup of an external database another workspace uses Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): refuse rolling back while external data tables are under roles, and type external_instance in the CLI Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): stop counting storage-only fork cleanup rows as uses of an external database Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): bind fork database copies to their workspace, and count every use before dropping one Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): authenticate instance database setup before writing its status, and keep a fork reservation across it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): create external databases only on a cluster setup succeeded on, and document the registry reader Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): keep only the most recently used DuckDB root certificate files Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): migrate fork reservations on workspace rename, and lock the parent's data tables for the whole fork Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): take the fork data table lock once, before the external cluster's Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(datatables): describe the external instance cluster and how to run one locally Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): keep fork reservations private, drop a cleaned-up entry with its database, and serialize cleanup with settings saves Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): hold the fork lock across a fork import, and carry the reservation inside the setup write Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): check the external cluster setting on its own transaction, and gate the registry probe Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #787 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 0edd40979cf36bfba59323f3f6a0811ae1369cf5 New ee-repo-ref: 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * fix(datatables): keep DuckDB root certificate files in the job directory Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: drop the unused json import from the settings crate Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): drop the serde_json::json import left unused by the fork setup write Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): accept external_instance data tables in the settings form type Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): serialize fork database reservations, cleanup, setup and Ducklake saves on the database - A fork copy is created and registered under its workspace's fork lock, and refused once the workspace is archived; a rename re-migrates reservations under that lock after archiving. - Ducklake saves lock every instance database they newly name, as data table saves do. - Instance database setup holds the database's lock until its entry is written. - Fork import also holds the database's lock across the restore. - Cleanup re-reads the entry under its locks before dropping anything. - Non-superadmins no longer see fork copies reserved for workspaces they are not in. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): state the authorization contract of the external cluster status and write check Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): lock the fork copy at finalization, and order cleanup's registry write after its settings row - Fork finalization holds the copy's database lock from its availability check to the commit. - Cleanup removes the registry entry in its own transaction, in a task of its own, instead of on a second connection; a rename migrates reservations after its settings rewrites, so both take the settings rows before the registry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): hold the fork lock across a rename's settings copy Fork cleanup of the old id could otherwise drop a copy the renamed workspace goes on using. Also states the authorization contract of the instance database drop helpers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): refuse moving the external cluster to another host or port while it holds databases Every settings writer goes through the same check as removal: the login, TLS and maintenance database may still change, the cluster may not. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(datatables): clone a data table under roles with its owners and grants (#11120) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UbrtwiYNfayrmqouBJHwGV Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: open the raw app data table drawer when the workspace has none Selecting the first data table of an empty list passed undefined to the name check, which threw instead of opening the drawer on no data table. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): offer cloning a data table under roles where its grants can be replayed The server clones such a data table and replays the source's owners and grants, which only the Enterprise Edition does, so the fork wizard hid both clone options everywhere instead of on a build that cannot replay them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: name the placeholder the empty raw app data drawer renders Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): replace a job directory file at the DuckDB root certificate path instead of trusting it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: pin the enterprise refusal the role pickers read as 'not under roles' The server's sentence and the frontend's copy of it were coupled by nothing, so rewording either one turned every role picker on a community build into a failed lookup. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): type Ducklake catalogs on the external instance cluster in the settings form Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): read a roles answer only for the workspace it was asked in A fork and its parent each have their own roles on a data table of the same name, so an answer stamped with the name alone settled the role from the workspace the editor was acting on before. Also derive the AI table creation flag from the data replaced into the editor: data naming no data table left the flag on from before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): keep an instance database a settings save is waiting to name Cleanup for a database whose setup failed took the lock first, read no user, and dropped it while a save blocked on that same lock was about to commit a reference to it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): check the workspace stamp in the default database selector too Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): read what a save racing instance-database cleanup committed A transaction blocked on the lock may still roll back, so keeping the database for it stranded one whose name then blocks every retry: it is let through and its outcome read instead. The waiter query also matches this database's locks only, since pg_locks spans the cluster. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): tell a waiting request apart from the workspaces using a database Both callers render what cleanup returns as the workspaces that keep the database, so a waiting request's pid read as one of them. Each now words that case itself, and the give-up comment names where the kept name actually goes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): take the cleanup lock on a connection the pool cannot reclaim A session lock outlives the future holding it, so a cancellation between taking it and releasing it handed a locked session back to the pool, where every later settings save waits on it. Detached, the connection closes when it is dropped and the server releases the lock with the session. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): close the cleanup connection on drop instead of detaching it Detaching released the pool permit while the session stayed alive, so concurrent cleanups waiting on their locks could open as many connections as they liked. Closing on drop covers the same cancellation and keeps them counted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 179d2454a063ee818a9387a1eafdd354a217a16c This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #802 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: c2e43f5b5ff753d339b70e232fd17b6ffecb054d New ee-repo-ref: 179d2454a063ee818a9387a1eafdd354a217a16c Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * chore: update ee-repo-ref to fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #798 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 3145e422d61d580f0a82804f075285c112879da0 New ee-repo-ref: fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * fix(datatables): classify a fork import's target from the resolution that built its connection A second read could see the entry flipped to a resource and skip the reservation check while the connection already built still reached the instance cluster. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): run external database lifecycle on the caller's transaction, one lock order for fork cleanup Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): check a fork copy's reservation on the locked transaction's connection Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): make and drop fork copies of external data tables on the external cluster Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): refuse a fork whose external copy something already names Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): check an external fork copy's uses before removing its entry, so child fork pointers still count Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): migrate external cluster fork reservations on workspace rename Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(datatables): configure the external instance cluster and pick its databases from the UI Instance settings gets an External Postgres tab: the cluster's connection, the setup run with its report, and the databases Windmill created there. Data table and Ducklake settings offer the external_instance kind, with a picker over those databases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): keep the external cluster form out of the instance settings the page bulk-saves The form seeded its key into the settings store after the page snapshotted them, so merely opening the tab made the page send a setting the validator refuses, failing an admin's unrelated save. The form is local state now, and only the setup writes the key. The database picker also treats a superadmin-only listing as authoritative: a workspace admin, who cannot list, no longer sees a saved database as missing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(tests): app paths are validated, so a guest app cannot be renamed to one with a space Path validation on apps landed after this test, which still expected a space to be accepted and created its fixture on a ':' path. The scopable-path guard it exists for is kept by planting that path on the row, which is now the only way an app can hold one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(datatables): one Managed Postgres tab, and a switch for Windmill's own database The instance settings tab covers both substrates Windmill administers: the external cluster, which can now be disabled once nothing sits on it, and Windmill's own database, which an operator can turn off so the cluster is the only one a workspace may newly name. A save that names it then refuses, as the create endpoint does. Workspace settings name them the way an admin meets them: Postgres Resource, and Managed instance, qualified as Internal or External only while both are on offer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(datatables): offer the external cluster in the add-data-table wizard, and give Ducklake its room back The wizard gets the external cluster as a fourth substrate: pick a database it already holds or name a new one, which the run creates before writing the entry, so Try again does not trip on a database the last attempt made. Ducklake's maintenance column moves into the settings popover next to the extra args, which the wider catalog select had squeezed the name box out of. A setting a component saves itself now also moves the page's baseline, or Discard would restore what it replaced and a later save would send that stale value back. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): only a database this wizard run made makes its retry idempotent A retry skipped the create whenever the name was registered, which let a run adopt a database another superadmin had made and share their data without the warning the existing-database branch shows. The run tracks what it created instead, and reports it so Discard can say the database is still there. Creating one now refreshes the registry the next run's default name and its validation read, and that default counts the external cluster's databases rather than the instance's. Row ownership carries the substrate: "instance" and "external_instance" can hold the same name, and a row repointed between them while a run probes must not read as that run's own. Also fixes the merge leftovers in the DuckDB executor's tests, which cargo check never compiles: the new PgDatabase field and the attach helper's job directory. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): shorten the picked managed kind, and say what an empty database list means The closed select has room for the qualifier, not the whole name, so a picked managed kind reads "Managed (Internal)". An external entry gets the tooltip its internal counterpart has, and a database picker with nothing in it says to type a name rather than "No items found". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): keep the wizard's external-database bookkeeping optional and parked The run deps gained a required field, which every existing caller of runSetup -- the sibling test suite included -- does not pass. It defaults to empty instead, the parked payload carries it across a Supabase redirect as it claims to, and a resumed run counts it as something left behind. Two regressions pin the create: made on a first attempt, skipped only for a database this run made. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): review an external-cluster database as one, not as a Postgres resource The review step fell through to the resource branch for the new provider, so it announced a connection already in the workspace for a database that does not exist yet. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): show the server's refusal instead of an object in the toast Saving data table settings passed the whole error to the toast, which rendered the request and response as JSON, and the instance-database wizard replaced it with "check console". Both surface the message the API sent, through the helper that exists for it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: point at the EE commit dropping the unused import Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): define a role on the cluster its data table sits on The permissions drawer created and listed roles without naming a cluster, so a role defined from an external data table became a login on Windmill's own, and the refresh then replaced the correct catalog with the internal one. The drawer passes the data table's cluster to both. The wizard also read a database it had just created as a name collision, which blocked returning to the failed attempt and finishing under the same name. And the merge had left the CONNECT-grant pass and its log in both the caller and the callee. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(datatables): manage the external cluster's role catalog, and name the cluster in the copy The roles drawer offered one catalog, so the external cluster's roles could only be reached through a data table sitting on it — and became unreachable once the last one was gone, while the cluster could not be unset until they were dropped. Opened from the page it now offers the clusters the instance has; a data table's own drawer still pins its cluster, and its copy names that cluster rather than "the instance". A DuckDB attach also decides whether to verify certificates the way every other Postgres connection does, so a resource carrying a root certificate is no longer downgraded to require here alone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(datatables): bind the roles list to the cluster it was read for Switching catalogs left the previous cluster's rows on screen and applied whichever response landed last, so a slower read could seat one cluster's logins under the other's heading while every control acted on the wrong id — invisible where a name exists on both. The switch clears the rows, a token discards a response the selection has moved past, and the controls stay inert while a catalog is being read. The drop confirmation also names the cluster whose databases it reaches. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to dfe7b8b9204d21e0264fbea1c6f6eedf9e738d56 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #810 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 30db1b33bda0446f5fc5dfe353fbb226d57a26d4 New ee-repo-ref: dfe7b8b9204d21e0264fbea1c6f6eedf9e738d56 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>	2026-09-29 14:45:47 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5	da866c5eff	feat: alert on and optionally cancel jobs stuck on unserved tags (#11354 ) * feat: alert on and optionally cancel jobs stuck on unserved tags Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: group stranded jobs in sql and recheck each job before canceling Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: guard stranded-job alerts and cancels against outages and pickups Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: count priority tags as served and retry lost stranded-job cancels Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: send one daily stranded-jobs alert that can be muted Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: cover native retries and finish lost stranded-job cancels unconditionally Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-25 17:48:21 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5	1fd729ac1a	feat: add an instance-wide accent color setting with sidebar tint (#11335 ) * feat: add an instance-wide accent color setting with sidebar tint Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: paint the cached accent before the license resolves Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: serve the banner and accent color from one cached endpoint Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: invalidate the instance ui cache and bound it with a ttl Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the instance ui ttl under the client poll period Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: load the banner and accent color once per page load Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: read the banner and accent color without a server cache Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: show a cleared accent color as off Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-25 11:23:30 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5	87761d1797	feat: let every EE instance set the announcement banner (#11238 ) * feat: let every EE instance set the announcement banner, not only cloud Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: move the announcement banner setting to the bottom of the general tab Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-18 21:03:00 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5	37e493ae66	feat: add an instance setting to refuse a token in MCP URLs (#11162 ) * feat: add an instance setting to refuse a token in MCP URLs MCP clients are commonly configured with the token in the URL (`/api/mcp/w/{workspace}/mcp?token=...`). A URL-borne credential ends up in browser history, proxy logs and referrers, so an instance can now turn that channel off with the `mcp_disable_token_query_param` global setting and leave the Authorization header as the only way in, which sends MCP clients through the OAuth flow the endpoints already advertise. The rejection is a middleware on both the workspaced and the gateway MCP mounts, layered outside everything that reads a token and inside the WWW-Authenticate layer, so the 401 carries the resource pointer a client needs to start OAuth discovery. Off by default. With it on, the token drawer and the home connect drawer stop offering to mint a token for an MCP URL and hand over the bare URL instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: read the MCP URL policy when a URL is asked for, and drop the all-workspaces option Two review findings on the token drawer: The policy was read once per page load and cached for the browser session, so a superadmin turning the setting on left every open tab handing out `?token=` URLs the server now refuses. Both entry points now read it when the user actually asks for an MCP URL: when MCP mode is entered, and when the connect drawer opens. The workspace picker offered "All workspaces / Multi-workspace", but the gateway's consent screen binds the token it issues to the one workspace picked there, so OAuth has no multi-workspace grant to hand out. That entry is now token-only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: don't guess the MCP URL policy, and say where the switch lands on restart Review findings: The comment on the settings load claimed `MODE=mcp` as the target deployment, but that mode joins no monitor loop, so the startup pass is its only read and a change lands on restart. That is true of every global setting there, `base_url` included; the comment now says so, and the setting description tells an operator running dedicated MCP servers what to expect. A failed settings probe resolved to "tokens allowed", so with the switch on the drawer would mint a non-expiring token and hand over a URL the server refuses for as long as it exists. The probe now propagates its error and the panel reports it with a retry, creating nothing until the answer is known. The test passed a valid token, so it could not tell a rejection before authentication from one after it. It now also sends a token that was never valid and asserts the middleware's own message, which fails if the layer moves inward. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: withhold the MCP URL until a workspace is picked With no persisted workspace the store starts undefined, so opening the drawer from /user/workspaces before choosing one rendered a copyable `/api/mcp/w/undefined/mcp`. It reads like a real URL and a client pointed at it would never connect. The panel now asks for a workspace instead, matching the guard the token branch already has on its generate button. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: drop the coverage-status note from the MCP switch test It documented what the test does not reach rather than a constraint the next reader could break; that belongs in the PR, not the module doc. The layer-order rationale, which is what a future edit would break, stays. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: fall back to the bare MCP URL instead of alerting on a failed read When the setting read fails, show the bare URL rather than an error with a retry. It works whichever way the setting is, so no alert is needed, and it still never mints a token for a URL the server may refuse. The connect drawer's wording falls back the same way so the blurb matches the panel. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: move the MCP URL token setting to Core It sat in the Auth/OAuth/SAML list, which the settings sidebar shows under SSO, suggesting a dependency on SSO that does not exist: MCP OAuth has Windmill act as the authorization server, and any login method, password included, completes it. It is an instance-wide credential policy, so it now lives with the other ones in Core, kept out of quick setup like its neighbours. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-18 15:24:00 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5	9320312eac	feat: cap user token expiration with an instance setting (#11159 ) * feat: cap user token expiration with an instance setting Adds `max_token_expiration_days`, an instance-wide ceiling on how far ahead a token created through `POST /users/tokens/create` may expire. With it set, that route refuses a token with no expiration and one that expires past the window; absent or non-positive, nothing changes. Only the user-facing handler enforces it. Server-side mints (native trigger webhook tokens, app embed tokens, sessions) pick a lifetime the caller never chooses and go straight to `create_token_internal`, so they stay uncapped, as does the superadmin `impersonate` route. Service accounts are exempt, in the workspace the token targets or in any workspace for a global token, so unattended automation can keep longer-lived credentials. The token form now surfaces the API error instead of only logging it, and offers "Expires In" in MCP mode as well: that mode always sent no expiration, which the cap refuses, leaving MCP URLs impossible to generate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: shorten over-long token expirations instead of refusing them Refusing a non-compliant request breaks the callers that cannot comply. The CLI authorization page, `wmill user create-token` and the editor's language-server token each pick a lifetime — usually none at all — with no way to read the setting, so a cap made browser login hang and the editor lose its LSP root rather than stopping the long-lived tokens the setting is aimed at. `cap_token_expiration` now returns the expiration to store, shortening a request that asks for too long or for none. The policy still holds absolutely, no caller can break, and there is no clock-skew boundary where an expiration exactly at the ceiling flips to an error. The token form needed no changes at all, so its MCP and error-toast edits are gone with it. Also drops the Enterprise badge on the setting, which nothing enforced, notes the mint paths in docs/auth-surface.md, and pins that `tokens/impersonate` and the second-workspace case stay outside the exemption. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: drop the unintended token-form change and correct the exemption docs The token form needed no change once the ceiling shortens rather than refuses, but the earlier revert restored from the index, which already held the staged edit, so the MCP expiration field and the error toast stayed on the branch with a comment justifying them by a refusal that no longer happens. docs/auth-surface.md claimed a service-account row in any workspace exempts outright; that only holds for a workspace-less token, which has no workspace to match. A ceiling written as a string, which the YAML instance config and config sync can both produce, now has a test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: offer only expirations within the ceiling in the token form The server shortens a token that asks for longer than `max_token_expiration_days` or for no expiration, which the token form could not tell anyone: a user picking "No expiration" got the ceiling silently. The form now reads the setting and, with one set, drops "No expiration" and every choice above it, adds the ceiling itself as "N days (maximum)" and selects it, and says the instance limits tokens to N days. MCP mode hides the expiration field and always sent none, so with a ceiling the field now shows there too and keeps its value across the toggle. Without a ceiling the form is unchanged. Reading it needs no superadmin: the setting joins the keys any logged-in user can read through `GET /settings/global/{key}`. It holds a policy, not a secret. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: make the token form and the server agree on what counts as a ceiling The form parsed `max_token_expiration_days` more loosely than `cap_token_expiration`, so the two could disagree on whether a ceiling exists at all. A `7.0` from the YAML instance config, or a string such as "7.0" or "1e1", made the form hide "No expiration" and announce a 7-day limit while the server capped nothing; a value between chrono's and JavaScript's date limits preselected an expiration the server could not parse. Both now read the same thing as a ceiling: a whole number of days from 1 to 1,000,000, stored as an integer, an integral float or a string of digits. `parseMaxTokenExpirationDays` holds the frontend's copy, and the instance settings validation uses it too, so the settings page no longer accepts a value the server would ignore. The bound replaces the date-range guard on both sides. Also corrects the rationale for shortening rather than refusing: the setting is now readable by any logged-in user, so those callers do not read it rather than cannot, and CLIs already installed never will. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: cap service-account tokens like everyone else's The ticket exempted service accounts from `max_token_expiration_days`, but their tokens are the long-lived ones a rotation policy is meant to bound, and the exemption let any workspace admin get an uncapped token by impersonating one. It also left the token form unable to agree with the server: an admin impersonating a service account was offered only capped choices while the server would have kept any. `cap_token_expiration` now takes just the requested expiration, with no per-caller lookup, and the service-account query and its cache entry are gone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: cap superadmin impersonation tokens and pin the frontend parser `POST /users/tokens/impersonate` wrote its own token row with whatever expiration the superadmin sent, so it was the one route left that could mint a token that never expires with `max_token_expiration_days` set. The ceiling only decides the stored expiration (the auth lookup never reads the setting), so leaving it uncapped meant exactly that. It now goes through `cap_token_expiration` like `create_token`; nothing in Windmill calls it, so no caller changes. Also adds `tokenExpiration.test.ts`, pinning which stored values `parseMaxTokenExpirationDays` reads as a ceiling against the server's reading, and documents that tokens existing when the setting is turned on or lowered keep their expiration. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: reject a max_token_expiration_days the token routes cannot read The settings API and config sync stored any value for the key, and the token routes can only read an unparseable one as no ceiling. A typo such as `7.5` or "7.0" was accepted and silently turned the policy off. `parse_max_token_expiration_days` in windmill-common is now the single server reading of the setting: null or empty clears it, a whole number of days within the bound is the ceiling, anything else is an error. The settings write hook and `sync_global_settings_declarative` reject that error, and `cap_token_expiration` reads through the same function, logging a value written around both. Tests: the parser's accept/clear/reject table (the same table as the frontend parser's), the settings API refusing 7.5, and config sync refusing "7.0". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: reserve the CLI login token label so its expiry does not email the user With a token expiration ceiling, the token the CLI authorization page mints now expires, so every `wmill` login earned an "expiring soon" and an "expired and deleted" email and critical alert. The CLI already signs in again on its own when that token stops working, so those notifications ask the user to do nothing. The page now labels it `cli-login:<username>` (previously `cli-<username>`), reserved in `is_user_token` and its SQL and Svelte mirrors: no expiry notifications, and the label cannot be edited. A colon-terminated namespace like `embed_app:` and `impersonation:` keeps hand-made labels clear of it. Not in `is_server_minted_label`, since the page mints through `/users/tokens/create`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: skip the expiring-soon warning for tokens that were short-lived from the start A token whose whole lifetime fits in the 7-day warning window got its "expiring soon" email (and critical alert, when enabled) minutes after it was created, about a lifetime its creator had just picked. With an expiration ceiling of 7 days or less that is every token created from the form or `wmill token create`. `register_token_expiry_notification` no longer queues a warning for such a token. The window is now `TOKEN_EXPIRY_WARNING_DAYS`, shared with `check_expiring_tokens`, so shortening the warning window can never leave tokens of an intermediate lifetime with no warning at all. The "expired and deleted" notice still goes out for every user token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: exempt service-account tokens from the expiration ceiling again Service accounts are the identity automation that needs a long-lived credential runs as, so their tokens are exempt from `max_token_expiration_days` once more: a service account in the workspace the token names, or in any workspace for a workspace-less token. `tokens/impersonate` checks the impersonated account, so a superadmin minting a token for a service account gets the same exemption. The token form applies the same rule for the account it is running as, when that account is a service account in the current workspace, which is what an admin impersonating one sees; otherwise it would offer only capped choices while the server keeps any. Any workspace admin can create and impersonate a service account to hold an uncapped token, so the ceiling bounds personal tokens; the doc comment and docs/auth-surface.md say so. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: decide the token form's service-account exemption from the token's workspace The form treated the account as a service account only when it was one in the workspace the app was on, while the server checks the workspace the token is for, or any workspace for a workspace-less token. With an email that is a service account in one workspace and an ordinary member of another, picking the other workspace in MCP mode offered "No expiration" and the server silently stored the ceiling; the reverse hid the exemption. `GET /workspaces/users` now returns each membership's `is_service_account` (its query already joins the `usr` row), and the form applies the server's rule to the token's own workspace. The selection becomes a derived value held within the ceiling, so switching to a capped workspace never leaves an unoffered choice selected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-18 14:37:39 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Fable 5.1	f082fddf41	[ee] feat: fall back to instance storage for AI session backups (#11153 ) * feat: instance object store as fallback for AI session backups Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: fence the instance store sweep by generation, name it by location Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: pin that an instance store location tells endpoints apart Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: show the instance storage fallback setting on while it is unset Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: check the generation fence queries at compile time Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stop the instance storage fallback once the plan is Pro Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-15 23:09:45 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5	d8d7332eb6	feat: add per-route CORS origin allowlist for HTTP triggers (#10833 ) * feat: add per-route CORS origin allowlist for HTTP triggers Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: fail closed on cold router cache and invalid origin input Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: resolve CORS route from the decoded path like the request handler Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add instance-wide default allowed origins for HTTP routes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let non-superadmins read the default allowed origins setting Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: badge the advanced section when a route's origins are restricted Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: state inherited origins on the control and use one hint row Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: trim the origins tooltip and relabel the toggle when a default exists Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the origins format hint visible until an entry is wrong Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: state the at-least-one requirement in the origins hint Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: import the origins validator in the trigger-http tests Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: make an empty allowlist deny rather than fall back to the default Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review nits on origin validation and the CORS editor * fix: derive the origins error from the stored list and tighten host validation * fix: parse real IPv6 hosts and refuse a newly emptied allowlist * refactor: make origin validation advisory except for null and non-ascii * feat: let an empty allowlist be saved as deny every origin * docs: document the empty allowlist as deny every origin * fix: bound allowlists, reject commas, and decide cors after the handler * chore: revert unrelated rustfmt churn in windmill-common tests * chore: revert unrelated rustfmt churn in windmill-common * chore: drop the route types the cors restructure replaced * fix: take the stricter cors decision from before and after the handler * fix: strip runnable cors headers when the routers are unavailable * docs: document the allowlist bounds in the openapi schema * fix: let an unavailable cors read defer to one that resolved * refactor: carry the resolved cors policy from the handler to the middleware * docs: describe why an unavailable read fails closed on the paths that reach it * fix: validate the default origins on the declarative settings path * test: keep the webhook doc comment with the test it describes * fix: warn on impossible schemes and ports, and validate the instance setting * feat: treat an empty allowlist as unset at both levels * perf: decode the cors path only when the fallback needs it * docs: document the empty allowlist as unset in the api schema * docs: describe an empty allowlist as unset in the frontend comments * docs: say what a null allowlist resolves to, not what it meant before the default existed * docs: state what the validator refuses and why methods stay broad * feat: exempt static asset routes from the origin allowlist * fix: hide the origin control for every static target, not just websites * fix: exempt only static websites, not single-file static assets * fix: warn on an unclosed ipv6 host in the origins advisory * fix: require assets present, not just the static website flag --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-14 11:36:01 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5	abf4c6c234	feat: add a dismissible instance-wide announcement banner (#11037 ) * feat: add a dismissible instance-wide announcement banner Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExBp57hUoB8hQm36bJuUEs * fix: harden instance banner validation and mandatory-banner visibility Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExBp57hUoB8hQm36bJuUEs * fix: sequence instance banner loads and match the backend character cap Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExBp57hUoB8hQm36bJuUEs * fix: gate the settings save on a valid instance banner link Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExBp57hUoB8hQm36bJuUEs * feat: restrict the announcement banner to the managed cloud Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExBp57hUoB8hQm36bJuUEs --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-09 11:20:25 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel Claude Fable 5.1 windmill-internal-app[bot]	79426a1a68	feat: reconcile IdP instance groups from the SSO groups claim (#10957 ) * feat: add sso_groups_claim setting for login-time instance group sync Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YESxWqzt959S6TY6vbc4eG * chore: bump ee-repo-ref for the SSO groups claim reconcile Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YESxWqzt959S6TY6vbc4eG * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 3b89bfc11314a326a191101cfe3ef65f6f7f82a8 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #774 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: e388527f9adbbe466fe050ca8d1d236ce3342bc3 New ee-repo-ref: 3b89bfc11314a326a191101cfe3ef65f6f7f82a8 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-03 22:23:43 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5	d472193e5b	feat: add retention cleanup for the otel_traces table (#10949 ) * feat: add retention cleanup for the otel_traces table Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NLhUaCPpLRAa29rSZDjS28 * fix: vacuum otel_traces and badge its retention setting EE Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NLhUaCPpLRAa29rSZDjS28 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-02 19:41:46 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel Claude Opus 5 windmill-internal-app[bot]	815de49e23	feat: make the service log retention period an instance setting (#10889 ) * feat: make the service log retention period an instance setting Service log retention was a hardcoded 14 days with no override, unlike job retention. It becomes the `service_log_retention_secs` global setting (env `SERVICE_LOG_RETENTION_SECS`, default unchanged at 14 days), reloaded on change like the other retention settings. The constant becomes `DEFAULT_SERVICE_LOG_RETENTION_SECS` and every reader goes through `service_log_retention_secs()`, so the `log_file` sweep, the object-storage orphan scan, the columnar store's compaction and pruning, the retrieval clamp and the search index's trim window all follow the configured value. Loaded outside `initial_load`'s `server_mode` guard: a dedicated indexer trims the search index to a window derived from this value and is not a server. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN * fix: never let a non-positive service log retention expire every log Every service log cutoff is `now - retention`, so a `0` or negative window puts the cutoff at or after `now` and the next sweep reads the whole history as expired — deleting the `log_file` rows and their object-storage files irreversibly. `0` is reachable two ways now that the window is configurable: it is what an operator types by analogy with the job retention period sitting directly above it, where `0` does mean keep forever; and `SecondsInput` writes a `0` into a field that was merely focused, so saving the Jobs panel is enough. Service logs always have a window, so clamp an unusable value back to the default in the accessor every reader already goes through. The upper bound is where `chrono::Duration::seconds` panics, which would abort the sweep that reads it. The settings field rejects a non-positive value rather than silently correcting it, and its description now names the database rows too — they are swept on every instance, including one with no object storage configured. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN * fix: address review findings on the service log retention setting - Bound the monitor's `log_file` sweep. Every process rotates a log file a minute, so lowering the retention can make one ordinary setting change expire millions of rows; the unbounded `DELETE ... RETURNING` materialized all of them, and their deletion futures, in a single tick. Batched like the settings-page cleanup on the same table. - Make the retention atomic private and give it one writer, so a value that would expire every service log cannot reach a cutoff by any path, and say so in the log when one is rejected rather than falling back silently. - Cap the retention at a century. The previous ceiling only bounded `TimeDelta` construction, while consumers compute `now - retention`, which panics past year 262143, and build a Postgres interval that overflows well before the old cap. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN * fix: cap an oversized service log retention instead of shortening it The two unusable directions were landing on the same fallback, so configuring a retention above the ceiling silently produced 14 days — deleting logs the operator had asked to keep for longer. Too large now caps at the maximum, which preserves that intent; only a non-positive value, which would expire everything and has no upward reading, falls back to the default. Also bound the `log_file` drain to ten batches per pass: `monitor_db` runs under a 600s timeout that cancels every maintenance future in the same `join!` and reports a critical error, so a backlog large enough to need batching has to drain across ticks, the way the neighbouring sweeps already do. The settings field carries the upper bound too, and the superseded query's offline entry is dropped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN * fix: route the new log-file registration cutoff through the retention accessor `send_log_files_to_object_store` arrived on main while this branch was open and reads the retention directly. The atomic behind it is private now, so it goes through the accessor like every other consumer — which also means the cutoff it uses to skip registering already-expired files follows the configured retention rather than a fixed two weeks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN * fix: say why every mode loads the service log retention setting A worker registers its rotated log files against the retention cutoff, so the comment naming only the indexer no longer covers why the setting sits outside the `server_mode` guard. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN * fix: file service log retention under Monitoring, not Jobs Service logs are the Windmill processes' own logs — every process rotates and registers its own, no job involved — so the Jobs panel was grouping by the shape of the widget rather than by the subject. It sits under Monitoring now, beside the Indexer panel that holds the other service-log window. Its own section rather than inside that panel: the panel is badged EE, while this governs the database sweep that runs on every instance. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN * chore: update ee-repo-ref to a6e3533b26195918a17fea58646f71d2bbcde288 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #752 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 1d93da24bd166b9a5a5cc204034a1d35ffc88474 New ee-repo-ref: a6e3533b26195918a17fea58646f71d2bbcde288 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * feat: say on the service logs page where the logs actually are The retention number alone does not tell an operator what it governs, and the answer differs by instance. Two states are worth calling out because they are the ones where retention does not mean what it looks like: Without instance object storage, each process keeps its files on its own disk. The page lists what every host wrote, since the rows are in the shared database, but can only open the files of the replica serving the request, and a host's files go with it when it is replaced. With object storage but "Delete logs from s3 periodically" off — the backend default, since uploads are gated on a store existing while deletions are gated on that toggle — expiring a log removes the row and the local file and leaves the uploaded copy behind for good. The retention field itself now names every copy it covers and says that full-text search reaches back at most that far, and less when the indexer's own window is shorter. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN * fix: describe raw log files as the transient copy they became Retiring the raw files landed while this was being written: the indexer now deletes each one as soon as it is ingested, and the log viewer rebuilds a file from the columnar store once the raw copy is gone. So the durable copy is the store, and warning that an uploaded file is kept forever when periodic s3 deletion is off only holds where no indexer runs to ingest it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN * chore: point ee-repo-ref at the EE compile fix EE main does not build on its own: extracting the index-window expression and adding a fourth copy of it landed in separate PRs that never conflicted textually. windmill-ee-private#756 is the one-line fix; this pins it so CI has a tree that compiles. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WsnpNSM6K3oyjwntRwJtVN --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-08-29 19:39:14 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5	2906504125	feat: add instance setting to mute zombie job restart alerts (#10813 ) * feat: add instance setting to opt out of zombie job restart alerts Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: preserve explicit false for default-on boolean instance settings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: invert zombie restart alert setting to a mute flag Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-24 22:36:21 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5	ef99a739dd	fix(github-app): complete the self-managed setup instructions, render the page header (#10683 ) * docs(github-app): state the pull-direction permissions and the App owner field The in-product "How to create a GitHub App" panel only listed Contents and Metadata, which covers the push direction of git sync. Webhooks, pull requests and checks are what the git to Windmill direction needs, and a GHE Cloud (.ghe.com) app also needs App owner, whose field hint was the only place saying so. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> fix(instance-settings): render the GitHub App page header The branch tested the pre-rename category name, so the page rendered with no header at all. Naming the header after the category duplicates the card below it, so the card that holds the app credentials is now labelled for what it is, next to the webhook base url card. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-13 11:03:42 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5	71b9989daa	feat: auto-build binaries to object storage on deployment (#10673 ) * feat: auto-build binaries to object storage on deployment Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: queue the auto-build from pre-locked deploys and off the lock slot Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: materialize companion modules before a deploy-time build Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep a build job from stamping lock_error_logs on a healthy script Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: de-flake test_flow_lock_all and surface the lock error it hides Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: trim drafting history from the flow-lock fixture comments Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stop a binary build from restarting dedicated workers Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the build-job marker off the agent wire and out of user args Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-13 07:50:28 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel	2d2cdb7a99	allowlist resource_type and escape fuzzy-search highlights (#10509 ) * fix: allowlist resource_type and escape search highlights * fix: bound path length and keep marked-label offsets entity-aware * fix: match postgres word-char semantics and drop double-escaping * fix: sanitize db constraint and rls errors instead of relying on the regex	2026-08-04 17:07:56 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel Claude Opus 5 windmill-internal-app[bot]	318c9f0073	feat(git-sync): dedicated base url for GitHub webhook delivery (#10411 ) * feat(git-sync): let GitHub webhooks register a dedicated base url Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): validate the webhook base url and apply it on change Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: pin ee ref for the git-sync webhook base url change Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): validate and reconcile the webhook base url on every write path Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): route every declarative settings writer through the same rules Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): let the reconciler own the webhook field write-back Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): make the webhook base url validators agree across UI and server Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): lock the workspace row across git_sync read-modify-writes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: pin the webhook base url validator to its server counterpart Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): retry a failed webhook move on every re-apply of the setting Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): retry pending webhook moves on every declarative re-apply Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): reject non-string webhook base urls and bound the sweep Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): reject credential-bearing webhook base urls Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): keep credentials out of webhook base url validation errors Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): redact through the last authority @ when reporting a bad url Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): stop echoing unparsed webhook base urls instead of scrubbing them Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): never echo a submitted webhook base url in validation errors Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): keep the submitted scheme out of validation errors Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(git-sync): drop the webhook sweep, surface stale receivers in settings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): refresh the stale webhook list when settings are saved Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): mark registered_url nullable and drop the duplicated field error Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: pin ee ref after dropping the reconcile lock and CAS Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(git-sync): refresh the stale webhook list on category saves too Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to aa05ca8e97fc8265cd724753a80db37f83243254 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #695 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 3e6cd9226b68707233ae2434511fe5131dce808b New ee-repo-ref: aa05ca8e97fc8265cd724753a80db37f83243254 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-07-30 23:27:12 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5	621718b32f	fix(ai): resolve deployment-pinned Azure base URLs to the v1 surface (#10362 ) An Azure OpenAI base URL naming a deployment, such as the `https://<res>.openai.azure.com/openai/deployments/<id>` format that `openai_azure_base_path` documents, was appended to as-is. That names the legacy surface, which serves only with an `api-version` query and answers 404 without one, so both the proxy and the AI agent step reached a route that does not exist. Such a base now resolves to the resource root and the v1 surface, like every other Azure shape. The deployment in the URL is redundant there: the v1 surface takes it from the request body. `azure_foundry_root` recovers the root the same way, so a Foundry resource on such a base builds its Claude URL from the root too. The instance-settings help text promised the URL pins the model for every workspace, which that surface never delivered; it now says where the model comes from. Verified against a live Azure OpenAI resource: the previous URLs 404 and the ones built now return 200. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-27 22:31:36 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel	434c4ac7c8	chore: pin ruff to 0.16.0 and keep the python editor rule set stable (#10331 ) * chore: pin ruff to 0.16.0 and keep the python editor rule set stable * chore: keep the ruff config path rationale at a single site	2026-07-26 14:10:02 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel	ddec2abbb3	feat(jobs): cap total queued jobs per workspace on cloud (#10218 ) * feat(jobs): cap total queued jobs per workspace on cloud A workspace could flood the queue with an unbounded number of jobs across many concurrency keys and scripts (or keyless jobs), which the per-key cap from #10197 does not bound. Add a companion instance-wide ceiling on a workspace's total queued jobs. check_workspace_queue_cap rejects a push once the workspace has WORKSPACE_MAX_QUEUED_JOBS (default 20000, superadmin-configurable, 0 to disable) jobs queued, cloud-only and runtime-gated on CLOUD_HOSTED like the per-key cap. It runs on every push, so it applies even to premium workspaces and catches parallel for-loop floods. Jobs already queued still drain; only new pushes past the ceiling are rejected, so an in-flight flow only fails to push further work while at the ceiling. The setting loader self-gates on CLOUD_HOSTED so it is never loaded off cloud, from initial load or a settings-change reload. The depth count is bounded by the cap via LIMIT so a runaway backlog never costs an unbounded scan on the push path. * docs(jobs): note the workspace cap is a soft ceiling and the depth helper is count-only Records the two review points as constraints: the cap does not serialize admission (a soft ceiling by design, like the per-key cap), and workspace_queue_depth is pub only for the test, returns a count not job data, and leaves authorization to the caller.	2026-07-20 22:09:59 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel	71f2d47cb4	feat: cap queued jobs per concurrency key on cloud (#10197 ) * feat: cap queued jobs per concurrency key on cloud * fix: close preprocessed-flow bypass and bound concurrency cap scan * fix: only cap concurrency keys with an active concurrent_limit * chore: only load concurrency key cap setting when cloud hosted * fix: reject queued-job import on cloud	2026-07-20 12:33:40 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel Claude Opus 4.8 windmill-internal-app[bot]	ff774c46bf	feat: add per-workspace job-retention override (#10050 ) * feat: add per-workspace job-retention override (EE) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 2ba6a2a75b6fc97858b306b2c98ada481e363c10 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #658 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: e7fb36acd813cd717bcf05f5aafbf81de271d618 New ee-repo-ref: 2ba6a2a75b6fc97858b306b2c98ada481e363c10 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-07-11 23:46:34 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel Claude Opus 4.8 windmill-internal-app[bot]	577ceeee86	perf(audit): re-anchor S3 audit export on enable + opt-in backfill (#9818 ) * [ee] perf(audit): re-anchor S3 audit export on enable + opt-in backfill The S3/GCS audit-log export's steady-state query filters by `age(xmin)` (unindexable), so the only scan bound is the timestamp floor. On a fresh enable the floor was epoch, and on a re-enable the cursor resumed from its pre-disable position — either way the first run scanned the whole `audit_partitioned` table. Under a `statement_timeout` (e.g. Aiven) that scan never completes: the cursor never advances, nothing is exported, and the repeated full scans saturate the database. Re-anchor on enable (EE companion, windmill-ee-private#634): - New trigger migration records a recent timestamp floor instead of the epoch sentinel and `DO UPDATE`s the cursor to the current snapshot xmin on re-enable, so the export always resumes from ~now and never rescans history. Includes a one-time fixup for legacy epoch-sentinel checkpoints on upgrade. Opt-in historical backfill (new `audit_logs_s3_backfill` module + endpoints): - Exports a chosen `[from, to)` window on demand, scanning strictly by `timestamp` (the partition key) in bounded keyset pages — each query is an index scan capped at one page (verified via EXPLAIN: later partitions `never executed`, ~11ms/page), so it stays well under any statement timeout regardless of window size. Writes alongside the steady-state objects under logs/audit/, without touching the xmin cursor. - POST /settings/audit_logs_s3_backfill {from,to} (super-admin + Enterprise), GET /settings/audit_logs_s3_backfill_status. Also repurposes the status endpoint's `bootstrapping` flag to mean "draining a backlog" (the cursor is capped and catching up), and updates the setting description to point operators at the backfill. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(audit): heartbeat backfill lease per object; bump EE ref Address review (cubic): persist progress (refreshing the lease heartbeat) after every object PUT in the backfill page loop, not only once per page, so the gap between heartbeats stays well under STALE_HEARTBEAT_SECS even on slow uploads and another replica can't re-claim mid-page and run a concurrent backfill. Bumps ee-repo-ref.txt to pull in the EE test-race fix (folding the backlog-drain regression into the single audit e2e test). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(audit): reject unstable backfill windows; bump EE ref Address review (P1): the backfill keyset-pages over rows visible at scan time and declares completion when the scan runs dry, but a row's `timestamp` is its inserting transaction's `xact_start`. A window whose upper bound is recent or in the future could silently omit a transaction that started inside `[from, to)` but commits after the scan passed that timestamp. `try_start` now rejects any `to` newer than the oldest in-flight `xact_start` (everything strictly older than the oldest running transaction is committed and stable), using the same trustworthy stats gating as the exporter's floor (restricted role / 2PC → a 7-day-old cutoff). Bumps ee-repo-ref.txt for the EE monotonic-checkpoint fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(audit): re-anchor legacy epoch checkpoints instead of synthetic floor Address review (P1): the legacy-checkpoint fixup stamped last_oldest_inflight_ts to now()-7d while leaving the old last_xmin in place. On an instance that enabled export on the old code >7 days ago and got stuck before the first successful batch, the next run would filter post-enable rows older than 7 days out via `timestamp >= ts_floor` while still advancing last_xmin over the interval — silently dropping them (the same floor-vs-cursor loss class fixed elsewhere in this PR), and contradicting the "nothing committed after enabling is skipped" guarantee. A stuck epoch-sentinel checkpoint cannot be safely resumed (its backlog can be arbitrarily old, so any recent floor prunes rows the cursor then skips, and an epoch floor reintroduces the full scan). Re-anchor it to the migration's current snapshot xmin instead — exactly like a fresh enable — so the export resumes cleanly from ~now and the never-exported pre-upgrade window is recovered via the opt-in backfill rather than silently dropped. Reword the setting description so it no longer implies the disabled/legacy window is covered by the cursor. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(audit): end-to-end integration tests for the object-store backfill The backfill previously had only SQL-level/EXPLAIN validation. Add real integration tests (in-memory object store, sqlx::test) exercising the public path: - backfill_exports_window_in_pages: with the page size forced to 2 rows, a settled 3-day window is exported across multiple keyset pages; asserts every in-window row lands exactly once, rows outside [from,to) are excluded, a day that straddles a page boundary yields more than one object, progress counts match, and a re-run is idempotent (deterministic keys overwritten, no dupes). - backfill_rejects_unstable_window: a future/live `to` is rejected as unstable, a window safely in the past is accepted. Adds a test-only PAGE_ROWS override so multi-page behaviour is exercised with a handful of rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(audit): note backfill scope is audit_partitioned only Make explicit that, like the steady-state export, the backfill reads only audit_partitioned; the pre-partitioning `audit` table is intentionally out of scope (not a missed case). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(audit): reject backfill windows before the partitioned boundary Address review (Codex P1): the backfill reads only audit_partitioned, but pre-partitioning history lives in the legacy `audit` table (still read by audit list/get via UNION ALL, and retained for the configured period — 365 days by default on EE). Since the setting text points operators at this API for "pre-existing history", a window overlapping legacy rows would report completion while silently omitting them. Per the decision to not export the legacy table, reject instead of silently omit: try_start now rejects a `from` earlier than the oldest audit_partitioned timestamp (every legacy row predates the partition cutover, so a `from` at/after that boundary can never overlap them). Reworded the setting text to scope the backfill to the partitioned era. Added a regression test, plus an RAII guard (cubic P2) so the test-only globals are restored even if an assertion panics. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(audit): backfill object keys per-window; require trustworthy settled cutoff Address review (two P1s): - Object-key overwrite loss: keys were `dt=<day>/audit_backfill_<min_id>.ndjson`. A narrower, overlapping backfill can start a day's page at the same first row (same min_id) but hold fewer rows, and `put` would overwrite a broader run's object — silently dropping the rows only that object held. Include the requested window in the key so different ranges write disjoint objects (same window re-runs stay idempotent; consumers dedupe overlapping rows by id). New regression test (verified red→green). - Untrustworthy settled cutoff: when min(xact_start) isn't trustworthy (role lacks pg_read_all_stats/superuser, or a prepared 2PC txn exists), the old now()-7d fallback could still let an old transaction commit rows inside an accepted window after the scan, so a "complete" backfill silently missed them. Since a backfill asserts completeness, reject in those cases instead of falling back. (The continuous exporter keeps its 7-day fallback — it only claims bounded lag.) Also makes the tests robust under the parallel runner: run_backfill takes the store as a param, so tests pass a local in-memory store (no global OBJECT_STORE_SETTINGS race) and serialize on the PAGE_ROWS override. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(audit): reject backfill overlapping legacy table; regen deref openapi; trim migration comment Address review (1 P1 + 2 P2): - Empty-partition backfill (P1): the min(audit_partitioned) guard no-ops when audit_partitioned is empty, so an upgraded instance with legacy `audit` rows but no partitioned rows yet would accept a window and complete with zero rows, silently omitting the legacy rows. Check the legacy `audit` table directly: reject any window that overlaps a legacy row (subsumes the boundary check and covers the empty-partitioned case). Test updated accordingly. - openapi-deref (P2): regenerate openapi-deref.yaml/json (served via include_str!) so /openapi.{yaml,json} expose the new backfill endpoints. - Migration comment (P2): trim the PR-history narration to the durable constraints (why a recent floor and a monotonic cursor are required), per AGENTS.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to b821fecccbcba2efed544890576bf2b84321d70d This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #634 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 6b191b77aabcf77658ad4f9031576e0d7b66bf89 New ee-repo-ref: b821fecccbcba2efed544890576bf2b84321d70d Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-06-26 21:37:33 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 4.8	796230d90a	fix(workspaces): add instance setting to disable workspace invite/add emails (#9643 ) * feat(workspaces): add skip_email option to invite_user and add_user endpoints The workspace invite_user and add_user API endpoints unconditionally sent notification emails when SMTP was configured, with no way to suppress them per-request. This is noise for automated workflows that programmatically add users to workspaces. Add an optional `skip_email: Option<bool>` field to `NewWorkspaceInvite` and `NewWorkspaceUser`, following the existing pattern on `NewUser` used by POST /api/users/create, and guard the `send_email_if_possible` calls with `if !nu.skip_email.unwrap_or(false)`. The field is optional, so existing clients are unaffected. The auto-add code paths in workspaces_ee.rs (domain-based and instance-group auto-add) are auto-triggered and take no API parameter, so they are left as-is. Fixes WIN-2068 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(workspaces): make workspace invite/add emails toggleable via instance setting Replace the per-request skip_email approach with an instance-level setting `disable_workspace_invite_emails`. When enabled, the email notifications sent by the workspace invite_user and add_user endpoints are suppressed. Useful for instances where users are added programmatically (e.g. CI pipelines that fork workspaces and add users) and the invite emails are noise. Backend: - Add `DISABLE_WORKSPACE_INVITE_EMAILS_SETTING` global setting constant. - Guard the `send_email_if_possible` calls in invite_user and add_user with a read of that setting (via the existing `load_value_from_global_settings` helper). Defaults to false, so existing behavior is unchanged. - Revert the per-request `skip_email` field on NewWorkspaceInvite / NewWorkspaceUser and the corresponding openapi additions. Frontend: - Expose the setting as a boolean toggle in the SMTP tab of the instance settings (superadmin). The auto-add paths in workspaces_ee.rs are unaffected. Fixes WIN-2068 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): gate disable_workspace_invite_emails toggle behind EE Email delivery (send_email_if_possible) is a no-op outside the EE/private build, so the toggle has no effect on a pure-OSS instance. Add `ee_only: ''` to match the sibling SMTP settings: the toggle is grayed out (with an EE badge) on non-EE instances instead of rendering as an active no-op control. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): don't EE-gate disable_workspace_invite_emails toggle The earlier ee_only addition was based on the false premise that the workspace invite/add emails are license-gated. They are not: SMTP configuration (SmtpSettings) and email sending (send_email_if_possible) have no enterpriseLicense check — they only require the closed-source build with SMTP configured. The sibling smtp_settings carries ee_only: '' but its smtp_connect field renders no SettingCard label, so that flag is inert (no badge, no disable). On a plain boolean field ee_only is fully active, which incorrectly grayed out the toggle and showed an EE badge. Drop ee_only so the control matches the actual non-license-gated behavior. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-18 16:59:11 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel Claude Opus 4.8 windmill-internal-app[bot]	afddfe8445	feat(worker): #ssh directive to run a bash script on a remote SSH host (#9479 ) * feat(worker): #ssh directive to run a bash script on a remote SSH host Add a first-class `#ssh <resource_path>` bash directive that reroutes a normal bash script to run on a remote host reached over SSH (a jump/utility node) instead of on the worker, with full parity: typed positional args in, structured result out, live streamed logs, cancellation, and remote exit-code propagation. It mirrors the existing `# sandbox <image>` precedent: the directive is parsed in handle_bash_job and reroutes to a specialized handler that reuses handle_child for all execution plumbing. - windmill-common: BashAnnotations::ssh_target() parser (+ unit test) and the ssh_execution_enabled instance setting (off by default) - windmill-worker: reroute hook in bash_executor + ssh_executor_oss shim. OSS returns a clear "enterprise feature" error; the real handler lives in ssh_executor_ee.rs (private feature) and is gated by a valid enterprise license + the instance setting. - examples/usecase/ssh-execution-wrapper: the ssh_target resource type, a userland wrapper (no-license fallback), and a README documenting both paths and the trade-offs vs agent workers. EE companion: windmill-labs/windmill-ee-private (ee-repo-ref.txt bumped). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(worker): ssh host-key opt-in, 0600 key write, instance setting UI * chore: update ee-repo-ref * feat(worker): #ssh $arg form to take the ssh target from a job argument * fix(worker): #ssh token must look like a target; $arg restricted to path strings * fix(worker): tighten #ssh parser to exact directive; add -- ssh destination guard * chore: update ee-repo-ref to d45b9a6cbe40f7fe5d322c850c50f64a6980e4f0 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #609 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 2804f1aa8e74b3a7733aeb6f5044d5085193872a New ee-repo-ref: d45b9a6cbe40f7fe5d322c850c50f64a6980e4f0 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-06-10 15:14:37 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.8	7590b28108	feat(sandbox): pull/extract images with crane instead of podman (#9455 ) * feat(sandbox): pull/extract images with crane instead of podman (+ add to image) The sandboxed container runtime (`# sandbox <image>`) only ever pulls + flattens an image (nsjail does the run), so a full container engine is overkill — and podman was never actually in any Dockerfile, so the merged feature couldn't run in the shipped image. Switch to crane (google/go-containerregistry): a single ~25MB static binary, no daemon/store/root/privileged. - docker_v2.rs: crane export -> flattened rootfs tar, crane config -> OCI config, crane digest -> content-addressed rootfs+config cache (cross-job dedup + automatic freshness), crane manifest -> pre-download size guard. DOCKER_CONFIG authfile dir. Cache eviction prunes the rootfs-tar cache by mtime (LRU). Pull policy honored via a ref->digest cache (missing/never reuse without a registry hit). - Dockerfile + docker/DockerfileSlim{,Ee}: install the crane binary (Full/FullEe and the EE image inherit it via FROM the base image). - docs + UI text + instance-setting descriptions updated (download size is compressed; cache is the rootfs-tar cache). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sandbox): address CI review — digest-pinned fetch, size cap on every job, eviction race Codex P1s: - Fetch by the resolved digest (name@digest), not the mutable tag, so content can't diverge from the digest the cache is keyed under if a tag moves mid-fetch. - Enforce the size cap on EVERY job via a cached {digest}.size sidecar (no registry call on cache reuse), so lowering the limit rejects already-cached oversized images. - Eviction race: hardlink the cache tar into the job dir before tar -xf (pins the inode against concurrent eviction) and re-fetch if it was evicted first. Claude P2s: atomic config sidecar (tmp+rename) + tolerate torn parse; soften the LRU comment (mtime = creation order); sweep orphaned .tmp. and .size on eviction. +digest_key/ref_key unit tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sandbox): P1 cross-fs cache staging (EXDEV), Dockerfile arch fail-fast CI re-review (Claude + Codex P1): the eviction-race hardlink crosses filesystems in the shipped deployments — the cache is its own volume (/tmp/windmill/cache) while the job dir is on the container fs — so hard_link returns EXDEV (not NotFound) and every sandbox job fails. Fall back to tokio::fs::copy on a non-NotFound link error; copy reads through the source inode so it still survives a concurrent eviction. Also: Dockerfiles fail fast with a clear error on an unsupported arch instead of building a 404 crane URL; ref->digest file written via tmp+rename (no torn read under missing/never). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(sandbox): say 'oldest by creation time' not 'LRU' for cache eviction Codex P2: the code evicts by tar creation time (cache hits don't touch mtime), so the user-facing docs + instance-setting text shouldn't claim true LRU. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-05 13:52:55 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.8	1727271e19	feat: sandboxed daemonless container runtime via '# sandbox <image>' (#9453 ) * feat: add sandboxed docker v2 runtime via '# docker <image>' Run a container image as a subprogram of the job's own nsjail sandbox: extract the image rootfs with podman (rootless) and run it chrooted inside the job's nsjail, so the container inherits the job's confinement and is safe under nsjail / for untrusted code. Selected by '# docker <image>'; a bare '# docker' keeps the v1 (dind) path untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: default to daemonless docker (drop dind from compose, allow docker on cloud) docker-compose no longer ships the dind sidecar (v2 is daemonless: podman + nsjail in the worker); removed the dind service, DOCKER_HOST env, depends_on and volume. Removed the language-picker guard that blocked Docker scripts on the multi-tenant platform, now that v2 makes docker safe to run sandboxed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: select sandboxed container via # sandbox <image>; add pull policy + size guards - Surface moved from '# docker <image>' to '# sandbox <image>' (groups under the sandbox annotation; '# docker' stays v1-only, '# sandbox' stays nsjail-bash). - SANDBOX_IMAGE_PULL_POLICY (default 'newer') so moving tags don't go stale. - SANDBOX_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE_MB rejects oversized images before extraction. - SANDBOX_IMAGE_CACHE_MAX_MB best-effort LRU eviction of podman's image store. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(sandbox): support # volume, honor nsjail tmp instance settings, v2 docker template - Thread shared_mount into the sandbox container nsjail config so '# volume' mounts (and the same-worker /tmp/shared folder) apply inside the container. - Use resolve_nsjail_tmp_mount_block for the container's /tmp so it honors the same nsjail_tmp_backing / nsjail_tmpfs_size_mb instance settings as other nsjail jobs. - docker-compose comment + the editor's Docker template now use '# sandbox <image>'. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(sandbox): make image size/cache/pull-policy UI instance settings Convert SANDBOX_IMAGE_* from worker env vars to DB-backed instance settings (sandbox_image_max_size_mb, sandbox_image_cache_max_mb, sandbox_image_pull_policy), hot-reloaded via the same mechanism as nsjail_tmpfs_size_mb and configurable in #superadmin-settings. No worker restart needed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(sandbox): windmill-managed registry — default registry + private auth Two new instance settings: - sandbox_image_default_registry: prepended to unqualified image refs (alpine -> <registry>/alpine); fully-qualified refs untouched. - sandbox_registry_auth: docker/podman auth.json blob written to a per-job authfile (0600, removed with the job) and passed to podman --authfile for private registries. Both hot-reloaded and configurable in #superadmin-settings. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sandbox): protobuf-safe proto_str escaper, atomic 0600 authfile, registry tests Addresses local-review P2s: proto_str now emits valid protobuf octal escapes for control/non-ASCII bytes (not Rust \u{..} that nsjail would reject); the registry authfile is created 0600 atomically (no world-readable window); add a registry_qualified table test + a non-ASCII proto_str case. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sandbox): P0 — deliver image env via nsjail envar:, never the launcher process env CI review (P0): the image's OCI Env (attacker-controlled keys+values) was applied to the nsjail launcher process via .envs(), so a hostile image could set LD_PRELOAD/ LD_LIBRARY_PATH/LD_AUDIT on nsjail itself and execute code as the worker outside the jail. Now the image env is rendered as proto-escaped 'envar:' directives (child-only) and nsjail's process env carries only windmill-trusted keys (reserved vars + proxy). Also: warn instead of silently bypassing the size guard on inspect failure; reset the eviction guard via a Drop guard (no stuck flag on panic/early-return). +render_envars test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sandbox): P0 symlink-write escape via rootfs script; P1 redact registry-auth logging CI review: - P0 (Codex): the body was written into the image-controlled rootfs as .windmill_docker_main.sh via write_file (follows symlinks) — a hostile image could plant that path as a symlink to a host file and capture the worker's write before nsjail starts. Now the body is passed straight to 'sh -c <body> sh <args>'; no file is written into the rootfs at all. - P1 (Codex): sandbox_registry_auth flowed through the generic setting loader which logs the value (raw auth.json credentials). Replaced with a secret-aware reload that loads directly and logs only a redacted 'configured=' message. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sandbox): redact sandbox_registry_auth in instance-settings write log too The settings API also logs 'Set global setting <key> to <value>' via format_setting_value; add sandbox_registry_auth to SENSITIVE_SETTINGS so the credential is redacted there as well as on reload. * fix(sandbox): don't silently disable cache eviction on podman images parse error Re-review (cubic/Claude P2): serde_json::from_slice(...).unwrap_or_default() meant any parse hiccup (e.g. podman omitting Size/Created via omitempty for a zero value, or schema drift) silently degraded to an empty Vec and disabled eviction with no log. Now Size/Created are #[serde(default)] (a missing omitempty key -> 0, not a whole-array parse failure) and a real parse error warns + breaks instead of being swallowed. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-05 08:35:51 +00:00
Ruben Fiszel	8bf7fd2c92	feat(queue): stochastic admission + EE availability of workspace fairness algorithm (#9321 )	2026-05-26 04:51:53 +00:00
Ruben Fiszel	de2e243313	feat(queue): per-workspace fairness cap on the shared cloud worker pool (#9303 ) * feat(queue): cloud-only per-workspace fairness cap on the shared worker pool On `app.windmill.dev` the cluster runs a single default worker group, so a single workspace flooding the queue can degrade quality of service for everyone else. This adds an opt-in mechanism that caps any single workspace at a configurable share of the shared worker pool when it has been dominating cluster activity for more than a configurable window. Detection signal counts both currently-running jobs and jobs completed in the rolling window, so it catches workspaces hogging slots with long jobs and workspaces spamming many tiny jobs (where no individual job's started_at is old, but throughput share dominates). Refresh is coordinated cluster-wide via a single UPDATE on `background_task_state`: the `WHERE updated_at < now() - interval` predicate combined with row-level locking means only one process per refresh cycle actually runs the aggregation, regardless of fleet size. Every other process gets the freshly written value in the same round trip via `UNION ALL ... LIMIT 1`. Heavy aggregation rate stays at ~0.2-0.5 qps for the whole cluster. Pull queries are split: the existing query string and its bind shape stay bit-identical to today, so the planner keeps using the same indexes when fairness is off or no workspace is currently capped. A separate `WORKER_PULL_QUERIES_FAIRNESS` adds `AND workspace_id <> ALL($2::text[])` and is only materialized while the feature is enabled. Hard-gated to `CLOUD_HOSTED=true` + BASE_URL host == app.windmill.dev at three layers: frontend `cloudonly: true`, API setter rejection in `set_global_setting_internal`, runtime check in `fairness_active`. Settings are exposed under Jobs in the instance-settings UI; defaults are off so the change is a no-op for self-hosted. Two-pass pull guarantees no worker idling: if every queued job belongs to a capped workspace, the second pass uses the unmodified pull queries. Cap re-asserts on the next refresh. Fixes WIN-1982 * fix(queue): address CI review findings on workspace fairness Six fixes from the four-reviewer cross-check on #9303: 1. Aggregation evaluation (Codex P1). The previous `INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE WHERE updated_at < ...` had the heavy `v2_job_queue ∪ v2_job_completed` aggregation inlined into `VALUES`, which Postgres evaluates for every contender to build the proposed row — losing the "one heavy aggregation per cycle cluster-wide" property the design advertises. Split into three small statements: (a) cheap claim with constant `VALUES`, (b) winner-only `UPDATE ... SET value = jsonb_build_object('overloaded', <agg>)` (Postgres only evaluates `SET` per row matching `WHERE`, so losers never compute the aggregation), (c) read for everyone. Heavy query now truly runs ~0.2-0.5 qps cluster-wide regardless of fleet size. 2. Numeric setting wraparound (cubic P1). `u64 as u32` and downstream `u32 as i32` could silently flip sign and feed `make_interval(secs => -N)`, making `now() - interval` a future timestamp and disabling the completed-jobs half of the activity signal. Clamp `duration_secs` to [1, 86400] and `min_total_jobs` to [0, u32::MAX] before storing. 3. `/instance_config` bypass (cubic/Claude/Codex P2). Bulk config endpoint sidestepped `set_global_setting_internal`'s gate; a self-hosted superadmin could persist `workspace_fairness_` rows via the bulk path. Mirror the per-key check in `set_instance_config` upsert flow. 4. DB error coerced to false (Claude P2).* `load_workspace_fairness_enabled` collapsed `Err(_)` to `false` and unconditionally swapped the atomic — a transient DB blip during notify-event propagation toggled the feature off cluster-wide (and triggered a `store_pull_query` rebuild precisely when load is highest). Now propagates the error so the atomic stays at its prior value. 5. Refresh failure cooldown (Claude P2). Storing `0` removed the rate limit entirely; every subsequent pull spawned a new refresh task. Leave `LAST_REFRESH_MICROS` at `now_us` (already written by the CAS) so the natural interval acts as the cooldown. 6. Visibility + duplication (Pi P2). Mark `make_pull_query_fairness` as `pub(crate)`. Move the duplicated `BASE_URL host == app.windmill.dev` parser into `windmill-common::worker::is_cloud_production_host` and share it between the API setter and the runtime path. Verified locally: - `POST /api/settings/global/workspace_fairness_enabled` → 400 (per-key gate) - `PUT /api/settings/instance_config` with fairness key → 400 (bulk gate) - `cargo check --workspace --features=private,enterprise,quickjs` — clean Refs WIN-1982. * fix(queue): second round of CI review nits on workspace fairness Three issues raised by the Codex/Claude re-review of commit `0b38ff2`: 1. Non-cloud deletes were rejected (Codex P2). The cloud gate ran before the Null / empty-string deletion branches in both `set_global_setting_internal` and the bulk `set_instance_config`. A self-hosted instance that inherited stale `workspace_fairness_` rows from a cloned cloud DB couldn't clear them through the API — the rows stayed in `global_settings` and continued to show up in the YAML export. Now the gate only blocks upserts; Null / empty-string deletes pass through on any host. 2. Deleted numeric knobs kept stale runtime values (Codex P2). When a cloud admin cleared `workspace_fairness_max_percent`, `..._duration_secs`, or `..._min_total_jobs`, the notify-event fired but the numeric loaders ignored `Ok(None)` and left the previous in-memory value pinned until process restart. Loaders now distinguish three outcomes: - `Err(_)`: transient — leave atomic alone (preserves the previous-round fix). - `Ok(None)` / `Ok(Some(invalid))`: reset to the documented default. - `Ok(Some(valid))`: clamp and store. Defaults are extracted to `WORKSPACE_FAIRNESS__DEFAULT` constants kept in sync with the `AtomicU32::new(...)` initialisers in `windmill-common/src/worker.rs`. 3. `fairness_active` was `pub` with no cross-crate caller (Claude nit). Tightened to module-private. Verified locally on this non-cloud instance: POST .../workspace_fairness_enabled body=null → 200 (delete passes) POST .../workspace_fairness_enabled body=true → 400 (set blocked) PUT .../instance_config {} → 200 (no-op passes) PUT .../instance_config with fairness key → 400 (bulk set blocked) Skipped the partial index on `v2_job_queue WHERE running = true` that Claude flagged as a residual nit — queue stays under 50k rows per the operator's measurement, so the seq-scan cost (~10 ms × 0.5 qps = ~0.5% of a DB core) is well below the noise floor and the index isn't worth the maintenance cost on job transitions. Refs WIN-1982.	2026-05-24 23:41:18 +00:00
Ruben Fiszel	b656dc6cdc	feat(nsjail): optional disk-backed /tmp via instance setting (#9272 ) * feat(nsjail): optional disk-backed /tmp via instance setting * test(nsjail): unit-test tmp mount resolver and narrow visibility * refactor(nsjail): switch tmp backing to select + conditional UI * ui(nsjail): make tmpfs the visible default in /tmp backing select * fix(nsjail): refuse preexisting jail_tmp to block symlink escape * fix(nsjail): allow jail_tmp reuse on sequential nsjail calls Codex flagged that python/ruby/rust executors invoke nsjail twice per job_dir (install then run). The previous resolver treated any preexisting jail_tmp as hostile and silently fell back to tmpfs on the second call, so disk-backed mode never reached the main script run for those langs. Use symlink_metadata().is_dir() to distinguish a real directory left by an earlier call in the same job_dir (safe to reuse) from a symlink or other entity (still refused, as the codebase-tar escape requires). Also loosen the frontend visibility predicate: only hide nsjail settings when job_isolation is explicitly 'none' or 'unshare', so deployments that enable nsjail via DISABLE_NSJAIL=false with no DB setting can still see the controls.	2026-05-21 15:34:49 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.7	1169371d48	feat: add UV_PYTHON_INSTALL_MIRROR env and instance setting (#9271 ) * feat: add UV_PYTHON_INSTALL_MIRROR env and instance setting Allows operators to point `uv python install` at a private mirror of the python-build-standalone releases. Configurable via the `UV_PYTHON_INSTALL_MIRROR` env var or the `uv_python_install_mirror` instance setting, with the env var as the boot fallback and the instance setting taking precedence at reload. Fixes WIN-1966 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: hoist uv_python_install_mirror binding above sandboxing branch The non-sandboxed uv pip install branch referenced a binding that was only declared inside the sandboxed branch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: neutral placeholder for uv_python_install_mirror The previous placeholder was the default public URL the setting is meant to redirect away from. A neutral example mirror URL is clearer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-05-21 05:24:50 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.7	9111f8908d	feat(nsjail): make tmpfs size configurable via instance setting (#9261 ) * feat(nsjail): make tmpfs size configurable via instance setting Adds a new `nsjail_tmpfs_size_mb` instance setting that overrides the size of the `/tmp` tmpfs mount inside the nsjail sandbox across all languages. When unset, the existing per-language defaults (500MB or 800MB) continue to apply, so no behavior change for existing deployments. The setting is exposed under Settings → Jobs and is read at job execution time, so changes take effect on the next job without a restart. Fixes WIN-1963 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(nsjail): unify default tmpfs size to 800MB Previously each executor passed its own per-language default (500MB or 800MB) to resolve_nsjail_tmpfs_size. Unify on a single DEFAULT_NSJAIL_TMPFS_SIZE_BYTES constant (800MB) so the placeholder behavior is consistent across languages. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(nsjail): resolve tmpfs size outside ruby download closure The download.ruby config render runs inside a sync closure passed to par_install_language_dependencies_seq, so `.await` on resolve_nsjail_tmpfs_size() was a compile error under the `ruby` feature. Resolve the size once before the closure and capture the string instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(nsjail): rename resolver to *_bytes and clarify fallback Addresses CI review feedback: - Rename `resolve_nsjail_tmpfs_size` to `resolve_nsjail_tmpfs_size_bytes` so the returned unit is unambiguous at the call site (cubic P2). - Fix the `NSJAIL_TMPFS_SIZE_MB` doc comment that still said "per-language default" — there is no per-language fallback anymore, all unset values resolve to the unified 800MB `DEFAULT_NSJAIL_TMPFS_SIZE_BYTES` (codex/pi P2). - Expand the resolver doc to call out that `Some(0)` and negative values also fall back, since the match arm is `Some(mb) if mb > 0`. No behavior change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-05-20 13:24:49 +00:00
Ruben Fiszelandwindmill-internal-app[bot]	ba6fb7021b	feat: export audit logs to a dedicated object store folder (#9207 ) * feat: export audit logs to dedicated object store folder * fix: gap-free audit export via snapshot-xmin gate and stable object keys * test: add integration test for audit log object store exporter * fix: cursor audit export on snapshot xmin to prevent id-leapfrog loss * fix: protect audit s3 checkpoint from config sync and bound export interval * fix: anchor audit s3 checkpoint at enable time to not skip first-window rows * fix: anchor first audit export at the enable transaction's xid * fix: use epoch timestamp floor on first audit export run to not drop old backlog * fix: anchor audit export at startup for env-var enable path * fix: anchor audit export via enabling-txn snapshot xmin trigger * fix: bound the bootstrap audit export to MAX_XID_INTERVAL per tick * refactor: store audit export cursor in background_task_state, add status endpoint * docs: align store_audit_logs_s3 setting text with the actual enable-boundary contract * [ee] refactor: move audit s3 export core logic to EE, gate on Enterprise license * chore: update ee-repo-ref to ec3cd353245e1cdf6a290528dbd7f2ac2498386c This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #579 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 4ffc6d5f874e64d7dc4a147b4e73baa6c44867a5 New ee-repo-ref: ec3cd353245e1cdf6a290528dbd7f2ac2498386c Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-05-19 14:43:54 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.5	1d279e7a1e	feat: add min release age instance settings for bun and uv (#8956 ) Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-27 22:45:53 +00:00
Ruben Fiszel Claude Opus 4.7 windmill-internal-app[bot]	4cf53a44bb	feat: add auto-login SSO provider instance setting (#8929 ) * [ee] feat: add auto-login SSO provider instance setting Adds an instance-level `auto_login_provider` setting that, when set to an OAuth provider key (e.g. "okta") or "saml", causes the login page to auto-redirect users to the configured SSO flow on mount. Useful for orgs with a single SSO where the provider button grid adds a pointless extra click. - Backend: new global setting constant, read from DB in list_logins handler and returned as the `auto_login` field in the response - Frontend: Login.svelte auto-redirects in loadLogins() when the configured provider is actually present in the response - Escape hatch: `?no_sso=1` skips the auto-redirect and shows the normal login form (admin fallback when SSO is broken) - No redirect loop: if the `error` prop is set (SSO callback failed), the redirect is skipped - Admin UI: new text field under Auth/OAuth/SAML in instance settings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: skip auto-redirect on /user/login page Auto-redirect should only fire on embeds where the user did not explicitly navigate to a login screen (public app popup, approval pages). Visiting /user/login is an explicit sign-in action — often by an admin who needs password fallback — so we must never hijack it. Gate the logic on a new `autoRedirect` prop (default true). The main login page passes `autoRedirect={false}`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to b7157d55fb9f8d8f7aeb7b1fb69bc935af895a2f This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #547 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: e32a48499d206a24e0c12817b465775321b0ee41 New ee-repo-ref: b7157d55fb9f8d8f7aeb7b1fb69bc935af895a2f Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * fix: handle popup-blocked auto-redirect in popup mode When Login is embedded with popup=true (public app), auto-redirect funnels through window.open() without a user gesture — browsers block it by default, leaving the user stuck on "Signing you in…". Detect window.open returning null, clean up listeners, reset autoRedirecting so the provider button grid re-renders, and surface a toast pointing users at the manual button. The grid click retains its user gesture and passes the popup blocker. Also extracts a redirectSaml() helper so the SAML auto-redirect path and the SSO button click share the same logic. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-04-24 04:20:01 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.7	0cfa131254	feat: add disable_password_login global setting (#8873 ) Adds an instance-level toggle that hides the email/password form on the login page and rejects password login, password reset request, and password reset endpoints server-side. Useful for OAuth/SAML-only deployments. - New `disable_password_login` global setting + lazy_static AtomicBool - `load_disable_password_login` loader wired into monitor initial_load and notify_global_setting_change listener - Unauthenticated `GET /auth/is_password_login_disabled` endpoint so the login page can hide the password form when enabled - Toggle in Instance Settings → Auth/OAuth/SAML - Login.svelte hides the password form and the "Log in without third-party" toggle when the setting is on Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-17 18:12:30 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6	4dc54ca3aa	fix: persist indexer max_index_time_window_secs setting (#8821 ) * fix: persist indexer max_index_time_window_secs setting Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: toggle UX for indexer time window cap Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-13 23:56:38 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6	3f5841f84d	feat: instance-level ruff config auto-pulled by LSP container (#8803 ) * feat: add instance-level ruff config auto-pulled by LSP container Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: move ruff config to new LSP tab in instance settings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-13 16:04:49 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6	506b7f55e1	fix: zero-downtime coordinated restarts for OTEL and other setting changes (#8768 ) * fix: zero-downtime coordinated restarts for OTEL and other setting changes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: use background_task_state for server heartbeats and fix stale heartbeat detection Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: show restart propagation toast when saving settings that trigger server restarts Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-08 20:35:27 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6	c09a4311fd	fix: remove stale KMS openapi/description, restore stripped doc comments Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-06 15:19:03 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6	09bbc18bb7	feat: add AWS Secrets Manager as secret storage backend (Beta) (#8734 ) * feat: add AWS KMS as secret backend (EE) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: switch from AWS KMS to AWS Secrets Manager as secret backend Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add AWS Secrets Manager integration tests (requires LocalStack) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: mark AWS Secrets Manager as beta Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remove leftover KMS handler functions from api-settings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to include AWS Secrets Manager EE impl Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: use full commit hash in ee-repo-ref.txt Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * sqlx --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-06 15:17:15 +00:00
Ruben Fiszel	02d0ee9198	feat: add object storage usage view and manual log cleanup (#8724 )	2026-04-05 13:10:48 +00:00
Ruben Fiszel Claude Opus 4.6 windmill-internal-app[bot]	dcd615fdc3	feat: add Azure Key Vault as secret storage backend (#8704 ) * feat: add --main flag to write_latest_ee_ref.sh to point to latest EE main Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add Azure Key Vault as secret storage backend (EE) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref.txt to azure-key-vault-support branch Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add token auth, insecure TLS for emulator, and integration tests Adds optional `token` field to AzureKeyVaultSettings for direct Bearer auth (bypasses OAuth2), enables self-signed cert acceptance in token mode, and includes 4 integration tests against the Azure KV emulator. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref.txt Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: handle Azure KV soft-delete and emulator quirks - Purge soft-deleted secrets after delete to allow name reuse - Retry set_secret on 409 Conflict (purge stale soft-deleted secret) - Accept self-signed certs when using static token (emulator mode) - Work around emulator version-ordering bug in CRUD test Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref.txt Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 47b0d9d5d163efdab1e145ee012bdb2eb1373b78 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #511 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: d432d78bda151d611d8065162de7c1b7edce92e9 New ee-repo-ref: 47b0d9d5d163efdab1e145ee012bdb2eb1373b78 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * fix: accept token OR client_secret in Azure KV validation, add token UI field - isAzureKvConfigValid() now accepts either client_secret or token - Added token input field to the Azure KV config form for emulator/dev use Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-04-03 21:02:36 +00:00
Alexander Petric Claude Opus 4.6 windmill-internal-app[bot]Ruben Fiszel	9ceab730d7	feat: add DB health diagnostic dashboard for superadmins (#8574 ) * feat: add DB health diagnostic dashboard for superadmins Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Update SQLx metadata * fix: improve db health query performance Bound large_results scan to last N jobs (configurable via scan_limit query param, default 10K) instead of full-table pg_column_size sort. Replace N+1 datatable size queries with single batched pg_class lookup. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Update SQLx metadata Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * sqlx --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>	2026-03-28 09:32:10 +00:00
Alexander Petric Claude Opus 4.6 windmill-internal-app[bot]	935fb44c84	fix: GitHub Enterprise Server support for self-managed GitHub Apps (#8507 ) * fix: GitHub Enterprise Server (GHE) support for self-managed GitHub Apps - Fix GHE installation URL: use /github-apps/ path instead of /apps/ for non-github.com hosts - Fix double decodeURIComponent on OAuth state param (URLSearchParams already decodes) - Add client_id to self-managed GitHub App validation - Bump hub scripts to GHE-compatible versions (sync, test, init, clone) - Bump LATEST_GIT_SYNC_SCRIPT_PATH to hub/28176 - Rename "GitHub Enterprise App" → "GitHub App" in UI labels (it works for both) - Formatting fixes in GhesAppSettings.svelte and gh_success page EE ref: windmill-labs/windmill-ee-private@09c9ed1 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Update SQLx metadata * fix: handle GHE Cloud (.ghe.com) app installation URL path GHE Cloud uses /apps/ like github.com, not /github-apps/ like self-hosted GHES. Docs: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/apps/using-github-apps/installing-a-github-app-from-a-third-party Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> fix: handle GHE Cloud (.ghe.com) installation URL and update ee-repo-ref GHE Cloud uses /apps/ like github.com, not /github-apps/ like self-hosted GHES. Docs: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/apps/using-github-apps/installing-a-github-app-from-a-third-party Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> fix: update hubPaths to deprecate 28176 and use 28180 as latest sync script Aligns with main's LATEST_GIT_SYNC_SCRIPT_PATH bump in PR #8532. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 6bb0ff0 (includes GHE fixes) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-03-26 06:26:57 +00:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 4.6	9b3e558d84	feat: add instance setting to enforce workspace prefix for HTTP routes (#8528 ) * feat: add instance-level setting to enforce workspace prefix for HTTP routes Add `http_route_workspaced_route` instance setting that forces all HTTP routes to use workspace prefix (`/api/r/{workspace_id}/{route}`), mirroring the existing `app_workspaced_route` setting for apps. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: bump http trigger version on setting change to invalidate route cache The route cache is version-based, not TTL-based. Without bumping the version sequence when the instance setting changes, cached routes would continue serving with the old prefix behavior until a route is created/updated/deleted or the server restarts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: immediately refresh HTTP routers on setting change The route cache polls every 60 seconds, but bumping the version sequence only makes the next poll pick up changes. Explicitly call refresh_routers after the setting reload so routes are rebuilt immediately. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-03-25 21:54:36 +00:00
centdixandClaude Opus 4.6	db5e03610d	feat: add instance-level AI settings (#8453 ) * feat: add instance-level AI settings with workspace fallback Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add AI step to onboarding setup wizard Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: thread workspace prop through resource editor and disable chat offset Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Revert "fix: thread workspace prop through resource editor and disable chat offset" This reverts commit 9fea9cc0c239f6432d1fef1487c45e74ab752e21. * fix: set workspace store and disable chat offset during AI setup step Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: thread workspace and disableChatOffset props through resource editors Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: populate workspace and user stores for AI step path component Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: initialize AI clients for test key during onboarding Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: extract AI config state into InstanceAISettings component Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: move AI config state ownership into AISettings component Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Persist instance AI settings before navigation * Reload effective workspace AI state after save * Scope AI key tests to the rendered workspace * Add post-create AI onboarding for new workspaces * Unify instance AI settings header * Fix instance AI drawer offset on workspace selection * Add instance AI fallback settings behavior * Update sqlx metadata * Update sqlx metadata * Clarify active instance AI in workspace settings * Refresh workspace AI state after instance AI save * Declare instance AI summary in API schema * Normalize empty instance AI config handling * Clean up workspace AI settings UI * Unify AI config provider checks * Split AI settings metadata from effective config * Propagate instance AI cache invalidation across servers * Fix AI settings dirty state tracking * Update sqlx metadata --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-03-24 19:18:36 +00:00
hugocasa Claude Opus 4.6 Ruben Fiszel	7d9fb57368	feat: DB-backed instance events webhook with superadmin UI (#8402 ) * feat: make instance events webhook URL configurable via superadmin UI The instance events webhook was previously only configurable via the INSTANCE_EVENTS_WEBHOOK env var, requiring a restart to change. This adds a DB-backed global setting with a UI in superadmin settings under Monitoring > Webhooks, while keeping the env var as an override. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address PR review - prometheus timer bug and cleaner cache init - Bind prometheus timer to `let timer` and call `stop_and_record()` after the POST (was silently discarded before) - Use `Option<Instant>` with `map_or` instead of `checked_sub` trick for clearer "not yet read" semantics Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: remove env var mention from webhook setting description Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: list all instance events explicitly in webhook description Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: restore send_instance_event guard with AtomicBool for DB setting Use a shared Arc<AtomicBool> between send_instance_event and the event loop so we skip channel sends when no webhook is configured (env or DB). Starts optimistic (true) so the first event triggers a DB read, then the loop updates it after each cache refresh. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: use static AtomicBool + notify handler for webhook guard Replace the Arc<AtomicBool> instance field with a global static INSTANCE_EVENTS_WEBHOOK_DB_ENABLED, updated by the notify_global_setting_change handler in main.rs. This follows the established pattern (like REQUIRE_PREEXISTING_USER_FOR_OAUTH) and avoids the deadlock where the bool could never flip back to true. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: single Arc<RwLock<Option<String>>> for instance webhook URL Replace the separate INSTANCE_EVENTS_WEBHOOK env var lazy_static and INSTANCE_EVENTS_WEBHOOK_DB_ENABLED AtomicBool with a single shared variable. Initialized from env var, then the reload function overwrites from DB (falls back to env var when DB has no value). Follows the same pattern as SCIM_TOKEN and other settings. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>	2026-03-17 15:26:04 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6	73fe45b6cb	feat: workspace-specific registry overrides (#8406 ) * feat: add workspace-specific registry overrides Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: move workspace registries to end of registries tab Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: workspace overrides use field selector instead of showing all fields Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: polish workspace registries UI to match design guidelines Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: show field selector directly and fix addField initialization logic Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: namespace pip_resolution_cache by workspace when registry overrides exist Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: namespace binary/bundle caches by workspace when registry overrides exist Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf: zero-cost cache suffix when no workspace overrides exist Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: reload workspace_registries via notify events on setting change Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address PR review findings - Fix discardCategory not reverting workspace_registries changes - Fix get_no_default: convert to async fn with owned Uuid param - Fix append_logs: use windmill_queue import already available - Fix ruby URL parsing: support both comma and whitespace delimiters - Add WorkspaceRegistryMap type alias to reduce inline type noise Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * all --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-03-17 12:49:25 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 4.6	372023e995	feat: add ws_base_url instance setting for WebSocket URL override (#8405 ) * feat: add ws_base_url instance setting to override WebSocket base URL Allow deployments behind reverse proxies to route WebSocket traffic (LSP, debugger, multiplayer) to a different host/port than the main frontend via a new instance setting. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: move ws_base_url to Advanced section with toggle and connectivity test - Move setting from Core to Advanced > WebSocket section - Render as toggle "Custom websocket base url from frontend to multiplayer/lsp/debugger" with conditional URL text field - Add Test connectivity button (always visible) that checks HTTP health and WebSocket ping for all three services (LSP, Multiplayer, Debugger) - Add /ws/ping and /ws/health endpoints to LSP service - Add /ws_mp/health HTTP and __ping__ WS handlers to multiplayer service - Add /ping WS handler to debugger service - Add CORS headers to health endpoints for cross-origin testing Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: toggle enabled check and testWs promise resolution - Fix enabled derived to check only for null (not empty string), otherwise the toggle never turns on since toggleEnabled sets '' - Fix testWs onclose handler to resolve(false) so the promise doesn't hang if the server closes without sending a message Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: make connectivity test work with existing services - HTTP test: accept plain text "ok"/"okay" (old services) in addition to JSON {"status": "ok"} (new services), reject HTML (SPA fallback) - WS test: resolve on onopen (connection established) instead of waiting for a specific pong message, so the test works even with services that don't have the new /ping handler yet Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-03-17 12:48:59 +00:00

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