Files
windmill/.github/workflows/check-write-access.yml
Ruben Fiszel 141ed7bae0 never let check-write-access fail the review chain (#10505)
check-write-access is additive by design: every caller ORs its `authorized`
output with `github.event.comment.author_association`, so a failure should
degrade to the author_association path, not block anything.

It does not. `claude`, `codex` and `pi` all `needs: [parse, check-access, plan]`,
so a failed check-access skips `plan` and with it all three reviewers. Any
disruption to the app credentials — an unset `INTERNAL_APP_ID`, a rotated
`INTERNAL_APP_KEY`, the app uninstalled from the org — turns a redundant
authorization probe into a total /review outage.

Guard the token minting and fall back to the default token, which still resolves
public members and repo collaborators; private members fall through to
author_association exactly as they did before this workflow existed.

Found while porting these workflows to windmill-helm-charts
(windmill-labs/windmill-helm-charts#656), where the app credentials are not
guaranteed to be present.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 11:38:51 +00:00

75 lines
3.1 KiB
YAML

name: Check Write Access
# Authorizes a user to trigger privileged command workflows (/review, /ai, /plan,
# /updatesqlx, ...). The webhook author_association reports PRIVATE org members as
# CONTRIBUTOR/NONE (only public members show as MEMBER), so command jobs can't gate on
# it alone. This mints the internal GitHub App token — which can see private members —
# and confirms the user is a member or has write access to the repo. The app token is
# minted fresh per run, so unlike the old ORG_ACCESS_TOKEN PAT it never expires.
on:
workflow_call:
inputs:
username:
required: true
type: string
description: 'The user whose access to verify'
trusted_bot:
required: false
type: string
default: 'windmill-internal-app[bot]'
description: 'A bot login that is always authorized'
outputs:
authorized:
description: 'true if the user is the trusted bot, an org member, or has repo write access'
value: ${{ jobs.check.outputs.authorized }}
jobs:
check:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
outputs:
authorized: ${{ steps.check.outputs.authorized }}
steps:
# This check is purely additive: callers OR it with author_association, so it must
# never fail the job. Failing here would block every dependent reviewer job through
# `needs`, turning an unconfigured or misconfigured app into a total review outage
# rather than a fallback to the author_association path.
- name: Mint internal app token
id: app
if: vars.INTERNAL_APP_ID != ''
continue-on-error: true
uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v2
with:
app-id: ${{ vars.INTERNAL_APP_ID }}
private-key: ${{ secrets.INTERNAL_APP_KEY }}
owner: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
- name: Resolve authorization
id: check
env:
# Without the app token, the default token still resolves public members and
# repo collaborators; private members simply fall through to author_association.
GH_TOKEN: ${{ steps.app.outputs.token || github.token }}
USERNAME: ${{ inputs.username }}
TRUSTED_BOT: ${{ inputs.trusted_bot }}
REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
run: |
if [ "$USERNAME" = "$TRUSTED_BOT" ]; then
echo "authorized=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
ORG="${REPO%%/*}"
# Org membership resolves private members too (204 = member, 404 = not).
if gh api "orgs/$ORG/members/$USERNAME" --silent 2>/dev/null; then
echo "authorized=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
# Fallback: effective repo permission (also covers outside collaborators).
PERM=$(gh api "repos/$REPO/collaborators/$USERNAME/permission" --jq '.permission' 2>/dev/null || echo none)
if [ "$PERM" = "admin" ] || [ "$PERM" = "write" ]; then
echo "authorized=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
else
echo "authorized=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "$USERNAME is neither the trusted bot, an org member, nor a repo writer."
fi