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5844c32ac5
`sign_s3_objects` minted a long-lived HMAC bearer signature for any S3 key handed to it, by any authenticated workspace member, with no check that the caller was allowed to read that key. Since `validate_s3_signature` only verifies the HMAC and expiry at fetch time, any member (operators included) could mint a transferable capability to read arbitrary S3 keys, bypassing the advanced S3 permission rules (`check_lfs_object_path_permissions`). Authorize the read at mint time: add an `ApiAuthed` extractor and, before signing each key, require the caller's own `S3Permission::READ` via `get_workspace_s3_resource_and_check_paths`. A caller can no longer sign a key they cannot themselves read. The fetch-side validators are left unchanged. The only legitimate caller is the wmill SDK invoked from an app-author job, whose token authenticates as the executing (author) identity — which can read the key — so authorized app display is unaffected. Adds an integration test proving an authorized caller can sign a readable key (and the signature validates end-to-end through the presigned fetch route) while an unauthorized caller is refused. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
125 lines
4.8 KiB
Rust
125 lines
4.8 KiB
Rust
//! Regression test for the `sign_s3_objects` permission bypass.
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//!
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//! Invariant: minting an S3 read signature (`apps/sign_s3_objects`) requires the
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//! CALLER to hold `S3Permission::READ` on the key. The signature is a transferable
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//! bearer capability (`validate_s3_signature` only checks HMAC + expiry), so a
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//! caller must not be able to sign a key they cannot themselves read — otherwise
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//! any workspace member could bypass the advanced S3 permission rules.
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//!
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//! Pinned against a FilesystemStorage LFS whose advanced permissions grant a
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//! non-admin READ on `allowed/*` but nothing on `secret/*`:
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//! - the non-admin CAN sign `allowed/*` (authorized), and the minted signature
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//! validates end-to-end through the presigned s3_proxy fetch route;
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//! - the non-admin CANNOT sign `secret/*` (bypass closed);
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//! Advanced S3 permissions are an enterprise feature, so this test requires the
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//! `enterprise` + `private` + `parquet` features.
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#![cfg(all(feature = "enterprise", feature = "private", feature = "parquet"))]
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use serde_json::json;
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use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres};
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use windmill_test_utils::*;
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fn client() -> reqwest::Client {
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reqwest::Client::new()
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}
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fn authed(builder: reqwest::RequestBuilder, token: &str) -> reqwest::RequestBuilder {
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builder.header("Authorization", format!("Bearer {}", token))
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}
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/// Configure the workspace LFS as a filesystem store rooted at `root_path`, with
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/// an advanced permission rule granting READ on `allowed/*` to everyone the glob
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/// matches (non-admins included). No rule covers `secret/*`, so it is denied.
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async fn configure_lfs(db: &Pool<Postgres>, root_path: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
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let lfs_config = json!({
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"type": "FilesystemStorage",
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"root_path": root_path,
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"public_resource": null,
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"advanced_permissions": [
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{ "pattern": "allowed/*", "allow": "read" }
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]
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});
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sqlx::query!(
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"UPDATE workspace_settings SET large_file_storage = $1 WHERE workspace_id = $2",
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lfs_config,
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"test-workspace"
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)
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.execute(db)
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.await?;
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Ok(())
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}
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#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))]
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async fn test_sign_s3_objects_enforces_read_authz(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
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initialize_tracing().await;
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let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
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let port = server.addr.port();
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let base = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace");
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let storage_dir = tempfile::tempdir()?;
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let storage_root = storage_dir.path().to_string_lossy().to_string();
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configure_lfs(&db, &storage_root).await?;
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// A real object so the signed fetch can stream bytes end-to-end.
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let allowed_dir = storage_dir.path().join("allowed");
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std::fs::create_dir_all(&allowed_dir)?;
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std::fs::write(allowed_dir.join("file.txt"), b"authorized payload")?;
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// ---- CORE REGRESSION: a non-admin (test-user-2) may NOT sign a key they have
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// no READ permission on. Before the fix this returned a valid signature.
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let resp = authed(
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client().post(format!("{base}/apps/sign_s3_objects")),
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"SECRET_TOKEN_2",
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)
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.json(&json!({ "s3_objects": [{ "s3": "secret/file.txt" }] }))
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.send()
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.await?;
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let status = resp.status();
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let body = resp.text().await?;
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assert!(
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!status.is_success(),
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"non-admin must NOT be able to sign a key they cannot read (bypass): {status} {body}"
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);
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// ---- NO OVER-BLOCKING: the same non-admin CAN sign a key their advanced
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// permissions allow them to read.
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let resp = authed(
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client().post(format!("{base}/apps/sign_s3_objects")),
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"SECRET_TOKEN_2",
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)
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.json(&json!({ "s3_objects": [{ "s3": "allowed/file.txt" }] }))
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.send()
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.await?;
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let status = resp.status();
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let signed: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await?;
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assert!(
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status.is_success(),
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"non-admin must be able to sign a key they can read: {status} {signed}"
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);
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let presigned = signed[0]["presigned"]
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.as_str()
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.expect("authorized sign must return a presigned string")
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.to_string();
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// ---- END-TO-END: the minted signature is accepted by the fetch-side gate.
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// Hit the presigned s3_proxy route (default storage) and confirm it
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// streams the object rather than rejecting the signature.
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let fetch_url = format!("{base}/s3_proxy/_default_/allowed/file.txt?{presigned}");
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let resp = client().get(&fetch_url).send().await?;
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let status = resp.status();
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let body = resp.bytes().await?;
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assert!(
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status.is_success(),
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"signed fetch of an authorized key must succeed end-to-end: {status} {:?}",
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String::from_utf8_lossy(&body)
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);
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assert_eq!(
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body.as_ref(),
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b"authorized payload",
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"signed fetch must stream the authorized object's bytes"
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);
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Ok(())
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}
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