hugocasa 01ddbff6f6 fix: cap devops role at workspace admin and reject reserved on_behalf_of identities ...

Extends the job-token cap with three pieces:

- `require_devops_role` takes `&ApiAuthed` and rejects job tokens.
  `is_devops_email` is true for superadmin emails, so every worker-management,
  instance-config and service-log route was reachable by the same superadmin
  `WM_TOKEN` that `require_super_admin` already rejects.
- A `job_id` claim that does not parse as a uuid rejects the token rather than
  resolving to `None`, which would clear the job provenance and uncap it. Applies
  to the internal JWT and the external `jwt_ext_` path.
- Defense in depth at store time: `validate_on_behalf_of` refuses the reserved
  internal sentinels as an `on_behalf_of` on apps/flows/scripts/schedules/triggers,
  and app execution refuses a policy carrying one — covering already-persisted and
  forked-app rows that predate the cap. Deploying on behalf of a real user,
  including a real superadmin, stays allowed; the cap handles that at execution.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-07-16 17:20:29 +02:00

..

src

fix: cap devops role at workspace admin and reject reserved on_behalf_of identities

2026-07-16 17:20:29 +02:00

Cargo.toml

refactor: extract 12 leaf crates from windmill-api (#7899)

2026-02-11 10:31:03 +00:00