mirror of
https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill.git
synced 2026-09-06 08:01:35 +00:00
* fix(security): a WM_TOKEN job token can never be a global superadmin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr)
Privilege escalation: an app/flow/schedule/trigger execution policy's `on_behalf_of`
(which a `wm_deployers` member can set) could point at a superadmin email. The
resulting job `WM_TOKEN` then passed the email-based superadmin checks, granting
instance superadmin. `forbid_superadmin_job_token` only guarded ~15 of ~75 routes.
Fix at the token layer: a WM_TOKEN must never satisfy a superadmin gate,
regardless of whose email it runs as (sentinel OR a real superadmin).
- `ApiAuthed` gains a `job_id` field, stamped once in `AuthCache::get_opt_job_authed`
from the resolved token's job_id (correct even on cache hits).
- `require_super_admin(db, email)` -> `require_super_admin(db, &ApiAuthed)`, rejects
`authed.job_id.is_some()`. `require_super_admin_email` kept for the few internal
callers without an ApiAuthed.
- `is_super_admin_authed(db, &ApiAuthed)` for the boolean `is_super_admin_email`
authorization branches on request handlers (workspace deletion, fork drops,
dev-workspace attach/archive, object-storage SSRF exemption, custom dbname, EE GHES
+ connected repositories, ...). Migrate ~75 sites (OSS + EE).
- CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB reads the *authenticated* job_id, not the caller-supplied
`?job_id` query param. Worker-tag check takes a precomputed job-aware `is_super_admin`
on the request path.
Execution-time on-behalf checks (scheduled/flow worker-tag, Cloud enqueue quota,
is_devops_email) are hardened in a follow-up — see
docs/followup-onbehalf-execution-privilege-hardening.md.
Regression tests: a superadmin-email WM_TOKEN is rejected on `require_super_admin`
routes, on `DELETE /workspaces/delete/{w}` (403, workspace preserved), and on the
CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB lookup with no `?job_id` (401); real superadmin tokens still succeed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap devops role at workspace admin and reject reserved on_behalf_of identities
Extends the job-token cap with three pieces:
- `require_devops_role` takes `&ApiAuthed` and rejects job tokens.
`is_devops_email` is true for superadmin emails, so every worker-management,
instance-config and service-log route was reachable by the same superadmin
`WM_TOKEN` that `require_super_admin` already rejects.
- A `job_id` claim that does not parse as a uuid rejects the token rather than
resolving to `None`, which would clear the job provenance and uncap it. Applies
to the internal JWT and the external `jwt_ext_` path.
- Defense in depth at store time: `validate_on_behalf_of` refuses the reserved
internal sentinels as an `on_behalf_of` on apps/flows/scripts/schedules/triggers,
and app execution refuses a policy carrying one — covering already-persisted and
forked-app rows that predate the cap. Deploying on behalf of a real user,
including a real superadmin, stays allowed; the cap handles that at execution.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): preserve job-token provenance when minting the proxy JWT
The MCP endpoint-tool proxy re-mints a JWT from the caller's ApiAuthed to
forward the proxied request, but passed job_id: None. A job's WM_TOKEN is
capped at workspace admin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr); dropping the job_id here
re-minted an uncapped token that satisfies require_super_admin /
require_devops_role on the proxied route (e.g. listWorkers exposing worker
IPs, job/workspace IDs, and sensitive tags).
Carry api_authed.job_id into create_jwt_token. Adds an in-module regression
that decodes the forwarded JWT and asserts the job_id is preserved for a job
caller and absent for a non-job caller.
Reported by Codex CI review (P1) on #10124.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the admin-or-devops gate at workspace admin for job tokens
require_admin_or_devops (the EE critical-alerts endpoints) grants when the
caller is a workspace admin OR an instance devops. is_devops_email is true
for superadmins, so a WM_TOKEN running on-behalf of a superadmin who is not a
member of the target workspace could clear the devops branch and read/ack that
workspace's critical alerts (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr). This gate takes a bare
email, not an ApiAuthed, so the token-layer cap could not see it.
Thread the caller's job-token provenance and reject the devops branch for job
tokens, matching require_devops_role. The workspace-admin branch stays allowed
— that is the cap ceiling. Adds an enterprise-gated regression proving the
bypass is closed and a real superadmin token still clears the gate.
Found while auditing the PR for bare-email gates the choke-point cap misses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap instance-global is_admin gates at workspace admin for job tokens
Three instance-global routes gate on the caller's own `is_admin` claim, which
`ApiAuthed.is_admin` carries into a WM_TOKEN (it is a workspace-admin claim,
true for superadmins too). A job token is capped at workspace admin
(GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr), so its is_admin claim must not authorize instance
actions on a route with no workspace binding:
- `unarchive_workspace` — unarchive an arbitrary workspace by id
- `prune_concurrency_group` — delete a global concurrency group
- `list_worker_groups` — return unobfuscated `env_vars_static` (may hold secrets)
Add job-token-aware `is_instance_admin` / `require_instance_admin` helpers (the
same shape as `require_super_admin` / `require_devops_role`) and use them at
these three sites. Workspace-scoped `require_admin(authed.is_admin, ...)` gates
are intentionally left unchanged — a workspace-admin job token is within the
cap there. Regression added covering all three; verified it lets a WM_TOKEN
unarchive/leak without the fix and is blocked with it.
Reported by Codex CI review (P1) on #10124.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): drop orphaned path_field_renames from EndpointTool test helper
The merge with main adopted main's mcp path-substitution refactor (#10162),
which removed the `path_field_renames` field from `EndpointTool` and its
consumer (`substitute_path_params` no longer takes per-field path renames).
main's `runner.rs` `ep` test helper still constructed the struct with
`path_field_renames: None`, so the workspace test build (cargo test --all,
which compiles windmill-mcp's own #[cfg(test)] module under the `server`
feature) failed with E0560. A plain `cargo check` does not compile that test
module, so it only surfaced in CI's cargo_test.
Remove the orphaned field to match the struct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: describe the sentinel-rejection policy the forged-identity test asserts
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: complete ApiAuthed initializers in feature-gated tests after merge
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: stop job tokens minting credentials that shed their provenance
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the MCP OAuth approval mint at the same elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap the self-service password reset at the elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: cap app embed/SDK mints and scope widening at the elevated-job-token gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep job tokens from destroying the account they run on behalf of
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: deny job tokens a foreign-workspace admin claim and workspace ejection
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: keep the follow-up inventory in the PR instead of the repo
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: make the session workspace status gate job-token aware
session_workspace_status derived its superadmin branch from a bare email
check, so a job token carrying a superadmin identity resolved the existence
of workspaces it has no relationship with rather than seeing them as
deleted. Switch to is_super_admin_authed, matching every other instance
gate reached from a request ApiAuthed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* revert: leave the global concurrency-group listing on the plain admin gate
The listing exposes concurrency keys across workspaces, which is metadata
rather than a capability, and it 401s rather than degrading. Keep the guard
on the prune route next to it, which is the destructive one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: keep the instance-admin gate on the global concurrency listing
The listing spans every workspace's concurrency keys, and the gate rejects
only job tokens: the !is_admin branch is the pre-existing check, so
workspaced tokens and interactive admins are unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to d30af67d38954f9012f7bad08da23e347344b4c6
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #664 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 7870573dbc3360f99bada143f094c67dce0d9e9c
New ee-repo-ref: d30af67d38954f9012f7bad08da23e347344b4c6
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: hugocasa <hugo@casademont.ch>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
383 lines
13 KiB
Rust
383 lines
13 KiB
Rust
/*
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* Author: Ruben Fiszel
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* Copyright: Windmill Labs, Inc 2022
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* This file and its contents are licensed under the AGPLv3 License.
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* Please see the included NOTICE for copyright information and
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* LICENSE-AGPL for a copy of the license.
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*/
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use axum::{
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extract::{Extension, Path, Query},
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routing::get,
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Json, Router,
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};
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
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use sqlx::FromRow;
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use uuid::Uuid;
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use windmill_common::{
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db::UserDB,
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error::JsonResult,
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jobs::{HIDE_WORKERS_FOR_NON_ADMINS, TAGS_ARE_SENSITIVE},
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utils::{paginate, Pagination},
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worker::{ALL_TAGS, CUSTOM_TAGS_PER_WORKSPACE, DEFAULT_TAGS, DEFAULT_TAGS_PER_WORKSPACE},
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workspaces::workspace_with_fork_ancestors,
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DB,
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};
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use windmill_api_auth::{require_devops_role, ApiAuthed};
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pub fn global_service() -> Router {
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Router::new()
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.route("/list", get(list_worker_pings))
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.route("/exists_workers_with_tags", get(exists_workers_with_tags))
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.route("/custom_tags", get(get_custom_tags))
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.route(
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"/is_default_tags_per_workspace",
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get(get_default_tags_per_workspace),
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)
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.route("/get_default_tags", get(get_default_tags))
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.route("/queue_metrics", get(get_queue_metrics))
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.route("/queue_counts", get(get_queue_counts))
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.route("/queue_running_counts", get(get_queue_running_counts))
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.route(
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"/workspace_fairness_events",
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get(get_workspace_fairness_events),
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)
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}
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pub fn workspaced_service() -> Router {
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Router::new().route("/custom_tags", get(get_custom_tags_for_workspace))
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}
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#[derive(FromRow, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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struct WorkerPing {
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worker: String,
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worker_instance: String,
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last_ping: Option<i32>,
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started_at: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>,
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ip: String,
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jobs_executed: i32,
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last_job_id: Option<Uuid>,
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last_job_workspace_id: Option<String>,
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custom_tags: Option<Vec<String>>,
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worker_group: String,
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wm_version: String,
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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occupancy_rate: Option<f32>,
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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occupancy_rate_15s: Option<f32>,
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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occupancy_rate_5m: Option<f32>,
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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occupancy_rate_30m: Option<f32>,
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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memory: Option<i64>,
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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vcpus: Option<i64>,
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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memory_usage: Option<i64>,
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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wm_memory_usage: Option<i64>,
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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job_isolation: Option<String>,
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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native_mode: Option<bool>,
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}
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// #[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
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// struct EnableWorkerQuery {
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// disable: bool,
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// }
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#[derive(Deserialize)]
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pub struct ListWorkerQuery {
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pub page: Option<usize>,
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pub per_page: Option<usize>,
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pub ping_since: Option<i32>,
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}
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async fn list_worker_pings(
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authed: ApiAuthed,
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Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
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Extension(user_db): Extension<UserDB>,
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Query(query): Query<ListWorkerQuery>,
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) -> JsonResult<Vec<WorkerPing>> {
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let has_devops_role = require_devops_role(&db, &authed).await.is_ok();
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if *HIDE_WORKERS_FOR_NON_ADMINS && !has_devops_role {
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return Ok(Json(vec![]));
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}
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let mut tx = user_db.begin(&authed).await?;
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let (per_page, offset) = paginate(Pagination { page: query.page, per_page: query.per_page });
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let rows = sqlx::query_as!(
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WorkerPing,
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"SELECT worker, worker_instance, EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM (now() - ping_at))::integer as last_ping, started_at, ip, jobs_executed,
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CASE WHEN $4 IS TRUE THEN current_job_id ELSE NULL END as last_job_id, CASE WHEN $4 IS TRUE THEN current_job_workspace_id ELSE NULL END as last_job_workspace_id,
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custom_tags, worker_group, wm_version, occupancy_rate, occupancy_rate_15s, occupancy_rate_5m, occupancy_rate_30m, memory, vcpus, memory_usage, wm_memory_usage, job_isolation, native_mode
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FROM worker_ping
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WHERE ($1::integer IS NULL AND ping_at > now() - interval '5 minute') OR (ping_at > now() - ($1 || ' seconds')::interval)
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ORDER BY ping_at desc LIMIT $2 OFFSET $3",
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query.ping_since,
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per_page as i64,
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offset as i64,
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has_devops_role
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)
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.fetch_all(&mut *tx)
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.await?;
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tx.commit().await?;
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let rows = if *TAGS_ARE_SENSITIVE && !has_devops_role {
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rows.into_iter()
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.map(|mut w| {
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w.custom_tags = None;
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w
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})
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.collect()
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} else {
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rows
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};
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Ok(Json(rows))
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}
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#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
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struct TagsQuery {
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tags: String,
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workspace: Option<String>,
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}
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async fn exists_workers_with_tags(
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authed: ApiAuthed,
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Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
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Extension(user_db): Extension<UserDB>,
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Query(tags_query): Query<TagsQuery>,
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) -> JsonResult<std::collections::HashMap<String, bool>> {
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// Create a list of requested tags
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let mut tags: Vec<String> = tags_query.tags.split(',').map(|s| s.to_string()).collect();
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// When TAGS_ARE_SENSITIVE is enabled, filter tags based on workspace visibility
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if *TAGS_ARE_SENSITIVE {
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let has_devops_role = require_devops_role(&db, &authed).await.is_ok();
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if !has_devops_role {
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if let Some(ref workspace) = tags_query.workspace {
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// This route is global, so the workspace is an unauthorized query param: check
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// membership before reading its lineage, which would otherwise disclose whether
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// an arbitrary workspace descends from one named by a `tag(parent*)` rule.
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let is_member = sqlx::query_scalar!(
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"SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM usr WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND email = $2 AND NOT disabled)",
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workspace,
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&authed.email
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)
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.fetch_one(&db)
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.await?
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.unwrap_or(false);
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if !is_member {
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return Ok(Json(std::collections::HashMap::new()));
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}
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// Filter to only tags visible in this workspace
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let chain = workspace_with_fork_ancestors(&db, workspace).await?;
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let custom_tags = CUSTOM_TAGS_PER_WORKSPACE.load();
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let allowed_tags = custom_tags.to_string_vec(Some(&chain));
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tags.retain(|t| allowed_tags.contains(t));
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} else {
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// No workspace provided and not superadmin - return empty
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return Ok(Json(std::collections::HashMap::new()));
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}
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}
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}
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if tags.is_empty() {
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return Ok(Json(std::collections::HashMap::new()));
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}
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let mut tx = user_db.begin(&authed).await?;
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let mut result = std::collections::HashMap::new();
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// Create a query that checks all tags at once using unnest
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let rows = sqlx::query!(
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"SELECT tag::text, EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM worker_ping WHERE custom_tags @> ARRAY[tag] AND ping_at > now() - interval '1 minute') as exists
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FROM unnest($1::text[]) as tag",
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tags.as_slice()
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)
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.fetch_all(&mut *tx)
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.await?;
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for row in rows {
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result.insert(row.tag.unwrap_or_default(), row.exists.unwrap_or(false));
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}
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tx.commit().await?;
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Ok(Json(result))
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}
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#[derive(Deserialize)]
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struct CustomTagQuery {
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show_workspace_restriction: Option<bool>,
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}
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async fn get_custom_tags(
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authed: ApiAuthed,
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Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
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Query(query): Query<CustomTagQuery>,
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) -> JsonResult<Vec<String>> {
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if query.show_workspace_restriction.is_some_and(|x| x) {
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let tags_o = CUSTOM_TAGS_PER_WORKSPACE.load();
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let all_tags = tags_o.to_string_vec(None);
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return Ok(Json(all_tags));
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}
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if *TAGS_ARE_SENSITIVE {
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let has_devops_role = require_devops_role(&db, &authed).await.is_ok();
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if !has_devops_role {
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return Ok(Json(vec![]));
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}
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}
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Ok(Json((**ALL_TAGS.load()).clone().into()))
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}
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async fn get_custom_tags_for_workspace(
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_authed: ApiAuthed,
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Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
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Path(w_id): Path<String>,
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) -> JsonResult<Vec<String>> {
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let chain = workspace_with_fork_ancestors(&db, &w_id).await?;
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let tags_o = CUSTOM_TAGS_PER_WORKSPACE.load();
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let all_tags = tags_o.to_string_vec(Some(&chain));
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Ok(Json(all_tags))
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}
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async fn get_default_tags_per_workspace() -> JsonResult<bool> {
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Ok(Json(
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DEFAULT_TAGS_PER_WORKSPACE.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed),
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))
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}
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async fn get_default_tags() -> JsonResult<Vec<String>> {
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Ok(Json(DEFAULT_TAGS.clone()))
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}
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#[derive(Serialize)]
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struct QueueMetric {
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id: String,
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values: Vec<serde_json::Value>,
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}
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async fn get_queue_metrics(
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authed: ApiAuthed,
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Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
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) -> JsonResult<Vec<QueueMetric>> {
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require_devops_role(&db, &authed).await?;
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let queue_metrics = sqlx::query_as!(
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QueueMetric,
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"WITH queue_metrics as (
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SELECT id, value, created_at
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FROM metrics
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WHERE id LIKE 'queue_%'
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AND created_at > now() - interval '14 day'
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)
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SELECT id, array_agg(json_build_object('value', value, 'created_at', created_at) ORDER BY created_at ASC) as \"values!\"
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FROM queue_metrics
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GROUP BY id
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ORDER BY id ASC"
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)
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.fetch_all(&db)
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.await?;
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Ok(Json(queue_metrics))
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}
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async fn get_queue_counts(
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authed: ApiAuthed,
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Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
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) -> JsonResult<std::collections::HashMap<String, u32>> {
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require_devops_role(&db, &authed).await?;
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let queue_counts = windmill_common::queue::get_queue_counts(&db).await;
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Ok(Json(queue_counts))
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}
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async fn get_queue_running_counts(
|
|
authed: ApiAuthed,
|
|
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
|
|
) -> JsonResult<std::collections::HashMap<String, u32>> {
|
|
require_devops_role(&db, &authed).await?;
|
|
let queue_running_counts = windmill_common::queue::get_queue_running_counts(&db).await;
|
|
Ok(Json(queue_running_counts))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[derive(Serialize)]
|
|
pub struct WorkspaceFairnessEvent {
|
|
pub timestamp: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>,
|
|
pub operation: String,
|
|
/// Affected workspace (stored in audit log `resource`). `None` only for very
|
|
/// old rows pre-dating the resource convention — UI should treat as "unknown".
|
|
pub workspace_id: Option<String>,
|
|
/// Snapshot of the relevant fairness settings at the time of the transition
|
|
/// (`max_percent`, `window_secs`, `total_overloaded`). `None` for uncap rows.
|
|
pub parameters: Option<serde_json::Value>,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Return the most recent ~200 cap and ~200 uncap transitions (merged into
|
|
/// at most 400 rows) written by `workspace_fairness::emit_transition_audit`.
|
|
/// Workspace fairness is an Enterprise feature; on non-EE / non-enabled
|
|
/// instances the table is naturally empty.
|
|
async fn get_workspace_fairness_events(
|
|
authed: ApiAuthed,
|
|
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
|
|
) -> JsonResult<Vec<WorkspaceFairnessEvent>> {
|
|
require_devops_role(&db, &authed).await?;
|
|
|
|
// No cloud-host gate — workspace fairness is an Enterprise feature
|
|
// available on any multi-tenant EE deployment. Non-EE / non-enabled
|
|
// instances will simply have no audit rows of these operation types,
|
|
// so the table is naturally empty.
|
|
//
|
|
// Return the most recent 200 cap **and** the most recent 200 uncap
|
|
// events separately, then merge — without this, a long stretch of caps
|
|
// can push every uncap off the unified `LIMIT 200` window and the UI
|
|
// appears to "never record uncaps". (The unified ordered limit was a
|
|
// real footgun in production audit drawers.)
|
|
let events = sqlx::query_as!(
|
|
WorkspaceFairnessEvent,
|
|
r#"
|
|
WITH capped AS (
|
|
SELECT timestamp, operation, resource, parameters
|
|
FROM audit_partitioned
|
|
WHERE workspace_id = 'admins'
|
|
AND operation = 'workspace_fairness.capped'
|
|
UNION ALL
|
|
SELECT timestamp, operation, resource, parameters
|
|
FROM audit
|
|
WHERE workspace_id = 'admins'
|
|
AND operation = 'workspace_fairness.capped'
|
|
ORDER BY timestamp DESC
|
|
LIMIT 200
|
|
), uncapped AS (
|
|
SELECT timestamp, operation, resource, parameters
|
|
FROM audit_partitioned
|
|
WHERE workspace_id = 'admins'
|
|
AND operation = 'workspace_fairness.uncapped'
|
|
UNION ALL
|
|
SELECT timestamp, operation, resource, parameters
|
|
FROM audit
|
|
WHERE workspace_id = 'admins'
|
|
AND operation = 'workspace_fairness.uncapped'
|
|
ORDER BY timestamp DESC
|
|
LIMIT 200
|
|
)
|
|
SELECT timestamp AS "timestamp!",
|
|
operation::text AS "operation!",
|
|
resource AS workspace_id,
|
|
parameters
|
|
FROM (SELECT * FROM capped UNION ALL SELECT * FROM uncapped) e
|
|
ORDER BY timestamp DESC
|
|
"#,
|
|
)
|
|
.fetch_all(&db)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
|
|
Ok(Json(events))
|
|
}
|