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* feat(sandbox): pull/extract images with crane instead of podman (+ add to image)
The sandboxed container runtime (`# sandbox <image>`) only ever pulls + flattens an
image (nsjail does the run), so a full container engine is overkill — and podman was
never actually in any Dockerfile, so the merged feature couldn't run in the shipped
image. Switch to crane (google/go-containerregistry): a single ~25MB static binary,
no daemon/store/root/privileged.
- docker_v2.rs: crane export -> flattened rootfs tar, crane config -> OCI config,
crane digest -> content-addressed rootfs+config cache (cross-job dedup + automatic
freshness), crane manifest -> pre-download size guard. DOCKER_CONFIG authfile dir.
Cache eviction prunes the rootfs-tar cache by mtime (LRU). Pull policy honored via a
ref->digest cache (missing/never reuse without a registry hit).
- Dockerfile + docker/DockerfileSlim{,Ee}: install the crane binary (Full/FullEe and
the EE image inherit it via FROM the base image).
- docs + UI text + instance-setting descriptions updated (download size is compressed;
cache is the rootfs-tar cache).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): address CI review — digest-pinned fetch, size cap on every job, eviction race
Codex P1s:
- Fetch by the resolved digest (name@digest), not the mutable tag, so content can't
diverge from the digest the cache is keyed under if a tag moves mid-fetch.
- Enforce the size cap on EVERY job via a cached {digest}.size sidecar (no registry call
on cache reuse), so lowering the limit rejects already-cached oversized images.
- Eviction race: hardlink the cache tar into the job dir before tar -xf (pins the inode
against concurrent eviction) and re-fetch if it was evicted first.
Claude P2s: atomic config sidecar (tmp+rename) + tolerate torn parse; soften the LRU
comment (mtime = creation order); sweep orphaned *.tmp.* and .size on eviction.
+digest_key/ref_key unit tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): P1 cross-fs cache staging (EXDEV), Dockerfile arch fail-fast
CI re-review (Claude + Codex P1): the eviction-race hardlink crosses filesystems in the
shipped deployments — the cache is its own volume (/tmp/windmill/cache) while the job dir
is on the container fs — so hard_link returns EXDEV (not NotFound) and every sandbox job
fails. Fall back to tokio::fs::copy on a non-NotFound link error; copy reads through the
source inode so it still survives a concurrent eviction.
Also: Dockerfiles fail fast with a clear error on an unsupported arch instead of building
a 404 crane URL; ref->digest file written via tmp+rename (no torn read under missing/never).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(sandbox): say 'oldest by creation time' not 'LRU' for cache eviction
Codex P2: the code evicts by tar creation time (cache hits don't touch mtime), so the
user-facing docs + instance-setting text shouldn't claim true LRU.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
5.6 KiB
5.6 KiB
Sandboxed container runtime (daemonless docker)
Windmill bash scripts can run a container image. There are two runtimes:
legacy # docker |
sandboxed # sandbox <image> |
|
|---|---|---|
| selected by | bare # docker |
# sandbox <image> |
| runtime | dind / Docker daemon (bollard, dind feature) |
daemonless: extract rootfs + nsjail-run |
| boundary | separate (daemon outside the jail) | the job's own nsjail sandbox |
| nsjail | not provided (trusted-tenant) | required — this is the sandbox |
| safety | trusted-tenant | sandboxed (untrusted-capable) |
| compat | full docker run/-d/API |
run-a-command subset |
The three bash annotations are distinct and don't overload each other:
# docker→ legacy daemon docker (unchanged).# sandbox→ run the bash script under nsjail.# sandbox <image>→ run that image's command under nsjail (this runtime).
Using it
Put the image ref on a # sandbox annotation line; the rest of the script runs
inside that image:
# sandbox python:3.12-slim
name="$1" # windmill args bind positionally, like any bash script
python3 -c "import sys; print('hello', sys.argv[1])" "$name"
- The body runs via the image's
/bin/sh -c(so the image needs a shell). - An empty body runs the image's
ENTRYPOINT+CMD. - Windmill args (declared
x="$1", …) are appended to the command. - The image's
Env,WorkingDirare applied; the windmill reserved variables (WM_TOKEN,BASE_INTERNAL_URL, …) are injected sowmill/API calls work.
How it works
- Pull/extract (
crane, no daemon/store/root):crane export <image>streams the image's flattened root filesystem to a tar (layers + whiteouts applied, likedocker export) andcrane configreads its OCI config. The tar + config are cached content-addressed by digest (crane digest) so unchanged digests reuse the cache;tar -xmaterializes the per-job{job_dir}/rootfs. crane is a single ~25 MB static binary — we never run the image with it (nsjail does), so a full container engine like podman isn't needed. - Run (the job's nsjail sandbox): nsjail binds each top-level entry of the
rootfs in place (binding the whole rootfs at
/trips nsjail's read-only remount of its base root in a rootless userns), mounts the standard pseudo-filesystems (/procfrom the jail's pid namespace, a tmpfs/tmp,/devnodes), maps uid/gid 0 inside → the worker user outside, and runs the command. The container is the jail.
# sandbox <image> ─▶ crane export → digest-keyed rootfs cache → tar -x → {job_dir}/rootfs ─▶ nsjail (chroot rootfs)
crane config (OCI config) ───────────────────────────────────────────▶ Env / Cmd / WorkingDir
Because the run is just the job's own nsjail with the image's filesystem as root, the container inherits exactly the job's confinement:
- Filesystem: only the rootfs + the job's mounts are visible — no host
/, no other job dirs, no dep cache. There is nothing to bind-mount escape to. - /proc: the jail's own pid namespace — the worker and other jobs aren't visible.
- uid: a single-uid jail — an escape lands as the unprivileged worker user.
- network: the job's network (same as any bash job).
Image storage, freshness & limits
- Where pulls live: a content-addressed cache of flattened rootfs tars (+ OCI
config sidecars) keyed by image digest, under
{ROOT_CACHE_DIR}/sandbox_rootfs(persistent, dedups pulls across jobs). The per-job extracted rootfs lives in{job_dir}/rootfsand is removed with the job. - Freshness (
SANDBOX_IMAGE_PULL_POLICY, defaultnewer): the cache is keyed by digest, so a moving tag whose digest changed re-pulls automatically.newer(default) /alwaysre-resolve the digest each job (one cheapcrane digestmanifest fetch);missingreuses a cached digest for the ref without hitting the registry;neveronly uses the cache (errors if absent). Pinning a digest (img@sha256:…) is immutable and never stale. - Per-image size cap (
SANDBOX_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE_MB, default 0 = off): images whose compressed download size (crane manifest) exceeds the cap are rejected before any layer is downloaded. - Cache size cap (
SANDBOX_IMAGE_CACHE_MAX_MB, default 0 = off): best-effort eviction — after a run, the oldest cached rootfs tars (by creation time) are removed until the cache is back under the cap.
Requirements
craneandtaron the worker for image pull/extract (a single static binary — no daemon, root, or privileged).nsjailon the worker — required. If nsjail is absent, a# sandbox <image>job errors clearly (use a bare# docker+ a daemon instead).
Limitations (by design — daemonless, run-to-completion)
- No
docker run -d+ laterexec/attach/logs -f, nodocker build,compose, swarm, healthchecks. - No arbitrary
-vhost bind mounts,--privileged,--cap-add,--device, host namespace sharing. - Images that drop to a non-root uid or chown to arbitrary uids inside need a
subuid range in the jail (single-uid only today — follow-up:
newuidmaprange mapping). - The script result is a completion message; capture output via stdout/logs.
Follow-ups
- Subuid-range nsjail variant for multi-uid images.
- Per-container isolated networking (slirp/pasta).
- Support under the non-nsjail
unshareisolation mode.